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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to place in historical perspective 
the Allied (mainly British) occupation of key areas in southern 
French Indochina in 19U5-19U6. This occupation was of profound 
importance in the subsequent course of history in Vietnam. Although 
this work is concerned primarily with events in Indochina in 19U5 
and 19^6, earlier material is introduced in order to place these events 
in historical context.
The relevant research spanned three continents, and was conducted 
in Saigon, Prance, Great Britain and the United States. Sources 
include newly-released archival material in the Public Record Office, 
London, and official' and unofficial published material in the British 
Library, In^erial War Museum and the French Army’s Historical Service 
in Paris. Personal interviews were also conducted with key contemporary 
British, French and Vietnamese military and civil officials. Of vital 
importance were the personal papers of the British Force Commander in 
Saigon, the late General Sir Douglas Gracey. These papers have never 
previously been examined, and they shed a great deal of light on events 
in Saigon in 19U5-19U6; they also refute much of what has been written 
on this period by various historians.
It will be seen that divergent Allied policy, especially the 
narrow US "anticolonial" views which compelled America actively to 
support the Communists in Vietnam, were of fundamental importance to 
the formation and ultimate victory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
It should also be apparent that the British Commander in Vietnam, General 
Gracey, who has consistently been inaccurately portrayed as a politically 
ignorant throwback to a simpler colonial past, was in fact a shrewd 
and farsighted officer of considerable ability who was fully attuned to 
the shifting tide of historical forces. It would not seem unreasonable 
to suggest that, in some measure, Douglas Gracey was directly responsible 
for South Vietnam enjoying three decades of freedom from Communist rule.
This thesis is perforce based on predominantly British source 
material. This is because the occupation was primarily a British 
operation, and not to have observed this constraint would have resulted 
in a study of encyclopedic proportions.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND - THE COMMUNISTS AND THE VIET MINH
The struggle of the world bourgeoisie 
against the Soviet Russian Republic, 
around which are inevitably grouping, 
on the one hand, the movement for 
Soviets among the advanced workers of 
all countries, and, on the other, all 
the national liberation movements in 
the colonies and among the oppressed 
nationalities, whom bitter experience 
is teaching that there can be no 
salvation for them except in the victory 
of the Soviet system over world imperialism.
Lenin
While the primary focus of this study is on the postwar Allied 
occupation of Saigon, it is necessary to place the Viet Minh in 
context as one of the major contenders for power during this crucial 
period. And since the Viet Minh was a classic example of a Communist 
umbrella organization, the supreme role played by Indochina's first 
Communist, Ho Chi Minh, must be examined.
Ho Chi Minh was most widely known as Nguyen Ai Quoc until 19^0i 
19^1 or 19^3 (opinions differ on this). For simplicity he shall be 
referred to as Ho Chi Minh throughout this paper.
A good many authorities agree that the final challenge to France 
in Indochina began, ironically, in France just after World War One.
The young Ho Chi Minh was there in the course of extensive travels 
which are well documented elsewhere. He had left Indochina in 1911 
at the age of 21, and was not to return for 30 years.
In 1920, after Lenin had published his "Theses on the National 
and Colonial Questions" at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Ho 
was in Paris. A friend gave him a copy of Lenin's Theses, in which he 
hoped to find the answer to his question as to which International 
(the Second or Lenin's Third) sided with the peoples of colonial 
countries. When Ho had earlier raised the question at a meeting, he 
was told that it was the Third, and given the Theses.
He read and reread the paper, making sure that he clearly under­
stood every line of it. Then, to use his own words:
" What emotion, enthusiasm, clear-sightedness, 
and confidence it instilled in me! I was 
overjoyed to tears. Though sitting alone in 
my room, I shouted aloud as if addressing large 
crowds: 'Dead martyrs, compatriots! this is 
what we need, this is the path to liberation! '
After then, I had entire confidence in Lenin, 
in the Third International"2
Here was the fountainhead of this inspiration, the source which
became a trickle, then a torrent which washed-the French and then the
Americans out of Southeast Asia. The Theses addressed 15 groups of
peoples, from the Polish-Jewish problem to Ireland and the Negroes in
America. One of the 15 groupings was less specific, a sort of catch-
3bag labelled "Colonies", in which fell places like Indochina.
Lenin warned that the Western bourgeoisie was perpetuating 
inequality and class differences by "pretending that all men sire 
absolutely equal." The Communist Party must base its national policy
on solid principles based on local (economic) situations. The
revolutions would overthrow the landowners and holders of wealth,
and fifty years later much of that plan has been fulfilled. Lenin's
words are still valid:
"... all events in world politics are inevitably 
revolving around one central point, viz.. 
the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against 
the Soviet Russian Republic, around which are 
inevitably grouping, on the one hand, the 
movement for Soviets among the advanced workers 
of all countries, and, on the other, all the 
national liberation movements in the colonies 
and among the oppressed nationalities, whom 
bitter experience is teaching that there can be 
no salvation for them except in the victory of 
the Soviet system over world imperialism." ^
Only the Soviet system could grant real equality to nations, and
it was "necessary that all Communist Parties render direct aid to the
revolutionary movements among the dependent and subject nations (for
example, in Ireland, among the Negroes of America, etc.) and in the 
5colonies." This last statement was of prime importance; the Communist 
Parties must assist the revolutionary movements. It set the Third 
International apart from the Second.
What most impressed the young H6 Chi Minh were the comments 
directed specifically "to the more backward states and nations, in which 
feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate." 
There were six main points. First, all Communist Parties must involve 
themselves in the liberation movements, which must be led by workers, 
not peasants. Second and third, to combat the clergy and Pan-Islamism. 
Fourth, to support peasant against landlord, to lend the peasant move­
ment "the most revolutionary character" and to set up "Working People's 
Soviets". Fifth, to enter alliances with anybody, provided the Party 
kept its own distinct character. Sixth, to remind the toilers that 
independent states created by the imperialists were really anything but 
that, being tied to their creators by economic or military bonds. There 
was "no salvation for dependent and weak nations except - in a union of 
Soviet republics". Lenin went on to recall how Socialists had behaved 
during the Great War of 19*1 ^ -1918.
In the "Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial 
Questions^' 26 July 1920, Lenin particularly stressed the distinction 
between oppressed and oppressor nations. The emphasis was on the idea
that the world was divided into two camps, a small group of imperialist 
countries being ranged against the Soviet system headed by Russia.
Lenin wrote with unambiguous clarity: "If we let this escape us, we 
shall not be able correctly to pose a single national or colonial
6
question, even if it concerns a most remote corner of the world*"
Since peasants make up most of the population in backward countries, 
the peasants must be won over. But they would not be allowed to lead 
the revolution —  only the workers could do that. And, importantly, it 
would be possible for backward countries to pass straight over to the 
Soviet system without going to the capitalist stage. This was an early 
unilateral twisting of Marxist theory, for even at that early stage, its 
flaws were readily apparent. Such, very briefly, was the teaching which
s 'f'
so profoundly affected HO Chi Minh.
\
It was thus patriotism which brought Ho to Lenin; after that it
v
was a Messiah-disciple relationship. To Hb, only Lenin had the answers
to the problems of the oppressed, and Lenin's program would provide the
\
vehicle by which HO's goals would be realized. At the 18th Congress of 
the French Socialist Party, held in Tours in December, 1920, Ho aligned 
himself with the Marxists and voted to join the Third International.
He thus became not only a founder member of the French Communist Party,
but the first Vietnamese Communist.
\
In 1925 H8 went to Moscow, where he became deeply and totally
wedded to the Party, learning Bolshevik theory, history, agitation,
organization, self-criticism, dialectics and tactics at the Eastern
Worker's University. In return he wrote for Pravda and handled the
7Comintern's international correspondence. Ho, recognized as a bright
and industrious young man, became head of the Southern Section of the
Eastern Department of the Comintern.
In early 1923, also, the Sun-Joffe agreement brought Kuomintang-
Soviet cooperation. Sun Yat-sen had turned in vain to the West for help
8
in his struggle against the Peking government. Sun permitted communists 
to join his revolutionary movement as. individuals, but not as an 
organized party.
The early Comintern Congresses had paid scant attention to the 
problems of peasants in Far Eastern colonial countries, being exercised 
almost exclusively by the industrialized capitalist countries, but the 
unrest in China appeared to Russia to offer scope for profitable inter­
vention.
Lenin, the communist Messiah, died in 192*S and within half 
a century his disciples would have brought over half the world under
Communism, In December of that year H8 was sent to China in his
9
first major assignment as a Comintern agent. He was officially 
designated as interpreter to Mikhael Borodin, Comintern adviser to 
Chiang Kai-Shek; his real mission was to organize Southeast Asia 
movements which would be directed by Moscow, There were scattered 
and splintered revolutionary groups in existence, and they provided 
Ho with ready recruits as he began his task of building Communism in 
Southeast Asia,
The memorable achievement of this period in South_ China was the
formation of the Vi<at Nam Thanh Ni§n Cach Mans Dong Chi Hffi (Vietnam
Association of Young Revolutionaries), or Thanh Nien, which eventually
became the Indochina Communist Party.
The most promising new Party members were sent to the famous
Whampoa Military Academy, from which graduated such people as Chou En-lai
and Pham Van D&ng. Ho lectured on politics at this institution-
According to Fall, Ho established 200 cadres between January 1925 and
10
July 1927’, these were infiltrated back to Indochina. Those who 
pursued their own nationalistic courses, rather than the Communist line, 
were betrayed by the Communists, to the French security forces. The
V  /
money received from the French for these tips was used by Ho Chi Minh
11
to build up his own units.
v
In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists and H8 was obliged to
leave China. His mysterious and varied travels, and his arrest in 1931
in Hong Kong by the British, have been the subject of considerable
interest. It is worth emphasizing here that in this early period his
talent for survival and his unmatched sense of opportunism are amply
illustrated. In 1925 he betrayed Vietnam's greatest contemporary patriot
Phan B6i Ch8u, to the French for 100,000 piasters, a sum whose magnitude
can be appreciated when it is understood that 5 piasters would have
12bought a water buffalo.
There were other groups competing for power during this period.
/ ry
The VNQDD, or Vi£t Nam Qu8c D&n Dang (Vietnam Nationalist Party) was
probably the first and best known of these modern nationalist movements.
Nguyen Thai Hoc was the force behind the new party, which was based
13roughly on the Kuomintang in China. The ever-essential publishing 
house was set up in Hanoi, and this provided cover for an internal
clandestine group. Hokng Vdn Chi stated that, early in 19291 the
group had already grown to some 1500 members, organized in 120 
1 ^
cells. However, the murder of a French labor recruiter named Bazin 
provoked swift response from the French security forces. The murderer
was never found, but when the Surety commenced systematically to
'X (apprehend the group's more important members, Nguyen Thai Hoc ordered 
an armed uprising (planned for a later date) to commence immediately 
while the VNQDD still possessed the capacity to implement it.
But confused orders for executing the rising resulted in only 
one garrison revolting, the famous Yen Bay Mutiny of 10 February 1930» 
French reaction was predictable and what was left of the VNQDD leader­
ship was beheaded or fled to China. They tried to come back in 19^5» 
but were liquidated by the Communists.
While the VNQDD was scattered after Y£n Bay, the Thanh Ni£n had 
built up a solid core of workers. However, there were now two other 
Communist organizations competing for recognition, the "Indochinese 
Communist Party" and the "Indochinese Communist League". But although 
these parties were in competition their messages were similar and 
falling on receptive ears. In the late twenties, factory workers, 
miners and plantation workers were being organized by the thousands 
into Red Unions, and strikes were carried out throughout Annam and 
Tonkin primarily. Each nation without exception has its share of 
citizens who for their own reasons promote an alien and often hostile 
philosophy, and France was no exception, for French Communist agents 
played important parts in organizing the early Communist movement in the 
Far East.
In 1929 the Thanh Ni8n became the Annamese Communist Party; the
Tonkin branch of the Thanh Nien had coalesced into the Indochinese 
15Communist Party. Each of the three Communist Parties claimed recognition 
by the Comintern, which understandably would not tolerate this frag­
mentation and overlapping for long.
In 1929 Ho Chi Minh was in Siam, subverting the 30»000 or so 
Vietnamese emigres there. In early 1930 the Comintern ordered him to 
Hong Kong, where he was to make one party out of the three. In February 
1930 he imposed the Comintern will on the unification meeting, and the 
result was the single Viet Nam Communist Party. When the documents were 
sent to Moscow for examination and verification, the Party was directed,
through the Southern Bureau in Shanghai, to rename itself the Indochinese
16
Communist Party to embrace all Indochina and not just Vietnam.
The new, unified Party (with a total of 211 Communists) was
admitted to the Comintern in April, 1931-
Although this high-level direction from Moscow was gratifying,
central Party interest was not exactly transfixed on Indochina,
which was thought to be politically in the stone age ("politically 
17
inert"). The Vietnamese, of course, were anything but that.
The depression years brought the Party's first major test —  
the well-known Ngh&-Tinh soviets and what is generally called the 
Red Terror of 1930* The Sixth Comintern Congress had concluded that 
this capitalist crisis was a good time to rise, but that decisions 
would have to be taken locally. Thus, along with widespread strike 
activity, Communist .cadres organized the peasants of Ngh& An and 
H&-Tinh to take land from the landlords (the "Land to the Tiller" 
slogan). A good deal of secondary source material, often based on 
questionable documentation, has established this scenario.
These self-run mini-communes were called "xo-viet" (soviets),i 1
and some lasted for over a year before the French security forces,
stretched and busy elsewhere, were able to deal with them. For while
these xo-viets were easily created, Party histories record that no
means of self-defence were simultaneously formed. Peasant associations
were set up under the hammer and sickle, guided by local cadres, and
richer peasants were executed."1^
The Communists were joined at first by more moderate elements who
saw an opportunity to hit the French, but the Communists preferred to
operate alone at this time. The alliances came later, when the Party
were wiser. On 12 September, 1930, thousands of peasants were mobilized
to march on the provincial capital at Vinh. They were repulsed by a
small detachment of less than a hundred troops (a dozen Frenchmen and
1977 Vietnamese tirailleurs), and over 170 Vietnamese were killed by 
the troops and a couple of aircraft.
The Surety picked off the leadership, and when the Foreign Legion 
was brought in they exacted a hideous and often sadistic revenge, known 
as the 'white Terror of 1931- The Communists fled, leaving the poor 
peasants to bear the brunt of the retaliation in the area. It is 
estimated that 90 per cent of the ICP was destroyed in the French reaction. 
According to the Party, the Comintern did not appreciate this effort and 
admonished the ICP for the poor planning and results which had cost them 
so dearly. But the experience of the soviets was regarded by the Party
as a trial run for the August Revolution of 19^5- As the Party's
own historians put it, speaking of the Nghe-Tinh soviets:
It affirmed the leading role of the Indochinese 
Communist Party towards the Vietnamese Revolution.
Indeed though new-born, our Party was clearly 
fully able to launch a broad mass movement, and 
especially succeeded in mobilizing and heading 
the peasant masses... During and after the Nghe- 
Tinh Soviet movement, although it suffered heavy 
losses, our Party was steeled and tempered in the 
fire of revolutionary struggle and accumulated 
experiences in seizing revolutionary power for 
the people. 20
Anyway, new cadres were being trained at the Stalin school in Moscow,
the University of the Toilers of the East. The training lasted from
\ ^
one to three years, and men like Tran Van Giau were soon to be 
introduced to Indochina (in his case to Cochinchina).
While the Party was recovering, the Trotskyists were building up,
primarily in the South. Ironically, as with the Marxist-Communists
who were exposed to the new doctrines in France during the First World
War, the Trotskyists were motivated early in 1932 by Tha Thu Thau, a
university man who had recently returned from France. Although small
Trotskyist groups had appeared a few months earlier, Tha Thu Thau became
the leader. Rebuilding, like the Stalinists, after Surety action, they 
\
merged with Tr&n Van Gi&u's Party in 1933 to work openly through the 
22
system. Together they published that most famous of revolutionary 
papers, La Lutte (the Struggle, or Fight). As a matter of fact, the 
Communist coalition legally elected three members to the Saigon municipal 
council in 1937* From then on the Trotskyists refused to conform to 
central Stalinist direction from Moscow and took over La Lutte. They 
grew stronger, but the Japanese entry into Indochina changed everything.
Although the ICP was following Comintern instructions to the letter, 
to form alliances with anybody if it furthered Party plans, Hd wrote 
the Stalinist line from afar:
"With the Trotskyists, no compromise, no concession, 
is possible. Every means available must be used to 
unmask them as fascist agents, who must be politically 
annihilated." ^3
As it turned out, most of the Trotskyists were later physically
liquidated, which certainly "politically annihilated" them.
During the rebuilding the Party "severely criticized" almost 
everything: "leftist deviation, such as isolationism, narrow-mindedness, 
failing to use legal and semi-legal forms to push the movement forward,"
as well as "rightist deviations", such as "legalism, overrejoicing
at partial successes...lack of vigilance, Trotskyists, and reckless
cooperation with them*" Not cooperation, but reckless cooperation.
The major Communist program of the thirties was the United Front; -
even the Trotskyists were for it. As the Nazis consolidated their
power in Germany, and fascism was on the rise in Italy and Japan, the
Comintern directed a broad world-wide strategy of anti-fascist alliances.
The pressure on the Communists in Indochina eased somewhat when in 1936
the Popular Front government assumed office in France, supported by the
Communists and Socialists, and the French signed a mutual defence pact
with Russia. In this new atmosphere the Trotskyists secured 8($ of the
votes cast in the 1939 elections in Cochinchina. But hoped for changes
in the colonies never came about.
Local Party workers worldwide had a difficult time in explaining
Russia's complete policy reversals, for in 1939 Stalin signed his pact
with Hitler, which surprised cadres everywhere. It should have surprised
no one, given Lenin's dictum of signing a pact with the devil if it
would further the Party's interests. Even the Party's writers admit to
the perplexity of the cadres. The old enemy was now an ally. Following
the Soviet-German treaty "a number of our Party members became confused 
25and wavering," and to rectify this a book had to be written, the title 
(and explanation) being, "The Soviet Union is Always Faithful to Peace."
In 1938 the Popular Front government in Paris fell, eventually 
resulting again in increased pressure on the revolutionaries. When the 
Soviets and the Nazis signed their pact, the Soviets and the French were 
no longer allies and the move was on again to root out the Communists 
everywhere. By now Party slogans emphasizing class struggle were 
replaced by messages concentrating on the imperialist war and national 
liberation. The 1936-1939 years had given the Party invaluable 
experience with broad front strategy.
The prewar years had also given rise to two other groups in 
Cochinchina which became important because of their rapid growth. These
s \ 7
were the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, eclectic religions indigenous to 
the south; they were centred around Tay Ninh and C^fnthc? respectively.
The Cao Dai were later armed by the Japanese, who also protected the
\ 9 \ / ^
Hoa Hao founder, the "mad bonze" Huynh Phu S6, from the French. When
the Japanese were later disarmed and the Allies confined to key areas
around Saigon, the Vi$t Minh "honour units" killed him and chopped up
his body by order of Tran Van Gi^u, who showed a distinct propensity 
for solving his problems inthis manner.
The Japanese entry into Indochina brought new trials and 
opportunities for the Party, which suffered further damage from 
more premature revolts. An uprising accompanied by an assault on 
the French fort at Bac Son in 19^0 was quickly quashed, and when 
1500 native troops in Saigon rebelled against orders to move to the 
Thai border the local Party cadres decided to start a revolt. Hancii 
forbade the planned uprising, but such few of its emissaries as avoided 
arrest by the ubiquitous Surety were ignored and the insurrection took 
place on 23 November 19^0* By December the revolt had been crushed,
.for the local native troops had been disarmed earlier. The Party 
was again badly hurt in the French repression, and Tran Van Gi&u 
whose invariable inclination was towards violence, was in official 
disgrace. A smaller uprising in Nghe An was similarly suppressed.
Again, after the failure of the 19^0 risings, the Party analyzed
the reasons for the failures. As they wrote later, the Party must be
more careful about the timing of the revolt. It must organize where
the enemy was weak (that is, in the countryside), and then gradually
move out (a sort of Communist version of the old oil-spot technique).
And the Party was reinforced in its view that the peasants must be
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mobilized and led by the workers, but there were precious few workers 
in Indochina, however, (reflecting the peasant-based economy).
The German attack on Russia in June, 19^11 caused the Party cadres 
worldwide to once again accommodate an abrupt reversal in strategy. 
Earlier, in November 19^0i the Seventh Plenum of the Indochinese 
Communist Party changed the name of the front from the "Indo-Chinese 
Anti-Imperialist National United Front" (of the Sixth Plenum) to the 
"National United Front Against the French and Japanese Fascists in 
Indo-China", to reflect the fact that overnight the fascists (and one
2 n
imperialist) had again become the main enemy.
The Sixth Plenum had already subjugated the main theme of class 
struggle to that of national liberation. There was no more talk of 
worker soviets —  the slogans were now of a Vietnamese government, a 
Democratic Republic* It was a shrewd and powerful appeal, which could 
hardly fail to attract support from patriotic Vietnamese of all political 
hues.
Ho ’s whereabouts during the period are a matter of conjecture, 
and most "authoritative1’ sources have been compelled to rely on 
second-hand information to support their conclusions. For this study, 
the 19^1-19^5 years are of particular importance*
On February 19^1» Ho, still better known as the veteran revolutionary
*** 1 £
Nguyen Ai Quoc, finally went to Indochina* For the first time since 
1923 he was acting largely on his own, the Russians being too pre­
occupied with their own survival in the West to bother with anything 
else. To use his own words, his life to now had been mapped out for 
him, and he had simply followed orders.
V
Ho now went to Pac Bo, in Gao Bang province. During the period
of 10 to 19 May 19V1, the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee
was held. This is of more than passing interest because the Party took
a hard look at the political situation and made a decision of profound
importance; this was recognized as the start of the Party's most vital
\
period, and which was for the Party, as Trddng Chinh later wrote, the
chance which appears but once in a thousand years, made possible by the 
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war.
The Party Central Committee traced the course and causes of the 
war and expected Germany to attack Russia, no doubt as a result of 
intelligence received from Russia. War would flare up in the Pacific 
and the imperialists would be hit badly, but the antifascist alliance 
would survive and eventually win. As Party histories noted in hindsight, 
as the First World War brought the USSR in being, so also would the 
Second World War bring other Socialist states into being. It reaffirmed 
the policy of subordinating the class struggle to the call for 
independence, as this would produce a wider response from the masses.
With Ho personally guiding the Plenum, a more urgent sense of purpose 
was impressed on the Party members. But the Suret§ were still effective, 
and several Party members were ambushed and captured while returning 
from the meeting.
The Eighth Plenum was of great historical significance for another 
reason. The decision was made to form a broad front alliance which 
would reach more people and be more effective than a purely Communist
A. \  A
organization* This was to be the Vi&t N a m ’Doc-Lap -Dong-Minh Hoi, or 
Viet Minh. This is the Party's version, although most sources say that 
the Viet Minh was formed at Chingshi, across the border in China. In
any case, represented were the Communists, the new Viet Nam Party,
the Viet Nam Revolutionary Youth League, what was left of the Viet
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Nam Nationalist Party (VNQDD), and a few smaller groups. These 
made up the Viet Minh.
~ / a' A '
By now Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot) was "Ho Chi Minh" (He 
Who Enlightens), although again authoritative sources say he took 
the name when he left prison the following year. His Viet Minh 
included something for everyone. To organise the masses, a forest 
of "National Salvation" associations sprang up. There were Workers 
for National Salvation, Peasants for National Salvation, National 
Salvation Associations for Old Folks, Women, Army men, Youth, Buddhist 
Bonzes, and more. Everything was National Salvation, not anti­
bourgeois, or proletarian, or anti-imperialist or anti-capitalist. 
Everything was aimed at the right time to rise, and the training of 
cadres took on top priority. Lenin's idea of "less foes, more allies", 
was being put into practice.
Not only were there associations for everyone, there were 
slogans and songs for everything. For traditionalists, there was a 
neat Party twist to the old three-syllable Confucian ode on ethics;
<v, *
this was the "Ngu Tu'Kinh", .or five-syllable ode, and it was sung:
To have a solid foundation
Our association should start with small cells
Having three to nine members
Who elect a leader for themselves.
A group of two, three cells 
Should elect an executive committee.
Strict discipline must be maintained ,Q
And bi-weekly meetings well attended....
Bernard Fall described this start as a "private poetical venture
(with economic overtones) of the Kuomintang warlord of Kwantung provinc
31General Chang Fa-kwei." Chinese influence was undoubtedly great, but
\
the idea certainly coincided with Ho's thoughts on making alliances.
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While the Bac Seta. base area was being built up, Ho went back to China
(the Party histories say he went to the Chinese for help). But on
29 August, 19^2, he was arrested in the market town of Tukvin, in
Tsinsi district, Kwangsi province. For months the Party thought he
was dead. These events, like almost everything else before about 19^5i
are open to conjecture, and a reader's opinions will be formed by what
v
and who he reads. Ho's whereabouts, the site of the Eighth Plenum and
A- / ( V. (
the formation of the Vi£t Minh, when Nguyen Ai Quoc became Chi Minh,
22
32and even whether or not he was really in prison —  there will be 
variations and contradictions from source to source*
It remains unclear as to why Ho was arrested in the first place* 
Certainly his Communist and revolutionary background were fundamental 
to his arrest —  some even say that the reason went back to his old 
days with Borodin. Whatever the reason, it seems clear that he was 
in jail, sustained largely by his beliefs and keeping his mind active 
by writing poetry of questionable quality. His party had suffered 
greatly at the hands of the French. In 1931 the Party had about
"Z~Z
1500 members, ^ and at this time the membership was about the same.
According to Party sources, Ho was released from prison on 
16 September, 19*t3. - His release was partially the result of the
■V ^
failure of the Bong Minh Hoi to supercede the Viet Minh. On k October 
19^2, Chang Fa-Kwei (military governor of the Fourth War Zone, in 
Kwangsi), had sponsored a political congress in Liuchow. By 10 October
the Viet Nam Cach Menh Bong Minh Hoi was formed. It was composed
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primarily of the old VNQBD, Phuc Quoc, and seven other groups* The 
Bong Minh Hoi was to provide information for the Chinese and eventually
V.
perhaps assume the form of a government in exile. The Bong Minh Hoi
could not compete with the Communists, and a network of cells and
organization could not be created overnight. After all, the Communists,
in assiduously building their Party over a period of 15 years, had
through stern trial and error accumulated an experience against which
other groups were largely unable to compete*
Somewhere at this point, enter the Americans. The accepted story
is that Ho wrote to Chang Fa-Kwei from prison, offering the services of
his organization in exchange for his release* Bernard Fall cites a
source which stated that the U.S. successfully intervened with the
Chinese on Ho's behalf, and "the Americans handed the Soviets, as often
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elsewhere during the war years, another trump.card."
According to Chang, the reorganization (which saw Ho's apparatus
incorporated into the overall Vietnamese group) had tv/o' main objectives:
to help the revolutionists gain independence, and to help the Chinese
37military advance to Vietnam at a later date. Ho, biding his time,
38accepted a lesser role in the group.
In 19^3 the Cao Bang base areas had been developed and intensive
\ J,
work carried out in the provinces of Ha Giang, Bac Can and Lang Seta.
fIn August 19^31 converging "columns" led by Giap and Chu Vs(n Tain
39met, and what the Party called a "political corridor" was created, 
which formed the basis of the future "liberated zone" and joined the
\ t
base areas of Cao Bang and Bac So’n.
In 1 9 ^  a thirst for direct action almost moved the Party into 
a confrontation with the French, a confrontation for which the
V
Communists were not yet wholly ready# However, Ho was released from 
prison in time to stop any premature rising, although he did direct 
the establishment of an armed force* Thus the forerunner of the 
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was created by Giap later in the year 
(on 22 December 19M0* It was called the Vietnam Propaganda and 
Liberation Unit*
It was not surprising that the ICP was able to build up its
/
base areas in the Bac Son - Lang So’n regions* The haute regions of
Tonkin, among others, were never fully pacified by the French, and the
p
Viet Minh found ready recruits among the Tho tribesmen. In May, 1955,
the Commander-in Chief, French Forces, Indochina, issued a three-volume
work which was distributed to a limited number of officials and is not
generally available. These volumes summarized the French experiences
of the war and sought to provide guidance for similar wars in the future
/
Volume Two explained, in part, Giap's success in recruiting in the base 
areas:
What we have observed in Indochina confirms a fact 
known in our African possessions: there exists a 
permanence or continuity in the centers of unrest.
History and geography reveal that certain regions 
are traditional cradles of insurgent movements, and 
these later serve as preferred areas for the guerillas*
It is in the provinces where the population has always 
shown itself to be proud, bold and independent that 
the revolt has taken on the most acute and intense 
forms (the Plain of Reeds, the region of Vinh, the 
mountains of Langson, etc.) It is-^striking to compare 
some recent engagements with the history of certain 
battles which recurred during the conquest. The 
events were often the same and even happened in the 
same places. Some of the writings from Tonkinese 
and Mandarin to our forces were written in the same vein 
as Viet Minh pamphlets. 1^
In late 1 9 ^  a U.S. pilot was shot down and somehow fell into 
Ho's hands. It was a great chance for a formal introduction to the 
Americans, and the OSS eventually arranged to set up a liaison unit 
with the Viet Minh. There is no widely known effort of the OSS to
actively work with or train any non-Coramunist groups, even though 
the main focus was obviously on the established Party network. It 
is one of the assertions of this paper that Ho's recognition of the 
political immaturity of his OSS colleagues, and the manner in which 
the Communists were able to manipulate the schoolboy anticolonialism 
of the U.S. officers, was a major factor in their eventual ultimate 
triumph. It is one thing to make temporary alliances with the enemy 
of an enemy, but the real damage was done after the war with Japan 
had ended, when the OSS, with little political experience and 
training, were simply not in the same class as the Communists and 
were unable to look ahead. The OSS, for those crucial postwar weeks 
in Southeast Asia, appeared to be acting independently, certainly 
indulging in what Donald Lancaster calls their ’’policy-framing
hz
proclivities” in contradiction to State Department policy —  and 
doing it clumsily, with terribly damaging results for the West and, 
eventually, the Vietnamese.
Earlier, although General Chennault had been warned of Ho's
Communist background by the KMT and advised not to see him, Ho secured
an interview by a trick* Charles Fenn described it as follows:
... then Ho said he jiad a small favor to ask the 
General... But all Ho wanted was the General's 
photograph. There's nothing Chennault likes more 
than giving his photograph. So he presses a bell...
In due course its another girl whd produces a 
folder of eight-by-ten glossies. 'Take your pick,' 
says Chennault. Ho takes one and asks would the 
General be so kind as to sign it?... Chennault writes 
across the bottom, 'Yours Sincerely, Claire L.Chennault.*
And out we all troop into Kunming's sparkling air.
As we shall see, it was £y waving this photograph 
like a magic wand that Ho was later to produce a 
magnificent rabbit.^3
Ho's later meeting with Colonel Helliwell is well documented 
elsewhere. OSS men were dropped in to Ho, and supplies followed. The 
small OSS group trained Giap's troops in the use of small arms, grenades 
and crew-served weapons. One of the American medical corpsraen may have 
even saved the veteran revolutionary's life when Ho came down with a 
bad fever.
All this OSS activity was supposed to produce a force to fight 
the Japanese. As with their Chinese ideological comrades in Yenan, the 
Viet Minh were noted for their ability to avoid the Japanese. Bernard 
Fall could only find a single recorded instance of a Viet Minh attack
attack on the Japanese, and this was when a battalion-sized group 
of Viet Minh, attacked a Japanese outpost of kQ men; 8 Japanese were
kK l*£
killed* As in China, the OSS were apparently pretty much in the
V,
dark as to Communist activity in Tonkin, for Ho had no intention of
wasting his troops against the Japanese, who he knew would lose the
war and leave anyway. It was heady stuff, but not quite behind the
lines, given the studiousness with which the Viet Minh apparently
avoided the Japanese*
On 9 March 19^5 "the sword, which had been hanging over the head
of the French for more than four years, fell* This coup by the
Japanese will be discussed elsewhere in this work. Suffice it to
say that it was one of the major reasons for the ultimate success
of the Communists. For now the French security forces were completely
neutralized, and the Japanese evinced interest in the Viet Minh only
when they threatened the Japanese lines of communication. There
followed that single known Viet Minh attack on the Japanese in July,
and in August the Japanese laid down their arms. This was the historic
moment the Party had been waiting for: the Allies were slow in arriving
the Japanese were neutral and the French were helpless. The Japanese
had earlier declared Vietnam independent, and Tran Trong Kim had
formed a government at the request of Emperor Bao Bai. At about this
time the terms of the Potsdam Conference became known.
On 13 August 19^5 the Indochinese Communist Party held its Second
National Congress at Tan Trao village, to discuss strategy and the
coming rising. News of Japan’s surrender was spread rapidly, and the
Insurrection Committee issued General Order Number One, the "Call
For a General Insurrection". It proclaimed the surrender of the
1*8
Japanese Fascists and called for a general uprising. Political 
and military tasks must be carried out simultaneously, and an ultimatum
1*9
was sent to the Japanese Army.
In the call for general insurrection the ICP, in the excitement
of the moment, could be excused a Freudian slip in forgetting the
emphasis on nationalism by declaring that "the Party expects you to
50
make great sacrifices."
On 16 August, to give the uprising a semblance of legitimacy, a 
Vi^t Minh People's Congress was convened at T^n Trao, the famous 
"Lightning Session," so called because by the time the non-Communist
51element of the Vi#t Minh heard about it the Congress was over* The
Congress rubber-stamped the decisions taken by the Party a few days 
earlier, and approved the gold-star red flag and the National Anthem 
"March to the Front", It indorsed the insurrection and the ten point
r *5
domestic and foreign policy statement of the Viet Minh League. It
also adopted the National Liberation Committee, which became the
a* f
Provisional Government under President Ho Chi Minh; the Provisional
53Government made its first appearance on 17 August, ^
The tremendous urgency and instant bursts of activity of the 
Viet Minh may be imagined when one considers that on 17 August the 
Viet Minh, with carefully planned tactics, infiltrated and took over 
a mass rally in Hanoi. The Viet Minh flag replaced the imperial flag 
of the Bao Dai government, and on the next day the Japanese permitted
5^
the Vi&t Minh to seize the arms of the Garde Indochinoise,
The Party puts the events of 17 August somewhat more euphemistically:
On August 17, 19*+5, the General Association of 
Functionaries held a meeting in favor of the 
Tr&n Trong Kim puppet Government. Answering the 
Front1s*call, the people of Hanoi protested 
energetically and turned this meeting in favour 
of the Viet Minh front.55
On 18 August the Revolutionary Military Committee (Uprising
Committee of the Party Committee in Hanoi) moved their office from a
village in the suburbs to inside Hanoi.
On 19 August a huge demonstration in Hanoi, orchestrated by the
Viet Minh, sealed the Front's ascendancy. A mass meeting was called
for 1100 hours at the Municipal Theatre Square. A military contingent
fired a salvo, the new national flag was displayed and the anthem played.
A member of the Revolutionary Military Committee repeated the call for
general insurrection, and the Viet Minh cadres fanned out to seize the
organs of the government. The same thing happened at the provisional
capitals of Yen Bay, Thai Binh, Phuc Yen, Thanh Hda, and others. On
j  ^ \
20 August it was the turn of Bac Ninh, Thai Nguyen, Ninh Binh, and on
21 August, Cao Bang, Tuyen Quang, Sc?n Tay, Kien An, Nghe An, Ninh Thuan, 
and so on as the cadres went flying out from the capital. The early
19 August scene in Hanoi is described well by Nguy&n Pu’c Minh, as two
( A
platoons of Viet Minh troops strode through the populous quarters of 
Hanoi, marching to "mot,hail mot, hail" (one,two! one, twoi):
Though still poorly dressed and ill-equipped 
these men were the first Vietnamese troops 
not commanded by foreign officers to march in 
Hanoi since the end of the 19th centuryI In 
a country which sets as much store by symbol 
and myth as Viet Nam does, the effect upon 
the masses was very great indeed...^6 f
The shock waves burst upon the imperial court at Hue on 23
August. The Viet Minh sent an ultimatum to Emperor Bao Dai, with
57a deadline of 1330 hours. At that time a large Viet Minh crowd
appeared, making a fearful noise outside the court. While the cabinet
discussed the issue, news just happened to arrive which confirmed that
two leading mandarins had been brutally murdered by the Communists —
this was to assist the debaters to reach a speedy solution, and it did.
The shocked court disbanded and Bao Dai's abdication marked the end of
the long and sometimes glorious Vietnamese monarchy. One of the
murdered mandarins was Ngo Binh Khoi, brother of the future South
Vietnamese President Ngo -Binh Diem; he had served Bao Dai and was said
to have been buried alive with his son, just one of the many victims
of an unparalleled campaign of assassinations carried out at this time
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by the Party led by that gentle "little old man sitting on his hill."
Sacks described the abdication as an event of great significance, 
as the Vietnamese people, great traditionalists, saw in this the passing
of the Mandate of Heaven from the Emperor to the Viet Minh and the
59Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
On 25 August the Viet Minh cavalcade reached Saigon. Things were
quite different in the South (Nam B9 ), and the Viet Minh did not have
things their own way. Tran Van Giau, another alumnus from the Moscow
school for revolutionaries, had been put out of action by the French
after the abortive 19*^0 Communist uprising. The Japanese coup of 9
March had resulted in the release of many experienced cadres of all
parties, and rival groups were rebuilt. On 14 August a wide spectrum
of parties had formed the United National Front (UNF), in which the
ICP was on paper a minority;^ but like the Viet Minh itself, the UNF
was a vehicle for Communist ambition. Membership included the (Stalinist)
Av f
Indochinese Communist Party of Ho Chi Minh and his southern lieutenant 
Tran Van Gi*au, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, the Advanced Guard Youth 
(later described by British Intelligence as militant and dangerous), the 
Trotskyists and the Vietnam Independence Party. It turned out that the 
leader of the Advanced Guard Youth (or Vanguard Youth, as it is also 
called), Dr. Pham Ngoac Thach, was really a member of the Indochinese
Communist Party, and his organization supplied most of the early
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"muscle" for Vi&t Minh manoeuvres.
The Japanese attitude in the south was markedly different in 
technique, if not in substance, from that of the Japanese northern 
command; the high concentration of senior commanders and staff officers 
accounted, for a somewhat less parochial outlook. While the Japanese 
were willing to turn the reins of government over to the Vietnamese, 
they preferred to exclude the Viet Minh, which was indistinguishable 
from its Communist brain and backbone. So the Japanese permitted the 
UNF to take over a number of public buildings and assume a posture of 
control.
Tran Van Giai immediately confronted the UNF, telling them that
since they appeared to be a Japanese creation they would not be
recognized by the Allies. Only the Viet Minh, free from Japanese
taint, would be acceptable. Lacking the broader historical perspectives
of the Communists, the UNF collapsed in uncertainty and by 25 August the
Provisional Executive Committee for the South was formed, with Tran Van
./
Gisiu in charge. As at Hue hours earlier, huge demonstrations on 21
62
and 25 August helped the UNF members to make up their minds. Of 10
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members of the Committee, k were listed as Communist and 2 as Viet Minh,
although at least one of the listed Viet Minh (Pham Ngoc Thach, of the
Advanced Guard Youth) was a Communist. As Party histories say, the
formation of the Provisional Executive Committee (PEC) completed the
"August Revolution". In victory, the Party reiterated one of its most
fundamental principles:"To make full use of the contradictions among
Gk
the enemy ranks and take good aim at the main enemy", a principle
which proved its value in the next 30 years.
"The success of the Revolution does not come by 
itself, it must be prepared and won. The August 
Revolution took place within the span of only 
fifteen days but it had been prepared through cc 
fifteen years from the first days of our Party"
The Party was now in control in the big three cities of Bac Bo, Trung Bo,
and Nam Bo: Hanoi, Hue and Saigon. McAlister offers a good summary
of the event:
While one of the key factors in the launching of 
the Vietnamese revolution was the destruction of
the colonial authority by the Japanese, their
material assistance to the Vi£t Minh was also 
vital. By ceding French arms to them instead of 
the nationalist government of Tran Trong Kim and 
by helping the Vi&t Minh to establish arsenals,
the Japanese seemed to be acknowledging that the 
Communist-led movement was, in their view, the most 
capable of Vietnamese factions to thwart the return 
of the French. 66
Most of these arsenals were in the north, and in the last analysis
the Japanese would have turned the government over to the devil rather
than see the French return (provided the devil was Asian). The
difference between the Japanese and the Chinese was that the Japanese
would not be bribed.
The Party's critique of the August Revolution revealed that a
major failure was their inability to seize the Banque de l'Indochine,
which was the one institution the Japanese held back from the Viet Minh;
another was the Party's failure to seize more arms from the Japanese,
although General Numata, Chief of Staff at Headquarters, Japanese
Southern Army, later stated that the Japanese turned over quantities
of arms to the Viet Minh. As the Party noted, Karl Marx acknowledged
that one cause of the failure of the Paris Commune in the 18th century
was the failure to capture the Banque de France (the "nerve center" of
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capitalist activity).
On 26 August Lieutenant General Numata flew to Rangoon to negotiate 
the Japanese surrender to the British, a session attended by Brigadier 
M.S.K. Maunsell, Chief of Staff to the newly-formed "Japanese Control 
Commission" (as it was then called) and former Chief of Staff to 
General Sir William Slim of the famed Fourteenth ("Forgotten") Army;
Slim was now Commander in Chief, Allied Forces South East Asia. The 
Control Commission was placed under the command of Major General Douglas 
D. Gracey, Commander of the 20th Indian Division, a man about whom much 
second-hand misinformation was later written, as first-hand evidence 
very strongly suggests today.
While the two Supreme Commanders, Lord Mountbatten and Field Marshal
N t
Count Terauchi, were working over their terms of reference, Ho Chi Minh
was moving into Hanoi, now rapidly being cleared of opposition by Viet
68 1 
Minh "honour units" (assassination squads). As the Party later noted,
these liquidations were fundamental to the Viet Minh success.
It was vitally important that the Viet Minh seize power before the
Allies arrived, and thus appear as a de facto government to the occupying
forces. They were under no illusions as to what would happen under any
sort of Allied occupation (other than Russian). As early as December 19Vi,
the Party had issued a communique which stated that "We must not nurture
30
the illusion that the Chiang Kai-Shek or British-American troops
69would bring us freedom*" The Viet Minh would seek out allies
everywhere, "even if they are only temporary, wavering or conditional
ones*" If the British-Araerican forces helped the Viet Minh, "we
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could give them some economic advantages in Indochina."
On 2 September 19^5 (which happened to be the day on which the 
Japanese formally surrendered to the Allies in the person of General 
MacArthur), E& Chi Minh formally proclaimed the founding of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Half a million people heard him make 
the announcement from the balcony of the opera house, and some reports 
say that a couple of American fighters flew low over the celebration, 
their white-starred insignia visible. The Viet Minh wasted no time 
in declaring that this was proof that the U.S. Government supported 
the new DRV. It was only now that many Vietnamese people discovered
f  (  0 / 1
that their new leader was the old revolutionary, Nguyen Ai Quoc.
A similar Viet Minh demonstration in the south ended in disaster.
It was also called for 2 September to celebrate the ascendancy of the 
Vi§t Minh; in fact, it proved the reverse, and the tragic results 
figured heavily in the actions of the future Allied commander in Saigon, 
General Gracey.
Although the Viet Minh were nominally in control, several groups 
marched under their own banners. The Trotskyists especially were
V
violently hostile to the ICP and Tran Van Giau, for they preached a more 
violent line. The Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen bandits among others, 
were their own masters. It was a huge rally, with perhaps a quarter of 
a million people taking part. Given the loose overall control of a 
mob of this size, it was almost inevitable that- violence would occur, 
and it did. It got out of hand near the red-brick Catholic cathedral, 
when shots were fired from an unknown source. It has been suggested
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that French agent-provocateurs were responsible, but this is questionable, 
given the internment of most of the French security forces and the high 
state of fear of the French civil population. What seems more likely is 
that provocateurs of all hues were involved. A massive mob attack on a 
helpless French community was not an unlikely event in this atmosphere 
(and this in fact happened three weeks later).
A Catholic priest who was watching the demonstration, Father 
Tricoire, was dragged from the Cathedral after the first shots had been
31
73fired. He was stabbed repeatedly, then finished off with a revolver.
The mob moved on, leaving a darkly dramatic scene behind. Father 
Tricoire's body lay on the steps of his Cathedral for over an hour, 
arms outstretched in the shape of the cross he served. Five other 
French people were killed, and many were beaten and dragged off to 
prison. A great deal of damage was caused, both political and physical.
Tran Vdn Gi&u was embarrassed by the breakdown of march discipline 
and spent the next couple of days racing around Saigon to release as 
many imprisoned Frenchmen as he could find. But the harm was done and 
the carefully cultivated myth of Viet Minh control was shattered in a 
tragic way. This myth was to be shattered again and again over the 
next few weeks. Just four days later the first Allied representatives 
arrived, in the form of a small British Repatriation of Allied Prisoners 
of War and Internees team; they received a first-hand report of the 
riot from the now liberated Allied FOWs, many of whom had formed units 
to protect the French civilians. These reports were sent back to Allied 
Headquarters and passed on to Rangoon to the senior officer most directly
concerned, Major General Douglas Gracey, who from that moment on, in his
k September message to Field Marshal Terauchi, reminded the Japanese of 
their obligation to maintain order under President Truman's General Order 
Number One. As it turned out, he was not alone in insisting that the 
Japanese maintain order, for American and British local commanders from 
Korea and China to Southeast Asia relied on the Japanese security forces
for some time to come.
\ *
At Ho Chi Minh's admission, there were only 5000 Communists in
Indochina at the time of the August Revolution. And there is little
argument that Communist ideology repelled the vast majority of Vietnamese
people, hence the Party's constant use of cover organizations, fronts,
alliances, and so on. How then did he do it? Irving, quoting Danielle
Hunebelle in Le Monde, provides the following pithy comment:
When we say:'Ho Chi Minh is a Communist', the 
Vietnamese replies: 'Ho Chi Minh is my father - 
in the rice-paddy, my brother in the maquis.
Do you wish me to take up arms against my father
and my brother?1 When we say: 'But your father
and your brother are fighting for Communism', 
the Vietnamese replies: 'I am fighting for my 
independence. My father and my brother are 
fighting for their independence. As for your 
Communism, I have no idea what you are talking 
about.' 7^
In the end, that may be as good an answer as any* Whatever the reason, 
it was especially during the August Revolution when Ho Chi Minh, short 
on material and manpower but long on boldness and intuition, showed 
just what a magnificent political animal he was*
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CHAPTER II 
THE FRENCH CONNECTION
"We saw Hanoi airport, with no flak at all, no 
Japanese planes, a very peaceful atmosphere, I 
told the Captain, the pilot, 'Drop me here, this 
is a good place*1 His response was 'I am ordered 
to drop you over Tam Dao*' If we had decided to 
land at Hanoi with the plane, it would have been 
alright* But he had orders and he decided not to 
disobey orders —  but it was the day and the place 
to disobey orders! "
Pierre Messmer
Former Prime Minister of France. 
Personal Interview, 1 September, 1977*
In order to appreciate the emotional and unyielding postwar 
French attitude toward the future of Indochina, it is necessary to 
have at least a passing knowledge of the historic ties between France 
and Indochina. The following is only a.brief introduction.
In the 17th century French missionaries, mostly Jesuits, began 
to arrive in Vietnam and pose a challenge to the long established 
religions and philosophical beliefs. During the 18th century some 
of those French missionaries found their counsel sought by the imperial 
court. However, there were times when xenophobic emperors forced the 
missionaries into hiding during periodic purges.
In France, the influence of the Catholic Church (and especially 
the Paris Society of Foreign Missions, founded by the 18th century 
Apostolic Vicar of Indochina, Pigneau de Behaine) was so strong that the 
court was induced to send French warships to repeatedly bombard the 
Vietnamese. This was to secure the release of imprisoned missionaries 
(and to facilitate trade arrangements).
During the reign of Napoleon III, the French government contemplated 
annexing Vietnam, as it was anxious to be included in the race for 
colonies in the East. The spreading of Catholicism remained a major 
factor, and French control really began when Napoleon invaded (against 
a good deal of advice from many of his military and foreign affairs 
advisers). Napoleon was also encouraged to invade by his wife, who in 
turn was influenced by the Church. The first French landings (the 
Spanish were briefly involved as allies) took place at Tourane (later 
Danang), then turned to the south. By *1862 Cochinchina had become 
a colony, with Saigon as the major city.
The rest of the French conquest, culminating in the final Franco- 
Chinese treaty in 1885i wajs a patchwork and haphazard affair, often 
resulting from the independent action of local commanders and swash­
bucklers. The experiences of Dupuis, Garnier, Riviere and the Blank 
Flags, among others, are well recorded elsewhere.
France took inordinate pride in Indochina. Of all' the colonies, 
Indochina took pride of place. The military officers, engineers and 
administrators who closely followed the missionaries left their 
permanent memorials: the civil service, Vauban citadels, rail and road 
networks, education, industry, medicine, the immense feat of draining 
the Mekong marshes, the complex system of dykes in Tonkin, and more.
All of this provided livelihoods for untold numbers of Vietnamese
families. The Emperors were restored to their throne, despite the 
limitations imposed on them, and Vietnamese militia raised.
Heroes were created during the course of the French conquest,
and French schoolchildren eagerly read of them to this day. The
French wrote of Garnier's achievements:
What were the reasons for the rapidity with 
which this first conquest of Tongking was 
• effectuated? The superiority of our arras was 
certainly not enough to compensate for our 
inferiority in numbers. The fact is that the 
population welcomed our fellow-countrymen as 
liberators. They knew that they would put an 
end to the exactions and piracy... In addition 
to popular sympathy, which facilitated our task, 
one must note the astonishing audacity of our 
troops, the qualities displayed by our men not 
only on the military plane, but also on the 
human, which enabled them to understand the 
local situations immediately and to learn the 
art of governing...^
Indeed, so proud was France of her vaunted mission civiliaatrice 
(civilizing mission) that she held regular and elaborate exhibitions 
to display to metropolitan Frenchmen the enormous benefits bestowed 
on her colonial subjects.
The first four decades of the twentieth century saw the French 
settling in and consolidating their affairs in Indochina, which 
comprised one directly ruled colony (Cochinchina) and four protectorates 
theoretically ruled by native kings (Cambodia, Laos, Annam and Tonkin). 
Despite periodic unrest and revolts which were routinely suppressed, 
the French progressively made Indochina a sort of "closed shop" which 
effectively tied all Indochinese trade and commerce to France, excluding 
other foreigners.
Unlike other colonial administrations (the British, for example), 
the Vietnamese were confined to routine and generally menial jobs, for 
even lower ranking civil service and police positions were filled by 
Frenchmen; it was a source of great local discontent.
The outbreak of World War II found the French armed forces in 
Indochina extremely weak and ill-equipped. In 19^0 the Vichy government 
replaced Governor General Catroux (who joined de Gaulle) with the 
controversial Admiral Decoux. Cut off, and under increasing pressure, 
the French continued to bow to Japanese demands and opened up Indochina 
for transit, for appeals to the United States and Britain produced no
aid. Although some Frenchmen sympathized with the Allies, the colons 
remained generally Vichyite and cooperated with the Japanese, so that 
throughout the war Indochina remained the only colony in the Far East 
to keep the mother country's flag flying. It would have been better 
had the flag fallen gloriously, for (apart from matters of honour) that 
would have later defused many of the Viet Minh's propaganda broadsides, 
which played effectively on this Franco-Japanese collaboration.
The French were beset with other problems in addition to the matter 
of the Japanese. The Communists were grievously wounded in the early 
thirties, but not quite finished off. Communist leaflets in Saigon 
in 1939 alerted the Surety, who discovered a clandestine press in 
Cholon and netted 28 Trotskyists in raids throughout Saigon; 26 more 
were caught in Mytho. The Chinese caused a shortage of bronze by 
hoarding one cent pieces (which were pressed in San Francisco). But 
otherwise life in Indochina was not too bad as 19^*0 approached.
Although French military reservists were not permitted to leave
the country until further notice, the approaching war caused no alarm.
On 12 December 1939 the authorities conducted a civil defense air raid
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exercise, with miserable results. Visitors to Indochina in December, 1939* 
included Major General Bond, the British General Officer Commanding in 
Malaya, and Admiral Sir Percy Noble, Commander in Chief of the China 
Station who arrived in Saigon on a cruiser; both held out little 
encouragement to the French concerning the possibility of British help 
in case of extreme Japanese pressure. Britain was locked in desperate 
combat with the Axis powers in the West, and it would be a couple of years 
yet before America would enter the war. And the United States was not 
offering the French much moral support at this time, either. Another 
visitor at this time was General Tsuchihasi, new chief of the Japanese 
Second Bureau, who visited Hanoi en route to Japan from Canton. He 
would be returning.
On 22 June the Chinese, reeling under the Japanese invasion, showed 
little sympathy for the French dilemma by bitterly criti-cizing the 
decision to close the frontier. The French ambassador in Tokyo told 
the British to expect the same pressure from the Japanese, as public 
opinion in Japan was solidly behind the Japanese expansionist policies.
The ambassador also advised the French in Indochina to submit to Japanese 
pressure for a Japanese mission in Tonkin. The Japanese had seemed to 
have gone mad with ideas of their superiority and importance, and would 
not be sobered by platitudes and appeals to reason.
The Chinese had asked the French envoy in Shanghai to discuss the 
Indochina situation, and when no reply was received they passed the 
request to the British for referral to the French. The British regarded 
the request for their intervention as improper, and "even more embarrass­
ing when the unfortunate French Ambassador could hardly know what
3government he represented.
The French in Indochina felt obliged to follow the advice of their 
ambassador in Tokyo, and on 29 June 19^+0 Major General Nishihara and 35 
staff officers arrived in Hanoi to keep an eye on the borders and to 
collect intelligence. Four days earlier the Japanese had announced 
that part of their South China Seas Squadron would patrol the Gulf of 
Tonkin to monitor the embargo on goods to China. The collapse of France 
and the indecision of the new Governor-General, Admiral Decoux, contributed 
to the defeatist attitude of the French Armed Forces, which did not 
exactly inspire confidence anyway. The French Army had a total of 2k 
tanks (of 1918 vintage) in Indochina, while the Air Force had a grand 
total of 85 planes, including 20 Morane *+06s, 3 Potez 63s, 6 Potez 5*+2s, 
k Fornam 222s, 2 Communications aircraft and 50 Potez 25s; all this 
added up to about 25 reasonably first line planes.
While this was going on, and word of France's defeat arrived, 
hundreds of Frenchmen beseiged and wrote to the British Consulate in 
Indochina to volunteer for the British forces in order to carry on the 
fight against the Germans. On 17 July the Germans warned the French 
in Indochina of reprisals against French families in France if the 
terms of the armistice were not adhered to.
In February, 19^0, the British Air Ministry instructed the Air 
Attache in Bangkok, Group Captain A.G.Bishop, to visit Indochina and 
render an assessment of the worsening situation. Bishop arrived in 
Hanoi on 20 February to investigate Japanese violations of Indochinese 
territory, and immediately saw the French Commander in Chief, General 
Martin, and Colonel Maupin, the Chief of Army Intelligence. He was 
specifically interested in knowing if the Japanese were.overflying 
Tonkin en route to or from Waichow island in the course of their 
operations against the Haiphong-Kunming Railway. It appeared that the 
Japanese initially avoided French territory, but not for long. Whether 
emboldened by French feebleness or exasperated by the cumulative effects 
of the China Incident, which resisted solution, they soon began to 
operate openly over French airspace. As the railway had already been
successfully interdicted by Japanese air strikes, they now confined 
themselves to regular reconnaissance flights.
Bishop asked Martin what he was doing about the problem. The 
answer was, "We send lots of paper to Tokyo about it." Tokyo responded- 
with replies of regret, but little changed. Paris forbade French forces 
in Indochina from taking action against the Japanese, permitting 
observation and reporting only. Only one case of Japanese bombing had 
occurred recently, a raid in conjunction with operations against Nanning, 
and this was investigated by a mixed Franco-Japanese commission. The 
Japanese accepted blame and paid compensation.
In early March the Japanese blockaded the border of Tonkin in an 
effort to choke off supplies to the Chinese. The flow of goods stopped 
on the two main routes to China (the Haiphong-Kunming Railway and the 
Hanoi-Nanning road), and the third route via Kweiyang was being looked at. 
The French stated that all munitions traffic was forbidden and imports 
limited to food, machinery', petroleum, and so on. The whole exercise 
was questionable as under policy from Paris food could be in the 
"Munitions" category to the same extent as ammunition. Rumours were
also spreading that the Thais were considering granting bases in northern
Siam to the Japanese to facilitate strikes on the Burma Road.
On 26 June 19^0, a BOAC pilot brought out a verbal message from
the British Army Liaison Officer in Hanoi to the British Ambassador in 
Siam, Sir J.Crosby. The message reported that the French Army and Air 
Force were in serious unrest due to the political uncertainties and the 
switch in Governors-General. The FAF were said to be considering a plan 
to seize and fly out their aircraft to Burma or Singapore. Part of the 
French Navy were later about to sail their ships to Singapore when 
stopped by Decoux.
In July, 19*+0» the French asked the British for two training planes 
from the Far East Flying Training School, which were provided, at which 
time the French asked for 7 Tiger Moth trainers. What the French needed 
was a couple of wings of modern fighters, but the RAF was in a fight to 
the finish with the Luftwaffe over the skies of Britain itself, and even 
the British forces in the Far East were sacrificed to concentrate fighters 
for the air battles at home.
In August, 19^0, the British Commander in Hong Kong received a letter 
from a French officer in Indochina, saying that French morale was declining
with the rising tide of Annamite discontent, and the Vietnamese 
troops may be unreliable. At about the same time the Chinese 
announced that they had amassed 17 divisions on the border to invade 
Tonkin should the Japanese enter.
Early in August the French referred Japanese demands to the XT .S.
and Britain; these demands included the right of passage for Japanese
troops and the use of naval and air bases in Indochina. The Foreign
Office attempted to enlist American support to put up a joint strong
stand against the onrushing Japanese whirlwind, butthe best they could
get at this time was reflected in the bitter Foreign Office minutes:
"The U.S. refusal to do more than make a statement about the status quo
5seems categorical."< Added M.E.Dening, always the prophet in elaborating 
what was not yet called the Domino Theory (and who will figure prominently 
in this story):
"I am afraid we must assume that the U.S. will do 
nothing, as usual... Nevertheless I hope the American 
press will make free play with this news... In that 
way the American public may be brought to a better
conception of what is likely to happen in the Far
East before long... But we should be under no illusions.
From Indochina it is but a step to Siam, and bases in 
Siam will at once put Malaya in grave danger. What we 
must do urgently is to stiffen up our defenses as best 
we can in Malaya, and prepare for the worst. Because 
the worst is likely to happen.
Ashley-Clarke added that Britain could not allow Japanese bases in 
Indochina without doing something, although the British, with the Nazis 
just 22 miles away across the Channel, could not do much alone. But 
there were two possible courses: Britain could tell the Japanese that
the Burma Road (closed under Japanese pressure) would be reopened, and 
quiet economic pressure could be applied (a not inconsiderable argument, 
given the make up of the Commonwealth at this time).^ But nothing could 
be done at this moment, since there was a risk of jeopardizing the
withdrawal of the British garrison from Shanghai, an operation which was
now underway. Sterndale-Bennett agreed, adding that although Britain 
was in no position to threaten Japan, "We cannot afford to let Japan 
take one strategic position after another, unhampered, so that at the 
end we are left to fight with every disadvantage, with our backs to the
g
wall, at Singapore.
Before long the United States would join Britain in freezing 
Japanese assets, but, as too often happens, it was too little too late.
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For the present, business was business; Britain was about to become
bankrupt through paying hard cash for American war supplies, and the
Japanese onslaughts relied heavily on supplies of American petroleum
10and iron, also received on a cash and carry basis*
On August, Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington,
advised the Foreign Office that the Vichy Government felt that if
Indochina were lost now it would be lost forever. On 5 August the
Yugoslav Government passed on the Soviet information that the Japanese
intended to seize Indochina and the Netherlands Bast Indies. On 14
August, His Majesty*s Consul in Saigon received a report from a Chinese
secret society that the Chinese had offered 300,000 troops to the French
for defense against the Japanese; all the French had to do was to feed
them. The Governor-General appealed directly to the United States for
help, but the Japanese intercepted the message and confronted him with
12it. In the manner of Hitler and Vienna earlier, they went on to add 
that they would destroy Hanoi by bombing if their demands were not met. 
Strangely enough, the German hand was seen behind a slight Vichy 
resistance in Indochina at this time.
In September, 19*K), the British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee 
compiled an estimate of French forces available to defend Tonkin.^
The French Army had one division in the north, plus two "weak" divisions 
in Cochinchina and Cambodia. The two southern divisions were unavailable 
for transfer to Tonkin because of the necessity to garrison Saigon and 
the Siamese border, and because the internal political situation, 
especially in Annara, was deteriorating. Even the pretender to the 
Annamese throne was in the Japanese army. The long French lines of 
communications were vulnerable, and French communications facilities 
were primitive.
The Tonkinese division consisted of 6 infantry regiments, 1 colonial 
artillery regiment, 1 company of light tanks (1918 models); only 5C$ or 
less were white troops. In a statement which reflected the general 
remoteness of Tonkin, the report stated that ’’The remainder are Tonkingese 
of fighting value possibly equal to the Japanese." The French had no 
anti-aircraft defenses and about 20 modern fighters; this fighter estimate 
was later revised to 11. Against these forces the Japanese had immediately 
available 8 infantry divisions (and possibly 3 more), plus modern land- 
based aircraft. Against the French Navy’s total of 8 river gunboats (k
of which were still in China), 6 minesweepers, 2 minelayers, 2 sloops
and 1 light cruiser ( 6 inch guns), the Japanese could amass a
frightening force of 8 battleships, 2^ + cruisers, 5 aircraft carriers,
60 destroyers and submarines. Each carrier had a complement of
50 modern fighters and 150 bombers.
Although the French commander thought that he could hold out
against three divisions for a limited time, the British estimate was
not so optimistic. On k September the Japanese Consul in Saigon
advised all Japanese citizens to leave Cochinchina on the S.S. Saigon
Maru, which was now anchored off Cap St.Jacques (which later became
known as Vungtau).
Japanese demands now centered on the use of three airfields between
Hanoi and the Chinese frontier, and the right to have 5000 troops in
Tonkin to defend the bases. They also wanted the use of all railways
and set a deadline of 5 September for their ultimatum. The Foreign
Office in London was following the drama, with difficulty, from long
range. On k September, Dening noted that "The situation in Indo-China
1
is at best obscure." It was not obscure to General Martin in Tonkin, 
who on that day conceded to the Japanese demands.
To emphasize their seriousness, the Japanese sent their aircraft 
on "show-of-force" missions over Langson, and two companies of Japanese 
troops in battle formation crossed the frontier (but withdrew without 
making contact).
The Chinese Ambassador in Bordeaux, Dr. Quo, thought that if the
United States and Britain took a hard line over Japanese threats to
Indochina, "they [the Japanese] would hesitate not once or twice, but 
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thrice." In fact, the Japanese seemed to be loosening up slightly, 
as their Foreign Ministry appeared to repudiate Nishihara's ultimatum 
(impressed perhaps by the RAF resistance in the Battle of Britain). In 
fact the French and Chinese did discuss joint defense plans, but nothing 
came of it.
The problems encountered by the French team which travelled to the
United States to buy aircraft are well documented elsewhere, and generate
controversy to this day, with both nations trading acrimonius accusations 
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over the affair. In any case, one interested onlooker (Britain) was 
hoping that the planes remained in Martinique where they sat, having 
been taken off the carriers Bearne and lie de France; the British did 
not relish the thought of that material going to Indochina and falling
Ub
into the hands of the Japanese• It was unlikely that there were 
enough trained pilots in Indochina to fully man the proposed new 
squadrons*
The rest is well enough known* The Japanese pushed on, and 
when all hope of reasoning with them was lost the United States 
suspended the trading of vital war materials to Japan, which 
unfortunately at this late stage just about guaranteed the outbreak 
of war, for the occupation of Indochina was now absolutely essential 
for the Japanese. Japan's overriding concern at this time was to seize 
the Dutch oilfields in the East Indies (now Indonesia), for the Allied 
embargo would immobilize the armed forces, and without the Navy Japan's 
growth, and even her existence, was in jeopardy*
About ninety days before Pearl Harbor, in mid-September 19^11 the 
French had exhausted their delaying tactics and the Japanese demanded 
the right to permanently garrison Indochina with a force of about 
32,000 troops, and would move in whether the French liked it or not*
Again the French, marooned from Europe, could only agree. However, 
to make a point, on 25 September a Japanese division commander attacked 
the French garrison at Leuigsdn, on the border, and wiped it out in 
a bloody battle. The incident appeared to have been the result of 
independent action by the Japanese commander (a not unusual occurrence), 
and peace was restored and apologies offered after a vigorous French 
protest.
Her position in Indochina secured, the Japanese sprang south and 
west, to destroy forever white rule in Asia. The British were driven 
back to India, the Dutch locked up and the Americans were swept back 
to Hawaii. The French were later to prove that they could fight well
in Indochina, but their collaboration with the Japanese now brought
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them no honor.
The year 19^2 saw the Japanese triumphant everywhere. The conquest 
of the American posts throughout the Pacific, the fall of Bataan and the 
fortress of Corregidor, the hasty British surrender at Singapore (brought 
on in large measure by terrible British generalship), the rapid collapse 
of the Dutch and the subservience of the French —  all heaped up the 
fires of Japanese invincibility. In Europe a junior French general, 
whose war material consisted mainly of large charges of pride, was 
gathering together the scattered remnants of what was once France. The 
French found refuge and strength in their African possessions and it was from 
these bases that their long struggle to recovery was launched*
hi
But although the French in Indochina were as tightly locked 
in as a ship in the ice pack, there were those Frenchmen who attempted 
to set up a resistance organization. This was an extremely difficult 
undertaking given the long distances from Allied territory and the 
non-existent sources of supply. One remarkable man was involved in 
the resistance efforts from the start, and provides an insight into 
the difficult beginnings of the movement. This was Fran<;ois de Langlade, 
a Frenchman, who had been a rubber planter in British Malaya for nearly 
two decades. The small French staff left free in Asia were working 
closely with the British in Singapore, and were under the head of the 
French Military Mission, Colonel Tutenges. There was a feeling through­
out the Malay archipelago during this period in 19^1 that war was just 
around the corner.
De Langlade was in the first class put through the first Commando
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school, which was set up by two British Array officers. His fellow 
students were from the Ministry of Economic Warfare, which at this time 
had responsibility for Special Operations; these would later be assumed 
by Force 136.
Upon de Langlade’s completion of the course, it was decided to send 
him into Indochina to assess the situation there. The two designated 
reasons for the mission were to choose a few reliable people in Indochina
and supply them with resistance materials (radios, special arras, etc.),
19and to get information on the Japanese. When Singapore fell the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare wanted to parachute de Langlade back into 
Indochina, but no planes were available and he and a British officer 
drove through Burma from Rangoon to Lashio during the British retreat. 
They blew up several bridges along the way and finally arrived in Yunnan. 
He waited four months in Yunnan for Chinese permission to move to the 
border to contact French frontier units, and waited six more months at 
Chen Tu, where he was still refused permission to contact the French.
His colleague here was a former French administrator, Pierre Boulle (who 
later immortalized Force 136 in his novel, "Bridge Over.the River Kwai"),
Finally, both men decided to enter Indochina secretly, but on the 
day before the start of their journey de Langlade was called to London 
by General de Gaulle, the start of a close collaboration between the two 
men. Pierre Boulle went in by himself via their planned route along the 
Black River, but broke his leg along the way and was captured by the 
Japanese.
De Gaulle capitalized on de Langlade's experience as an 
administrator (he was Director of a large rubber concern while in 
his twenties) by asking him to start up wood-based factories (from 
Canada) in the Cameroons and Brazzaville. When this was done de Gaulle - 
sent de Langlade back to the Far East. When de Langlade arrived in 
India he became the French Indochina (FIC) section of Force 136, 
working for Colin Mackenzie, its ubiquitous director, and collaborated 
closely on Force 136 plans for Indochina.
With de Langlade in Delhi for the moment, a unique unit was 
being formed by the French in North Africa. This was the Corps Leger 
d'Intervention (CLI), later renamed the 5th RIC, which missed its 
golden opportunity in Indochina, where it might have altered the course 
of history, because of the determination of the United States to eject 
France from Indochina.
The Corps Leger was modeled loosely on the Chindits and was formed 
in Algeria during December,*19^31 by Lieutenant Colonel Huard, who had 
seen long service in Asia. It was composed of 1200 men who were 
specialists in various skills and Indochinese languages. The CLI would 
not be committed to combat as a unit, but would be dispersed through­
out strategic areas of Indochina, its small parties forming cadres for 
an expanded resistance later. The camps of the CLI were in the hills
of Kabylia, on the coast separating Bougie and Djidjelli, for the hills
in this area (according to the French) closely resembled the Annamite
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chain and high Laos.
At the end of January 1 9 ^  the men were divided into commandoes 
and dressed in the manner of British paratroopers, but with the 
Australian-style felt hats. Two groups of three commandoes were formed, 
which were reinforced in July 1 9 ^  by the Special Air Service (SAS) Navy 
parachutists formed in England. Its makeup and mission was similar to 
the US Special Forces in Vietnam a generation later. In a letter to 
Admiral Mountbatten, its prospective Theater Commander, Mackenzie outlined 
the CLI’s charter, which included political and military action. It's 
military tasks were as follows:
1. Form guerilla zones in the hinterlands.
2. Sabotage strategic communications.
3« Work for the advantage of the principal Allies, primarily 
by assisting the initial cadres for units introduced by air.
h. Make contacts with and restore the fighting morale of suitable
elements of the old Corps d'Occupation and among the Police Force.
* Some sources say November.
The Corps Leger's political tasks included the following:
1. Direct the operations of resistance groups which had 
already been organized in country.
2. Report on the developing political situation in Indochina 
after the Corps Leger had commenced operations.
3. Take the preliminary essential measures in territory 
returned to Allied control which would restore French 
sovereignty, and to facilitate the eventual reestablishment 
of the regular civil authorities.
With the French thus laying the groundwork for reentry to Indochina
and the structuring of the latent antipathy of the Allied sympathizers
there, de Gaulle ordered de Langlade to return to Indochina and go
straight to Decoux. There was no definite course of action for
Indochina at this ti-me, but de Gaulle wanted information on the current
state of affairs there.
De Langlade's first try in 1 9 ^  was aborted when the United States
authorities refused to permit him to leave from Kunming, so he was
forced to return all the way to India and use Force 136 facilities.
The RAF flew him from the great Special Duty base at Jessore and dropped
him into Indochina.- It was, as de Langlade commented, "An 8 hour flight
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to go over there, instead of half an hour." De Langlade's mission
was unsuccessful because of internecine disputes within senior French
colonial ranks. But [as will be discussed later by Colonel Mingant]
General Aym§ would have nothing to do with Free France and left it to
Mordant to see de Langlade. De Langlade returned to de Gaulle and
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reported on the unsatisfactory results of his mission. The meeting 
was brief. De Gaulle asked de Langlade, "Well, did you see Decoux?".
De Langlade said no, at which point de Gaulle said, "Well, go backl", 
which he did.
This time de Langlade was allowed to stage from Kunming, for the 
OSS was now interested in Tonkin, and he arrived at Dien Bien Phu by 
aircraft, being spared the rigors of parachuting in again. He now was 
taken to Decoux in Hanoi by Colonel Robert (who was beheaded in the coup 
of 9 March 19^5 by the Kerapei Tei for his part in the resistance), and 
gave the Governor-General de Gaulle's message.
De Gaulle asked Decoux to keep completely apart from the resistance 
and refrain from interfering in any way. In return France was prepared 
to forgive and absolve him from postwar retribution. As it turned out 
Decoux was unable to resist the impulse to involve himself, and in de 
Langlade's words, "Instead, he meddled —  and went so far as to communicate 
with Vichy with a code we knew was bad. I had to stop the cables and go 
back and tell him."^ This pretty well summarized the greatest problem
of the resistance throughout the war —  the glaring security 
compromises*
De Langlade was unhappy with the loose organization he found in
Hanoi, and on the authority invested in him by de Gaulle he separated
it from the fence-straddling senior officers and gave full control to
the brave Robert; thereafter they preferred to work with younger men*
The resistance movement had two major purposes. The main reason
for its existence was the hope of bringing our a large part of the
French Army in Tonkin to China. These troops would later join the
Allies in the war against the Japanese, as de Gaulle desperately wanted
to get every man he could into the fight. There was no hope of getting
the troops out from the south. The second purpose was the collection
2*f
of information for Allied intelligence.
A letter from the English wife of a Vichy embassy official in
Tokyo, written to the wife of a Swedish diplomat, provided an insight
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into everyday life in wartime Indochina. She said that Indochina 
had been their chief preoccupation for the past three years. Japan 
itself was dirty and the people hungry, and Canton was about the same. 
But Saigon was very nice, one of the few places where the visitor could 
still find clean sheets, well dressed-people and the shops were still 
stocked; the same was true for Hanoi. Due to the petrol shortage the 
cars were running on rice alcohol and lubricated by castor oil.* Local 
industries were flourishing and a program of road building was underway, 
but the Japanese had taken over 2 of every 3 trains running between 
Hanoi and Saigon. They had the same problems with boat travel, and 
the rice was not being moved well as a result. The Japanese were never 
seen except in the streets and had no contact with the white population 
"who simply ignore them". In Tokyo, corruption and black marketing were 
rife.
Without warning, the Japanese brought Australian prisoners of war 
through the Annamite quarter, and were visibly displeased when the 
Vietnamese showered the prisoners with flowers and began to help them.
A local baker drove by their camp each morning, slowed up and threw 
fresh loaves of bread over the wall, and parcels of clothing were 
smuggled in by devious means.
The inter-Allied infighting over French involvement in the Far 
East is discussed later; suffice it to say that in January 19^, the 
French Committee for National Liberation took the first positive steps
*no pun intended.
26in that direction. General Blaizot was named Chief of the French 
Expeditionary Forces, Fair East, and would head the French Mission to 
Mountbatten*s South East Asia Command Headquarters in Ceylon. Two 
mixed brigades would be immediately formed of black troops with white 
cadres, and when circumstances were favorable these brigades would 
be reinforced by a number of colonial infantry divisions, plus navy 
and air forces. A Corps Leger was also being formed to operate 
exclusively in Indochina. The French stressed that two conditions 
were necessary: immediate contact between Blaizot and Mountbatten, 
and the introduction of French military representation in the Chiefs 
of Staff organization in Washington.
Contemporary Chungking could well have been a Hollywood creation.
The British senior military representative there was General Sir Carton
de Wiart, a released POW, who had had an arm and an eye shot away, wore
a black patch over the eye and held Britain's highest award for valor,
the Victoria Cross. He was now joined by the new Free French Ambassador
General Pechkoff, who was late of the French Foreign Legion, of Pussian
descent and also had one arm. General Pechkoff broke journey in Kandy
en route to Chungking. At SEAC Headquarters, Pechkoff said that while
he was in the US he spoke to General Marshal and Mr. McCoy, "both of
whom had expressed sympathy for France and the restoration of-the Empire
Asked of White House feelings, he stated that "a good friend" [reputed
to be General Donovan of the OSS]} had recently seen FDR and implied that
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"the wind in that quarter was not too unfavorable".
If true, it was a cynical play on Pechkoff's fears, for the wind 
from the White House could not have been more unfavorable. The French 
were subjected to the type of transparent delaying tactics which the 
Soviet Bloc later applied as a matter of course to the West, and the 
French Mission at South East Asia Command, stalled in Europe, could 
only peer into Indochina from a distance and watch passing opportunities 
slip slowly away.
Mountbatten continued to press for the installation at SEAC of
the French Mission. His view was that the end of the war was in the
foreseeable future, and, as reported by Dening, "these interminable
delays will, if they result in General Stilwell obtaining strategic
control of Indo-China, have a disastrous effect not only on the future
operational prospects of his [Mountbatten*s] Command, but on the whole
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British position in the Far East. In a memo to Dening, Mountbatten
said that
"poor General Blaizot, eventually driven nearly as
mad as I have been by these delays, appears to have
persuaded Mr. Eden, through M.Massigli, to allow him 
at least to come out on a visit pending a final 
settlement between the President and the ^Kime 
Minister of the question of the Mission."
As Mountbatten heard it, the British could not deal with Blaizot 
because he was de Gaulle's nominee, and de Gaulle was persona non grata 
with Roosevelt. Then when Roosevelt accepted the facts of life and came 
to terms with de Gaulle, the British, noted the Supreme Allied Commander, 
still could not have the Blaizot Mission "just because". The time had
come to act if future operations were not to be jeopardized.
On 1 September 19^, de Gaulle, enraged at the American refusal 
to accede to moving the Corps Leger to the Far East, and the personal 
humiliations being heaped on him by US officials from the President 
on down, ordered Frenchmen in Indochina to cease all cooperation with 
the Americans and to channel all intelligence information to the D.G.E.R. 
in Calcutta.. This caused some problems, but the French resistance 
continued to supply the US l^th Air Force with vital target intelligence 
"because only the Americans could bomb the Japanese in Indochina at 
that time. We were military, and not concerned with the politics of
it.-3°
The French in Indochina referred to the resistance efforts prior
to 1 September 1 9 ^  as the "old" resistance, and the organization after
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that date was the "new" resistance, reflecting the change of policy and 
direction from France. To the resistance in Indochina, conditions in' 
Indochina and France were similar, with Decoux being a Japanese puppet 
much as Pfetain was Germany's. After 1 September de Gaulle ordered 
Mordant to be his representative.
When Decoux heard that General Mordant was to be de Gaulle's 
representative he retired Mordant from active ’service, saying he was 
too old to continue in his post as Army Commander. Mordant was replaced 
by General Aym&, who wanted nothing to do with the Gaullists or the 
resistance. Aym§ then told Mordant that since the Gaullist instructions 
stated that the Army Commander was to be in charge, then obviously 
it was Ayme, the General, and not "Mister" Mordant who would be the boss.
Mordant then wired de Gaulle for clarification, asking who was to 
be in charge: Mister Mordant or General Ayme. De Gaulle replied that 
Mister Mordant was in charge and not General Aym§, who was now to be
considered as number two, Decoux remained at the top in name only. 
Therefore at that time the resistance ceased to be a "true11 resistance, 
because the government was no longer hostile and in fact received 
instructions from de Gaulle through the resistance* This was the "new” 
resist ance*^
As it happened, General Blaizot did go out to SEAC technically
as a visitor, but he stayed, arriving in Colombo on 26th October 1944
aboard the French warship Dumont dOrville, In Europe, de Gaulle,
anticipating the move to Indochina, told General Eisenhower at SHAEF
that the coming of winter made it desirable for the makeup of the 9th
Colonial Infantry Division (DIC) to be altered, as blacks composed
two-thirds of the division. The black troops would be sent to garrison
duty along the Mediterranean coast, and later be included in follow-on
units to the Far East, SHAEF did not like the proposals for they did
not even like the idea of forming new divisions, claiming that the two
proposed new divisions destined for the Far East would drain resources
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from the main effort against the Germans. This stand was later 
modified, for the divisions were forming in southern France, an area 
hardly known for pivotal combat in this war. As it was, the 9th and 
3rd Colonial Infantry Divisions were among the first French troops to 
land in Indochina in late 19^5i but the first detachment from France 
comprised the shock troops of the Groupement de Marche of the Deuxieme 
Division Blind§e(Leclerc's crack 2nd Armored Division). It was known as 
Groupement Massu, after Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Massu, its commander -- 
a man destined to become a full general and a legend among soldiers.
The" high feelings at South East Asia Command about the Blaizot 
Mission and the uneasiness regarding future developments are summarized 
by Dening, "I am sure the step is politically sound even though the 
Americans may shriek to high heaven at its impropriety.” SEAC was 
envious of MacArchur’s independence in the Pacific, for while Mountbatten 
adhered closely to guidance from the Chiefs, MacArthur was independent 
to a degree
"not dreamt of in our philosophy, and I often think 
that we might on important occasions remind ourselves 
that we are not yet the 49th of the United States.
I learn in strictist confidence that General Wedemeyer 
is destined to succeed Stilwell in China. He was with 
SAC in Cairo and knows of the decision. He is hardly „_ 
likely to be on our side. So there may be trouble ahead.”
While Blaizot was on the high seas bound for Ceylon, General 
Juin, on behalf of the French Committee of National Liberation, 
summarized the role and composition of the French expeditionary forces 
for the Far East. French forces would be used mainly in actions 
leading to the liberation of Indochina. French ground and air units 
would initially be divided into two groups, one to operate in the 
Pacific (from New Caledonia) under US command and one to stage from 
India under British command. Ground forces available were as follows:
a) The Corps Leger d'Intervention and the Brigade d'Extrdme- 
Orient (BEO). The BEO was in Madagascar, and was to be 
completed with the addition of 1 AAA Light Mobile Group 
(Groupe Leger Mobile DCS).
b) A Reconnaissance Squadron (Escadron de Reconnaissance),
British type.
c) One two-brigade division, British type, based in India 
with elements from France, ready to embark in March 19^5 —  
a total of 26,000 men.
d) One division, US Marine type, for the Pacific —  of 26,000 
men, including reinforcements. This division would draw 
Senegalese cadres from the 9th DIC and personnel from France, 
and would leave in January 19^ +5*
e) The CLI and BEO were already fitted out with British 
equipment.
But getting political approval to equip and move these forces to 
the Far East, in time for the Japanese surrender if not the March coup, 
was akin to rolling a large snowball up the Matterhorn, as will be seen. 
The Combined Administrative Committee thought that the only proposals 
specific enough to send to the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerned the CLI 
and the BEO. Their considered opinion was that forming large units in 
France prior to the defeat of Germany would interfere with existing 
military operations and should be disapproved, and that forming them 
elsewhere was not feasible for lack of shipping and equipment. And it 
was not possible to foresee when it would be practicable from a logistical 
view to use French ground forces in the Far East. This predominantly 
American practice of separating military and political objectives, a 
policy not adhered to by any of the major powers on either side, was to 
be an error of historic proportion from which the faces of Europe and 
Asia may not recover during our lifetimes.
Other arguments put forward were that the British equipment 
sported by the CLI and the BEO was designed for internal security 
(as in Madagascar), and not for operations in the Far East, and 
Eisenhower reported that the French plans would detract from the 
efforts of the Southern Group of Armies. When the problem was elevated 
to the Combined Chiefs, they generally approved the move of the CLI to 
the Far East, with the proviso that SEAC withhold regular military 
information and intelligence from the CLI. Additional French units 
would only be accepted in the later stages of the war, and if they 
were good and experienced fighting men.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Planners arrived at the following 
conclusions. French forces might be formed in time to take part in 
the war in the Far East. India-based French forces could mount operations- 
in Southeast Asia in Autumn 19^5, and Pacific-based forces might perhaps 
take part in the assault on the Japanese mainland in late 19^5* There 
would be no French participation in operations in the South West Pacific 
Area (SWPA), but limited Allied amphibious operations (shore to shore) 
in the Netherlands East Indies would continue. No major French units 
would be formed before the defeat of Germany, and for the present no 
operations were planned which required special knowledge of Indochina 
or other French possessions. There was no point in forming and equipping 
French forces anyway because the same problems of shipping, shortage of
7C
service troops and specialist equipment would remain.
When Blaizot and his staff docked in Colombo Mr. Dening and the 
SEAC Headquarters Assistant Chief of Staff, Major General Kimmins, went 
on board to welcome him. They all lunched in Colombo, then drove up to 
the pleasant hill station at Kandy, where Mountbatten*s headquarters was 
located. Mountbatten received Blaizot at 1800 hours; after this the 
French were entertained to dinner, when Mountbatten made a short welcoming 
speech. Blaizot sat next to Wedemeyer. Some of the French wore "FEFEO" 
shoulder straps, denoting Force Expeditionnaire Francaise Extreme Orient. 
What Blaizot had brought out with him was the nucleus of. a force head­
quarters. Blaizot himself was described as "pleasant but colourless, a
description which on first acquaintance would appear to apply as well to 
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his staff." Wedemeyer left for Chungking a few days later. Again
wistfully mentioning MacArthur's assumed independence, in which he informed
his Chiefs of Staff, rather than consulted them, Dening wrote that "the
37extent to which he [Wedemeyer] will cooperate is anybody's guess."
As to Blaizot's mission, Dening and Mountbatten were of one
mind and their views were reflected in a message from Colin Mackenzie,
the Force 136 Commander, to SEAC:
Every step which registers a further fait accompli 
with regard to the basing of French activities in 
the Far East on S.E.A.C. as opposed to other Far 
Eastern theatres provides General Blaizot with an 
additional argument. S.A.C. expressed his desire 
not long ago that we act in this sense, always 
provided that progress was made with the minimum 
of fuss. 38
This much was true. But the rest of the memo probably reflected 
a bluff on Mackenzie's part, or at best the age-old oral authorization 
from a senior officer to perform a risky task with the proviso that 
if the operatives were caught they were on their own. Trying to force 
the issue, Mackenzie went on:
"The F.O. has expressed quite recently the same view 
to our London Hq and from the diplomatic point of
view has authorized us to assist S.A.C. in getting
the 5th Colonial Regiment out to Ceylon as quickly
as possible as long as this is done discreetly. The 
draft signal we have submitted is in terms recommended 
by London as being least likely to cause repurcussions.
Additional to the policy reason set out in the above 
paragraph is the fact that the men to be called forward 
include certain elements essential to the continuation 
of our preparatory work in the immediate future. I 
refer to W/T operators, officers and men for Special 
Groups to act as Reception Committees, etc."39
The Foreign Office was prepared to be reasonable in this delicate 
matter, but this was a bit too much and Sterndale-Bennett stopped it as
soon as he heard about it.
In January 19^5 the Resistance in Indochina sent out word that the
Japanese had moved in ^4000 troops to Tonkin from Kwangsi, with possibly
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a division to follow. The Japanese were pressing for piaster payments 
so exorbitant that the very stability of the piaster was threatened. The 
French authorities in Indochina saw these events as a hardening of 
Japanese attitudes and a warning signal of an impending .crisis.
Captain Doignon, Blaizot's Chief of Staff, passed this information
to Mountbatten, who repeated that it was not yet possible for SEAC to 
intervene directly in Tonkin. Guided by his Political Affairs staff 
(principally MacDermot, as Dening was in Calcutta), Mountbatten agreed 
that the Japanese actions may threaten the piaster, but were really not 
as ominous as they seemed to those on the spot. He also sent word back 
to the Resistance that the French must not release American aviators to
the Japanese, who were demanding their handover.
MacDermot downplayed the significance of the Japanese troop 
movements by telling Doignon that these transfers were sensible 
Japanese responses to the threat of possible American landings. The 
Foreign Office commented internally that it was not within Allied 
power that this time to prevent a Japanese takeover of Indochina, 
but the Japanese did not appear to be about to topple Decoux.
The French Resistance had a difficult time in starting up and 
in carrying out concrete plans. Their source of support, Force 136, 
had to fly tremendous distances to reach Indochina and the OSS, just 
across the Tonkin frontier, could have made all the difference had they 
supported the French. But they refused to have anything to do with the 
French resistance movement, and indeed to this day it is difficult to 
tell whether some of their operatives were more interested in defeating
if “I
the Japanese or the French*
Yet another rebuff was suffered by the French in their request
to assign a liaison officer to the Air Force headquarters bombing 
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Indochina. On 7 February 19^5 the USAAF struck targets in Saigon, 
with heavy loss of life in the French and Vietnamese quarters. A 
hospital and barracks for French troops were bombed and the French 
Provisional Government feared the results on population morale of a 
repeat visit by the bombers. Also, some US aircrews downed in an earlier 
raid (12 January) were fortunately in French hands, although the Japanese 
were pressuring the French to hand them over. The Americans, however, 
were passed through French channels to the Chinese border, where they 
were returned to US control. To Admiral Fenard's request, the US Chiefs 
replied that the damage was not the result of a lack of "technical opinions 
of well informed sources". The target for attack on 7 February was the 
Naval Yard and Arsenal in Saigon* The target was "adequately identified 
and described in intelligence material, and was of a strictly military
Zflf
character." The attack was part of a series designed to inhibit repair 
and rehabilitation of "Japanese naval vessels damaged, or seeking haven 
following, naval action in connection with the Allied recapture of the 
Philippine Islands. Bombing was performed by standard procedures." 
Therefore, the presence of a French liaison officer was not required,
"the performance of missions being governed largely by the weather, 
operational considerations and the degree of resistance encountered at 
the target." But the US Chiefs expressed regret at the collateral damage
and loss of life and their appreciation for the safeguarding and 
return of the downed American aviators.
The Foreign Office demurred at this latest blow to the French, 
but deferred to the British Chiefs on this point since wider issues 
concerning the French were now being examined. A Foreign Office 
memo noted that it was not the first time that the British Chiefs had 
been asked to join in shutting out French operations in the Far East, 
and every time the British went along with the US they committed them­
selves a little more to the US objective of opposing France everywhere 
in the East. However, the Foreign Office asked the British Chiefs to 
amend the Combined Chiefs1 reply to the French to show that the US 
saw no advantage in having French liaison at US headquarters. Fenard's 
additional argument was that 50,000 French troops could provide a 
useful resistance if they had reasonable liaison and air support available, 
and the 1^ +th Air Force in China was best suited for striking targets 
called in by the resistance. The Combined Chiefs' reply, in effect, said 
that the 1^ +th Air Force was pretty busy and French liaison was not needed. 
Or was it?
Until the advent of electro-optical and laser guided weapons a 
generation later (the "Smart" bombs), it was, for a variety, of reasons, 
impossible to avoid collateral damage by conventional bombing. And an 
unfortunate by-product of Allied bombing raids was the death of a good 
number of Allied prisoners of war, for the Japanese made a habit of 
holding POWs in danger areas, adjacent to lucrative targets. Since 
locating and identifying camps was an ongoing exercise, would a liaison 
with French forces, who were generally closer to the problem, have 
resulted in more updated information? Perhaps —  but it would not have 
completely spared such casualties, for it was British policy, anyway, 
that POW camps were not to deflect the air forces from necessary tasking, 
(although the final decisions were referred to the Supreme Allied 
Commander).
The Japanese coup of 9 March 19^5 is examined in. greater detail 
later, and it came as the French Provisional Government was beginning 
to slowly but firmly arrive at some practical measures for taking part 
in the war against Japan. Suffice it to say that the Japanese had an 
easier time of it due to what can only be described as the astounding, 
lackadaisical attitude displayed by senior French officers to security 
matters, and it took no geniuses in the Kempei Tai to piece the jigsaw
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k5together. So surprised were the French authorities that a delay 
of 8 hours occurred before the Tonkin units were informed of the 
ultimatum handed to Decoux in Saigon.
The French, with great difficulty, succeeded in extricating 
about 5000 troops into China, while scattered remnants found refuge 
in Laos. As expected, there was nowhere for the southern units to 
go. The Tonkin formations made the sort of fighting retreat which 
would have been immortalized elsewhere, but they were not later brought 
into the fight against the Japanese due to Chinese and American political 
objections. They remained in China, actually if not technically interned 
by the Chinese in less than pleasant circumstances.
The British Embassy in Chungking, sympathetic to the French, 
recorded the Franco-American friction over the exhausted French columns. 
When these troops first arrived across the frontier, the French 
Ambassador, General Pechkoff, had a "stormy interview" with the American 
Ambassador, General Hurley, for the first American reaction to the 
arrival of the French was "to get rid of them as speedily as possible."
The Americans, reported the British Embassy, called the French'hin- 
disciplined, unequipped and destitute refugees and almost useless." The 
French hotly flung back that "despite all appeals for help they had had 
no assistance from the Americans in their own two-months fight with the
Japanese," and what little help they did get from the British South East
_ 50
Asia Command had been the subject of American criticism.
It was made clear to the US Ambassador and US Array Headquarters
that the French would strenuously resist evicting these troops from
China. Pechkoff was further depressed on receiving a message from General
Juin, who reported that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could foresee no
immediate operations in Indochina and that the two French divisions may
not be moved to Indochina in the immediate future. But, reported the
British Ambassador, there had lately been a "sudden (and not explained)
51change of heart on the American side" to keep the French in China*
When it became evident that Allied help to the harassed French 
would be too little too late, the British and French began to concentrate 
on the problem of getting the Corps Leger to the East. There were limits 
to everything, and finally the US chiefs agreed to the shift, provided 
that the British move the CLI and take all responsibility for the 
operation —  although by March 19^5 the US Chiefs had still not replied 
to the request made in August 19^*
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In April the Combined Administrative Committee presented the
Combined Chiefs of Staff with a proposal to overhaul and reequip the
52Free French forces. It was a proposal emanating from the Supreme 
Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF), and aimed at increasing 
French ground forces (in Europe) from 8 divisions and 213 supporting 
units to 8 divisions and 1128 supporting units. The United States 
would supply the basic forces, while the British would be responsible 
for equipping the security battalions, worker units, gendarmes and 
garde mobile. The Canadians were also involved to an extent, as the 
Canadian Chief of Staff had requested to help. Equipment for 3 divisions 
and 336 support units had already been shipped from the US to Britain, 
but a possible delay might be expected due to shortages in supplying 
artillery, anti-aircraft and cavalry reconnaissance units. With this 
the French could more realistically look ahead to returning to Asia.
The French rearmament program quite likely reflected the realization 
that it was folly to wish for a weakened France at a time when the 
Soviet monster was devouring everything in sight.
Despite the fact that the time had passed when the Corps Leger 
could have done its best work, the British Chiefs thought that the 
CLI cadres could still inject fresh blood and needed technical expertise 
to the French units slogging out of Tonkin, but even that moment passed 
with the CLI still stuck in Algeria.
The British and Americans grew further apart over this issue, and
the French Military Mission in Washington may as well have been in a
revolving door, with their requests being tossed out as fast as they
were submitted. Observing the situation, the Joint Staff Mission
reported the position of the hapless French in trying to build up their
armed forces, including the naval air arm:
In the replies they have been given from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff they have received no
encouragement whatsoever to think that their
cooperation will be welcome, no promise that
they will be given due warning when operations
are being planned to liberate territories in
which they are interested, and no indication
that this situation is likely to improve in the
future... we do feel that the attitude that has
been adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
largely of course on American insistence, is
quite out of keeping with the current policy
of our two governments to the French in Europe
where they have been admitted to the E.A.C.,
the German Control Council and given a share in
the occupation of Germany. It seems only logical „
that this policy should be extended to the Far East...
In April the US Chiefs at last agreed to moving the CLI, but
warned Fenard that due to shortages of transport this was not a firm
commitment as to time or scope of their use in Indochina, and they
assumed that their use would be coordinated with Wedemeyer. The Corps
5kLeger, now the 5th Colonial Infantry Regiment, left their camp at 
Djidjelli for Algiers and embarked on 13 May for Southeast Asia aboard 
the SS Strathedan for Ceylon, arriving on the 28th. Their new base was 
the "French camp" 20 kilometres from Trincomalee.
Now that the 5th RIC was actually in Ceylon, Blaizot, acting on 
instructions from the Chief of Staff of the French National Defense 
Committee, asked for information regarding the use of the First Far
55East Brigade at Madagascar and the type of equipment to be supplied to it. 
The brigade was complete less a reconnaissance troop and a light anti­
aircraft battery (which had been trained under Blaizot's supervision in 
North Africa and were now in France). Mountbatten asked for guidance 
from the War Office, and back came the familiar reply: the War Office
"can give no information" on the BEO as HMG was committed only to 
provide it equipment, and the US Chiefs of Staff had expressed no view 
as to the use of French formations in the war against the Japanese.
The French added to their own problems with the diversity of their 
chains of command, which their principal ally, the British, on occasion 
found confusing —  as did, no doubt, some Frenchmen. Mountbatten finally
asked Blaizot for a diagram of the lines of command, which on inspection
56does not appear to justify its complexity by the numbers involved. A 
week later Force 136 submitted a paper to the SEAC Assistant Chief of 
Staff on the French command and operations structure as seen by the British.
Blaizot's paper to Mountbatten was based on a telegram from de Gaulle, 
which in British judgement resulted in no less than 5 equal French 
authorities:
1. General Blaizot, Chief of the French Mission at SEAC,
reporting to the Chief of Staff in-Paris.
2. General Sabattier, Chief of the French Mission in China,
reporting to the Chief of Staff, Paris.
3* General Pechkoff, French Ambassador in China, reporting
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.
k. Colonel de Raymond, Inspector-General of Colonies,
reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.
5* Colonel de Roos, in charge of SO and SI, with Headquarters 
in Calcutta, reporting to DGER*3® in Paris.
Any dispute regarding the services of SO and SI would he settled 
by de Gaulle through DGER in Paris. Blaizot and Sabattier in China 
had equal rights to direct clandestine operations in Indochina. As 
Force 136 (who were working with Blaizot) saw it, Blaizot had no 
authority over Sabattier, who was controlled directly from Paris through 
DGER, whereas Blaizot reported to General Juin and the National Defense 
Staff. The SA (Service d'Action) section of DGER was at the disposal 
of Blaizot (who routinely dealt with it), but not under his command.
Blaizot worked with SA through Lieutenant Colonel de Crevecouer, whose 
office was located in the Force 136 section at Kandy.
According to Force 136 the reason why the resistance in FIC was 
not under Blaizot was that their activities were not yet at an overt 
stage, when it could be under the command of a regular soldier. Force 
136's assessment to the ACOS was that the French setup was "extremely 
confused", with the differing organizations at times holding contrary 
views.
On 15 June de Gaulle approved the initial composition of the
Expeditionary Corps for the Far East. He selected Philippe Leclerc,
commander of the crack 2nd Armored Division, as its commander, despite
Leclerc's objections. Although Leclerc wanted to go to Morocco de Gaulle
59told him: "You will go to Indo-China, because that is more difficult." 
Leclerc's title was Commander of French Forces in the Far East, and he 
was eventually to replace Blaizot at Kandy, en route to Indochina. The 
British Chiefs had no objection to Leclerc's title but, in consonance 
with the grayness of the French command structure, requested that he 
clear it with the French Commander in north French Indochina (Sabattier), 
who still appeared to be Leclerc's equal. The British Joint Planning Staff 
submitted a paper to the Chiefs of Staff in which the role of the French
60in the Far East was discussed:
The French have available 2 Colonial Divisions and 
one Brigade. These can be ready for movement as soon 
as they are fully equipped. The United States Chiefs 
of Staff are not prepared to agree to the provision of 
further equipment until their future role has been 
decided. 1^ We do not consider that there is any 
military advantage to counterbalance the political 
disadvantage of employing these forces elsewhere than 
French Indo-China.
We therefore consider that French forces should 
be reserved for the clearance of the mainland of 
Indo-China, for which they are particularly suited, 
after bridgeheads on the coast have been established 
by British forces* If we are to participate in 
'Coronet'* in any form it is unlikely that operations 
against FIC could take place before the second half 
of 19^6. We do not, however, think that doubt 
regarding time should stop the Americans from 
completing the equipment.
* The invasion of Honshu and the Tokyo Plain
In July the Potsdam Conference ("Terminal") was held; And like
Solomon in his wisdom, the politicians cut the Indochina baby in half,
and as may be hardly surprising it was damaging to the baby's health.
Planning dates for the invasion of Kyushu and the Tokyo Plain were
1 November 19^5 and 1 March 19^ +6 respectively, and a target date of
15 November 19^ +6 set for the end of organized resistance by Japan. In
August the two atomic strikes against Japan thus shortened the war by
well over a year and saved casualties on both sides in the order of
millions —  a million American casualties alone were estimated to have
been avoided, and the Japanese casualties which would have been incurred
in defending the homeland are almost incalculable* The US Chiefs
hesitated at returning to Washington via London because the Russians
62might accuse them of "ganging up" on the USSR. The British could not 
accept that argument, pointing out that the war with Germany was over 
and Russia was not at war with Japan. General Marshall had wondered 
if he should even attend the conference, as most of it was political.
The French wanted to use the broadcasting facilities in Delhi, 
and the Foreign Office asked the Political Intelligence Department (PID)
63for their opinion. The PID questioned the wisdom of this as they 
could not furnish an officer capable of reading and writing "Tonkinese 
and Cochinchinese" to act as a monitor and check on the French and 
Annamite broadcasters. And anyway, they said, with the liberation of 
French Indochina imminent the French would soon regain Saigon radio and 
should not need New Delhi. Finally, a favorable reply to the French 
request may well be "rais-interpreted" at this date. As it was, a nucleus 
of French civil administrators was now attending the Civil Affairs 
training school in Wimbledon.
In Chunking Sir H.Seymour reported that the anxious French Chargfe 
d'Affaires had, without instructions, told the US Army Headquarters, US 
Embassy and the KMT Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs that "he considers
it absolutely necessary that in the event of a Japanese surrender 
French troops of General Sabattier*s command, now in Yunnan, should 
accompany any forces which may be moved into FIC from the Chinese 
Theatre". Wedemeyer replied that it was up to Chiang Kai-Shek#
In early August the French Military Mission at SEAC was asked 
to furnish details of their future civil administration in French 
Indochina and emergency plans in case of an early Japanese surrender.
The Chief of the French Colonial Mission, Inspecteur des Colonies de 
Raymond, was in Calcutta. With him was Major Pierre Messmer, the High 
Commissioner-designate for Tonkin, while Captain (soon Colonel) Cedile,
Ctz
the acting High Commissioner for Cochinchina, was in Kandy. C&dile
at the moment was in Burma observing the British Military Administration
(BMA) there. The British would (in addition to the 8 Civil Administrators
undergoing training in Wimbledon) mobilize and train French administrators
in Ceylon, but in deference to US attitudes the British did not give
any firm commitments regarding operations in Indochina, forces which
might conduct such operations or the eventual use of the Civil Affairs
66trainees (numbering about 100).
Mountbatten was in London in early August, and M.Massigli, the 
French Ambassador, asked to see him. Mountbatten thought it would be
more courteous if he called on the Ambassador, and on ^ August the two
67men discussed the events unfolding in Southeast Asia. Massigli said 
that the French Government was becoming "increasingly worried" about 
French Indochina and the possibility of French troops taking part in the 
liberation of that country. The French felt that the war against Japan 
would soon end, and thought that under a new adjustment of Far East 
theaters French Indochina would fall under South East Asia Command. If 
so, would Mountbatten welcome French troops in his command?
Mountbatten replied that the question of boundaries was sub judice 
with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he had received no instructions 
from them. As to the troops, he believed that French forces should be 
used to reconquer French Indochina. Massigli responded .that France had 
offered the Corps Leclerc, but had not specified how it should be used. 
Mountbatten said that he would welcome the Corps if it came fully equipped 
and had a "tail", but said that the main difficulty would be with shipping 
Present allocations to Mountbatten only sufficed to carry British forces, 
but there was always a welcome for French forces provided, as with the 
Corps Leclerc, they came with support troops as the British could not
supply them. Reported Mountbatten, "I got the impression that the 
Ambassador is determined to push French interests in Indo-China, also 
that he has a very shrewd idea of what the present position is regarding 
the division between theaters. He feels, however, that logically FIC 
is bound to fall into SEAC sooner or later11.
The French now had some firm ideas of their actions in case of an
immediate Japanese capitulation. Group Captain Fay of the French Air
Force (a future Chief of Staff and now acting head of the French Mission)
advised Mountbatten that should the Japanese lay down their arms the
French would, with Allied cooperation, want to take immediate possession
of Hanoi, Saigon, Hue and Phnom Penh in order to establish French authority,
68insure order and release Allied prisoners of war and internees. Six
DGER teams were standing by in Calcutta to parachute into the above four
locations, each team being composed of k Frenchmen and 2 Vietnamese.
These were reconnaissance teams, and on receipt of their reports further
69civilian and military officials would follows. Hanoi and Saigon were 
to receive two reconnaissance teams each, with single teams destined for 
Hue and Phnom Penh. They would all be dropped under Force 136 aegis by 
RAF Special Duty B-2*f Liberators from Jessore. Should Wedemeyer decide 
to cooperate, General Alessandri would enter Hanoi from China.
There were already scattered resistance groups of French and 
Vietnamese left in the field, including 100 men (codenamed "Nuisance") 
north of Luang Prabang, k-3 northeast of Luang Prabang ("Herbage"), 1*t0 
in the Paksane area ("Glazier"), 69 northeast of Thakhek ("Calcaire"), 
and 150 in an area within Savannakhet-Saravane-Hue ("Hostile"). DGER 
could now scrape together an additional 1000 men from various resources, 
including naval parachutists, and 200 men of the 5th RIC were parachutists.
By 15 August the awaited Japanese capitulation occurred, and 
Mountbatten1s staff were frantically attempting to cope with their new 
and crushing responsibilities throughout Southeast Asia and the Netherlands 
East Indies. On 15 August Mountbatten asked London to send out Civil 
Affairs officers with experience in France. "Regarding FIC while planning 
here does not envisage occupation of any large areas we are considering 
[the] composition of [a] projected SACSEA control commission to Japanese 
Southern Army Headquarters at Saigon/Dalat which may have to control the 
area surrounding those Headquarters." It is worth emphasizing the words 
control the area surrounding those headquarters, for this is exactly what 
the Allied commander was directed to do, and latter day critics of the
British Commander, still largely Americans, discounting the Communists,
somehow cannot yet understand why he did not disregard his instructions,
which included a directive that the Administration was to be French, and
70turn the country over to the Viet Minh.
On 18 August Mountbatten received a message from General Juin, Chief
of the General Staff for National Defense, in which he was informed of the
nomination of Admiral Thierry d*Argenlieu for the position of High
Commissioner and Governor-General. D*Argenlieu was the first French
71disaster in Indochina. In his capacity he would be over Leclerc, a
turnabout from their respective positions in Africa. He later personally
\ t
wrecked the delicate negotiations being carried on between Ho Chi Minh 
and the French Government, but that part of history has been adequately
described elsewhere. Suffice it to say that a terrible mistake was made
72in appointing D'Argenlieu to that supreme post at such a crucial time.
We shall soon follow the course of events in Cochinchina, but it is 
necessary to follow, briefly at least, the initial French actions in 
Tonkin in order to keep the story in perspective. The key man in the 
French operations was Pierre Messmer, who was designated High Commissioner 
for Tonkin, the dangerous and crucial protectorate which France must 
control as quickly as possible. Here the race with the Viet Minh was on.
The appointment of administrators like Messmer and C§dile began a 
controversy which continues today. These were the GaullistB, untainted 
by Vichy collaboration but new to Indochina. The question was whether to
sweep the Vichy officials completely out and replace them with the new
73breed or keep them on and use their experience in the Far East.
The original plan for reconnaissance teams was now modified in
that the teams to be parachuted into Tonkin would restore French
sovereignty to their areas. All teams passed through the SA (Service d'Action)
section of DGER for final preparation before being sent in. Seven 3 man
teams were readied for Tonkin, and they were all dropped by RAF Special
Duty B-2*+s from Jessore. Their training had been given by Force 136.
There were two missions among the new arrivals, a military mission and an
administrative mission (of which Messmer was head). Messmer*s civil mission
wore uniforms for security reasons. As it cannot be improved upon, let
7kMessmer tell the tale in his own words:
We were sent, 7 small troops of 3 people, over
North Vietnam (Tonkin and Annam) —  2 or 3 ia 7e
the South. I was dropped at the foot of Tam Dao,
a large mountain not far from Vinh Yen. It 
waB an awfully bad place to drop people because 
it was what was called the Moyen R&gion. the 
Middle Region —  that is to say not the mountains 
and not the plains —  a kind of country with small 
hills, terribly complicated, with numerous cal­
careous caves, trees. An awfully bad place, and 
moreover a place where we always had a very bad 
political situation.76 The French were always 
in heavy difficulties in the Middle Region —  it 
was simply a bad place to drop us.
Of the men sent in to Tonkin, few lived to tell of their experiences. 
All 7 groups were captured by the Viet Minh, and only two survivors in 
Messmer's group escaped. Only two teams were returned by the Viet Minh 
after the Leclerc operations in Tonkin; the k other teams (12 men) were 
executed, and one man in Messmer's group was poisoned.
This was one of the many excruciating "might have beens" which 
characterize these few breath-taking weeks bracketing the Japanese cease­
fire. Messmer himself is best qualified to pick up the story:
We left from near Calcutta —  Jessore; RAF Liberator 
with Australian pilots.77
[A built-in time pad brought the bomber to its target area one hour 
ahead of schedule, so to kill time and make good his TOT (Time over Target)
the pilot gave the team a look at the coast along the Gulf of Tonkin and
lazily swept inland to view Hanoi. It was a daytime flight with the drop 
scheduled to be made at dusk].
We saw Hanoi airport, with no flak at all —  no 
Japanese planes, a very peaceful atmosphere. I 
told the Captain, the pilot, 'Drop me here, this 
is a good place.* His response was 'I am ordered 
to drop you over Tam Dao.' If we had decided to 
land [at Hanoi's Gia Lam airport] with the plane it 
would have been alright. But he had orders and he
decided not to disobey orders —  but it was the day
and the place to disobey orders! 7b
Since all the Tonkin teams were captured by the Viet Minh, the
question of a tip-off immediately came to mind. Messmer said that there
simply was no proof, and mentioned a fact well known to later US aircrews
shot down by the Viet Minh successors: it was very difficult for Caucasions
to evade for any length of time in an oriental country. . He then made the
following dramatic statement:
As a matter of fact, if our seven groups had dropped 
together, that is to say 21 people, we could get 
through them because they [the Viet Minh] were not well 
organized, and we should have succeeded in entering 
Hanoi. No question. From a military point of view
there is no doubt at all in my mind* They were 
not organized -- they had small groups with old 
weapons, and no wireless, no telephone, no 
communications. With 20 people we should have 
passed through. 79
Had they dropped together and broken through to Hanoi, what 
perhaps would have happened? A strike at the citadel would have released 
several thousand French soldiers being incarcerated in appalling conditions, 
the capable SuretS would have reestablished their networks. Ho Chi Minh 
would not have made his effective independence speech in Hanoi and the French 
could have dealt with the Chinese on more or less an equal basis. But 
for want of a nail the kingdom was lost. Who made the decision (against 
some questioning by the teams involved) to scatter and drop the groups 
separately? It was the old problem of officers in the field trying to 
present a realistic picture of conditions to the headquarters staff. It 
is an insoluble problem which in the West has resulted in huge tail, small 
dog, and the French were no exception. Messmer was not impressed with the 
plan and was not sure who approved such a scheme. De Langlade, de Gaulle's 
right hand man as Secretary-General for Indochina, thought that the 
decision was probably taken collectively by Crevecoeur and Roos, of the 
Service d*Action and Services des Renseignments sections. Messmer was told 
by Roos to do it. Interestingly, the decision was taken before 9 March 19^5 
and never changed, despite the fact that after the Japanese coup the French
go
no longer controlled the country. [Pierre Messmer*s previously un­
published account of his experiences, given generously to the author during 
an interview in 1977* appears in full as Appendix A].
All French teams were dropped by Jessore-based RAF Liberators,
including Governor Cfedile's, of whom we shall speak later. Messmer
verified previously published reports of his team being poisoned by the
Viet Minh. Of Brancourt's death, Messmer said:
But as a matter of fact Brancourt was older than 
we were, and I think that he was very tired by the 
kind of life we had, and he was weak. Brancourt 
spoke very good Vietnamese, and it was the reason 
they decided to poison him. It is a good reason 
for that. I did not speak any [Vietnamese]; my 
wireless operator, Warrant Officer Marmont, only 
spoke a few words —  not fluently. Brancourt spoke 
fluently. 81
When Messmer disappeared Sainteny was sent in to replace him as Commissioner 
de la Republique. Sainteny knew that Messmer had been captured by the 
Viet Minh and came down from Kunming as fast as possible, obstructed and
humiliated at every step of the way by the OSS during those crucial 
days. Some of the personal treatment given to Sainteny and his team 
exceeded the norms of professional collaboration.
Sainteny's experiences are set down in his absorbing story,
Histoire d'une Paix Mancufee (Story of a Failed Peace). Briefly, after 
some desperate attempts at finding a way to Hanoi, the OSS finally 
promised the French a Liberator. All previous attempts had met with last 
minute excuses. Finally, on 16 August all seemed set for a dawn take off
Op
on the 17th when at OkOO Major Archimedes Patti, OSS, presented 
Sainteny with a telegram from Wedemeyer forbidding any aircraft departing 
Kunming for Hanoi. Patti apparently knew it all along but waited until 
their expectations were at a peak before breaking the bad news to the 
EVench, who trembled with fury at this treatment.
Sainteny attempted to play on the wording of the telegram and 
emulate "Wrong-Way" Corrigan in a French C-47 which had just arrived from 
Calcutta, but well-briefed Chinese sentries turned the French away at 
bayonet point from their aircraft, and more precious moments slipped 
away as the Vi|t Minh and its communist leaders were rushing to enter 
Hanoi. Sainteny had intended that Fulachier, the pilot, would make an 
error in navigation and find himself over Hanoi, at which time Sainteny 
and team would bail out.
Sainteny and Patti's crew finally got to Hanoi, after another staying 
order had arrived too late to prevent the flight. At 1330 hours on 22 
August they approached Hanoi, the French with "Notre Emotion est profonde".' 
After breakfast, a few days after reaching Hanoi, they saw 3 young French 
women walking side by side in dresses of all red, white and blue. Sainteny 
and his colleagues, after their countless tries and failures, watched 
with throats constricted at this gesture by the women; Patti, observing 
the emotional Frenchmen, mocked them by saying it was the first French 
flag they had seen in Hanoi. There were, of course, no French flags 
flying because thousands of Frenchmen were still locked up in terrible 
conditions which saw several dying in the citadel every day.
Patti covered his antics by saying that the Potsdam agreements made 
no mention of French rights or sovereignty in French Indochina. The rest 
is well enough known. The OSS men, including senior officers, were easily 
seduced by the Viet Minh who succeeded in maintaining the chasm between 
Americans and French. The usual "Friendship Society" was formed, this 
one the "Vietnamese-American Friendship Society", which promised to "send
students to America". The OSS men thought all of this so terrific that
at the VAFA's inaugural party the audience was treated to the spectacle
of the senior American officer and his aide going on stage to sing songs:
Lieutenant Unger, aide-de-camp to General Gallagher, 
sang a French Romance and was thunderingly applauded*
But the greatest success was General Gallagher's, who 
by order - once in a lifetime - of his aide-de-camp, 
went before the microphone for a lively performance.84
From a senior Western military officer it was an astonishing 
performance at a blatantly political party. Sainteny*s pungent comments 
sum it up:
... the American mission no longer concealed their 
hostility. Their position, in fact, is very clear.
Kept and flattered by the wily members of the new 
Annamite government, swollen with arrogance by the 
importance the French themselves accorded to them, 
convinced of the necessity to deliver the poor 
Annamites crushed under the yoke of French colonialism, 
absolutely ignorant of all the relative problems, not 
only of Indochina, but moreover the Far East, the 
representatives of the United States in Hanoi played, 
without the least caution —  perhaps involuntarily —  
the game of the Annamite nationalists.85
According' to Sainteny, a man who personally held Ho Chi Minh in high 
esteem, the Americans in Hanoi, in playing the "anticolonial" and "anti­
white" game, helped to pave the way for Asiatic Communism. Sainteny asked 
himself why the OSS, "so rich in men of valor", sent such "shortsighted 
amateurs" to Tonkin during the critical months of August and September,
1945. He prophesied that one day the United States would pay for their
86mistake, which was not confined to the local area.
And what was the Viet Minh reaction to the ease with which they
were manipulating their American colleagues? Vo Nguyen Giap had no idea
why the Americans had turned so venomously on their French allies, but
he was amused:
Soon after we returned to Hanoi... we also noticed 
that the Americans and the French in Hanoi seemed to 
dislike each other ... the American officer by the 
name of Patty [sic], for some reason we don’t know, 
showed sympathy for the Vi8t Minh’s anti-Japanese 
struggle. 87
Of Potsdam even Giap wrote, "Under American pressure, the French were
left out of the operation", but "Gradually the Americans came to realize
88that we were not pro-Western 'Nationalists' as they had expected." From 
that period was born a deep contempt of the United States by the then 
North Vietnamese which was reinforced over the years.
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The rest is well recorded. The Chinese arrived in Hanoi and 
complicated the issue while the French were still off balance and the 
moving finger, having written, moved off,, never to return.
In the south it was a different story. The southern half of the 
two-pronged French reentry into Indochina was led by Jean C&dile. As 
Pierre Messmer had responsibility for the north, C&dile was designated 
Commissioner for Cochinchina, or south Indochina. He had been sent by 
the Gaullist government to represent it at Mountbatten1s headquarters 
and to study the British Army and British Military Administration. He 
was attached to the staff of the Director of Civil Affairs, Brigadier 
Gibbons, and travelled up and down Burma looking at Civil Affairs 
administration. He was on such an inspection trip when the atomic 
bombs exploded over Japan and the war ended. A C-4? was hurried over 
to pick him up and return him to headquarters in preparation for his 
entry to Indochina.
It was de Gaulle*s wish that since the Japanese had laid down
their arms a French presence must immediately be felt in Indochina. As
C&dile recalled:
General de Gaulle insisted that I be parachuted 
immediately so that there should be a Frenchman
looking after French interests, and that the
British would not be left solely in charge of the
situation. This was not to imply a mistrust of the
British, but obviously the situation required a 
French officer to be present.89
The British asked C&dile whether he had ever previously made a
parachute jump. ”1 said, obviously, I had," recalled CSdile. Two days
before he jumped he was taken to Jessore, where the other small teams
were being assembled, and put into the capable hands of Force 136 and
the RAF Special Duty people. Some of his NCO instructor jumpers gave
him a crash course in landing-fall techniques, and he made a few practice
jumps from a height of two meters. Then on 2*t August, the RAF took
several teams under C&dile, a total of about 21 men, in two or three
aircraft and dropped them at their scattered drop zones .all over
Cochinchina and Annam. Said C§dile:
It was my first jump, and my only jump. I landed 
in a triangle between Soc Trang, Tay Ninh and the 
Cambodian frontier. We landed near some lakes, and
it was the season of flooding. Our presence must
have been revealed and in the middle of the night, 
at about eleven o*clock, we were attacked and captured 
by a Japanese company. 90
C&dile's team comprised four men; three extra parachutes contained
arms,radical supplies and their baggage. At that time there was no
question of Franco-Japanese cooperation. Cedile's mission, according to
his instructions, was to reestablish French authority as quickly as
possible and to show Frenchmen in Indochina that France had not abandoned
them and was coming back. On landing, Cgdile knew that he could rely
on little more than his own wits:
We had virtually nobody, and the only Frenchmen 
on whom we could count were the prisoners of war.
The Allies, too [POWs], such as the Dutch, the 
Australians and the British, were exceedingly 
cooperative. The first French troops only arrived 
at the beginning of November, the Groupement Massu 
troops, whereas I was parachuted on 2k August.
Looking ahead, C&dile said,
"The British sent units of the 20th Indian Division 
under General Gracey. There was never any doubt about 
cooperation with the British —  there was 10C& cooperation. 
There was absolutely no problem and they helped us very, 
very much.1'
In picking up the chronological order of events, C&dile recalled that 
one member of his team had jumped a little sooner and was not immediately 
found.
The Japanese interrogation of Cfcdile and his men was not a gentle
one. The Japanese wanted to know if there were any more parachutists in
the area, to which C£dile replied no, there were just the three of them
plus the seven parachutes. [ It must be kept in mind that the war was
over now]. They were then marched to the local brigade headquarters,
fording rivers en route:
And then when we marched through the river they tied 
our hands behind our backs and beat us quite cruelly.
We had to march all night to arrive at the local 
Japanese brigade headquarters. The division which 
captured us was a Manchurian division,^ an elite 
division. They were only in transit, passing through 
that area. We stayed with them about two days, and 
after two days a lorry came and took us to Saigon.
Cfcdile has never forgotten his treatment at the hands of the Japanese
at the time of his capture:
They were beating us with their fists and kicking 
us, and tied our hands very tightly behind our 
backs, and as we were marching through the rivers 
we were falling down into the mud. Yes, we were in 
the lorries, but when we were crossing the rivers 
we had to march — and these were two very painful 
and difficult days.
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When we saw two high-ranking Manchu officers —  
we saw first a colonel, then* I believe, a general 
—  they were of course much more human. They under­
stood that the game was up, but the troops -- if we 
had stayed with them, things would have turned out 
very badly for us. They were not yet aware of the 
state of the war, very much. They probably hadn't 
heard many speeches or radio broadcasts, so they . 
still believed that things were going to get better 
for them and that they would win. They believed 
that we were spies who just had to be eliminated.
But the higher up the hierarchy one went, the more 
correct was the behavior.92
When C&dile and his team arrived in Saigon they were kept in a school,
along with some other parachutists who had been picked up by the Japanese.
They stayed there for a few days, with little to eat or drink. But
Cfedile puts it in perspective, saying that there was little food to
spare and the Japanese themselves were suffering shortages. Again,
their stay at the school was not a pleasant one, and after a few days
C&dile and two others managed to escape. He was precise in emphasizing
that his breakout from the school was an escape, since the Japanese
had them under what amounted to house arrest. Continued CSdile:
We then went to the Governor-General*s palace, it 
was on that day in fact that the Japanese guards were 
just leaving, to be replaced by the Vietnamese.
My friends and I had taken a machine gun from the
Japanese. We went to the top of the palace stairs
and opened fire from there, and somehow, luckily, 
the three Vietnamese guards just ran off. I then 
asked the Japanese to send us some guards to guard 
us and the palace, and they did so, and gradually 
the [Allied] troops began to arrive. 93
It seems quite likely that CSdile and the French were now benefiting
from the firm line being taken with the Japanese by Gracey in Rangoon.
The political situation in Saigon at this time [the beginning of
September, 19^5] was extremely fluid and confusing. In C&dile's words,
there were Japanese officers like Colonel Imano* [a French-speaking
Japanese officer], who knew that they had lost and had little to say.
On the other hand, there were other Japanese who were defying the official
position of the government in Tokyo:
One mustn’t forget that these Japanese had in fact 
formed and armed some Vietnamese guerillas. They 
armed and trained them against us. And that is why 
we very quickly found Vietnamese guerillas fighting 
against us, and in many places we even saw the 
Japanese commanding the Vietnamese commando troops.
* The author's phonetic rendition of the Japanese name, from Jean 
CSdile’s account.
I’m not sure if the [Japanese] government 
knew anything about that; I am convinced 
that they must have had some inkling of it, 
but they always denied it when asked.9^
C&dile and his two companions broke out on the day before the massive
demonstration of 2 September:
We escaped from prison on perhaps the first; 
it was on the eve of Father Tricoire's death.
The Viet Minh believed that they would win and 
come into power and they were having demonstrations.
We escaped on 1st September —  we escaped, you 
know —  we were not freed, we escaped.
Of the disturbances of 2 September, Cftdile said:
... I'm convinced there were provocateurs among 
the French, but also especially on the part of 
the Vietnamese. It was the Vietnamese who 
were provoking the French, and the French reacted 
to these provocations instead of remaining quiet 
as we'd ordered them to do. Because, after all, 
we were not fools; we knew we were not the strongest, 
but they didn't take heed of that and they retaliated 
by provoking the Vietnamese.
Cfcdile went up to Loc Ninh as soon as possible, to see the former
Governor-General, Admiral Decoux. The Japanese were reticent about
allowing Cfcdile to go there, but Cfedile demanded to go, and by now
Mountbatten had telegraphed the Japanese, saying that Cfcdile represented
him and General de Gaulle; Mountbatten also stated that he was responsible
for CSdile's safety. Said C§dile, of Decoux:
I wanted to tell him that he had nothing further 
to do in Indochina and that he could go away. In 
fact, we sent him away in a very correct manner.
When the Japanese learned I was going they said,
'All right, but you can't go alone', and gave me 
two cars full of soldiers for my protection; and 
in fact on that day they even returned my own 
revolver. And there were also two grenades in my 
car —  they told us the road was not free and 
there were Viet Minh commandos. They never talked
much about politics, and if one asked them they
never replied.95
Cedile had a great deal of trouble in simply communicating with the 
Japanese, and Imano appeared to be the only French-speaking Japanese 
officer available. There were other Japanese officers who spoke English, 
but "I didn't speak very much English, but their English was even worse 
than mine." Imano traced the course of events for Cedile, including the 
atomic explosions. He said that American troops were moving across the 
Pacific and Burma had already been liberated, and a part of Siam was being
attacked, so really there had no longer been any hope for them:
They had no boats left, they had no provisions, 
in fact they were living off the land, off the 
population, and that is probably why they committed 
certain excesses against the population —  they 
simply had to feed themselves*
In Saigon, ”We immediately understood that things were going very badly,*’
CSdile had great difficulty in establishing contact with the Viet Minh
authorities:
There were Vietnamese authorities, and although 
they were not official they did exist to give 
orders, and this became obvious when we tried to 
free Saigon in September*
But CAdile inherited problems from other quarters:
As for the French, they realized we were just a 
few officers with no arms, nothing* As soon as 
they saw a French uniform they thought that 
everything was fine and there would be no more 
problems now, nor more occupation.
There were provocations from both sides, and 
there are many books written about all this*
Cedile was explicit in recalling the fundamental problem: a lack of hard
intelligence:
We [earlier] were convinced that the Allies were 
winning [in Asia], but on arrival there we really 
had very little information. We had very little 
information about what was going on in Saigon, and 
especially after the events of 9 March, when a lot 
of Frenchmen were eliminated; all our agents were 
either captured, imprisoned, killed or went into 
hiding. So we could get very little information, 
indeed* In fact, some British officers in Lord 
Mountbatten's headquarters had asked us to send 
them what little information we could* But 
unfortunately I couldn't do very much about that, 
for when I was captured by the Japanese I managed 
to throw away all my coding instructions and cards 
and couldn't send them what little information I 
had*
Cfcdile reiterated his difficulty in getting the Vi&t Minh to a conference 
table:
I found it very difficult to meet any of the authorities*
The Committee for the South used to send me emissaries 
to tell me a few things and ask me what my government 
was going to do, but I really was not in any position 
to enter into negotiations because I myself didn't know 
what the situation was as I had left France some months 
before —  but I found it very difficult to see them.
This thesis draws attention to several critical lost opportunities, and
this is one of them. Although there now appears to be little doubt that 
de Gaulle fully intended to grant independence to Indochina,^ he cam be
faulted for not making his plans known to his emissaries, his Allies
and the Vietnamese* In any case, the Vi£t Minh initially avoided the
French envoys:
They didn't want it to be said that they were 
subjecting themselves to the French government*
They just wanted to ignore the French* What they 
said was, 'We don't want to know anything about 
the French; as far as we know they are no longer 
here* We're not going to accept them and if they 
are here they can go and jump in the sea*' They 
didn't want to have anything to do with us*
On the few occasions that C%dile did meet the Vi§t Minh representatives,
his main efforts were directed to preserving the safety of the French
civil population in Saigon* In the meanwhile, he formed "a kind of
embryo police force and intelligence force," preparing for the French
arrival. CAdile provides a valuable clue as to why the Viet Minh
appeared reluctant to meet him:
They [the Vi|t Minh] were not very sure of themselves*
They often gave out proclamations, many of them, and 
very often these contradicted each other.
And referring to the period just prior to the arrival of the Allies,
C&dile remarked to the author, "One of your compatriots was there,
Peter Dewey;" a good many people would soon have a great deal to say about
Dewey*
The first substantial French troops to arrive in Indochina were
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Massu, a soldier's soldier, whose
Groupement Massu, of the 2nd Armored Division would soon be disembarking 
97in Saigon* Massu had been hand-picked by Leclerc for the task*
Leclerc went on to Tokyo to represent France at the Japanese
surrender on the Missouri * after which MacArthur told him to rush as
many French troops as possible immediately to Indochina in order to
reestablish French sovereignty. De Gaulle knew the difficulties facing
the French in Indochina, and although he had resolved to grant the
Vietnamese autonomy within the French Union it was unfortunate that his
plans to grant them outright independence were not widely heralded.
Wrote de Gaulle:
Throughout Indochina the population which had recently 
seen the French lose face now appeared hostile toward 
our compatriots there*.. Lastly, the Allies, applying 
their preestablished plan for the occupation of the 
country —  Chinese north of the 16th parallel, British 
south, American missions everywhere —  had fatally 
compromised the effect which the immediate arrival of 
French troops and officials and the disarmament of the
Japanese by our forces might have produced.•• the 
arrival of our soldiers, the departure of the 
Japanese, the withdrawal of foreign troops —  these 
conditions would have to be fulfilled for France to 
recover her status in Indo-China.98
To summarize, history has now rendered its verdict on the gross errors
in judgement committed by some (but not all) of the OSS representatives
^ /
in North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh has emphasized the supreme importance of 
the American support at this time. By morally and materially supporting 
the Communists, and by actively blocking the return of the French, they 
insured the survival of the Communists in Indochina,
Ho Chi Minh used the Americans during the last year of the war and 
continued to use them during his seizure of power in Hanoi. It would be 
no exaggeration to say that he made the American officers dance to his 
tune with embarrassing ease; he simply had to trot out the " anticolonialist" 
tune. It was truly astonishing, and would be humorous were it not for the 
iron curtain which ultimately fell over Vietnam, an iron curtain and
50,000 American deaths a generation later. He used them, simply, to 
legitimize his revolution, for the sight of American officers at Ho's 
beck, and call had a profound, if not decisive, influence on the Vietnamese 
masses. There are few Vietnamese today who would dispute this. The 
obvious question which arises is whether or not the United States has 
learned anything from all this.
To those writers, and what is called the “news media", mainly 
Americans, who so bitterly criticized the French (and later the Americans 
and South Vietnamese) in Indochina now falls the task of explaining the 
improvements in liberty, political freedom and what are now fashionably 
called "human rights" in Vietnam.
Another short-sighted policy was the continued veto by the U.S. 
over the transfer and employment of the Corps Leger in Indochina at a 
time when they quite probably would have destroyed the Communists.
Also, was the fight against the common enemy, Japan, rendered even 
a little less effective because of the American anti-French prejudice?
The USAAF was more than willing to receive and react to target information 
from the French resistance in the field, as stated explicitly by Franqois 
de Langlade and Marcel Mingant, but would not be seen having a Frenchman 
officially assigned to a US staff agency. For it was the French, and 
not the Viet Minh, who possessed the technical expertise, who knew 
intimately the factories, lines of communications and vital installations 
in Indochina, and how to inflict maximum damage to the Japanese. And
although the French colons collaborated to an unconscionable degree 
with the Japanese, there were enough Gaullists to form an effective 
resistance if properly supported and exploited. Certainly the Viet 
Minh contribution to the anti-Japanese effort is now seen as minimal 
and ineffective at its best.
Perhaps worst of all was the American policy of frequently 
humiliating the French on a personal level, starting with Roosevelt's 
treatment of de Gaulle and going down to open American contempt of the 
French in postwar Indochina. France has never forgotten it, and most 
Americans have never understood it. For both the Americans in that 
particular sphere and the Communists formed an unholy alliance of fanatics; 
the Communists classically illustrated their maxim that the end justifies 
the means, while the Americans exhibited their own brand of fanaticism in 
their rigid and nearsighted views of colonialism, reflecting a foreign 
policy which, as a Foreign Office official noted, was based on an event 
which occurred two hundred years ago. And where fanaticism in any form 
enters the field, reason is often the first casualty.
One feature which stands out clearly in any discussion of this 
period was the apparent autonomy of the OSS,and the danger of permitting 
an agency of this sort to operate beyond the control of the theater 
commander. As will be seen, the OSS defied US Government policy under 
both wartime presidents. They overtly cooperated with the French 
resistance when ordered not to do so by Roosevelt, and refused to cooperate 
with the French during the postwar period when ordered to do so by Truman. 
It appears that Wedemeyer did not have firm control over their activities 
in his theater; it is also likely that he was unaware of some of their 
operations.
Although it is not generally known, the OSS did in fact supply the
99official French resistance movement with arms from as early as 1942, 
although on a smaller scale than the Viet Minh received later. Since OSS
archives remain closed, the evidence of their activities must come from
100participants like Captain (later Colonel) Mingant, who remembers the 
names of his OSS contacts.
Although the British, especially, did their utmost to facilitate 
the return of the French, de Gaulle was never reconciled to the fact that 
France did not reappear with "suitable dignity". But there was no question 
that de Gaulle knew that France could never again established direct 
political control over Indochina, and he also foresaw that the French
people themselves would ultimately provide the answer. On Indochina
and related issues would they share his vision and see "the beams of
101a new dawn or the last rays of the setting sun?"
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On 14 March 19^S Pierre Francfort, the Free French Ambassador 
in London, wrote to Ashley Clarke at the Foreign Office. In it 
he traced France’s record in Indochina from 1939 to the time of 
his departure from that colony in July 19^2. Part of his 
information was received in a letter from M.Laurentie, former 
Directeur des Affaires Politiques in French Equatorial Africa 
and now in Algiers as Directeur des Affaires Politiques in the 
Colonial Commissariat, who described the Japanese attack at Langson.
The following is Francfort*s report to the Foreign Office [and is 
to be found in PRO, F0371/VI723]. Any errors in the translation 
are mine•
The Chinese-Japaneae Incident of 1937, which was a sequel to the 
Manchurian affair of 1931-33* directly concerned Indochina from 
the first months of 1939* On 9 February 1939* Japanese troops 
occupied Hainan island, which controlled the Gulf of Tonkin and - 
was less than 300 miles from the developing French naval base at 
Cam Ranh. France had long recognized the strategic value of Hainan, 
and in 1897 had obtained a promise that China would never cede it 
to anyone. In 190? the Japanese had acknowledged the Franco-Chinese 
agreement.
In September 1937* when the China Incident was heating up, 3 
Japanese battleships and an aircraft carrier attacked Hainan; 
another bombardment followed in January 1938- On 9 February 1939 
the first troops disembarked at Hainan.
The Japanese recruited thousands of coolies and built airfields, 
submarine bases, casernes and seaplane moorings. Despite French 
protests, Hainan became a "pistol airmed at the heart of Indochina." 
Japanese plans for southward expansion were now perfectly clear, 
especially when the Spratleys were occupied, to which French rights 
had been claimed in April 1933 by the visits of the French sloops 
Astrolabe and Alerte. But on 31 March 1939 the Japanese disputed 
the French claim by saying that the islands had not been settled, 
and took possession. (At this point the Foreign Office minuted that 
the account later omitted all discussion of the July 19^1 Agreement, 
and was incorrect in some areas).
The encirclement of Indochina was completed when 3 elite Japanese 
divisions from Shanghai were moved to Kwangsi province. On 17 June 
19**0 the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, a "notorious 
Francophobe" named Masayaki Tani, declared in a press conference 
that the arms traffic to Chungking through Tonkin must cease (this 
was the only supply route to China since-the fall of Canton in 1938) 
[Presumably this was one of the errors noted by the FO]. To emphaei 
this point, two weeks later Japanese aircraft bombed ThatkhA in 
upper Tonkin.
On 20 June, the Vichy Ambassador to Tokyo, M. ArsAne-Henry, signed 
an agreement with Japan, and in early July, General Nishihara and 
his staff arrived in Hanoi to moniter the Haiphong-Laokay route.
On 17 July the Yonai cabinet fell, and Matsuoka became Foreign 
Minister in the new KonoyA Cabinet. On the same day, the British 
were obliged to shut down the Burma Road and prohibit interchange
81
with Chungking through Hong Kong* While the pressure was being 
applied to Britain and France, the United States continued to 
fuel the Japanese war machine by sending emormous amounts of 
aviation gasoline to Japan*
General Catroux sent an arms buying mission to the United States.
The team was headed by Colonel Jacomy and had left Indochina 
before the Metropole had fallen. His directive was to order two 
million dollars worth of war material, mostly aircraft. He 
received a cool welcome in Washington because the Americans neither 
wanted to help a Vichy colony nor did they wish to unduly excite 
the Japanese. To console the Colonel the US told him that the 
material did not exist, to which Jacomy responded that perhaps 
the planes and tanks going to the Philippines could be diverted 
to Indochina. This suggestion was received with hilarity, and 
the feeling arose that Japanese involvement in Indochina would 
give the United States time to manoeuver. Anyway, nothing came 
of Jacomy1s mission and Indochina was left with its 11 to 23 
modern planes (.depending on which source is relied on). [The
author's estimate would be nearer the dozen mark].
Catroux had earlier outlined his problems to Admiral [Sir Percy] 
Noble. The French were outnumbered, had no modern guns... and 
the Japanese could quickly assemble 200 aircraft on Hainan. The 
French had but 1 light cruiser to put against the Japanese Navy. 
Catroux asked for aircraft and submarines but, as the saying goes, 
he was preaching to the choir. Noble said that his 13 submarines 
had been ordered to Europe1 and he had no aircraft to spare. Further­
more, he only had. three cruisers left.
In the US, Cordell Hull was reputed to have orally told the French
Ambassador, M. de Saint Quentin, that the US understood the French
position and would not object to France appeasing the Japanese in 
Indochina. [This may have been another of the errors noted by the 
Foreign Office, for the remark was reputed to have been made by 
Summer Welles].
The French preoccupied with Japanese pressure, Siam moved in to 
settle old scores and claim disputed territory, and the Siamese 
dispute and brief war bled off troops from Tonkin to the south, so 
that the French were not even up to strength to meet the Japanese. 
[While in the south the French troops were also obliged to deal 
with a sizable Communist insurrection].
On 20 July General Catroux handed over to Admiral Decaux and departed 
soon after to join de Gaulle.
In late July and early August the Japanese presented the French 
with new requests. On 28 July General Nishihara returned to Tokyo 
to report on his control commission, leaving Colonel Sato (from the 
Canton Army) in charge. Sato thought himself empowered to play a 
grand game in Nishihara's absence. Nishihara was a diplomat, but 
Sato was as impatient as General Ando [whose troops later attacked 
Langson] on the Kwangsi-Indochina border, and was eager to exploit 
the situation. He demanded to use the port of Haiphong and set up 
naval and military bases in Tonkin, and reserved the right to seize 
material in Haiphong which was supposedly en route to China.
It was a rugged initiation for Decoux, who said he would have 
to refer to Vichy. At this time Nishihara returned and sent 
Sato back to Canton, but he was secretly pleased with the results. 
Nishihara continued the game and set 3 September as the deadline 
for French submission. [Although 3 September may have been the 
original deadline, 3 September is generally recognized as the 
time limit set by Nishihara]. Decoux refused to consider it and 
called Washington three times. [These probably were the cables 
intercepted by the Japanese and laid in front of Decoux, accompanied 
by threats of force]. Hull responded by saying that the Japanese 
ultimata would have serious repurcussions.
But the Japanese were not yet finished. On 13 September [19^13 & 
Japanese plane landed at Gia Lam airport, Hanoi, bearing a set of 
"draconian demands" for naval bases, free movement of aircraft and 
unlimited troop passage. The bases would be on the Gulf of Tonkin, 
to include Cam Ranh Bay and Kouang Tcheon Wan, and the Japanese 
would take over airfields at Lao Kay, Phu Tho and Hanoi. Furthermore, 
the tentacles of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere now 
began to fasten on Indochina, for the French were also requested to 
restructure their customs and finances to mesh with the Japanese 
union. The French had three days to think it over, from 19 to 22 
September.
French agents on the border reported that General Ando was gathering 
his division at Dong Dang, and Decoux submitted to slightly modified 
terms. But on the night of the 22nd, Nishihara*s troops attacked 
Dong Dang first, then Langson. [Another minor error, for the troops 
were not Nishihara*s]. Dong Dang fell, then Langson. Lieutenant 
Colonel Lonnet was killed in an ambush. More than **5000 Japanese 
troops, supported by tanks and planes, attacked Langson through 
Loc Binh [the Japanese attacking force was actually smaller than 
this]. Lieutenant Colonel Lovat, Lieutenant Dennery and Commandant- 
aviateur Schertzer "found a glorious death". [These were officers 
presumably known to Francfort]. . Langson fell on 25 September and 
France, isolated, accepted 20,000 Japanese in Tonkin.
Goaded by the Japanese, Siam disavowed the non-aggression pact signed 
with Britain and France on 12 June, claimed frontier revisions and 
attacked. Siamese planes bombed French troops (Indochinese) in the 
Porpet region. Later, on 16 January, Capitaine de Vaisseau Berenger 
in the Lamotte Picquet. with two smaller vessels, attacked and 
defeated a superior Siamese fleet at Kochang.
The day after Langson was overwhelmed Japanese troops made a 
triumphal entry into Hanoi, parading their flags at the head of their 
columns. [They left soon after] • General Nishihara then returned to 
Tokyo, having brilliantly fulfilled his mission of securing Japanese 
rights in Indochina and aligning the Indochinese economy with Japan's. 
General Sumita remained behind. An Indochina economic mission led 
by the old Governor-General Robin (who was sent from France) travelled 
to Tokyo to negotiate the economic situation. On returning, on© of 
the French said, "We gave them a lot, they took the rest...." [The 
preceding account is correct in substance, if not in its entirety.
A blunt Foreign Office comment stated that most Frenchmen agreed that 
France was not to blame for the disaster of 19**0, want to keep their 
empire intact and make any excuses they can find].
83
18 Personal interview with M* de Langlade, 3 September 19^ -5*
One of these British instructors was Spencer-Chapman, who stayed 
behind when the Japanese came and who later wrote his excellent 
account, "The Jungle is Neutral". The other was Tim Gavin, who 
became a Major General*
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refused to believe de Langlade's account of the Japanese build-up*
On this first trip out of Indochina in 19^1, de Langlade left 
Hanoi by rail in the status of "French soldier, second class".
Halfway through the journey to the border he fell asleep and awoke 
with his head on the shoulder of a Japanese soldier. De Langlade's 
pockets at the time were stuffed with secret papers of the resistance, 
positions and numbers of Japanese troops, and so on* He was met at 
the frontier by a British and a Chinese officer*
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21 Franqois de Langlade, personal interview, 3 September 1977-
22 M» de Langlade stated that de Gaulle's memoirs give an accurate account
of this episode*
23 Franqois de Langlade, interview. 3 September 1977*
2*t In this regard the resistance was extremely successful* Hundreds
of thousands of tons of Japanese shipping were sent to the bottom 
by the China-based U.S. 14th Air Force on information passed by the 
French* Other lucrative targets were similarly struck* De Langlade 
reported a spectacular operation in 19^ 4* when he asked for the 
bombing of a Japanese brigade assembled at the Hanoi railway station,
and personally saw it carried out by the USAAF. As with the conduct
of operations during this period, pervaded by American francophobia 
in the crucial north, the severest critics of the French today are 
still American writers, a good many of whom have written voluminous 
works based largely on secondary sources. In another tragic irony 
the USAAF pioneered Azon bombing at this time, much as the USAF 
did with the "Smart" bombs in many of the same target areas not 
many years later.
25 G.B, PRO, P0371A1723, 28 August 19^3*
26 Ibid.« Kingsley Rooker (Office of the British Representative to the
FCNL, Algiers) to the Foreign Office, 11 January 19^*
27 GB, PRO WO 203/5610. Keswick to Foreign Office, 20 March 19^*
28 Ibid.. Dening to Foreign Office, 30 September 19Mf*
29 Ibid.« Mountbatten to Dening, 30 September 19^* -
30 Colonel Marcel Mingant, personal interview, 26 October 1977*
31 Ibid*
32 GB, PRO, CAB 88/30, SHAEF to War Department, 19 October 19^*
33 GB, PRO, WO 203/5610, Dening to Sterndale-Bennett, October 19^+*
3^ GB, PRO, CAB 88/38, 20 October 19Mu
35 In March, 1945, the Combined Chiefs finally turned the French 
down on their request to equip a Marine-type Colonial Infantry 
Division* The British Chiefs, desirous of letting the French 
down, as gently as possible, wanted it made absolutely clear to 
the French that they were refused beaause of supply shortages
and not for political considerations* The British Chiefs' statement 
said, "We have every sympathy with the desire of the French 
Government to strengthen their Colonial forces*" In deference 
to the hostility of the U.S* Chiefs these words were omitted and 
the final British comment was "The Combined Chiefs of Staff very 
much regret that they cannot at present accede to this French 
request owing to the supply stringency, but this requirement will 
continue to be borne in mind*" [GB, PRO, CAB 122/1171, Memo by 
British Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 15 March 19451# 
On 26 March the U*S, Chiefs responded; in their view, the reply 
to the French was not tough enough and they objected to including 
the statement "This requirement will continue to be borne in mind."
36 GB, PRO, W0203/5610, Dening to Foreign Office, 27 October 1944.
37 Ibid*, Dening to Sterndale-Bennett, 27 °ctober 1944.
38 GB, PRO, FQ371/46304, Memo by Commander, Force 136 to ACOS, SEAC,
10 January 1945#
39 Ibid*
40 Ibid*. MacDermot to Foreign Office, 24 January 1945#
41 One of the main arguments which seem to be popularly projected 
is that the OSS supported Ho Chi Minh because of the potential 
assistance his people could render in returning downed Allied 
aircrews* If this was true (and it makes sense), then the case 
for supporting the French is strengthened, for a vastly greater 
number of American fliers were cared for and returned at risk 
by the French than were by the Communists, who for 30 years have 
viewed American fliers as bargaining chips*
42 GB, PRO, CAB 88/35, Memo from Head of French Naval Mission,
Admiral Fenard, to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 21 February 1945#
43 Ibid*, French Military Mission, Washington, to Joint Staff Mission,
20 February 1945*
kk A generation later the USAF was still defending itself (against
a good many other Americans, among others), as this time it was 
the Hanoi docks which were struck*
45 When de Langlade, on his second journey into French Indochina, was 
brought to General Mordant, he had to stop Mordant from openly 
discussing highly confidential information of the resistance in 
front of the native household help* [Personal interview, 3 September 
1977]*
46 M. de Langlade, interview, 3 September 1977#
47 See Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams, for example, for an account of 
the French retreat; see also the book by the French commander, 
Sabattier.
[The following is from Great Britain, PRO, F0371/46272. "French 
Troops in China", July-August 1945]*
Again, as with the initial RAF Special Duty airdrops, the initial 
relief work for the French survivors was undertaken by a tiny but 
enthusiastic British branch of SOE [the Ministry of War Production ' 
Unit in Yunnan-fu, whose work was normally secret]* In early April, 
with the powerful Americans apparently doing their best to ignore 
the French, the French Ambassador appealed in desperation to this 
small British unit for help in victualling the exhausted French 
columns* There were about 5500 French troops said to have reached 
China, but when the relief operations were over the actual figure 
was thought to be nearer 7000* The official figures were as follows:
Camp French Vietnamese Total
Szemao 1250 550 1800
Muong Sing 200 950 1150
Tsaopa 311 121 432
Wenshan 123 125 248
Makwan 156 772 928
Tsingsi 50 350 400
Fengshan 200 300 500
Wun Shan 29 - 29
2319 3168 5487
These camps were for the most part in wild and inaccessible districts 
of Yunnan, and it was to the small Kunming office of the Ministry of 
War Production [MWP] that the French appealed after being turned 
away by the U.S. Headquarters in Kunming. This was about the time 
when it seemed that Sabattier would be forced to retire to China.
Mr. Lionel Davis, the British MWP representative in Kunming, 
immediately responded and through his office the British Embassy 
asked the supreme U.S. Headquarters in Chungking for transportation 
"on purely humanitarian grounds." The answer was delayed, but help 
was finally authorized on 24 April.
There was no food in the areas in which the French were now camped, 
and Davis's immediate concern was to keep the French from starving*
His entire office staff consisted on 5 British officers, 1 British 
lady, 3 Chinese clerks, 7 drivers and mechanics and 11 Chinese 
servants. With this organization Davis collected 3 three-ton 
trucks, 2 fifteen-hundredweight trucks and 1 jeep, and by mid-May 
had delivered to the ragged and hungry French and Vietnamese survivors 
about 100,000 pounds of food, medical supplies, blankets and clothes.
A further 14,000 pounds of supplies were airlifted by the RAF from 
India, at which time the U.S. authorities began to drop in supplies 
to the camps* Of the totals listed, 52,000 pounds were sent by rail 
to the Mengsze area [which was on the Hanoi-Kunming rail line], and
15 ,000  pounds were carried forward by road and muleback over the 80 
hard miles to where the first French columns were staggering in.
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Through 15 June the US Army was caring for 1 camp, at the same 
time Davis's tiny band was looking after four (more inaccessible) 
camps with a French population of 5000* The US camp had the 
best location, on the railway at Tsaopa, and had a camp population 
by now of 1900*
By June special camps had been built, including the Tsaopa transit 
camp for 2000 men, which was handed over to US authorities after 
the arduous tasks of getting it underway were completed* As the 
British report said:
The most important point, and one which over-rode 
every other consideration, was the obtaining the 
goodwill of the local Guerilla General, and the 
subsequent placing at our disposal of many thousands 
of coolies* It must not be forgotten that the writ 
of Chungking only runs lightly in this area, and that 
the active good will of local authorities must be 
obtained by other means*
With the British struggling in the shadows of the vast and [in this 
case] relatively dormant American organization, it is not surprising 
that British bitterness is added the French anger when writing of 
the episode* Sir H* Prideaux Brime noted, in a Foreign Office memo 
of 7 May 19^ 5:
It is most invidious for the Americans, who are 
training Chinese troops, possibly inter alia, to 
invade Indochina, to cold-shoulder these French 
troops who succeed in escaping to China*
Mr. Sterndale-Bennett commented that "this is a very tangled story 
which I find it difficult to piece together." And the British 
Ambassador in Chunking, Sir Horace Seymour, telegraphed: "American 
military are obviously acutely embarrassed by these developments."
As for the remarkable Mr. Lionel Davis and his doughty little band, 
the secret nature of SOE prevented their receiving special recognition 
for these herculian humanitarian labours. Their .role was by necessity 
never publicized, although the French were well aware of what they 
had done for those desperate French columns. But Mr. Davis and 
his unit won the admiration of both the Foreign Office and the local
officials in China and were warmly congratulated for their remarkable
operation.
^9 GB, PRO, W0205/5561A, British Embassy, Chungking to Foreign Office 
and M.E. Dening (SEAC), 18 May 19^5*
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 GB, PRO, CAB 88/351 "French Metropolitan Rearmament Program",
5 April 19^5.
53 GB, PRO, F037l/if6321. Joint Staff Mission to London, 12 April 19^5.
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54 The Corps Leger Df Intervention came into being on 4 November 1943, 
was renamed the 5th Regiment Infantry Colonial (RIC) in May, having 
been granted the colours of the 5th RICM (Colonial Infantry Regiment 
of Morocco) in November 1944* The old 5th RICM had originally been 
created for the pacification of Morocco, and had distinguished itself 
in World War One* In 1940, as part of the 2nd Army*s 6th Colonial 
Infantry Division, it had met the German thrust south of Sedan and 
Argonne, suffered heavy casualties and had burnt its flag when the 
unit was surrounded and destroyed* It was composed as follows, with 
personnel strengths in brackets:
Headquarters Company: Regimental Headquarters, medical branch, signals,
engineers and supply detachments [total of 1051*
One Group Headquarters [303» plus 3 companies, 
or Groupes de Detachments [165 each]; total 
equalled an understrength infantry battalion [5701*
Same as Group One, but with 2 companies [4051 • ‘
Each group contained 1 parachute detachment 
attached [451*
Also, a special core of 81 men was being trained at Poona, India, by 
Force 136 specialists, to be used by Service D*Action. On arrival 
in Ceylon in May 194-5 the training of the 5th RIC was strengthened 
by this core, and the French carried on intensive training in small 
arms and mortars, booby traps, mines, demolitions, signals, elementary 
jungle training, physical training, map reading, language training, 
river crossings and navigation* Some of the training was given 
directly by Force 136 instructors*
The operational priorities of the 5th RIC were as follows:
(1) Moi country south of Pleiku, and north of the Great Lake,
Cambodia —  to enable landing operations in south Annam or
the Cambodian coast and interrupt Japanese Lines of Communications 
areas and reserve troop movements*
(2) Annam Quadrilateral [Vinh-Thakhek-Savannaket-Quang Tri], plus 
the Tran Ninh Plain [Sam Neua-Paksane-Vientiane] —  to enable 
Allied operations in Indochina to be insulated and to intercept 
Japanese movements between Siam, Annam and Tonkin*
The operational regions must have a low density of Japanese troops 
and open country for movement, but where adequate hideouts existed, 
ready access to the Japanese lines of communications, and where the 
operations could facilitate Allied operations.
55 GB, PRO, W0203/5561A, SACSEA to London, 30 May 1945*
56 Ibid*« Dening to Field Marshal Wilson, 31 May 1945*
57 GB, PRO, W0203/5610, Force 136 to ACOS, SEAC, 5 April 1945*
58 DGER (Direction General des Etudes et Recherches) had replaced the
old DeuxiSme Bureau. It consisted of the CE (Contre Espionage),
SR (Service des Renseignements) and SA (Service d'Action).
59 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1964), P.926.
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60 GB, PRO, F0371/1*6323, "Allied Participation in the War Against 
Japan", 15 July 19^5*
61 This posed an apparently insoluble problem, as the U.S.Chiefs were 
objecting to moving French forces east; there was no doubt in 
anyone else's mind as to the future role of these forces.
62 GB, PRO, CAB 119/12, "Terminal" and the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
2k July 19^5.
63 GB, PRO, P0371A6323, Foulds to PID, k August 19<+5*
6k GB, PRO, W0203/5598, SACSEA to War Office, 8 August 19^5.
65 Cfcdile at the moment was in Burma observing the British Military 
Administration (BMA) there. His tour was interrupted and he was 
flown back to Kandy when the Japanese collapse appeared imminent.
66 GB, PRO, WO203/5598, Brigadier E.Gibbons (Civil Affairs Officer) 
to General Blaizot, 1 August 19^5*
67 GB, PRO, F037l/if6323, Mountbatten-Massigli Meeting, 9 August 19^5*
68 GB, PRO, W0203/5611, Fay to Mountbatten, 13 August 19^5-
69 About 100 parachutists were introduced to Indochina by DGER in
August and early September. Most were picked up by the Japanese 
and General Gracey was asked on 6 September to affect their release. 
Most of those in Viet Minh hands were executed.
70 A good deal of questionable material has been written about General 
Gracey, by relatively weighty writers who should know better. It 
may be that his harshest critics have never had the privilege of 
serving their country in uniform and are unable to comprehend what 
an Operations Order means to a Commander. Gracey*s directives left 
not the slightest provision for him to leave administrative control 
to the Vi^t Minh, for he was told bluntly that the French were 
responsible for the administration of Indochina. His surviving 
senior officers, however, say that Gracey without question would 
have dealt with the Viet Minh if they were really exercising 
effective control of Saigon, but in reality, as we shall see, their 
occupation of the City Hall and a few administrative buildings was 
very transparent window dressing.
71 Pierre Messmer, a brilliant man who went on to become Army Minister, 
Defense Minister and Prime Minister of France had this to say about 
the appointment of D'Argenlieu. On being asked why D'Argenlieu had 
been picked he replied, "I never understood it. Maybe de Langlade 
[de Gaulle's right hand man on Indochina] could give an answer.
I'm not quite sure. Anyway, I think it was a bad choice. He was 
an old man, and before the 1st World War he was a Navy Officer. Navy 
officers in the French Navy were very hard on colonial questions." 
[Personal interview, 1 September 1977]«
Fra^ois de Langlade provided an insight into the de Gaulle philosophy. 
De Langlade had met D'Argenlieu several times, and all correspondence 
between de Gaulle and D'Argenlieu passed through him. D'Argenlieu 
was "a bit of a disaster. But that was [the philosophy of] de Gaulle. 
The man didn't matter —  what was important was the job, and [in 
de Gaulle's view] any man should have been able to fill it." It was 
a view not shared by de Langlade who added, "We didn't have a very 
great choice, don't forget." De Gaulle was hesitant to give jobs to 
new people, and he "tried to help an old pal at the same time." 
[Personal interview, 3 September 1977]*
72 Thierry D'Argenlieu was an amazing choice for the job* After the 
First World War he had entered a severe order of monks, rising to 
the head of the order* As Pierre Messraer said, f,It was a strict 
order, and he was strict when he came back into service*" At the 
start of World War Two, after about 20 years in the monastery, he 
joined de Gaulle and resumed his Navy rank* He was named Governor 
of New Caledonia in the French Pacific, and scandalized society by 
openly having an affair with the wife of his private secretary, 
both of whom were English* To make matters worse he presented her 
as hostess by his side for official functions, to the consternation 
of society in New Caledonia* A report sent to London by a British 
Naval liaison officer contained the following unflattering information
He was sent, it seems, to 'prepare the French colonies 
for war' and settle the disunions that existed in the 
Pacific possession* He would announce that he went out 
to calm agitation and confront traitors, to exhort the 
lukwarm, and establish firmly the authority of General 
de Gaulle* He failed everywhere in his aims* He succeeded, 
however, in annoying the British, antagonizing the Americans 
and maddening the New Caledonians, who finally took him, at 
the climax of the disturbances in May 19^2, into captivity*
Instead of pacifying, he stirred up; instead of raising 
the prestige of Free France, he lowered it among his own 
countrymen and in the eyes of foreign nations*
The report went on to say that fighting the enemy seemed to be the
last thing the French wanted, judging from his conduct in the Pacific*
The officer continued:
It is entirely regrettable that the Admiral's undoubted 
courage was overshadowed by his unbalanced nature*•• It 
is hoped, too, that he will not have to be treated as he 
was by the New Caledonians. If he is locked in a room 
for some hours, he apparently agrees to anything* As a 
last resort, it may be considered the one infallible 
method. When he left the New Caledonians were delighted,
and said that if he came back they would throw him into
the sea*
GB, PRO, F0371A6307 (F5231 )•
73 Did the French send back too many of the old civil servants? Messmer 
answered this question in an interview with the author on 1 September 
1977:
A very good question. Many people think, even now, 
it was a mistake. It is not my opinion.
The old civil service in Indochina, as with the Indian 
Civil Service, had certain strong ideas about policy to 
follow in Indochina, and were very strongly against people 
like Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and all the people who 
are dead now —  Duong Bach Mai in Cochinchina. It was 
quite impossible to have through them any kind of cooperation 
with the Viet Minh. It was quite impossible.
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De Gaulle1s idea was, first, to replace French sovereignty 
in Indochina, and then to negotiate a new status with the 
government which had heen in function then. It would have 
been more difficult to do this with the old civil servants 
from Indochina. To negotiate a new status would have been 
quite impossible.
The French Government was short of civil servants in Indochina, as 
all available administrators were returned to France at the start 
of the war. Only ten or twenty were available, so new administrators 
were sent from other parts of the French Empire. Many with long 
service in Indochina were sent back to France for health or political 
reasons.
74 Pierre Messmer, personal interview, 1 September 1977*
75 USAF officers and members of the River Rat Society in America’s
Vietnam War will never forget the Tam Dao massif; it will always
be known to them as ”Thud Ridge1*. ([See Colonel Jack Broughton's
book of the same name (Thud Ridge).'! It was a gigantic knuckle
of a ridge which pointed straight to Hanoi, and at the base of 
which was located Phuc Yen airfield, the main North Vietnamese 
Mig base.
76 See Chapter I, Note 44.
77 This is one of the many inaccuracies in the portion of Ellen Hammer's
The Struggle for Indochina. 1940-1955. relating to this period in which 
she credits an American C-47 (implying the OSS) with dropping 
Messmer's team into Tonkin. It is a fundamental error, for the OSS 
were hostile to the French and the Force 136 organization was forced
to attempt to check the Viet Minh and support the French from long 
range.
78 Pierre Messmer, Personal interview, 1 September 1977*
79 Ibid.
80 Franqois de Langlade, personal interview, 5 September 1977*
The author believes that the basic principles of the operation (to 
scatter teams) was unchanged, for minor changes in executing the 
plan were effected. The point is that the basic assumptions were 
no longer valid after 9 March 1945 but were not altered, with fatal 
consequences, for after 9 March the French forces no longer had 
freedom of movement.
81 Pierre Messmer, personal interview, 1 September 1977*
Messmer stated that Ho Chi Minh knew of Brancourt's death, if he 
had not specifically authorized it, for he wrote two letters to Ho 
after Brancourt had died. He found these letters in Ho’s desk 
after the French returned to Hanoi.
82 At the time of this writing Patti had not broken a thirty year silence. 
However, see note 100.
83 Jean Sainteny, Histoire d'une Paix Manqu6e (p.71)
84 U.S. Government Printing Office, The United States and Vietnam; 
1944-1947 Staff Study No.2 for the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 1972.
85 Sainteny, Histoire. p.95*
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86 Messmer summed up the effects of the OSS actions and the memorable 
feat of Ho playing off the various factions against each other
in what some authorities regard as Ho's finest hour:
We had heavy difficulties [with the 0SS1* The problem 
was not easy* All our French problems in Indochina at 
that time, in '45-* 46, are clear when you know that 
Roosevelt had decided to bar the French* I suppose he 
gave orders to the Officer Commanding in China, it was 
Wedemeyer, to manage the thing so we had as many problems 
as possible* As a matter of fact we had awfully bad 
problems in north Indochina* At the same time we had 
no real problem at all in the south, where the British 
were in charge of the mission, especially in Cochinchina 
and Cambodia*
But in the north the OSS sent an officer to Hanoi, a
Major Patti,, who was sort of a counsellor to Ho Chi Minh.
And Ho Chi Minh thought it was easy for him to play 
American off against French, and later to play French 
against Chinese when Leclerc was there. At the time the 
main idea of Ho Chi Minh was to bar the French, especially 
new French civil servants, from coming to north Indochina.
[Personal interview, 1 September 1977]*
I
87 V# NguySn Giap, Unforgettable Days [Hanoi: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 19753* pp*l8»19«
88 Ibid*« pp* 17 and 59*
89 Jean C&dile, personal interview, 26 October 1977*
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., A British Intelligence summary of the period contained a 
report of a Manchurian division in this area.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid*
9^ Ibid*
95 Ibid.
96 As he did with Algeria when he returned to power, de Gaulle 
intended to grant complete independence to Vietnam* But he was 
obliged to retire from politics in 19^6 and the rise and fall of 
a succession of weak French governments made it impossible to 
effectively prosecute the war, although the Expeditionary Corps 
gave an amazingly good account of themselves despite the political 
problems with which they were saddled*
Both Pierre Messmer and Francois de Langlade, who shared de Gaulle's 
innermost thoughts, are emphatic on this point* Both separately 
stated that de Gaulle had made up his mind to grant Vietnam 
independence (as opposed to letting them take it), but it would 
first be necessary to temporarily reestablish French sovereignty 
exactly as it had been*
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De Langlade had this to say:
... as of Brazzaville, de Gaulle wanted to give all 
the colonies independence* His aim was to reestablish 
Stance exactly as before the war, and then be able to 
set policy of independence. He was stopped from doing 
this in 19^5-^ for two reasons. First of all, we 
were only up to the 16th parallel [in Indochina}, not 
all the way up? and secondly quite a part of the public 
opinion in France, including the Socialists and extreme 
right, were dead against it for two different reasons.
One was for the status quo, to go back to the old ideas, 
and the Socialists were for quite a philosophical idea 
that you find again sometimes with Soustelle about 
Algeria and so on, where they say that the ordinary man 
is better off under a good colonial regime than he is 
under their own law.
[Personal interview, 3 September 1977}•
97 Massu went on to become a four star general in the French Army 
and a legend in his lifetime. He commanded the French para­
troopers during the Suez invasion of 195& and was instrumental 
in recalling de Gaulle to power. In a now classic operation 
[described by Jean Larteguy in The Centurions, from which the 
film ”The Lost Command” (with Anthony Quinn)was made}, his 
airborne division, in a coldly efficient operation cleared Algiers 
of the FLN and urban terrorists. During the leftist uprisings
in 1968 Massu and the Army sustained de Gaulle in the Presidency.
His iron-fisted methods of turning the tactics and techniques 
of urban terrorists and Communists against themselves have made 
him the bane of liberal writers, but his methods as a very tough 
and successful soldier and commander may well be studied in the 
Age of the Terrorist.
98 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Salvation« 19^-19^6. From R.Howard 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) p.225.
99 Colonel Marcel Mingant, personal interview, 2.6 October 1977*
100 As this thesis neared completion the British Broadcasting Corporation 
presented a penetrating series of radio programmes dealing with
the American involvement in Vietnam; the series was titled "Many 
Reasons Why”, and directly parallels this work. The distinguished 
commentator, Michael Charlton, interviewed the leading figures of 
the Indochina drama, going back to the 19^5 period. Archimedes 
Patti of the OSS apparently broke a thirty year silence to take 
part in the series. Charlton began the study with the Communist-
led seizure of power in Hanoi on 2 September 19^ +5, commenting:
By the side of the new communist leaders that day, 
also saluting the flag, were American officers in 
uniform. This episode is a first landmark in the 
American involvement in Vietnam. At first hand, it is 
a largely untold story. It concerns, essentially, 
three men: The communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, who died
eight years ago; and two of our contributors, the
American intelligence officer who helped Ho..., Major 
Archimedes Patti, and Frenchman Jean Sainteny, commissioner 
for Indo-China, who watched that day, while what he calls
the * infantile anti-colonialism of the Americans* 
assisted to power a movement dominated by communists 
with incalculable consequences*
At the Yalta Conference [which many knowledgeable Vietnamese 
see as being disastrous for Indochina], Roosevelt told Stalin 
that he was '*unable to find any ships to transport French troops 
back to Indochina*1 •
Continued Charlton:
The British •••supported France, and engaged in what 
can only be called a running battle with the Americans 
over the postwar order in Asia*..
In the resultant Balkanising of the old imperial 
systems, the peace would be kept by the authority 
of a new world body, the Security Council of the 
United Nations, a concept which was soon to be 
doomed by the onset of the Cold War and by the Russian 
veto. But in 19^ and 19^5, with victory approaching, 
the Americans considered it their international right 
and in their national interest, where possible to 
thwart the return of the colonial powers, by getting back 
into South-East Asia first...
In the northern provinces on the Chinese Frontier, the 
communist-led guerilla bands had begun agitation and 
armed propaganda campaigns with assassination of government 
officials. In the months before their [Japanese] final 
surrender, Indo-China was drifting into a state of anarchy.
This was the wind Ho Chi Minh rode to political power...
The Americans, who controlled the air transport at K*un-ming 
in China, prevented the quick return to Hanoi of the 
representative of France and the head of their intelligence, 
Mission Five, designated commissioner for Indo-China, Jean 
Sainteny.
Sainteny faulted his own government for being caught short by the 
sudden Japanese collapse, for his instructions were essentially to 
use his wits and do the best he could. Charlton asked Sainteny 
about photographs showing Major (later Colonel) Patti, OSS, shaking 
hands with the Communists as they announced their claim to power, 
and what Patti*s role appeared to be. Replied Sainteny:
There is an even more startling photograph*, showing 
Patti with his two aides by the side of the famous
General Giap, saluting —  but you can*t see what they*re
saluting. I can tell you what they are saluting. It is 
the unfurling of the Communist colours over the Hanoi citadel.* 
And so the American mission endorsed this communist takeover 
by being at the side of Giap, who was not minister of war 
at the time, but minister of the interior.
* Shown in The Listener, 22 September 1977, P*359*
** Sainteny*s bitterness is evident here, as at the time of this
photo, there were still thousands of Frenchmen imprisoned in 
concentration-camp circumstances in the citadel, with perhaps 
a dozen dying each day.
Sainteny then confirms the view reached by the author during 
the course of this study regarding Patti's actions:
What was Patti's role at K'un-ming? He was, I 
believe, very much on his own#*, clearly, the 
United States' hostility towards France's eventual 
return to Indo-China went through Patti. Did 
Patti do it spontaneously? I don't think so, 
because this hostility was such that it could only 
have been the result of general directives issued 
much higher up.
The very selection of Patti to head an intelligence section 
in Indochina must also raise some questions. In a vast and 
varied nation like the United States, the OSS found it necessary 
to bring in an officer from Europe to go to Indochina, an officer 
who first had to check the map to find out where Indochina was.
Said Patti, of.Indochina: "I had an idea it was out in Asia, 
somewhere." Patti, in breaking a long silence, indicates that 
General Donovan, OSS chief, instructed him to steer clear of 
political involvement. He was also aware of Ho's communist 
background, but Ho convinced him that he was more nationalist 
then Communist. Asked by Charlton if he was aware that American 
support was vital to Ho in establishing his authority, Patti 
replied:
Yes, that is true. He did use us, and I knew it.
I didn't mind, frankly, because the use he made of 
us was more one of image than substance.
The last statement is perhaps the most telling sentence of this 
whole story, for it reveals just how little the Americans really 
knew of Vietnamese culture; they should have known by now that 
to the Vietnamese, symbolism is everything, and image is substance. 
And while the Americans [one of whom accompanied Giap into Hanoi] 
were blocking the French they knew that the Viet Minh under Ho 
would reach Hanoi first.
Charlton drew attention to the fact that some of the history disputes 
the statements that the Viet Minh were attacking the Japanese, 
saying that the Viet Minh were more intent on burning villages and 
intimidating the local population, and hinted that this was more of 
what the OSS saw than attacks on Japanese. Patti replied that "there 
might have been some of that" [burning of villages]. But Patti is 
right in saying that Ho Chi Minh more correctly filled a power 
vacuum than seized power, a vacuum caused in part by MacArthur's 
forbidding the Allies to enter Indochina until 2 September [the day 
he personally accepted the Japanese surrender in Tokyo]. The trouble 
was that although this tied up the Allies it left a clear field 
for the communists and their OSS followers who tagged along. Through 
Patti an explanation is at last offered for the fly-past of a flight 
of USAAF P-38 Lightnings as Ho Chi Minh announced his seizure of 
power in Hanoi. It was, he said, "a quirk of fate; just one of 
those things that happens once in a million years, I suppose."
Said Patti:
During the speech that Ho was delivering from 
the rostrum, way up high, a flight of P-38s (I 
believe they were) came overhead* They were 
curious of the huge crowds below, and I can
imagine what a pilot might do: 'Say, what's
going on down there?' And he must have dipped
down to look, and many people interpreted that
to be a dip of a salute* That was simply an 
accident*
Patti's version of the disbandment of OSS activities in Vietnam
made no mention of the fundamental reason for their departure: the
new American consul in Hanoi was so appalled at the results of OSS
activities that he demanded they be removed at once, before they
could do further damage*
Charlton stated that ’’The apparent American benediction on Ho Chi 
Minh's men deeply impressed the Vietnamese," one of whom later 
became an important figure in the late South Vietnam's military 
and political spheres, General Tran Van Don* Don stated that he, 
along with all the other Vietnamese, had never heard of one 
Ho Chi Minh before 19^5*
People like myself discovered that there was a leader, 
who came back and took over control of Hanoi, with the 
name of Ho Chi Minh, leading an organization —  we 
didn't know how big, but we knew that this organisation 
was backed by the Americans, that was the crucial fact**
Michael Charlton pressed Tran Van Don on this key point of American 
support, saying:
So you think the principle reason for Ho Chi Minh's 
sudden acceptance as a national leader for North Vietnam 
was due more or less entirely to the fact that he was 
visibly being supported by the victorious Americans, 
rather than any popular sentiment or uprising among the 
people?*
Tran V&n D8n confirmed the author's conclusions in replying:
I am convinced about this* Even Emperor Bao Dai 
resigned very fast. He said, there is nothing to say against 
these people, because they are fighting for independence 
and the Americans are supporting them*
Charlton mentions how the enthusiastic American support of the 
Vi^t Minh, and Major Patti's zeal in particular, shocked the French. 
Sainteny continued:
He had instructions, but went beyond his orders**, 
the fact remains that he behaved towards us as a 
deliberate enemy. I was incarcerated by the Japanese 
and by the Viet Minh, together with my associates, in 
the governor general's palace* I was permanently 
guarded by Japanese sentries with fixed bayonets, and 
Patti used to come regularly to make sure we were 
really properly guarded by the Japanese —  our common 
enemy, who had capitulated two weeks earlier. When
*A11 italics in this footnote are added*
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you come to think of it, it really was abnormal,
Charlton's narrative continued:
There seems little doubt that he [Patti] and other 
American intelligence officers succumbed when they 
were with him, not just to Ho Chi Minh's impressive 
determination and abilities, but to his charm and 
flattery of them, too. Ho perceived that it would be 
the Americans, not the Russians, who would determine 
events in the immediate future in Indo-China.•• The 
fact is, that it was the Americans who literally 
took revolution by the hand and accompanied it into 
Hanoi.
Dennis Duncanson, an authority on Vietnam affairs and author of the 
book, "Government and Revolution in Vietnam", has the last word in 
this particular program:
During the course of the war, of course, the Chinese 
element becomes less and less significant [to Ho Chi 
Minh] and the Americans move in, and they become the 
Allies. But there was no question of the communist 
party, of Ho Chi Minh personally, or anybody else, 
actually winning power in Indo-China simply by 
sentimental appeal to the mass of the people. Politics 
is not of that kind, and no communist has ever supposed 
that it was; politics grows out of the barrel of a gun...
I would put Ho Chi Minh's capacity in the actual exercise 
of power as more remarkable than Lenin's. Of course,
Lenin was a great literary figure. Ho Chi Minh wrote 
very little and was not a great intellect. But, in his 
narrow field he was, I would say, as a political manipulator, 
supreme.
fThe Listener, British Broadcasting Company, London: 22 September 
1977* pp.357-360.] Italics added.
101 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Salvation, p.93^*
CHAPTER III
THE JAPANESE IN VIETNAM
"Where," asked the Emperor, "is the Strike- 
South commander going to set up his headquarters?"
"In Saigon," replied Sugiyama.
In all the discussions about Vietnam in recent years, the role 
of the Japanese seems to have been largely ignored or downplayed. Yet 
it was the Japanese who ultimately destroyed forever the position of the 
French in Indochina (and the white man in Asia, for that matter). By 
occupying Indochina and successfully forcing their demands on the French, 
they finally demonstrated the fact that the French were very ordinary 
people. When Japan collapsed, she did everything in her power to impede 
France’s reclaiming her former possession. The Japanese turned over 
large stocks of arms, ammunition and money to the Vietnamese revolutionaries, 
and in many cases Japanese deserters fought beside the Vietnamese rather 
than surrender to the Allies.
In March, 19^5i the Japanese dispensed with the trappings of French 
colonial rule and swept the French armed forces and civil administration 
into jail. In August, when Japan surrendered, the French were still 
locked up, and the Viet Minh were presented with the improbable spectacle 
of their former masters helpless, the Japanese silently cooperative, and 
all of Indochina ripe for the plucking as it had never been before and 
would never be again* Thus the August Revolution was made possible. It 
was not until later that the Japanese in the south were ordered to retain 
their arras and go into action against the Viet Minh. The Japanese Array 
thus continued fighting for several months after the end of World War Two, 
but this time under the orders of the Allies —  in rapid succession the 
Japanese had changed from former enemy to active ally.
Indeed, it was the initial Japanese occupation of Indochina which 
was eventually responsible for the postwar British insistence on returning 
Indochina to France. The effective use that the Japanese had made of 
Indochina as a springboard to all of Southeast Asia was not lost on the 
British. In discussing the role of the Japanese in postwar Saigon, it 
is first necessary to understand the reasons for their presence there.
The Japanese political situation in the mid-thirties was marked by 
turbulence, uncertainty and assassination. In the middle of the decade 
the militarists got the upper hand and the idea of the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere took shape. In the thirties the Japanese invested 
Manchuria and created the vassal state of Manchukuo. If Japan’s grandiose 
ambitions for empire and influence were to be realized she would have to 
have access to a wider variety of raw materials than her own meagre 
resources could provide.
In July, 1937* with further Japanese encroachment into China, 
there occurred the famous "China Incident", in which Japanese troops 
fired on the Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge, near Peking* Henceforth, 
the Japanese referred to the larger Chinese war as the "China Incident".
By 19*+0 the Japanese had pushed the surprisingly stubborn Chinese to 
the southern border, beyond which lay French Indochina.
The French in Indochina were naturally apprehensive at the bellicose 
Japanese behavior (especially since they eventually became politically 
marooned with the defeat of their homeland by Germany). With the fall 
of Canton to the Japanese, the only reasonable supply route to Chiang 
Kai-Shek was via the Indochinese port of Haiphong, the Tonkin rail system, 
and the railway from Yunnan to Kunming (which was French-owned). The 
Japanese exerted pressure on the French to close these routes, and finally, 
took matters into their own hands by interdicting the Yunnan route by 
tactical air strikes.
The French government was not prepared to forcibly resist the 
Japanese unless the British and American governments promised support*
The British replied that they would only go as far as the United States, 
and no farther. However, Cordell Hull of the U.S. would have none of it, 
and felt that the British were shifting the burden of responsibility to 
him. The result was that the French were forced to become more flexible 
in their dealings with the Japanese, who fully appreciated the tenuous 
position of the French. On 19 June 19^0, the Japanese bluntly demanded 
that the French seal off their border with China and permit Japanese 
inspectors to oversee the embargo on Chinese traffic. The French were 
prompt to respond to the Japanese demands, and on 20 June they replied 
that the border had in fact been closed a couple of days earlier to 
gasoline supplies and trucks, and that they would expand the list of 
prohibited goods. They would, however, welcome the Japanese.
The Japanese accepted the French offer, and on 29 June a Japanese 
mission under General Nishihara landed at Hanoi; from there they fanned 
out and set up a number of checkpoints at Haiphong, Hagiang, Laokay, Caobang, 
Langson and Fort Bayard. Most of these same places would later become the 
scenes of bitter battles between the French and Viet Minh.
The Chinese, of course, protested vigorously to the French and 
threatened to send their own armies into Tonkin. The French were now in 
the uncomfortable position of possibly being in the middle of the Sino- 
Japanese War. The Japanese were not at all satisfied with what they
considered the lukewarm cooperation of the French, and the Japanese 
ambassador in Berlin was trying to persuade the Germans to pressure 
Vichy into closer cooperation in Tonkin.
The Japanese made clear their need for new materials and rice, 
and the pro-Allied Governor General, Catroux, asked the Allies for some 
tangible support. The British Far Eastern Naval Commander sailed up 
from Singapore and quashed any hopes that Catroux may have cherished. The 
British simply had no power to spare.
The British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir R. Craigie, was fully aware
of the dangers inherent in the diplomatic manoeuvering in Southeast Asia,
and was himself subjected to considerable pressure from the Japanese.
On 2k June 19^0, the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told
Craigie that Japanese public opinion was solidly against the British
because of the British support.of the Chinese with war materials and
because British troops were still in Shanghai. Furthermore, the Japanese
were in no mood to bargain over the Burma road, over which supplies for
China were moving. The British Foreign Office were trying to determine
whether [in the worst case of hostilities commencing] the war would be a
local or general conflict, for the Japanese were giving the British little
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room to manoeuver. The Foreign Office was now satisfied that whatever 
happened they would be going it alone, for the United States was not 
prepared to take a firm stand against the Japanese. If the British were 
to give in to the Japanese demands over closing the Burma Road, further 
pressure could be expected. The British hoped to use the Burma Road as 
leverage in their efforts to extricate their Shanghai garrison, but they 
were under no illusions as to the difficulties involved for the Japanese, 
in their clashes with the Russians, had demonstrated that they could wage 
violent local war without generalizing the conflict. To Craigie it was 
apparent that the younger group of Japanese officers were beyond reasonable 
control and might well murder the more cautious senior officers. The 
momentous issue of war or peace depended on the outcome of the struggle 
between the moderates and extremists in Japan.
The British, aware of their weakness in the Far East while they 
were concentrating on the fight for survival in Europe, fell back on their 
traditional diplomatic skills in order to buy time. Craigie told the 
Japanese that reports of arms shipments to China over the Burma Road were 
greatly exaggerated, and the amount was in fact declining. Craigie asked 
the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, ,1Was not Japanese public opinion, 
under guidance from an interested party, making a mountain out of a mole-
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hill of this whole question?” The Vice Minister was ready to agree 
with Craigie, but ”it was obvious that Japanese public opinion, which 
had become greatly stirred,” would not settle for less than a complete 
ban on Burma road traffic to China* The British were asked to put a 
halt to this flow of materials and to show '’concrete evidence” that it 
had stopped, or further unspecified pressure would be applied. ’’Concrete 
evidence” would consist of permitting the Japanese Consul-General in 
Rangoon to go up and see for himself. The important point in this whole 
exercise was the American attitude. A firm American commitment to resist 
further Japanese aggression would very largely decide the British reaction, 
but the Foreign Office predicted that they would get nothing but goodwill
from the United States, and in this they were correct* The U.S. continued
to preach to the Allies but refused material support*
Craigie correctly advised the Foreign Office that this was not an
opportune time to take on the Japanese. The British had just extracted 
their Expeditionary Force from the beaches of Dunkirk while the Royal 
Air Force and the Luftwaffe were building up to the decisive air campaign 
of the war in the Battle of Britain. Craigie reluctantly recommended that 
the British accede to Japanese demands to close the Burma Road temporarily, 
but faced opposition from some of his colleagues* Sir A.Clark Kerr in 
China, for example, did not relish the idea, for while the Chinese may 
understand the French reaction to Japanese pressure, they might not forgive 
the British, who were not ’’beaten to our knees”, and suggested archly that 
the Orientals demanded a higher standard of morality from the British.
His suggestion was to use the Shanghai garrison as a bargaining chip, and 
keep the Road open.
Craigie, nearer to the mood of the Japanese, disagreed, saying that 
the Japanese Army was determined to close the Road at all costs. The 
discussions on this subject were fascinating. Sir F.Leith Ross, of the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, disagreed with Kerr and favoured retaining 
the Shanghai garrison, while a majority in the Foreign Office agreed with 
Kerr. Mr. Amery, of the India Office, told the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs that the British position in the Far East was so weak 
that their only chance lay in a policy of boldness. If the Japanese started 
to fight now, Hong Kong must hold out as long as possible in the hope that 
the United States would come in before Singapore fell and the Navy sunk.
”To ask the United States for help beforehand is to my mind a waste of
if
breath." Lord Lothian, in Washington, advised keeping the Road open. The
War Cabinet reflected Araery's view that the U.S. was not prepared to 
increase pressure on the Japanese or take the initiative in a policy of 
conciliation.
Craigie, knowing that the Japanese would plunge recklessly into 
a fight, continued to press for closing the road. The idea was repugnant 
to him, but he thought that the Japanese could be taught a lesson when 
the Germans were defeated. The Burma Road was closed for three months 
as a compromise, but it was closed during the monsoon season when supplies 
to China would have been minimal.
In mid-July, General Nishihara raised the inevitable question of 
air bases in Tonkin. The Strike South faction in Tokyo, of which more 
will be said, was prevailing. The French, desperately stalling for time, 
replied that they would deny entry to Chinese troops, but the matter of 
air bases and transit rights for Japanese troops was a matter for negotiations 
between the French and Japanese governments.
In August, 19^ *0, a French delegation travelled to Tokyo to engage 
in negotiations with the Japanese. Matsuoka, the new Japanese Foreign 
Minister, was not taken in by French stalling tactics and threatened force.
The French finally gave in under these threats and recognized Japanese 
economic and political dominance in the East; they also granted the 
Japanese sweeping economic privileges while agreeing to permit about 
5,000 Japanese troops to be based at three airfields in Tonkin and transit 
rights for the Japanese army along the Tonkin rail system. The Japanese 
claimed that these provisions were only to facilitate a favorable conclusion 
to the war with China, but it is doubtful if the French were satisfied with 
that explanation, even though the Japanese promised to recognize French 
sovereignty in Indochina. Despite these Japanese assurances, the French 
were still justifiably reluctant to allow the Japanese foot in the door, 
and continual French delays in carrying out the accord were met with a 
threat by Nishihara to bring the Japanese Array into Indochina in early 
September. On  ^September, the day before the Japanese deadline, the 
French commander, Martin, signed an agreement which clarified the 
technicalities.
The Governor General, Admiral Decoux, frustrated by the inexorable 
Japanese pressure, accused the British of subversion in Indochina by 
assisting Gaullists to leave Vichy territory. The Foreign Office, not 
wishing to give Decoux an excuse to act against British missions in 
Indochina, advised their consulates to suppress their natural inclinations
to help the anti-Vichy French# However, any Frenchmen who managed 
to reach British territory on their own would be given help in reaching 
Britain or Free French forces in Africa. This again reflected Craigie's 
advice, for he had advised against making an issue out of the problem 
of Gaullists in Indochina, and the British were still contemplating 
"discreet" assistance to groups in Indochina. Decoux was also quite 
concerned about a possible Gaullist coup by the army, fears which the 
army commander assured him were groundless. He was even worried about 
possible agitation from Singapore by Catroux, and the Chinese were 
threatening to blow up the railway at the Dedkay frontier station.
After Catroux left Indochina he made the sort of assertions which
became the common rationale for the French collapse: "It was not the
French nation that was conquered, but its leaders. The crisis came too
quickly for the people as a whole to assert itself. It was sold into
5bondage by men unworthy of a great and noble country." In Indochina at 
least, Catroux was himself one of the leaders.
The British Commander in Malaya reported that the situation in
g
Indochina was "extremely confused," and thought that there was a small 
possibility that General Martin would carry out a coup in Cochinchina, 
and oppose both Decoux and the Japanese. The British were in no position 
to help Martin and were unsure as to whether the coup would be in the 
British interest or provoke further Japanese advancement to the south.
It was finally decided not to send a British liaison officer to Indochina, 
although there were no reliable channels for receiving information from 
Martin. The British did have a bargaining chip in that the most important 
source of industrial salt for Japan was Eritrea and Italian Somaliland 
(250-300 ,000 tons a year), and the Japanese had informed the Foreign 
Office that they were concerned for the safety of their vessels in Middle 
East and European waters since sharp naval actions had occurred between 
the British and the German/Italian navies. So although the British were 
blockading Italian exports they replied that truly neutral shipping would 
not be endangered, and suggested that although the blockade on Italian 
exports would continue, perhaps the Japanese could switch to British sources.
By January, pro-Gaullist literature was passing from Shanghai
through Singapore for Indochina. Although the British censors were with­
holding much of the Gaullist propaganda Decoux protested that the British 
Consul in Saigon was anti-French and supporting Thai claims to Indochinese 
territory. The British then entered into a "Gentleman's Agreement" with
Decoux (the forerunner of a later, and better known Gentleman's Agreement
over Indochina of which much will be said later), in which the British
would fully ban all Free French propaganda to Indochina provided no Vichy
propaganda were distributed in the Free French territories in the Pacific*
From Tokyo, Sir R.Craigie reported that the French Mission there
was under strong pressure from the Japanese for alleged rapprochement
with the British over Indochina, The Japanese declared that they were
concerned that Anglo-French talks were going on in secret while the
Japanese-French negotiations were in progress, and hinted broadly that
Japanese Army commanders on the spot in Indochina may be hard to control*
In early 19 Vi Admiral Decoux, beginning his long and controversial
double game, authorized the passing of military information to the British
in Hanoi; there were now about 8,000 Japanese troops in Tonkin* Increased-
unofficial Japanese activity in the area was reflected in their aircraft
loss rate, when from 1? October to 1 December they lost 36 aircraft (7 of
which were accidents while 1*f were lost over the Burma Road), a loss rate
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of nearly one aircraft a day*
Significantly, evidence of Japanese interference in local politics 
was uncovered even at this early stage* Pamphlets inciting the Tonkinese 
to rebellion were found in the baggage of Japanese officers, and there
g
was "no doubt" that the Japanese were giving arms, clothing and money 
to the Vietnamese resistance against the French. The French were considered 
to be especially vulnerable because of their long lines of communication 
and the increasing pressure being applied by the Thais, and the Foreign 
Office thought that the Japanese now regretted their promise to respect 
the integrity and sovereignty of French Indochina.
The Foreign Office noted that the profile of the French administration 
in Indochina was not one to inspire confidence. In their view incompetence, 
corruption and defeatism were rife in high French circles, and most officials 
seemed to be blind to wider issues being concerned mainly with their own 
salaries and pensions. The British Consul at Haiphong reported that as of 
January, 19Vi, the Japanese command structure in Tonkin .was as follows: 
General Nishihara commanded the division in Tonkin, General Sakaruda 
commanded the brigade at Haiphong, Colonel Kumabi had the air/land forces
at Gialam airfield [Hanoi], while Colonel Ozonoe commanded artillery and
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tank troops at Bac Ninh. Even Catroux was recommending a cautious policy 
in Indochina, for the Gaullists were in the minority. The "Gentleman's 
Agreement" also extended to the British and French naval commanders in the
Far East, who refrained from firing on each other.
In Tokyo, Japanese policy was formulated by a series of Liaison
10Conferences between the Government and the service Chiefs of Staff.
The Emperor, Hirohito, also had a large part in influencing Japanese 
11policy. These Liaison Conferences were started in late 1937* for By
then the armed forces were so strong that the government had to secure
service approval for policy decisions. Before long these conferences
became paramount in the decision-making process, especially regarding
foreign policy. The Cabinet business was now confined largely to domestic
affairs. Major decisions reached at these conferences were referred
directly to Emperor Hirohito for imperial ratification.
At the 21st Liaison Conference, 3 May 19^1 , Foreign Minister Matsuoka
12discussed his trip to Germany* The Germans told him that in their view '
Japan should conquer Singapore now, but the Japanese War Minister cautioned
that before operations could be undertaken in Malaya, Thailand and French
Indochina would have to be occupied.
In April 19V1, Churchill (aware of the growing intransigence of
the Japanese and the current crucial discussions on war policy) wrote a
remarkable letter to Matsuoka, in which he asked Matsuoka to consider the
13answers to the following questions. Would Germany, without control of 
the air or sea, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain, and would 
they even try? It would be in Japan's interests to wait and see. Did 
Japan's joining the Triple Pact (the "Axis") make it more or less likely 
that the United States would enter the war, and if the former was the case, 
would not the "naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable 
them to deal with Japan while disposing of the Axis powers in Europe?" Was 
Italy a help or hindrance to Germany, and was the Italian fleet as good 
at sea as on paper; moreover, "Is it as good on paper as it used to be?" 
Would the British Royal Air Force be stronger or weaker in the coming year? 
Would the countries "being held down by the German Army and Gestapo, learn 
to like the Germans more or will they like them less as the years pass by?" 
The United States and Great 3ritain had a combined steel- production capacity 
of 90 million tons; if Germany was defeated again would the 7 million tons 
of Japanese steel production be enough to sustain a "single-handed war?" 
Churchill concluded by saying, "From the answers to these questions may 
spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe.. .J1
At the 30th Liaison Conference of 12 June 19V1, & policy document 
called "Acceleration of the Policy Concerning the South" was presented for
1 bdiscussion. The main points of discussion were the need for a
military union with French Indochina in order to facilitate the movement
of Japanese troops to Cochinchina, and for diplomatic preparation to be
made in case force was used to achieve access to south Indochina.
Furthermore, the Japanese must not shrink from war with the so-called 
15A B D powers should they interfere with Japan's need for access to the 
south, including the coveted Netherlands East Indies soil. In any event, 
an early decision was necessary, for the rainy season was approaching and 
much work was needed to bring existing Indochinese airfields up to heavy 
bomber standards.
Dutch East Indies oil was one of the main reasons for the relentless 
Japanese drive to secure bases in Indochina. In the face of a belated 
Allied embargo on oil shipments to Japan the Dutch oilfields took on an 
overriding importance. Without them the Imperial Japanese Navy would 
be immobilized, and without the Navy the growth of the Empire, or even 
its very existence, would have been in jeopardy.
The only reason the Japanese did not move even more swiftly was the 
bitter infighting going on within the highest councils in Tokyo over whether 
to advance to the north or to the south. The Strike South faction won 
when Hirohito approved the General Staff paper on "Acceleration of the 
Policy concerning the South." The right wing army faction, bolstered by 
important politicians such as Foreign Minister Matsuoka (who had spent 
some of his formative years in the United States) favoured an attack on 
the Soviet Union rather than risk a war with the U.S. and Britain. This 
"Strike North" group lost influence when the Red Array inflicted a bad 
beating on the Japanese Kwantung Army in the Mongolian border area and 
official opinions held that the raw materials in the south were more 
important than allying with Germany against Russia. Moreover, 75% of the 
Japanese Army were in China, and the Navy advised that they would need 
about 50 days in order to switch their preparations from south to north.
The remarkable Soviet spy, Sorge, had also advised Russia that the Strike 
South faction was gaining influence, and the Soviets sealed the decision 
by promising to remain neutral in any future conflicts in the Pacific 
regions.
The debate sharpened when Germany attacked Russia in June 19^1, 
for Matsuoka thought that the Germans would win, and if Japan attacked 
Russia from the East she would have a say in the postwar settlement. Tojo 
said that if Japan did not do something before the end of the year she may
as well abandon the Greater Bast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. All the 
heady talk of going north or south received a slight dampening when 
Mr. Kobayashi, Minister of Commerce and Industry, gave his opinion that 
the Japanese were not strong enough for war anywhere, if its resources 
were used as a guide to strength.
The Strike South group finally won when at the Imperial Conference
of 2 July 1941 the decision was made to go into Indochina, regardless
16of the risk of war with the United States and Britain. Matsuoka himself
was ousted when the Cabinet was asked to resign and Admiral Toyada replaced
him as Foreign Minister. The French were to be immediately told that
Japanese forces would move south by 20 July. The French again had little
option and agreed, and on 24 July 40,000 Japanese troops advanced southwards
to establish air and naval bases in south Indochina, including Saigon. As
a result of this Japanese defiance in the face of warning by the Western
powers, Japanese assets in the British Empire and the United States were
frozen and sweeping economic sanctions were applied* The Dutch also
curtailed Japanese financial dealings in the East Indies, so that the
Japanese were basically left with the choice of stopping their advances
or pushing on and probably going to war with the Western powers. The Navy
Chief of Staff, Admiral Nagano, thought that if there must be war with
America, victory would go to the Japanese now, but Japanese chances would
17decrease as time passed. The Japanese were never fully confident of 
victory against the U.S., but thought that if war were inevitable this was 
the best time to strike.
On 6 September 1941, eight weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
a set of general principles was laid down at the Imperial Conference. To
the question of the aims of a war against the United States, Britain and
the Netherlands the conference stated:
The purposes of a war with the United States, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands are to expel the influence
of these countries from East Asia, to establish a sphere 
for the self-defence and the self-preservation of our 
Empire, and to build a New Order in Greater East Asia.
In other words, we aim to establish a close and in­
separable relationship in military, political, and 
economic affairs between our Empire and the Southern Regions...
The Director of the Planning Board, Suzuki, spelled out Japan’s
situation in stark terms:
At this stage our national power with respect to 
physical resources has come to depend entirely on
the productive capacity of the Empire itself, upon
that of Manchuria, China, Indochina and Thailand... 
therefore, as a result of the present overall blockade 
imposed by Great Britain and the United States, our 
Empire’s national power is declining day by day. Our 
liquid fuel stockpile, which is most important, will 
reach bottom by June or July of next year... I believe 
that if important areas in the south were to fall into 
our hands without fail in a period of three to four 
months, we could obtain such items as oil, bauxite, 
nickel, crude rubber, and tin...39
The conference agreed that preparations for a war with Britain
and the United States must be completed by the last 10 days in October,
at which time the weather in the north would be unsuitable for military
operations. It was felt that to delay preparations past October would
permit the United States to grow too strong.
"A war with the United States and Great Britain will be 
long, and will become a war of endurance... it would be 
well-nigh impossible to expect the surrender of the United 
States."
Then in a prescient statement which revealed a keen insight into
the nature of American politics, the Japanese continued.
"However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the war 
may end because of a great change in American public opinion,
which may result from such factors as the remarkable success
of our military operation...!1^ 0
In mid-September, 1941, French fears were realized as the Japanese 
now demanded the right to garrison Indochina with a force of about 32,000 
troops, and threatened to move in whether the French liked it or not. The 
hapless French, beaten at home and beset by scattered native unrest in 
Indochina, could only accept the Japanese demand. However, on 25 September, 
a Japanese division attacked the French garrison at Langson, on the Chinese
border, and annihilated it* The incident appeared to have been the result
of independent action by the Japanese divisional commander, and peace was 
restored after a vigorous French protest* But the lesson was well taken.
The new Japanese ambassador to Indochina, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, left
Kobe for Haiphong on 31 October 1941, arriving'in Tonkin on 8 November. He
was met by the Secretary General in the absence of Admiral Decoux, and
proceeded to Hanoi. There Yoshizawa announced that relations between the
two countries had entered into a new phase of cooperation and mutual 
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prosperity. With Yoshizawa were a strong staff composed of Mr.Uchiyama 
(a man of wide diplomatic experience), Mr. Kuriyama (former ambassador to 
Belgium), Baron Hayashi (former ambassador to Great Britain and Consul- 
General in Hanoi), Mr. Minoda (formerly with the Saigon consulate, with 
wide service in French-speaking countries), Colonels Cho, Nakada and
Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi (former assistant military attache in Poland 
in 1937)| and Captain Horuichi and Commander Sasaki, both of the Navy 
and assigned to intelligence duties* Yoshizawa was described by the 
press as an "able and patient negotiator", although he had had little 
success with the stubborn Dutch in the East Indies negotiations* Colonel 
Cho had taken part in negotiations on the Manchurian border following the 
Changkufeng incident in 193d*
On 4 November, 1941, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council,
General Dodhara asked: "What is the official excuse for this war against 
America, Britain and the Dutch?" In a remarkable statement the answer 
was given:
This is a clash between nations which have different 
world philosophies* The basic purpose of the war is 
to make the Americans do obeisance to us against their 
will —  that and the Co-Prosperity Sphere to make us 
self-sufficient. Before we achieve these ends we must 
be prepared for a long war. Our immediate short-term 
ends are to break out of encirclement, undermine the 
morale of Chiang Kai-Shek, seize the raw materials of 
the south, expel the Anglo-Saxon race from Asia, make 
the Chinese and the peoples of the Southern Regions 
depend on us rather than the United States and England, 
open a southern route for closer ties between Asia and 
continental Europe, and get a monopolistic corner on 
the rubber, tin, and other raw materials which the 
United States needs for military purposes.22
At the same meeting General Terauchi, Supreme Commander for the
Southern Regions, betrayed a hint of anxiety in posing a written question
to the Council in which he asked if there was not some way that a prolonged
23war could be avoided. He also called for some guidance in asking what
were the most important points to remember in Japanese administration of
the occupied areas. The answer was:
First, secure raw materials; second, insure freedom 
on transport for raw materials, and personnel; third, 
in accomplishing these two objectives, we must not 
hesitate, as we did in China, to oppress the natives.
On the other hand, we will not interfere in the details 
of government, as we did in China, but will make use of 
existing organizations and show respect for n'ative * 
customs. 24
This explained why the Japanese alloyed the Tricolor to fly in 
Indochina until 9 March 1945, when Allied pressure and an increasingly 
bold French resistance movement compelled the Japanese to round up and 
intern the French military and civil service units. The French had been 
doing an excellent job of running the country for the Japanese while
effectively quashing native unrest* The rest is history* The Japanese
used Indochina and Thailand and as firm bases from which to attack Malaya,
Burma and the East Indies*
Admiral Decoux had reasonable relations (under the circumstances) -
with Yoshizawa, but the latter was replaced by Matsumoto in late 1944,
when the Japanese were being pushed back everywhere. Matsumoto was not
the gentleman that Yoshizawa was, and he immediately pressed the French
to increase Japanese occupation expenses to 110,OCX),000 piasters per 
25month, a large increase and far in excess of what the Japanese really 
needed* The question still remains unanswered as to what the Japanese 
did with this excess cash, though some clues may be found in the postwar 
report by Lieutenant Colonel T.H.Sweeny, British Army Pay Corps, after 
his detailed inspection of the records of the Bank of Indochina (discussed- 
later)*
Yoshizawa had earlier told Decoux that the Japanese would alter
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their policy in Indochina if Manila fell to American forces* In
February 1945 Decoux, for a number of reasons, moved the seat of government
from Hanoi to Saigon, and since the Japanese Supreme Headquarters was
also in Saigon it facilitated the Japanese coup* To ensure Decoux*s
presence in Saigon when they struck, the Japanese suggested that the
Japanese-French Indochina rice agreement be renegotiated on 9 March 1945*
On 4 March Decoux travelled to Dalat to visit his wife's grave, and (much
to the relief of the Japanese) returned to Saigon on 7 March*
On 9 March, General Tsuchihashi hosted a Japanese-French dinner,
in return for a party at the Governor-General's residence a week earlier*
At 1915 hours on the 9th Tsuchihashi left his dinner and went to Army
Headquarters. A few minutes earlier Matsumoto had met Decoux and said
that a U.S. landing was imminent and there was now an urgent need for
closer cooperation between Japanese and French forces. What he meant was
that French forces must be placed under Japanese control. At 1900 hours
Matsumoto presented the ultimatum to the stunned Decoux, demanding an
unequivocal answer by 2100 hours. At 2121 hours the orders went out to
all Japanese units to execute their contingency plans, the signal for
27execution being a continuous 7-7-7 message. At 2125 hours Navy Captain 
Robin delivered a reply to Matsumoto, who called the note a rejection.
In the south, the French were neutralized fairly easily, and the 
Japanese, during postwar interrogation, correctly blamed General Delsuc, 
commander of the Cochinchina division, for the French debacle during the
early stages of the coup. He had not only ridiculed Decoux*s
apprehensions, but had ignored a crucial piece of information unwittingly
supplied by the Japanese. A Japanese airfield company commander had
unthinkingly told his employees that he would be on duty during the 
29night of the 9th, and these, suspecting something was afoot, reported 
it to their superiors. Delsuc, however, failed to perceive the significance 
of the information. And when the Japanese ultimatum finally arrived, no 
one bothered to notify immediately the French Army in Tonkin.
In Tonkin the French reacted more intelligently thanks to the 
independent action taken by General Sabattier. A double agent at Cao Bang 
had warned the French of the Japanese plan and, under the pretext of 
holding manoeuvers, Sabattier had moved several battalions into the field 
when the blow fell. These troops made a fighting retreat to China.
On 9 March 19^51 Domei (Japanese Telegraph [News] Service) broadcast
the following announcement from Imperial Japanese Headquarters in Tokyo:
Our forces stationed in French Indochina, owing to 
the utter lack of sincerity on the part of the French 
Indo-China authorities, realized that the joint defense 
of French Indo-China has finally been rendered 
impossible. Consequently, with a view to eliminating 
hostile influences, our forces decided to assume the 
duty of defending French Indo-China on their own 
responsibility and commenced to take necessary measures 
on the night of 9th March.30
On 10 March the following momentous statement was released by Tokyo
through a broadcast in German by the Japanese Overseas Service, which
included the usual platitudes of the sincerity of the Japanese and the
treachery of the French:
We herewith also assure them (the Indochinese) that 
we shall unconditionally support what for many years 
has been their keenest desire, but suppressed desire;
i.e., the desire for national independence -- according 
to the main stipulation of the Greater Asia declaration.
Regardless of the stipulation, this was it —  a first concrete 
promise of independence. This was something from which the French never 
fully recovered although it was later in their power to .turn the tide 
of independence in a more propitious direction. Consequently, on 11 March 
19^5, Emperor Bao Dai proclaimed the independence of Vietnam.
In the British view there was more to the coup than the reasons 
advanced by the Japanese. Having dispensed with the French the Japanese 
now gained full control of the Hanoi-Saigon Railway; they had previously 
been allotted only 2000 tons per month (of a total railway capacity of
5000 tons per month). They now also seized outright all coasters,
junks, buses, and so forth, for Allied air attacks had now severely
dislocated all Japanese shipping and movements. But more important
was the French refused to make an open-ended commitment and pay out
an unlimited amount of piasters for the Japanese occupational expenses.
To British intelligence this was the actual occasion for the military
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proposal to take over the country. In January and February the French
paid out enough to cover actual Japaneses expenditures, but it was only
one-third of the sum demanded by the Japanese.
Following the coup the French were forbidden to leave town without
authorization from the Japanese. All firearms, munitions, radios, cameras,
binoculars and typewriters were to be handed in to the Japanese, and the
sale and exchange of these items were forbidden. The French were also
forbidden to be out between sunset and sunrise, and meetings of more than
5 people were banned. Outer doors of houses and apartments must be left
open, and even an announcement was made "To Frenchmen who wish to become
Quislings." Since the Japanese could not entirely manage on their own,
an appeal was made to the civil servants to keep them on the job by
promising to maintain their salaries.1 Severe punishment (including death)
was promised for any actions deemed detrimental to the Japanese Army, such
as espionage, destruction of communications and power plants; actions
prejudicial to Japanese Army officers, economic life, and other actions
subsequently mentioned by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief could also receive
33this severe retribution.
On 11 March, General Nagano and the 37th Division moved south from
Kwangsi to Hanoi to reinforce General Mikuni and the 21st Division. By
13 March, the Japanese in Tonkin claimed to have captured 8500 PQWs (plus
1000 killed), and a booty of 54 aircraft, 274 trucks, 62 cars, 46 heavy
machine guns, 164 light machine guns, 8? artillery nieces, 6672 rifles 
34and 327 revolvers.
On 14 March the Japanese announced that the post of Governor- 
General was now held by the Japanese Commander. Matsumoto was Supreme 
A.dviser in Indochina, Yokoyama was Adviser to the Annamite Government, 
Consul-General Kubo was Supreme Adviser to Cambodia, Consul-General 
Minota was Governor of Cochinchina, and Consuls-General Tatsuichi, Kawano 
and Kobase were Mayors of Saigon, Cholon and Hanoi. Spreading false 
rumours and removing Japanese posters were added to the list of punishable 
offences.
* This included 5000 French and 23000 Vietnamese civil servants; also, the 
important railway workers, amounting to 300 Frenchmen and 16000 Vietnamese.
The Japanese listed 10 "Glaring Incidents of Treachery" which 
led to the coup. These had occurred over a period of months, and were 
as follows:
1. French military preparations against the Japanese (by 
deploying garrisons in the major cities).
2. Attacking Japanese shipping in cooperation with the USAAF.
3* French military leaders had urged [at a Hanoi conference 
on 20 February 194-5] that the Japanese be attacked.
4. The U.S. was dropping supplies to dissidents at Thai Nguyen.
5. The French were sheltering Allied airmen.
6. Petain elements were being purged.
7* The French had planned on holding a prayer meeting for the
liberation of France, and "went so far as to send an invitation" 
to Yoshizawa, the Japanese Ambassador (who banned it).
8. In government debates, the term "French Republic" was
replacing "French State", and Gaullist articles were becoming 
more conspicuous.
9. Decoux had refused to recognize the Chinese Nanking Government.
10. Decoux had expressed a hope for liberation during his New Year's 
broadcast.35
After the coup the Japanese administered the country directly. They 
did, however, permit lower-echelon French officials to continue functioning 
Despite the arrest and imprisonment of their compatriots (many of them in 
appalling conditions), many Frenchmen did continue to work for the Japanese 
In Saigon, the Opera House was turned into an interrogation and torture 
chamber by the Japanese, and some Frenchmen continued in their positions 
as prison warders.56
But France's "mission civilisatrice" in Asia was at an end. The 
Japanese coup had, said Sainteny, "wrecked a colonial enterprise that had 
been in existence for eighty years and that, despite its detractors,
37remains one of the glories of the French civilizing action in the world." 
Worse, the blow fell just three days before the French were to execute an
\ f
ambitious operation to destroy the Viet Minh. .Thus, as Ho Chi Minh is 
reputed to have said of the August Revolution, the Viet Minh did not 
really seize power, for there remained no power to seize. Continued 
Sainteny:
... the Japanese... may not have disliked the idea 
of leaving behind them this time bomb represented 
by a Communist Vietnam. Besides, at this point the 
Japanese may have felt that political color was less 
significant than racial color. Then, as now, "Asia 
must be left to the Asians: Thus, the Japanese would 
not have lost the war completely, as Marshal Teroki 
[Terauchi] was later to declare." 38
*See Appendix for the Japanese version of the coup.
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Louis Allen echoes this view in succinctly summing up the
significance of the Japanese in Vietnam:
At its fullest extent, Japan's Empire in Asia must 
be one of the most short-lived in history: three 
and a half years. Yet its impact was very great.
Either as a direct result of Japanese conquest, or 
in the disposition which followed Japanese defeat, 
the pattern of history in Asia was irrevocably 
altered. Arms taken from the Japanese forces fed 
the armies of Mao Tse-tung... Hesitant and belated, 
though it was, a taste of independence was given 
to Burma, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In the long 
perspective, difficult and even bitter as it may 
be for Europeans to recognize this, the liberation
of millions of people in Asia from their colonial
past is Japan's lasting achievement.39
The defiant Count Terauchi,^ promoted to Field Marshal, was in 
Saigon when the Japanese Empire came to its cataclysmic end, and when
General Gracey arrived with the leading elements of his 20th Indian
Division to secure the Supreme Headquarters of the Japanese Army in 
Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER IV
BITTER HARVEST - ROOSEVELT AND INDOCHINA
"It would look very bad in history if we failed to 
support isolated French forces in their resistance 
to the Japanese to the best of our ability, or, if 
we excluded the French from participation in our 
councils as regards Indo-China."
Churchill to Roosevelt, 30 March 19^-
Roosevelt's active opposition to the return of the French to Indochina 
ultimately made the heralded Communist "August Revolution" a foregone 
success. In Asia, as a glance at the map will confirm, United States 
policy was not an unmitigated success if the object was to maintain 
friendly governments and open new markets. In the two main areas of U.S. 
influence on the Mainland, China and what became North Vietnam, the United 
States ended up fighting bloody wars against those two countries. South 
Vietnam's recent history is too sad and well known to relate here, and 
the domino theory suddenly regained respectability. As Lyndon Johnson 
later sarcastically commented, some American people thought that by 
talking to each other they had repealed the Domino Theory.
To the majority of Americans (including a large number of professional 
military officers, among them the author) who never quite understood the 
fundamental reasons for de Gaulle's ejection of U.S. forces from France 
in the sixties, France's withdrawal from active military participation in 
NATO, the expulsion of NATO Headquarters from France to Belgium, and the 
lack of cooperation or sympathy by the French and British Governments 
during America's Vietnam War-, the following should be a modest source of 
enlightenment in the search for the answers to these and other annoying 
questions.
In June, 194*0, de Gaulle began to organize the Free French, and was 
recognized by the British as the leader of all Frenchmen who were fighting
I
the Germans. Even Russia, on 26 September 1941, recognized de Gaulle,
who was an archenemy of the Communists. Only the United States failed to
recognize that unique Frenchman. Roosevelt could not conceal his dislike
for de Gaulle, and was said to have made jokes about him at the Casablanca
2
Conference in 194*3* In fact, the U.S. did not recognize de Gaulle until 
well after D-Day.
In the early days of the war it was the Vichy regime which merited 
U.S. support, and with the passing years Roosevelt's support for the re­
establishment of the French Empire waxed and waned in direct proportion 
to the U.S. need for French support. On 7 December 194*1, Pearl Harbor 
Day, Roosevelt wrote to Petain saying that it was essential to U.S. vital 
interests that the French Empire be preserved and that France continue to 
exercise jurisdiction and control over her colonies. As the war turned 
in his favour, Roosevelt became more confident in asserting his Ideas for 
postwar political settlements, much of it disadvantageous to his Western 
Allies.
But he toned down his plans to frustrate the restoration of the 
French when their vitally needed cooperation was sought for the North 
African landings in 1942.^ On 20 January 1942, Roosevelt, through 
Ambassador Leahy, sent a message to Marshal Petain, in which the President 
said that it was important for the French to realize that he was "about 
the best friend they have; that one of his greatest wishes is to see 
France reconstituted in the post-war period in accordance with its 
splendid position in history. The word 'France* in the mind of the
It
President includes the French Colonial E m p i r e T h e  note also warned 
the French Government and people against helping the Axis. However, as 
soon sis the Torch operations succeeded Roosevelt returned to his theme 
of stripping France of her possessions.
Roosevelt's note was disquieting to many Cabinet officials. Mr. D.
Morton sent a note to Churchill saying that:
"Unless the American language differs from our own more 
greatly than I suppose, I find most disturbing the 
President's personal message to you of January 29 about 
Vichy. I feel that the linking-together of the 'French' 
Government and the French people by the President 
throughout his telegram is not accidental. The State 
Department have signally failed so far to comprehend 
what is going on in France; that the Vichy Government 
is acting without the consent of the great majority of 
the French people. It looks as though the President 
has not the situation clear either."3
It must be said that Churchill viewed the U.S. contacts with Vichy 
with mixed feelings, for they did provide him with useful information 
on occasion.
Roosevelt particularly disliked de Gaulle, calling him some nasty 
names, and actively backed his rival, General GiratfcU De Gaulle, in 
turn, reciprocated, and thought that Roosevelt was trying to run the 
world.
It was true that Roosevelt had grand plans for everyone else's 
territory, and even touched on reshaping India's future, but backed off
when Churchill became angry De Gaulle could not be influenced by
/
F.D.^r., and knew that Roosevelt was actively working to undermine the 
French everywhere. Given this attitude at the top in America, the French 
could really expect to return to Southeast Asia only through the British, 
who took perhaps a more pragmatic view of things. One of the main 
problems was the deeply-rooted anti-colonial instincts of Americans,
whose early history began with the breaking away of their colonies from
the mother country. This tendency, reinforced through the school years,
led many Americans to generally regard all colonialism as evil and to
instinctively oppose it, regardless of the consequences.
Roosevelt had mapped out a sort of grand scenario of world events,
and part of that great plan was the elimination of the British and French
7Empires. As La Feber and others have pointed out, the British became 
financially strapped early in the war; alone, outnumbered and outgunned 
everywhere, and in the war longer than anyone else except the Germans, 
Britain was forced to pay in hard cash, securities, and trade arrangements 
for American war supplies. until Pearl Harbor and Lend-Lease.
A week after F.D.*R.'s election to a third term, Churchill sent an 
urgent message to Roosevelt. In it Churchill described the desperate 
situation in Europe and told Roosevelt the stark fact that Britain was 
going bankrupt by having to pay so heavily for American supplies, and 
would soon run out of money. Wrote Churchill, "The moment approaches 
when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.
To quote La Feber, "The United States had tried to weaken British 
rule and gain postwar American access to the colonial and Dominion areas
at the Atlantic Conference of August 194-1, but a compromise had to be
9devised when Churchill refused to be cornered."
Roosevelt's comments on the French in Indochina, how the French had 
"milked" that colony and how the Indochinese deserved better, are too 
well known to repeat. But his attitude adversely affected Allied co­
operation in the war effort, and was reflected in the Mountbatten- 
Wedemeyer disputes which began almost from the creation of the British 
South East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) in 194-3* Wedemeyer was initially 
the deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South 
East Asia (S.A.C.S.E.A.). The dispute flared up when Stilwell was removed 
from China and Wedemeyer was promoted to the job as U.S. Commander, China 
Theatre. It is not so much that the Chinese, or China Theatre, could do 
all that much in Indochina, it was more a matter of keeping the French 
(especially) and the British out.
In July, 194-3* Anthony Eden, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
prepared a note for Cabinet discussion on his views on "the French
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position and the American attitude thereto. Earlier that year, on Z 
January 194-3* Eden had informed the United States of the British view of
the central French administration of the French Empire. This
administration was to he formed in Algiers, a move privately supported
by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who knew that Roosevelt opposed it.
The U.S. never replied to Eden's message, and Eden concluded:
"...I would say that they did not wish to see a 
strong central administration for the French Empire 
built up in Algiers... They dislike the growth of an 
independent spirit in any French administration any­
where and consider that any French authority with whom 
they deal should comply without question with their 
demands. The fusion of General Giraud's and General 
de Gaulle's administrations has been unwelcome to them 
and they would have wished, if this had been possible, 
to disrupt the Committee of Liberation, to eject de 
Gaullist members from,it, to set up in its place a 
puppet committee..."
Eden went on to recall the strong U.S. pledges to the French on the
restoration of the French Empire, and the fact that F.D.R was now going
back on his promises. What was worse, Roosevelt now wanted to remove
part of metropolitan France itself, including the province of Alsace-
Lorraine, and incorporate it into a new buffer state to be called 
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"Wallonia." It appeared that the United States had "little belief in
France's future," and, continued Eden:
"Dr. Benes has told me, since his return from Washington, 
that the Americans are not so much anti-Gaullist as anti- 
French. .. and that they class France with Spain and Italy 
as a Latin power with no great future in Europe... Such 
views are at variance with those of His Majesty's Government...
Eden then went on to outline the main reason why Britain supported
the restoration of the French, a position which would be the basis of
a firm commitment to help the French, and a position from which the
British would not waver in the coming crucial, three years.
"Our main problem after the war will be to contain 
Germany. Our treaty with the Soviet Union for 
this purpose on Germany's eastern flank needs to 
be balanced with a powerful France in the west.
These arrangements will be indispensable for our 
security whether or not the United States collaborate 
in the maintenance of peace on this side of the Atlantic.
Our whole policy towards France and Frenchmen should 
therefore be governed by this consideration. France 
has twice stood between us and the assault of the 
German aggressor. In 1914- to 1918 she was bled to 
exhaustion; in 194-0 she was struck down. In all our 
dealings we should have due regard to French suscept­
ibilities in matters of prestige and sovereignty; we
should do everything to raise French morale and 
promote French self-confidence. In dealing with 
European problems of the future we are likely to 
have to work more closely with France even than 
with the United States... There is evidence that 
feeling against the Americans is growing, not 
only in North Africa but In Metropolitan France 
Itself as a result of their repeated affronts to 
French susceptibilities, their protection of 
doubtful personalities and their open hostility 
to the Gaullists. It is not to our interest that 
this feeling should become directed against 
ourselves.
Europe expects us to have a European policy of 
our own and to state it." 14
Finally, Eden noted that the U.S. appeared to harbor a "deep
resentment against de Gaulle and seem to have little sympathy for
the more active of the resistance movements," while appearing to support
the collaborationists. Eden had tried his "best to bring the United
States Government to a more sympathetic outlook towards Gaullists, but
15without success." J
At that time, in presenting his own views on the situations to the
War Cabinet, Churchill took exception to a remark made by Roosevelt during
a Press Conference, in which F.D.R. had said that there was "no France at
the present time, a remark which was made with the knowledge that the
other Allies (Britain and Russia) did not agree with him. As Churchill
mentioned, recalling his visit to Washington not long ago, "... the
President almost every day gave me some paper or other showing his
17
annoyance with de Gaulle."
However, since then de Gaulle had gained strength and was gradually 
politically eliminating Roosevelt's favourites in the Free France movement. 
Roosevelt's response was a high-handed order to Eisenhower in North Africa 
to forbid the Committee of National Liberation (Free France) to meet, but 
this was going too far and Churchill persuaded Roosevelt not to send it.
As Churchill put it, "I have repeatedly stated that it is in the major 
interests of Great Britain to have a strong France after' the War and I 
should not hesitate to sustain this view. I am afraid lest the anti- 
de Gaullism of the Washington Government may harden into a definite anti- 
France feeling." Churchill was trying to impress Roosevelt with the 
complex problems to be faced after the war, and the fact that there were 
difficulties enough in fighting the Germans and Japanese without alienating
his closest Allies, while indirectly warning Roosevelt not to go to 
the point of no return with his friends.
Roosevelt counted heavily on the Chinese, but his feelings were 
not universally shared; in fact, he was pretty much alone on this. At 
the Tehran Conference Stalin told Roosevelt that he (Stalin)- had no 
use for the Chinese. He thought that they had fought badly, but the 
problem probably lay in their poor leadership (which, unfortunately, 
Roosevelt was backing).
Stalin also had no time for the French generally, saying that they
had collaborated with the Germans. Roosevelt agreed (although he had
officially recognized the collaborationist Vichy regime), and went on
to say that "no Frenchman over 40, and particularly no Frenchman who had
ever taken part In the present French Government, should be allowed to
return to position in the future... the first necessity for the French,
not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest 
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citizens." Stalin, of course, was delighted and agreed with Roosevelt.
Word of Roosevelt's ideas spread rapidly. Far away, in Southwest China,
Mr. John F.Brewis, Acting Consul-General of the British Consulate in 
Kunming, wrote to Sir H.I. Prideaux-Brune, Charge-d'Affaires at the 
British Embassy in Chungking. In his note Brewis transmitted the
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leading article from the "Yunnan Jih Pao", dated 16 December 1943* The 
article was titled "The future status of Indo-China", and advocated 
independence for that colony after the war. The paper may well have 
represented the views of General Lung Yun, who was believed to have a 
controlling interest in the Yunnan Jih Pao;" in view of the support the 
Kuomintang Government was now giving to "disaffected Annamites" in China, 
this could also be the view of the Government. The feeling was that after 
the war Indochina would no longer belong to France. Brewis noted that 
this sort of comment could apply to Hong Kong and Burma. The paper noted 
the brevity of French rule as compared to the centuries of Chinese rule 
in Indochina, and that the French had used political intrigue and force 
against the "feeble and incapable Ch'ing Government;" this situation 
would be changed. The artiie went on, "This is a shameful page of history; 
but now the world has changed, and it follows that this page of history 
must be rectified." Furthermore, "French strength was insufficient to 
oppose the aggressive influence of a third party, and that third party 
was none other than China’s enemy —  then China was exposed to a very 
severe military presence. The Japanese entry into Indo-China serves a
very useful lesson." The paper went on to suggest that three courses
were now open: to return Indochina to France, to return Indochina to
China, or to promote Indochina’s independence. The Chinese would
promote the last option, and hoped that the future Indochinese Government
would be democratic; "Such a government would be able to cooperate
closely and confidently with all other democratic countries, and in
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particular with China. This, and only this, is what China hopes."
In keeping with his own peculiar concept of the postwar world,
Roosevelt now engaged in a somewhat bizarre performance. On 16 December
1943* he received the Chinese and Turkish Ambassadors, the British
Minister Sir R.I.Campbell (Halifax was sick), the Egyptian Minister, and
the Soviet and Persian First Secretaries. During this now famous meeting
Roosevelt made the following statements, saying that the assembled
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ministers "must not repeat to anyone what he said*." He said that "he
had been working very hard to prevent Indo-China being restored to France,"
who during the last hundred years had done nothing for the Indo-Chinese
people under their care. They were still as poor and as uneducated as
ever and this state of affairs could not be allowed to continue.
Roosevelt thought that the Indo-Chinese were not yet ready for elective
institutions of their own, and should be put under some sort of U.N.
trusteeship, under which they would begin to govern themselves, something
in the Philippine manner. Roosevelt acknowledged future trouble with
the French, but said it must be done. He said that peace must be kept by
force and world policemen were necessary who would need certain bases from
which to operate without bringing up questions of sovereignty." As La
Feber has pointed out in his excellent article, "F.D.R.'s anti-colonial
idealism was firmly rooted in the determination to protect American spheres
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of interest with military force." He went on to mention Dakar, which
could be a threat to the whole Western hemisphere if in weak hands. J
Eden immediately flashed the message to Churchill, who replied from
the Mediterranean: "I have frequently heard the President express these
views about Indo-China and Dakar and have never given any assent to them,..
One can hardly suppose any intention on the part of the United States to
take territory from France forcibly without agreement with France after
a French Government has been formed on the basis of the will of the French 
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people." Churchill then intimated that Roosevelt did not know what he 
was talking about in regard to Dakar, "as it was only made available to 
the Allies by the voluntary action of Admiral Darlan and had hitherto
25resisted all other shocks." Furthermore, said Ghurchill, "For the
above reasons I am of the opinion that if we are officially apprised
of these declarations we should give immediately a perfectly clear
indication that we have no part in them... You should also recur to
the various declarations on behalf of the integrity of the French Empire
2 6which have been given by the President from time to time.
Eden completely-agreed with Ghurchill, and hoped that the British
would resist any American action to deprive France of both Dakar and 
27Indochina. Eden then instructed Halifax to speak confidentially to 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull about it, and to ascertain whether it was 
a concerted White House-State Department policy, and whether F.D.R. 
remembered the many American promises to France and had considered all 
of this "in the light of a possible post-war security system in that
4 ~  •• 28region."
Halifax saw Hull on ^ January. Hull said he knew no more about all 
this than did Halifax. Halifax, thus assuming that this was not a 
concerted American diplomatic effort, pointedly reminded Hull "of the 
fact that United States Government had given various undertakings
concerning the French Empire in terms more explicit than any which we
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had employed." Hull acknowledged this "and said that he did his best
from time to time to remind the President of this." Halifax concluded
with his own opinion, "This is all a bit woolly."
In Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, Roosevelt's words were noted. Lord
Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, and his Chief
Political Advisor, Esler Dening of the Foreign Office, both viewed
30Roosevelt's remarks with alarm. Not only would a hostile France make 
the future Allied invasion of Indochina an extremely difficult operation,
but it would be impossible to establish resistance nets in the country
31(an operation which Mountbatten was now secretly conducting).
Mountbatten immediately sent word of Roosevelt's comments to his
Chief of Staff. "I attach an astonishing telegram. I am afraid that,
by speaking to the Chinese, Turks, Egyptians and Persians, the President
is scarcely likely to achieve that degree of secrecy which he enjoined
32upon his hearers." J The operational aspect was particularly disturbing, 
as it cut right through SEAG future planning. If the French were now 
to be excluded from Indochina, "then I think the French should be told 
now, since not to tell them would be an act of treachery. To tell them 
now would be to prejudice forthcoming operations in Europe, as also in
due course in Indo-China." Hostility could be ejected in Indochina,
and the French, "far from collaborating half-heartedly with the Japanese
as they are now will do all they can to obstruct our entry." This new
policy would adversely impact on intelligence and subversive activities *
there. "We are already faced with the arrival of the Corps Leger
d'Intervention, and if we are not going to give Indo-China back to
France we had better be chary about using Frenchmen."
Besides SEAC, SOE in Europe were upset with Roosevelt's remarks, as
they now feared a hostile French population both in metropolitan France
and in the colonies. From Asia Dening wrote of his concern over the
American7Asian policy, for he saw Indochina becoming the key area in
Southeast Asia in the future. "In view (of) the hopelessly unsatisfactory
position of Americans’ activities in and from China ... consider vital
that we should do everything in our power (to) prevent destruction of our
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cooperation with French."
Mountbatten was concerned also in that Japanese broadcasts were
already making big of the fact that the major Allied powers were ignoring
the French. They were now bound to seize on these remarks by Roosevelt.
Again up in Yunnan, Mr. Brewis sent another clipping from the 'Yunnan
Jih Pao" to the Embassy in Chungking. The semi-official paper returned
to the problem of postwar settlements in the area, and Brewis commented
that "The argument is that peace in the Far East can only be assumed if
all peoples of the Far East are allowed after the war to choose their
own form of government. Throughout the tone and content of this article
betray a racial inferiority complex which is no doubt the perfectly
34
natural outcome of thirty years of Kuomintang teaching." The implications 
for the British colonies were unmistakable.
Roosevelt's Indochinese trusteeship plan was to involve around 
half a dozen members of various nationalities, including a Russian, an
35American, and perhaps a Chinese,"to educate them for self-government." 
Presumably it would be a democracy based on the Philippine model} it is 
not clear what the Russian would contribute to the idea- of representative 
government.
Halifax next went straight to Roosevelt, and on 18 January 1944 the 
two met over lunch. Roosevelt had, in the meanwhile, received a note 
from Hull describing his talk with Halifax. Hull's note mentioned 
Halifax's question as to whether the President's comments "represented 
his considered view." ^  The President, reported Halifax, "gaily inter-
jected"that they did. And on Halifax's comment that, in view of the
company in which Roosevelt’s remarks had been made, they no doubt would
get back to the French, Roosevelt again cut in with "I hope they will."
Roosevelt then went on to expound "the usual case" for depriving the
French of Indochina, and said that Stalin thought it was a good idea.
Churchill, continued Roosevelt, had refused to discuss it, as Roosevelt
said that he had discussed it 25 times with the Prime Minister, "or
perhaps discussed is the wrong word. I have spoken about it 25 times
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but the Prime Minister has never said anything." Halifax pointedly 
reminded Roosevelt of the President's promises to restorethe French, but 
"The President did not think that his pledges about the French Empire 
were of importance."- Halifax told Roosevelt that "quite apart from his 
pledges which were primarily his own affair," he did not like the trustee-' 
ship plan. Halifax also told Roosevelt that the next time the President 
spoke with the Prime Minister, Halifax hoped it would not be a monologue. 
To the Foreign Office Halifax wired, "He might one of these days have the 
bright idea that the Netherlands East Indies or Malaya would go better 
under international trusteeship."
When pressed on British and Dutch possession Roosevelt said that the 
cases were different. Halifax said "I then asked him whether he did not 
think that however long it might take, it was all in our interests to 
get France on to her legs again as a great power and that if she started
off with a good slap in the face like, this she would be permanently
38
resentful which would not at all be helpful." ^  Halifax persisted, but
Roosevelt "was not taking it all too seriously", and kept on about the
hopelessness of the French. Roosevelt concluded by remarking, "Well tell
Winston I gained or got three votes to his one as we stand today."
Halifax left a worried man, saying that "I am left feeling that he has
got this idea in his mind a bit more than is likely to be wholesome."
Halifax's paper was circulated through an equally worried Foreign
Office. A memo by Mr. Foulds noted that "President Roosevelt continues
to push his idea that France should not be allowed to recover Indo-China
and evidently pledges are not to be allowed to stand in the way.«. the
President's assertion that the French have been 'hopeless' in Indo-China
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is a gross exaggeration." Mr. Butler, referring to F.D.R.'s remarks 
on three votes to one, commented, "I don't understand the President's 
remarks about gaining votes," to which someone pencilled in "U.S., 
U.S.S.R., China = 3; U.K. = 1."
Ghurchill was not too impressed with this sort of alignment,
or voting. He and Stalin represented irreconcilable ways of life,
and as for Ghiang Kai-Shek, "I cannot regard the Chungking Government
as representing a great world-power. Certainly there would be a faggot--
vote on the side of the United States in any attempt to liquidate the
ifO
British Overseas Empire."
Mr. Ashley-Clarke then suggested that the Dominions be consulted 
before the Foreign Office began to "develop a strong movement with the 
State Department."
The Foreign Office Research Department was asked for some information 
on Indochina and reported that "There is not now, and there never has been, 
an 'Indo-Chinese' State or an 'Indo-Chinese' people; there have always 
been various different kingdoms with diverse and mutually antagonistic 
peoples. Political unity can be conferred only by an outside Administration
Zti
such as the French, of one native people over the others." The French 
had built 30»000 kilometres of roads, 3372 kilometres of railways, and 
had dug a complex series of canals which had drained the Indochinese 
marshes. This drainage system had exceeded the work done on the Suez 
Canal in terms of earth moved, and their Tonkinese dyke system was one 
of the greatest in the world.
Despite the strong British opposition to Roosevelt's trusteeship 
scheme, the Foreign Office was trying to avoid being forced into a 
needless confrontation with the United States over France, and as a sop 
to Roosevelt tentatively agreed to the idea of "police station" bases 
in Indochina. The Post Hostilities Planning Sub-committee reiterated 
the case for a strong France in the heart of Europe, and ended by saying 
that "our policy for Indo-China should be to encourage American co­
operation in its defence, without prejudicing our friendly relations 
with France by laying ourselves open to the charge of conniving at an 
infringement of her sovereignty. This might best be achieved by the
establishment of some system of United Nations bases in Indo-China,
1±2
rather than by depriving France of her possessions."
This was a reference to Roosevelt’s idea of four great "Policemen" 
keeping world order after the war. The four were to be the U.S., U.S.S.R.,
Great Britain and China. The Policemen would need certain strategic
/
bases from which to operate, and rn^ y have to take what they needed by 
force if necessary. Recalcitrant nations would be brought into line 
by economic sanctions, and if that was not enough then aerial bombardment 
and invasion would occur. Roosevelt was now even thinking of keeping law
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and order for the world. ^
When Ghurchill was approached by the Foreign Office to go straight 
to Roosevelt over this impasse about France and her possessions, the 
Prime Minister declined to do so at this time. In a letter to Eden and 
Viscount Cranborne, the Dominions Secretary, Ghurchill said, "I think 
it a great mistake to raise this matter before the Presidential election.
I cannot conceive it is urgent. On this point the President’s views 
are particular to himself. The war in the Far East may go on for a long 
time. I do not consider that chance remarks which the President made 
in conversation should be made the basis for setting all thisponderous
machinery in motion. Nothing is going to happen about this for a long
Mi-
time."
Churchill advised Eden to "develop a very strong movement on this
issue from the Foreign Office through the State Department and leave
till a later stage any direct communication between me and the President."
He then went on to compliment the report by Dening* (who had suggested
this policy to Ghurchill through the Foreign Office) as "a pretty good
piece of work." In other words, the problem would be faced later,
at a more opportune and critical time, but there were more urgent problems
to deal with at the moment. As Ghurchill told the Cabinet at the same
time, "It would be better to delay. One can always concede."
Ironically, the Soviets were supporting de Gaulle. It may be that,
desperate for a second front to be opened, which must draw off at least
40 German divisions from the Eastern Front (or the future of the Red Army
would be in doubt), Stalin looked to de Gaulle as the man who would
rally the French and insure the success of the invasion of France, and the
French were permitted to broadcast from Moscow to Indochina.
Many people in the State Department shared the Foreign Office's alarm
over Roosevelt's hostility to France, but Roosevelt would not be moved
by any argument at this time, and the Foreign Office was frustrated at
what they considered the President's blinkered view of the future. Wrote
Sir Alexander Cadogan, "I cannot follow the purpose of a policy of
estranging progressively, and often to our own disadvantage, the only
French authority that at present exists. I don't understand it - I don't
know what is at the back of it... I can only infer that the Prime Minister,
knowing as we all do President Roosevelt's —  or Admiral Leahy's —
sinister intentions regarding Indo-China, is careful not to do anything
46that might imply recognition of French rights there." Eden, fast 
losing patience, wrote that he agreed with Cadogan and did "share his 
* Mountbatten’s Foreign Office Political Adviser.
concern at consequences of treating (the) French Committee in this 
way in every sphere;"4? he planned on drafting a memo to Churchill 
about it.
Eden wrote to Churchill, and mentioned, among other things, that 
Lord Selborne (of S.O.E.), the Chiefs of Staff and Mountbatten were all 
in favour of the French taking part in political warfare in the Far East. 
To this end they wanted the Corps Leger D'Intervention moved to the Far 
East for operations against the Japanese. The French were also pressing 
the British to move the Corps East, and to permit the establishment of a 
French Military Mission at S.E.A.C. Headquarters. Churchill demurred, 
noting American opposition to these moves. It was pointed out that the 
Dutch Mission was established at S.E.A.C. without referring to Washington, 
but Churchill was unmoved as the President had peculiar feelings about 
Indochina. The time was not yet ripe.
In the Pacific, U.S. Government pledges to Plevin and Giraud were
repeated "word for word" to the French leader, Admiral d'Argenlieu (of
whom more will be said later). These were relayed by the U.S. Consul
at Noumea , and were authorized for publication by the State Department.
"The fact that this statement was issued in New Caledonia is perhaps of
interest since the ports of the French Empire, the future of which is
debatable are, in addition to Indo-China, the French islands in the 
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Pacific." These French islands, of course, figured prominently in the 
U.S. Pacific invasion strategy, and again French cooperation was needed 
here.
It was becoming difficult to keep up with Roosevelt's views. The
British Ambassador to Free France, Duff Cooper, wrote to Churchill that
de Gaulle had been surprised by a visit from Admiral Fenard of the French
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Military Mission in Washington. Fenard said that he carried a personal 
message from Roosevelt to de Gaulle, which said that the President knew 
that de Gaulle thought that Roosevelt did not like him, but that the 
opposite was really the case and the President would be pleased to 
receive him in Washington. De Gaulle told Cooper that he was "completely 
mystified" by it. This was one week before the vital D-Day invasion at 
Normandy. Yet four weeks earlier Roosevelt had told Churchill (when 
Churchill had pressed the President to receive de Gaulle), "I will not 
ever have it said by the French or by American or British commentators 
that I invited him to visit me in Washington. If he asks whether I will 
receive him if he comes I will incline my head with complete suavity and
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with all that is required by the etiquette of the eighteenth century."
A few days later Roosevelt wrote to Ghurchill, commenting on the 
latter's forthcoming talks with de Gaulle: "All good luck in your talk
with Prima Donna...please for the love of Heaven do not tell de Gaulle 
that I atm sending him a * friendly message to come over to see me...' I
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decline absolutely as Head of the State to invite him to. come over here."
However, if de Gaulle persisted in going to the United States, Roosevelt
would see him. Furthermore said Roosevelt, "Don't worry about chit chat
over here in regard to France. It is an old controversy and soon I hope
that he will not be able to worry us much one way or the other." Ghurchill
in reply, referred to American press attacks on his references to Spain,
and said that Britain was closer to these problems than America and had
no wish for a hostile Spain after the war. In a pertinent and prophetic
statement Ghurchill wrote that "We should not be able to agree here in
attacking countries which have not molested us because we dislike their
totalitarian form of government. I do not know whether there is more
freedom in Stalin's Russia than in Franco's Spain. I have no intention
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to seek a quarrel with either."
Roosevelt's crude personal attacks were not confined to de Gaulle.
In X9kZ Vice President Wallace had passed a message from Roosevelt to
Chiang Kai-Shek in which the President had said that Britain did not
think that China was a world power and that "Churchill is old", and a
new British Government without him would be more sympathetic to China,
and perhaps even give Hong Kong to China. When Roosevelt suggested to
the British that they should think about giving up Hong Kong as a gesture
of good will, Eden swallowed and noted caustically that he had not heard
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of any similar offers of self-sacrifice from the Americans. F.D.R.
also said that "We shall have more trouble with Great Britain after the
5^
war than we are having with Germany now.
On 22 June 19^, when the Normandy landings appeared to have some 
chance of success, Halifax wrote a personal note to Ghurchill and Eden.
He mentioned that the French delegation in Washington, long on the 
receiving end of American scorn and dislike, now had copies of correspondence 
between the U.S. Government and Vichy in the 19^0-19^2 period concerning 
Indo-China. These were reported to show that Sumner Welles "consistently 
urged Vichy to make every concession to Japan and to acquiesce in all 
Japanese demands. After Pearl Harbor, fearing that Vichy might publish 
the correspondence, the United States Government gave an unqualified
undertaking that they would support the return of Indo-China to France 
in all circumstances."^ The U.S. Government was probably unaware that 
these documents were in de Gaulle's hands, but now that the tide of war 
was turning the Vichy officials were trying to make amends by passing 
anything of importance to de Gaulle. Eden said that he was unaware of 
this, but did reiterate to Churchill that the U.S. had, on several occasions, 
guaranteed the territorial integrity of the French Empire, but Roosevelt 
seemed "to make little of guarantees." ^
This brief political overview facilitates an understanding of the 
military problems in Southeast Asia, of which Indochina was the sticking 
point. In 19^3» spurred in part by Roosevelt's apparent desire for post­
war supremacy in Southeast Asia, the British created a new major command 
in the area, South East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.), with Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia (S.A.C.S.E.A.).
S.E.A.C. was an Allied command, although primarily British. As 
directed by the Chiefs of Staff^  S.A.C.S.E.A.'s prime duties were two­
fold: to wear down the Japanese Forces, especially the Air Forces (and 
force the Japanese to divert resources from the Pacific Theatre), and to 
maintain and broaden contacts with China in the joint effort. S.E.A.C's 
task, thus, was to fight a grinding war of attrition against the Japanese 
and to keep them tied down as much as possible on the far flank while 
the really spectacular operations were conducted in the Pacific by the 
U.S. forces. By now all American hopes that China would be the place to 
defeat Japan had long since vanished and the Pacific strategy was proving 
to be tremendously successful under some great American commanders.
When the Japanese thrust to India was stopped during the desperate 
battles at Imphal and Kohima, and General Slim's i^th Army began to push 
the Japanese back, Mountbatten began to think ahead to the days when a 
final assault would eject the Japanese from all of the Southeast Asia 
mainland. But before any Allied landings could take place in Indochina 
it was necessary that a great deal of "preoccupational" groundwork be 
done, resistance nets organized, native levies raised, intelligence data 
gathered, and so on. One problem lay in the fact that Chiang Kai-Shek, 
supported by the U.S., regarded Thailand and Indochina as lying within 
the Chinese area of operations, and Chiang was reluctant to omit these 
areas from his theatre because of the adverse affect this move would have 
on the morale of the Chinese people and forces.-5® It was a matter of "face."
Since the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in 19^2 had complicated matters by
unilaterally declaring that Siam and Indochina lay in the U.S. (and thus 
Chinese) sphere of operations, Mountbatten had to see Chiang Kai-Shek 
about working out an arrangement whereby Indochina could be considered 
open territory for military operations. Since it took years to develop - 
resistance nets, Mountbatten could not afford to wait much longer before 
doing something in Indochina. He proposed to Chiang that the Chinese 
and British be free to attack Indochina from the north and south 
respectively, the political boundaries to be decided later in accordance
KQ
with the progress of advance of the forces. Chiang agreed and suggested 
that a political commission be set up in Chungking to settle political 
problems, the commission to be composed of Chinese, American and British 
representatives. Mountbatten would not concur in this, as he had no 
desire to further complicate, or publicize, the issue. Mountbatten 
followed up by asking Chiang if he objected to the British sending agents 
into Indochina and Siam; Chiang had no objections provided he was kept 
informed.
This was the famous "Gentleman's Agreement", which was worked but 
through the good offices of Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Chief of 
the U.S.Army Services Forces, who was visiting Chungking from Washington 
at the time.
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had no objection to this arrangement, for 
they thought that the Chinese would get there first anyway, and were in 
general agreement with the views expressed by the Generalissimo at Sextant:
When the timeoomes for the two theaters to launch 
assaults upon the enemy in Thailand and Indo-China, 
the Chinese troops will attack from the North, and 
the troops under the commander of the South East Asia 
Theater, Mountbatten, are expected to make full use 
of facilities afforded by the ports and air bases 
under its control and attack from the South. If the 
troops are landed in those countries, the boundaries 
between the two theaters axe to be decided at the 
time in accordance with the progress of advances the 
respective forces made. °0
Admiral Leahy, noting the changed conditions, now advocated a 
recognition of French desires in Indochina, and even MacArthur, despite 
Roosevelt's publicized antagonism, had written to de Gaulle, backing the 
French with moral support.
S.E.A.C., as could be expected, had some teething troubles at first, 
not the least of its problems being the Deputy Commander, the U.S. General 
Stilwell. With the senior Allied political leaders openly at odds over
Southeast Asia, the antagonisms were often reflected to and below the 
commanders in the field. Among the troops, some Americans sneered at 
S.E.A.C., saying it had been formed to "Save England's Asian Colonies."
The British in turn wondered where the Americans were until 1917 and 
nearly 19^2. These feelings were not universal in Southeast Asia, but 
were prevalent enough to be of real concern.
There were also major difficulties at higher levels; Stilwell was 
wanting to control operations in Burma. At about that time Mountbatten 
had been informed by CGSSEA No.80, ZUr March 194^, that the U.S. Chiefs 
of Staff intended to seize the Palaus in late summer as an intermediate 
base for an assault on Mindinao, followed by landings on Formosa or Luzon. 
Mountbatten was asked to capture Myitkyina in order to increase the air 
transport capability to China and provide "a suitable diversion for the 
Pacific advance." In May 1 9 ^  a stunned Mountbatten wired London of a 
new and grave problem which had suddenly emerged. The U.S. Chiefs of 
Staff had offered SEAC ^00 transport aircraft; it was originally an 
unconditional offer, but CBI (the U.S. China-Burma-India Theater) had 
now attached strings to the offer, saying that the aircraft could only 
be used as they saw fit. CBI appeared to be exceeding the directions of 
the Combined Chiefs, and major SEAC plans were in jeopardy. Churchill's 
reaction was prompt: "This is a very serious telegram, casting its shadow 
forward upon the whole of our affairs in S.E.A.C... The American method 
of trying to force particular policies by the withholding or giving of 
certain weapons, such as carrying airplanes or-L.S.T.s, in theatres where 
the command belongs by right of overwhelming numbers to us, must be 
objected to at the right time and strongly protested against." While 
it was not yet "the right time" he sent a rocket back into SEAC by 
demanding to know why only 10 divisions were in action against the 
Japanese in Burma from a pool of nearly two million men in India. It 
was a good question.
By early 1 9 ^  SEAC was aware that Stilwell- had been conducting a
press campaign in the United States to undermine Mountbatten's strategy
while advancing his own plans to defeat the Japanese with Chinese troops
under his command. Dening expressed his deep concern, saying:
"... the latest animosity of General Stilwell, which 
has made the existence of S.E.A. Command so uneasy 
ever since it was established, is now manifesting itself
in a more virulent form. I have discussed the telegrams
with General Wedemeyer who said that, whatever else 
his faults, he had always been given to understand 
that General Stilwell was at least honest. It now 
appeared that he was not even that, and General 
Wedemeyer found that very hard to forgive. I have 
in my own mind no doubt that, in spite of Admiral 
Mountbatten*s defence of him in Chungking last 
October, General Stilwell has been disloyal to 
him throughout... and there have been strong 
suspicions that General Stilwell has been active in 
trying to undermine our position with Chiang Kai-Shek."
Eden immediately sent a draft of the message to Churchill, in which 
Dening ended by saying, “Such activities on the part of an American 
officer holding the position of Deputy Supreme Commander are difficult 
to excuse... There is little doubt that the general attitude of U.S. 
troops in this theatre is influenced by the Commanding General. It is 
doubtful whether this very unsatisfactory state of affairs can continue 
indefinitely without doing active harm to the cause for which British and
American troops sire fighting together.”
Stilwell, a man of great ability, was his own worst enemy, and everyone
else was out of step when it came to fighting the war. Mountbatten had
earlier intervened with Chiang Kai-Shek on Stilwell*s behalf. When 
Mountbatten went to Chungking in October 19^3» Dr* T.V. Soong told him 
that the Generalissimo was finding Stilwell intolerable and wanted to be 
rid of him. Mountbatten supported his deputy and refused to be associated 
with a campaign to remove Stilwell, and indeed insisted that Stilwell be 
informed of all this. When told, Stilwell was crestfallen, but cheered 
up when Mountbatten assured him of his support. Things did improve in 
China after that, and Stilwell expressed his “gratitude and devotion" 
to the Supreme Allied Commander —  but it did not last long. He soon 
continued to undermine Mountbatten, submitting papers to the U.S. Chiefs 
on SEAC, without Mountbatten1 s knowledge. At Delhi, at a meeting of 
senior officers to discuss strategy, Stilwell publicly humiliated 
Wedemeyer, who had discussed a paper, and went on "in a very ill- 
tempered manner" to describe his own strategy —  a drive on Canton. He 
refused an invitation to meet the Viceroy and left.
As Dening noted, the great danger lay in the growing inter-Allied 
friction which was being openly inflamed in Stilwell's Headquarters, 
and which was embarrassing to the U.S. officers at S.E.A.C. J
Wedemeyer said that Stilwell was now an American hero, and the British
must not agitate against him in an election year, even though he agreed 
that it was outrageous for Stilwell to send his representative to the
United States to begin a press campaign without informing Mountbatten,
Ah,
the theatre commander, and called Stilwell “mean." Stilwell was 
warned by General Marshall to stop it or be fired, and the S.E.A.C. 
representative in Washington met divergence of South East Asia policy 
"round every corner". It was not clear to the British exactly what the 
U.S*. Southeast Asia policy was, except that in general it concerned the 
liberation of subject peoples and the impossibility, in American eyes,
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of Britain and the U.S. ever seeing eye to eye on anything East of Suez.
Stilwell's grand plan appeared to call fqj* everyone else to cease
activity while he mounted a drive to seize the port of Canton. Dening
was not sure what good that would do as the Japanese controlled the seas •
in that part of the world and could mount devastating counterblows —
and it was no good having a port if one could not sail in and out of it.
Dening philosophized, "It may be that all alliances carry with them the
seeds of disillusionment and discord, and the third year of marriage is
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proverbially the most difficult."
The French, meanwhile, though rebuffed and humiliated by the U.S.,
never gave up. They were in the unenviable position of having to go for
help, begging bowl in hand, asking for some ships here, a few planes there,
perhaps some equipment for a couple of divisions or transportation to
move troops to a crucial area. In late 1944 the French offered a marine
division of colonial troops to be used in warm climates, but the U.S.
Chiefs declined the offer. In January 1945 the French requested six
Liberty ships and two tankers to move their own people* and were turned
down. The British, in the war for a very long time, could now only
refer them to the U.S. for major supplies. But de Gaulle never accepted
a reduced role for France.
In August 1944 the French Committee of National Liberation requested
the British Chiefs of Staff to sponsor a more active French role in the
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war against Japan. f The British, sympathetic, forwarded the request 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who were still dominated by Roosevelt's 
ideas. The French proposals contained the following suggestions:
(l) a French military mission be established under S.A.C.S.E.A.; (2)
French forces should take an active role in the war against Japan;
(3 ) the French should participate in planning the war; (4) they should 
participate in planning political warfare against Japan. The British
Chiefs passed it on to the Joint Staff Mission with the following 
comments: (i) The French Military Mission would help the operations 
of the S.O.E. and O.S.S., and would serve as the nucleus of an operational 
headquarters to he formed later; (2) If the mission was not accepted at - 
S.E.A.C., the French would probably try to get it established at Chungking, 
where it would be harder to control; (3) The mission would be confined 
to Indochinese matters only, and not participate in general strategy, 
in the manner, for example, of the Dutch mission's interest in the 
Netherlands East Indies; (4) It would stimulate French resistance to 
Indochina; (5) The mission would be restricted to planning operations 
against Indochina; (6) it would be involved in political warfare; (7) The 
presence of.the French battleship "Richelieu" meant that the French were 
already participating in the war in the Far East. On JO August 1944 
the U.S. Chiefs concurred, with the exception that the French participation 
in political warfare be confined to S.E.A.C. The pendulum was slowly 
swinging in favour of the French —  very slowly, but moving, at least.
S.O.E.'s arm in Southeast Asia, Force 136 (immortalized in Pierre 
Boulle's "Bridge Over the River Kwai"), had proposed three possible 
courses of action in Indochina, Courses A, B, and C. Course A involved 
a lower level of risk and investment, calling for pure sabotage. Course B 
was a bigger development embracing certain units in the French Army, while 
Course C called for substantial support for French regular troops in 
Indochina and a widespread resistance movement throughout the country, 
with the main elements in the Northwest. Mr. J.Keswick, on Dening's
staff, sent these proposals to the Foreign Office and asked for political
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guidance. He received the following reply: (a) French Indochina was 
not within S.E.A.C., but, in view of the "Gentleman's Agreement" to 
attack when ready, it was a sort of "no man's land" in which the Chinese 
had an interest; (b) The Prime Minister had delayed a decision on the 
Chiefs of Staff earlier recommendation that a French mission be sent to 
S.E.A.C.; (c) Roosevelt was against the French in Indochina, and had 
made no decision about it; (d) the British should make no promises to 
the French which could not be kept. However, the Foreign Office could 
not be absolutely sure on a couple of these points, as they added that 
they had now heard rumours of Roosevelt receiving de Gaulle in Washington 
as "my friend". Based on this reply it was decided to adopt Course A, 
and to defer Courses B and C until a later date.
French support in Indochina would go a long way to ensuring Allied
success when the time came to invade. It was thus becoming more
difficult to exclude the French from "reasonable military participation,"
for they would not be willing to keep S.O.E. (Force 136) fully informed
pending acceptance of the Blaizot Mission. Anyway, the French would
soon leap-frog SEAC control by broadcasting from Metropolitan France
direct to French Indochina. Wrote Dening:
"The situation in Indo-China has grown very delicate 
with the disappearance of the Vichy regime, and I feel 
that the F.C.N.L. will wish to take early steps to 
influence it to the advantage of France. The Japanese 
on their part have as yet shown no signs of wishing to 
take drastic action to forestall a French move against 
their partial occupation and my guess is that they would 
prefer not to extend their commitments if they can 
avoid it. The Chinese may not remain idle watchers
of a situation from which they may hope to derive
ultimate benefit. The Americans seem to have no 
constructive ideas on the subject except that they 
want to exclude us." ^9
According to Dening, it made no difference who really attacked 
Indochina, but French help would certainly be needed in any case; the 
main point was to strike a blow against Japan. "If we are prevented 
from doing this by American obstruction, then I think the outlook is 
gloomy both militarily and politica l l y . C o u l d  Dening have been looking 
ahead to 1954 in the North, and 1975 in the South?
Mountbatten had been urging Eden to push for the establishment of
the French Mission at SEAC, and Eden in turn had been pressing the
Combined Chiefs for a decision. Since SEAC was an Allied Command it
was necessary to consult the Combined Chiefs. Eden's prompting took on
more urgency as he foresaw the Japanese coup of 9 March 1945: "With the
progress of the operations in France the days of the Vichy regime are
numbered and, when it disappears, it is possible, though I am not prepared
to say certain, that the Japanese will eject Admiral Decoux's government
in Indo-China and take over the administration themselves. Should that
happen there would be added scope for subversive operations by the special 
71corps." However, the problem was complicated because "the United
States Government have given more specific guarantees than we have
ourselves about the restoration of the territorial integrity of the 
72French Empire," but now Roosevelt's about face was well known to the 
French. Eden then suggested to M.Massigli, the French Ambassador, that 
the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) m^y as well take up 
the matter directly with the Americans, since the War Cabinet was already
generally supporting the French. About this time, too, French reports
coming out of Indochina supported Eden's view of a possible Japanese 
coup.
Roosevelt's problems were growing in this area. The French,
whom he had publicly despised and humiliated at every turn, were
growing stronger, and "Uncle Joe" was not as nice as he had been when his
back was to the wall. The Chinese were soaking up prodigious quantities
of American supplies without doing an awful lot with them. As for Stalin
and the Russians, this is what Roosevelt received in return for his
lavish support for them:
"Since the end of the war is in sight our relations 
with the Soviets have evinced a startling turn during 
the last two months. They have shown an unwillingness 
to dicuss pressing problems and have held up our 
requests with complete indifference to our interests...
I have received no acknowledgement even of my letters 
or numerous discussions... We have received no 
answer or permission to transport trucks to our Air 
Forces in China. Our request presented a week ago to 
allow General Eaker's bombing appraisal party to 
visit Ploesti, which was followed by urgent conversations 
with Molotov, is unanswered. The indifference of the 
Soviets to world opinion regarding this ruthless 
attitude toward the uprising in Warsaw and their 
unyielding policy toward Poland are best described 
by the statement of Molotov that the Soviets would 
judge their friends by those who accept the Soviet 
position... These are only a few examples... It seems 
to be the general attitude that since Russia has won 
the war for us it is our obligation to help her and 
accept her policy.
This trend can be diverted, I am convinced, but only 
if our policy toward the Soviet Government is 
materially changed. Evidence has come to me that our 
generous attitude toward them has been misinterpreted 
as acceptance of their policies and as a sign of 
weakness... Thera is every indication the Soviet 
Union will become a 'World Bully' wherever their 
interests are involved unless we take issue with 
their present policy. When they turn their attitude 
in that direction this policy will reach into the 
Pacific and China as well....?3
It was distressing that the United States, an abundantly generous, 
brave and resourceful nation, could be afflicted with such political 
myopia.
At SEAC, Mountbatten was trying hard to prod the politicians into 
a decision on Indochina; the day was not far off when his planners
would be concentrating on that area. Both Siam and Indochina were vital
to him because Japanese reinforcements and supplies had to transit
those countries to reach Burma and Malaya. Although he had been supporting
minor covert operations in Siam and Indochina it was now urgent that he
commence full scale preoccupational activities. It was important that
resistance forces be in position to tactically interfere with Japanese
Lines' of Communication as required by British offensive operations in
Burmaf and be ready to promote large scale resistance' and revolt in
conjunction with future operations following the reconquest of Burma.
74He requested an early decision on the boundary question,1 especially 
since the Allied leaders were meeting in Quebec.
As it was Churchill did not raise the Indochina issue with Roosevelt.
Events were moving swiftly and the impasse could go on indefinitely.
Churchill gave up on Roosevelt in this matter and had decided to do what
he thought best. He had had a great deal of trouble In just getting the
United States to accept British support in the Pacific fighting. Although
the conference itself was a success, "the only difficulty here has been
to persuade the Americans to give space and facilities to deploy in the
Pacific. Some of them wanted to keep it all to themselves. However I
have offered a British Fleet capable of fighting an action single-handed
against the whole Japanese Fleet, to share in the main operation, and this
75has been accepted."
In October, 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff received a copy of a 
message which Churchill sent to Roosevelt. Churchill urged the President 
to support the Mountbatten-Chiang Kai-Shek verbal agreement. When queried 
by Eden about pursuing it further, Churchill decided that there was no need 
to do so and instructed Eden to proceed with proposals by the Chiefs of 
Staff and to Inform Mountbatten accordingly so that he could get on with 
his work.*^
At noon on 28 October 1944, Roosevelt announced the recall of 
General Stilwell and the splitting of CBI into two new theatres, China 
Theatre and India-Burma Theatre (IBT). Major General A.C. Wedemeyer was 
to head China Theatre, and Lieutenant General D.I.Sultan would command 
IBT. Stilwell had antagonized everyone in sight by his intemperate remarks, 
and his usefulness was at an end; there were enough competent generals 
to replace him. It was a pity that such an obviously technically capable 
man was unable to exercise a measure of self control.
For SEAC, the end of CBI meant the start of new problems. When
China Theatre was formed the U.S. Chiefs had unilaterally decided to
place French Indochina in the new command in contradiction, thought
Dening, of the agreement made by Mountbatten and Chiang Kai-Shek in
November 1943* Mountbatten wanted the British Chiefs to contest the
point about French Indochina, since the announcement unfortunately
coincided with the arrival of the French Military Mission to his SEAC
Headquarters in Kandy, Ceylon. As Mountbatten put it, the British
position "would be made quite ridiculous In the eyes of the French if,
after this official acceptance, we had immediately to walk back on the
arrangements and say that the French would not be able to participate
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against Indochina from Southeast Asia." So the U.S. Chiefs had allowed 
the French mission to go out to SEAC, then had neatly unilaterally 
excluded French Indochina from SEAC's area.
French and British officials at SEAC were angered, for the U.S.- 
Chinese partnership would now have veto power over SEAC plans in Indochina, 
plans which had taken months and years to formulate and which were now 
being put into operation. The French teams which had planned to drop 
in and set up resistance groups in the North, and who could possibly 
have stamped out the still small Communist groups in the hills, were 
now stymied by active U.S. opposition to their plans. It was to be one 
of the most costly errors of judgement yet made by the United States, 
one of many transparent political decisions which misfired badly.
Dening thought that if this action was unilateral the British were
not bound to accept it. If the stalemate over Indochina could not be
resolved, then none of the Allies would achieve any results.
"There is less than a fortnight to go before the
Presidential election and perhaps this vexed question 
will become easier to discuss after that event, but 
the arrival of the French Mission on the one hand and 
the action of the U.S.Chiefs of Staff on the other 
have complicated the issue still further and unless 
it can be argued out I foresee a hopeless tangle 
which may not only adversely effect military operations, 
but Anglo-American as well as Anglo-French relations."78
It was, however, a fait accompli.
Wedemeyer had been relatively reasonable while in his former position 
as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander at SEAC. But as soon as he assumed 
command of China Theatre and became deputy to Chiang Kai-Shek he began to
actively oppose SEAC in Indochina, with far-reaching consequences.
Mountbatten reported that Wedemeyer now not only opposed the
"Gentleman's Agreement" but "went so far as to declare that General
Somervell had no authority to negotiate (which is interesting when one
recalls that in the early days of this Command General Wedemeyer was
in complete support of the Supreme Commander’s attitude). He seemed to
have forgotten that the President and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff favoured
this agreement (see COSSEA 6 of 19*1-3) •*1^
On 27 October 19*14- Mountbatten announced the arrival of General
Blaizot and the French Mission. By November 1944 Blaizot, anticipating
a Japanese move against the French, wanted to send small parties to
Indochina to organize resistance and sabotage. But none of this could
happen unless the Chinese (and that meant the Americans) would cooperate.
But Wedemeyer was adamant, and his attitude placed an increasing strain
on inter-Allied relations. And none of this was helped by the American
press which too often belittled the British effort in the Far East.
Conditions in Burma were atrocious; Merrill’s Marauders had disintegrated
after ten weeks in the jungle, and it was rumoured that a British regiment
had refused to go back into the line when ordered. Many of the British
troops had been in the Far East for five years, and some had had no leave
and no prospect of getting home.
In this atmosphere Dening met Wedemeyer for a discussion of. the
problem and was taken aback by the intensity of Wedemeyer's animosity.
"Until General Wedemeyer told me with conviction that 
there would not be a British Empire after the war I 
had hoped that the tension would be eased out here 
with the removal of General Stilwell and the conclusion 
of the Presidential election. Now however I fear that 
the situation may well deteriorate further.
At present the question of. whether to prop up a 
tottering China with props which may not hold; 
or to hit the Japanese hard where we have the 
forces to do it, seems already resolved in favour 
of the former. If props hold, America will get the 
credit and if they do not, we shall get the blame...."
So the Allies went their separate ways in Southeast Asia. The USAAFand
US Navy were doing most of the bombing of Indochina; ironically, many
of these same targets were to be struck again just twenty years later
when the man the Americans had protected, Ho Chi Minh, was killing a
hundred American soldiers a week.
The USAAF were bombing rail communications, docks, and factories
in French Indochina. However, in late 1944 the Japanese staged an
offensive which captured the U.S. bases in Hunan and Kwangsi, but the 
strikes continued from the Yunnan bases. No amount of American prodding, 
from Boosevelt himself on down, could persuade Chiang to commit his 
numerous well-rested and American equipped divisions to battle to save 
the bases. He knew that the war would have but one ending, and then 
the problem of Mao and the Communists would be faced. So it did not 
matter really if a couple of provinces went in the meanwhile, or some 
American bases, or even some American or British units.
By December 194*3 daily passenger train service between Hanoi and 
Saigon had been stopped. In December 1944 it was up to one a week, 
each way. Freight service was down, and used almost exclusively by the 
Japanese military, and it was going from bad to worse. Attacks on the 
big Hongay mines in the north had resulted in a severe shortage of coal, 
and rolling stock was decreasing. In early 1943 there were 22 heavy 
freight locomotives in Indochina; by June 1943 thirteen had been destroyed
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and could not be replaced incountry, and the Japanese had none to spare.
In April 1944 the trip from Saigon to Hanoi took 6 days; it was normally 
a two day journey. Passengers had to cress rivers in small boats, since 
many bridges were down. Trains were full of badly behaved Japanese troops. 
Sea transport was worse,-being open to attack by aircraft and submarine. 
Haiphong's docks and piers were out of action, and two out of every five 
ships diverted to Saigon were lost. The Japanese were now unable to 
fulfil their economic agreements, and nothing had arrived in French 
Indochina since early 1943; the country was living off its stocks. It 
was a good time to review operations in Indochina.
At a meeting held on 7 December 1944, chaired by Mountbatten's Chief
of Special Duty Operations, Air Vice Marshall Whitworth-Jones, it was
decided to ask Force 136 to update their proposals for preoccupational
82activity in French Indochina. There were, however, certain grouid rules 
within which they must confine themselves. Due to the delicate situation 
in Indochina between the French and Japanese forces, all operations which 
provoke the Japanese into action against the French were prohibited. 
Furthermore, no act of resistance was to be initiated without orders from 
General Blaizot, acting with the authority of SAC3EA.
A review of past and present operations was conducted. During three 
series of operations, codenamed "Belief", "Polka" and "Radical", 18 
RAF B-24 Special Duty Liberator sorties had been flown into French
Indochina up to 1 December 19^, out of 4*6 which had been planned and
po
approved. ^ The "Belief" sorties dropped transmitters and receivers
to form a communications net, while the "Polka" operations were designed
to introduce demolition stores into the country. These operations had
succeeded in: (a) establishing a W/T network within French Indochina,
with 12 stations now in communication with the Force 136 War Station
in Calcutta; (b) introducing a certain very limited number of stores
for training purposes (1595 pounds of High Explosives and ancillary
equipment, plus 17 limpets; (c) carrying out three pickup operations
by which leaders of the Resistance Movement inside French Indochina had
come out for discussions, and one of General Blaizot's staff officers
8^
had been sent in to hold discussions within Indochina. These modest 
operations' were conducted at the maximum possible range of the aircraft, . 
and in addition to the support given to the extensive Force 136 operations 
in Burma, Thailand and Malaya. It is almost too much to imagine what 
could have been accomplished with a coordinated Allied resistance policy, 
given the unlimited U.S. supplies and many USAAF squadrons sitting just 
across the border, a stone's throw from the operational area.
Force 136 objectives in Indochina were to continue the buildup of 
the internal organization of the Resistance Movement, and establish 
Reception Committees in remote, sparsely populated districts in the 
north, west, and south Indochina, in which guerillas could assemble and 
establish bases. In these areas instructors and supplies would be 
dropped. These objectives would be accomplished by: (a) introducing 
specially trained French Officers and NCOs who would set up the Reception 
Committees and train others; (b) paradropping special stores and 
explosives for demolition training; (c) maintaining and expanding the 
existing W/T network. The air commitment needed was 33 Liberator sorties 
per month from January to December 19^5* The operations to date, in 
addition to the H.E. and limpets mentioned, had resulted in the dropping 
in of 13 radio stations, 6 midget receivers, plus the following arms 
and ammunition for the Reception Committees: 19^ + Sten guns, L-0 carbines, 
522 grenades, plus medical field dressings, supplies, and a few compasses 
and watches. The new operations would build on this small beginning.^
In late 1 9 ^  a new "Indo-China Council" was imposed on Admiral 
Decoux by the Resistance Movement to make sure that he did not act in 
a manner contrary to the interests of the French Provisional Government
86of de Gaulle. It was a brazen act, carried out under the noses 
of the Japanese. The council was composed of the following members:
General Mordant, former Commander of French Forces in Indochina;
General Ayme, present Commander of French Forces; M.Bodin, railway 
engineer; M.Boissanger, diplomat; M.Marche, former magistrate; M.Thorel, 
Director of Political Affairs for the Government; M.Dallez, planter.
As yet, there had been no Japanese reaction to the Council, the 
formation of which was announced by a broadcast in Vietnamese on 
3 December 19^* At that time the Supreme Federal Council of Indochina 
was dismissed and the new Indochina Council formed, which was to be 
"responsible for all interests of Indochinese countries and advise the 
Governor-General on efficient methods for ruling the country. All 
decrees and laws issued by the Governor-General will be discussed and 
assented to by this council before execution." The Council would meet 
twice monthly, and the number of members would not exceed ten. The 
Japanese very likely knew what was happening, but were not yet ready 
for a showdown with the French as they were pressed with bigger problems 
everywhere else.
The British were given responsibility for Southeast Asia at the 
Quebec Conference in September 19^*» in which the United States decided 
to concentrate on the Pacific strategy. At "Argonaut", the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff decided on the following strategic objectives. Mountbatten, 
as SACSEA, was directed first to liberate Burma (Operation "X"), then
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Malaya, and finally to open the Straits of Malacca (Operation "Y"). 
Mountbatten could not do this without the continued use of the U.S. 
transport squadrons which had done outstanding work in SEAC, and 
attention was drawn to the "agreed policy" of use of India-Burma theatre 
forces. In the Mediterranean the Germans were able to make a voluntary 
withdrawal from Italy as Allied forces were being withdrawn to Western 
Europe. In Europe, SHAEF plans concerned operations north of the Moselle, 
to close the Rhine north of Dusseldorf and destroy the enemy west of 
the Rhine, and tc seize bridgeheads over the Rhine. Allied forces 
would then deploy east of the Rhine and north of the xRuhr, while 
gathering the maximum number of divisions (about 35) ^he capture 
of Frankfurt and advance on Kassel to draw the Germans down from the 
north.
In the Far East the U.S. was to continue operations in the
Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, Leyte), and assault Iwo Jima, with a
target date of 19 February 19^5• Target dates for the invasion of the
Ryukus was 1 April to August 19^5* The final assault on the Japanese
homeland, the invasion of Kyushu-Honshu, was set for the winter of
19^5-19^6• There was also the possibility of seizing a position in
the Kuriles to maintain and defend the sea route to Okhotsk (when
Russia entered the war); the possibility of protecting the sea routes
from bases in Kainchatka was studied. With the U.S. abdication of
interest in Southeast Asia, Force 136 now came to life in Indochina.
In January 19^5 the plans were put into effect to try to build up the
French in the interior by dropping in arms and supplies to resistance 
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groups.
The RAF had 10 squadrons available for Special Duty; 7 squadrons 
were equipped with B-2*+ Liberator bombers, modified with dropping slides, 
long range fuel tanks and navigation homing equipment. One squadron 
had B-2A* and Halifax bombers, one was a Catalina flying boat squadron, 
and one had B-2^s, C-^s, and Lysanders for short field take-offs and 
landings. There were eight other squadrons which could make special 
supply drops when called upon: seven C-^7 squadrons and one Halifax 
squadron. The special dropping slides on the Liberators made it possible 
for a stick of up to four men to be dropped on the same run. The C-^7s 
were used for the narrow valleys of Burma, which were hazardous for 
B-2^s.89
These Special Duty squadrons did tremendous work and deserve a 
study of their own. They were directed at that time from the Special 
Duty operations section in Calcutta by Wing Commander J. Blackburn 
and Squadron Leader T.R.Lee. These hazardous missions produced their 
casualties. In April 19^, before China was closed to them, an attempt 
was made to stage a B-2^ operation to Hue, in Annam, using Kunming as 
an alternate destination. It was a disaster, as one fully loaded aircraft 
made a miraculous forced landing on the tiny fighter strip at Fort Hertz; 
the second aircraft was reported missing and later found crashed in China, 
with the loss of 13 RAF crew members —  a difficult operation over the 
Hump. Some missions were unsuccessful when the aircrews did not receive 
the proper reception signals from the ground^due perhaps to enemy in 
the area or the drop zone being compromised.
These missions took their toll of men and machines. The 358
Squadron alone lost Liberators which were listed as crashed or
missing on Special Duty operations. Some of the men needed resting
as well. Some aborted missions were due to "Lack of confidence of the
Captain," while others pressed too hard in dangerous conditions and
crashed. In one operations summary, two aircraft Captains were removed
from operational duties for "Lack of Moral Fibre". For these crews
there was no glamour, no targets destroyed, no rolling stock shot up,
no enemy killed. Their missions were secret, involving long, lonely
night missions of great technical difficulty, and often were the sole
reason that many resistance groups stayed alive, judging from their
field reports which were sent back to the aircrews.
Most of these sorties were flown by 358, 357,8 and 160 Squadrons;
240 Squadron, at Madras and Redhills Lake, India, flew Catalinasfor
the smaller Special Operations Group in their dangerous infiltration 
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missions. The 358 Squadron was based at Jessore, in Bengal (not far
from Calcutta), as was part of 357 Squadron; 358 Squadron had 16
Liberators, while at Jessore 357 Squadron had 10 C-47's, plus 11 Lysanders
at Mingaladon, Burma, and 10 Liberators at China Bay, Ceylon. Number 8
Squadron was at Minneriya, Ceylon, with 12 Liberators, as was 160 Squadron
also with 12 Liberators.
One long-standing problem was that huge areas of Indochina were
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uncharted; some of these areas covered hundreds of square miles.
Since these B-24's were not equipped with airborne radar, tacan, and
other sophisticated navigational aids, with which the navigation was
difficult enough, it is a credit to their skill and perseverence that
they accomplished as much they did.
Given this modest start and the limited resources at hand, Force
136*s expanded plans were now put into operation. On the night of
22/23 January 1945, 11 Liberators of 358 Squadron took off from Digri,
98headed for target areas at Lang Son, in northern Tonkin, J and Hanoi 
under Operation "Bazaar". Only two missions were successful, with the 
appalling winter weather conditions necessitating multiple air aborts.
All target areas reported 10/l0 low cloud cover, and some aircraft 
dropped their stores where they estimated the drop zones to be. Three
of 358 Squadron* s B-24s failed to return. It turned out that at least
two (and possibly three) of these Liberators had suffered a terrible fate.
In February, Headquarters SACSEA sent to Headquarters ACSEA (Air 
Command South East Asia) a study titled "Incidents Involving SD Aircraft."
In it was quoted a message from General Carton de Wiart, the British 
military representative in Chungking. De Wiart’s first paragraph 
had been originally delivered for circulation the usual way, but the 
second had been transmitted in a private, sealed letter from Air 
Vice Marshal Whitworth-Jones to Admiral Mountbatten. The first 
paragraph said, "It is reported that a few days ago (date not given) 
three Liberators operated into French Indo China without warning the 
14th USAAF in the normal manner. -General Chennault has told General 
Carton de Wiart that had the Americans been carrying out an operation 
the British aircraft might well have been destroyed." The sealed 
message reported that "General Carton de Wiart was informed by General 
Chennault that 'sometime ago* two British Liberators had entered 
Chennault's area without giving previous warning. As a result the 
Liberators had unfortunately been destroyed." Whitworth-Jones ended 
by saying "I am to request that these two assertions be examined and 
a report rendered. It is possible that the Liberators referred to by 
General Chennault as having been destroyed by the Americans inadvertently 
are two of the Liberators lost on a recent S.D. operation. The other 
incident is not understood."
This was an extremely grave incident indeed. It suggested that 
China Theatre-Command was prepared to take extreme measures to protect 
"their" resistance group, the Viet Minh, against the resurgence of 
the French, who were being supported by the RAF. Because of the 
secretive nature of the operations the results of the subsequent investi­
gation were not released, but the fact remained that over two dozen 
RAF crew members were killed by the USAAF under questionable circumstances.
It was true that SEAC did not always notify Wedemeyer of these 
special operations, for Mountbatten had complained of the notorious 
inability of China Theatre to keep secrets. It was a problem which 
continues to plague Americans.
Part of the subsequent investigation revealed that the loss of 
the two, and perhaps three, bombers was a logical outcome of the 
Mountbatten-Wedemeyer dispute over activity in Indochina. Earlier, 
when General Donovan, head of OSS, came through Ceylon he had been 
disturbed at the atmosphere created by the dispute, and the resulting 
adverse affect upon clandestine operations, and he strongly urged 
Mountbatten to personally take up the question of French Indochina with 
Wedemeyer. While Mountbatten and Wedemeyer were talking, SEAC's Special
Duty Branch chief issued orders to insure that Mountbatten would not 
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be compromised. No operations to French Indochina were to be staged 
through China; routine exchanges of Information with 14th USAAF were 
suspended "in the Interests of safety", and cover bombing and leaflet 
drops stopped, although S.D. operations without cover bombing or 
leaflet drops could continue.
When the talks between the two senior Commanders were over, 
Mountbatten, having made his point about security, authorized a return 
to the routine exchanges of information with the 14th Air Force warning 
system. However, the B-24s were launched just prior to the resumption 
of this exchange. It was recommended by the Special Duty branch, and 
accepted by ACSEA,” that all concerned adopt a "sealed lips" policy over 
this tragic incident, and if a detailed investigation was carried out 
the results remain a secret. Had the news been published that the USAAF 
had shot down at least two friendly RAF bombers, the consequences on 
Allied relations, to say nothing of possible ad hoc retaliation, were 
almost unimaginable.
The security problem in China was considered to have remained a 
problem for special duty flights to north Indochina were stopped to 
avoid having to warn 14th Air Force. Blaizot was upset, as over 50 
trained French and Vietnamese agents were poised to jump into various 
areas in Indochina to begin the final work of building the resistance 
cores. He was also very apprehensive of a Japanese coup, but Dening 
disagreed with him in this regard. The plan put into effect in January 
had been flown into Indochina and agreed upon by resistance leaders after 
careful study; within eight weeks- the Japanese made their move..
These difficulties in the field still paralleled the higher level
differences in Washington, London and Paris. In January, 1945, Halifax
was still fighting the Indochina battle with little success. On 3
January he had seen the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius', who
said that the President still thought that any military or political
action on Indochina was premature, and that Roosevelt would prefer to
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discuss the situation with Churchill. Halifax hung on, telling 
Stettinius that the President was not considering Mountbatten’s urgent 
military arguments for operations in Indochina. Stettinius said that 
he could do no more, so Halifax again decided to go directly to Roosevelt; 
but Halifax was not optimistic, knowing the President’s feelings on 
Indochina, and Foreign Office correspondence now tended to betray a hint
of exasperation that Roosevelt refused to discuss this issue with 
anyone but the Prime Minister.
When Halifax saw Roosevelt a few days later, he told the President
that he was disappointed in StettLnius's reply on the Indochina question
based on instructions from Roosevelt. Wrote Halifax, "The President
launched off into his general ideas about the future of Indo-China
with which we are generally familiar. I said that I was not concerned
to argue those at the moment, and the point of our suggestion, to which
we attach great importance, was that Mountbatten should be free without
delay to get some parties of Frenchmen into Indochina to do sabotage
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work which might hamper Japanese communications into Burma." The 
President replied that if the British thought it important they should 
tell Mountbatten to go ahead and do it and ask no questions. The 
Foreign Office were unsure about the meaning of this "off the record" 
remark by Roosevelt, but thought that it should be quoted to all 
commanders in the field in order to show that the problem was not, 
after all, insoluble; however, it was not to be quoted normally, as it 
did not represent a formal indorsement or commitment by the United States. 
If Mountbatten was getting by in his challenge to the Americans, Halifax 
advised, "Let sleeping dogs lie" and press on. If Mountbatten intended 
to expand his operations, then Halifax would confidentially tell General 
Marshall of Roosevelt's comments and Marshall could pass it on to the 
appropriate American commanders.
As Halifax was carrying the banner in Washington, Dening of SEAG,
was preparing a political summary for the Foreign Office. Mountbatten,
in view of the rapidly changing situation, was asking if it was now
99worthwhile to continue pressing Roosevelt on Indochina. On the same 
day Dening advised Eden that in view of the President's attitude it 
would now be wiser to stop pressing him and stand on the assumption that 
the "Gentleman's Agreement" was still valid. Since November 19^» when 
the Foreign Office were pushing for formal American concurrence, the 
local situation had changed as follows: (l) reflecting-the rapid develop­
ments, the British were about to open direct contact with French Indo­
china regarding preoccupational activities; (2) the French Mission under 
Blaizot was already established in SEAG, and their work on Indochina was 
going well; (3) Blaizot's mission was recognized by both the Free 
French and the resistance groups in Indochina; (*0 Coordination of
intelligence gathering activity with the French was important, especially 
in the area of naval intelligence (which was of particular use to the 
U.S. South West Pacific Fleet; (5) the staff at SEAG was fully integrated, 
with the Americans being kept informed of all developments. Therefore, 
in Dening's conclusion, if Mountbatten pressed on in Indochina, acting 
on the assumption that the "Gentleman's Agreement" was still valid and 
there were no grounds for disagreement, Roosevelt may have to accept "an 
already firm situation" —  a nice way of saying a reverse fait accompli.
Dening also passed on the strong French request to work on Indochina 
from SEAG rather than China, as the French were extremely hostile to 
incursions from China. At the same time he quoted information received 
from a"private source" in the United States that Admiral Fenard had. 
asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a judgement as to which command 
enveloped French Indochina. Fenard, unlike most French officials, 
preferred Indochina to fall under Wederaeyer. He thought that the French 
would need the support of the U.S. l^th Air Force for the resistance in 
Indochina to secure French control for its future. Fenard had. no 
inkling of the open hostility of the Americans in China Theatre to the 
French, and before long the same tragic fate would befall French columns, 
in a fighting retreat before the Japanese, which befell the RAF B-24 
crews six weeks earlier —  this time from a deliberate lack of action.
Roosevelt was being reinforced in his Indochina ideas by Admiral
Leahy, who now strongly recommended keeping French Indochina out of
SEAC. As Sterndale-Bennett noted, "The obstruction seems to be partly
the President's political Ideas about Indo-China and partly the alleged
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desire of Admiral Leahy to get Indo-China out of SEAC." Within 
twelve months the U.S. would have done a complete about face and be 
strongly urging the British to keep Indochina in SEAC, but by then 
continued American obstruction and subversion in Indochina had made it 
impossible for the West to stay on.
During the same week, on 9 January 19^5* -Mr. J.C.Sterndale-Bennett, 
of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department, minuted that the Foreign 
Office had made proposals to the State Department, as far back as August 
19^, that the French Military Mission be established at SEAC, the Corps 
Leger d ’Intervention be moved to the Far East and the French be allowed 
to participate in political warfare in SEAC. To date the United States 
had not even replied to the proposals. As it happened the British went 
ahead with the Mission. As Sterndale-Bennett wrote, "After all the war
cannot stand still and we have been waiting 5 ov 6 months for the
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President's reply." So Blaizot’s move, originally a temporary 
measure pending U.S. approval, was now regarded as permanent. On 21 
October the Prime Minister, from Cairo, authorised the Foreign Office 
to simply advise the United States of Blaizot's presence at SEAC.
The French were under suspicion of having a foot in each camp, 
desperately trying to make sure that they would return to Indochina. 
Continued Sterndale-Bennett, "it is highly unsatisfactory that we and 
the Americans should be fencing with each other in this way... It is also 
high time we knew where we stood with the U.S. Government sis regards 
the broad general principle of whether Indo China is to remain French."
A Foreign Office memorandum of 18 January 19^5 reflected this 
maddening stalemate, noting that theatre commanders could not agree on 
courses of action In Indochina because of the risk of upsetting Roosevelt, 
and the British were precluded from taking offical action because the 
President's remarks to Halifax were made off the record.
At the same time, while the Foreign Office and Roosevelt were
sticking to their positions, the acrimonius and unproductive sparring
continued between SEAC and China Theatre. As reported by Dening, SEAC
received a message from Wedemeyer "who, this time, seems to be determined
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to challenge our whole position." J Wedemeyer said that his directive 
included French Indochina, and this was recognized by the British Chiefs 
of Staff (this was news to Dening). Furthermore, if SEAC had bomber 
sorties available for use to China Theatre he would pick the targets 
at his own headquarters. Said Dening, "So that is that," and went on,
"If there were any prospect at all that his Command could, In the fore­
seeable future, attack Indo-China, one could see some point in his claim 
from the military point of view. But this is impossible." Wedemeyer 
was claiming that he should have full control of all forces and activities 
in French Indochina. Dening (and the Japanese) thought that MacArthur, 
using Luzon as a springboard, stood a far better chance of invading 
Indochina. Had that happened perhaps things may have turned out 
differently for Vietnam in the long run.
General Blaizot, keeping up the pressure, repeated that it was not 
a practical proposition to conduct preoccupational activity from China, 
and Wedemeyer was ignoring the verbal agreement between Chiang and 
Mountbatten, which the President and U.S. Chiefs of Staff had approved. 
Dening, alarmed at the long term implications of the U.S. Indochina
policy, was determined that SEAC should hold fast. "I think, therefore, 
that we should stoutly resist General Wedemeyer's attempt to usurp 
the sole authority for this job." Although Force 136 was not heavily 
involved In China, "Indo-China, on the other hand, Is another matter.
As you know Force 136 have been the guiding light there, and but for 
them the French, who I believe are now contributing very valuable 
intelligence, apart from any other activities, would have been unable 
to get going. The Supreme Commander has just urged that we should let
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sleeping dogs lie. Unfortunately the dogs have failed to remain asleep."
Halifax, however, was making sure that the dogs kept quiet, for
he questioned the wisdom of pursuing Dening*s complaint of a Washington
10*5
press leak that the French had a mission at SEAC. Any further 
publicity may bring the U.S. Chiefs of Staff into the act and the 
whole business of SEAC's activities in Indochina may be open to question.
So it was quietly dropped by the Foreign Office.
The French Mission at Kandy were now becoming worried over Japanese 
activity in Indochina. They reported that the Japanese had brought 
^000 troops to Tonkin from Kwangsi, and there may be a further division 
to follow. The Japanese were also pressing the French to hand over 
six U.S. pilots, but the French were resisting the Japanese demands. 
Mountbatten quickly responded and told the French that under no circum­
stances were the pilots to be handed to the Japanese.
Dening persisted in trying to find some way out of the jam, but 
Wedemeyer's obstinence was, if anything, getting worse. "I am afraid 
it is only too clear that the Americans are, for what are purely
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political reasons, trying to block something which is militarily sound." 
Even if MacArthur was able to mount the initial assault from the 
Philippines, any preoccupational activities in Indochina would be 
invaluable to him.
At the Tet festivities in Paris, de Gaulla flatly rejected 
Roosevelt's ideas of trusteeship for Indochina. France, said de Gaulle, 
would be her own trustee. A Foreign Office planning paper had 
anticipated his remarks by recalling, a week earlier, that former 
Governor-General Albert Sarraut had described Indochina as "the most 
important, the most developed and the most prosperous of our colonies."
Any attempts to arbitrarily confiscate it "would be passionately resented" 
by France and have incalculable results not only in the Far East but in 
Europe. It would also "put in question the future of all other Far
Eastern colonial possession (including our own) which have been over- 
107
run by Japan." French Indochina was of considerable importance to
Great Britain. It had been used as a stepping-stone for outflanking 
Malaya, and British interest, "by means of special strategic agreements 
within an international security scheme", lay in making sure it did not 
happen again.
The planning paper mentioned an ominous possibility. If Russia 
entered the war against Japan she may show an interest in French Indo­
china. The position of Indochina was peculiar to begin with. De Gaulle 
was saying that France was at war with Japan, but the Japanese did not 
recognize his Provisional Government and therefore did not regard herself 
at war with France. Japan regarded Indochina as Vichy with whom she had 
certain agreements and rights, but Vichy did not really exist anymore. 
Roosevelt was guaranteeing trouble In Europe and Asia by persisting in 
trying to take away Indochina from France, and the Allies were not able 
to prosecute the war fully In Indochina because of these fundamental 
differences between the U.S. and British/French senior commanders in 
Asia. The only people gaining anything out of this unfortunate deadlock 
were the Japanese and Viet Minh.
The larger problem of the postwar status of Indochina loomed over 
everything. It was becoming more difficult to see how Roosevelt could 
go on like this, 21s de Gaulle’s Provisional Government was rapidly 
gaining strength. Previous U.S. commitments to France were now more 
than ever in the minds of the French and British governments. In October 
19^1 Mr. Atherton, of the State Department, had written to M,Pleven 
outlining the U.S. position. Atherton had said that the policy of the 
U.S. Government to France was based on maintaining and restoring the 
French Empire. "I am able to assure you that the restoration of France 
in Its complete independence, in all its grandeur, and the extent it
possessed before the war, in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the
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war aims of the United Nations." Mr. Murphy had given General Giraud 
the same guarantee just prior to the North African landings.
There were a number of diplomats in the State Department who 
disagreed with Roosevelt on Indochina and France. Others who could go 
either way just wished that he would do something, for he now postponed 
discussions on Indochina. On 6 February 19^ +5 the U.S. Ambassador to 
China told the British Ambassador in confidence that the absence of any 
declared American policy on Indochina was embarrassing for him. He had
asked Roosevelt to make a move, perhaps at a three-power meeting, but 
had had no luck so far. And he was not likely to do much better in the 
future.
In a memorandum of 1 January 19^5 to the Secretary of State,
Roosevelt had written, "I still do not want to get mixed up in any
Indochina decision. It is a matter for post-war. By the same token,
I do not want to get mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation
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of Indochina from the Japanese."
On 12 February 19^*5 Cabinet officials sent a message to Churchill 
at Argonaut, asking him to air the Indochina stalemate, but Churchill 
replied the next day that it was no good bringing it up to Roosevelt 
as the President had no military advisers with him. If absolutely 
necessary, however, he would talk generally about it. As it happened, 
Indochina was not officially discussed at Argonaut, although it is a 
possibility that Churchill may have privately passed on the Foreign 
Office request that Wedemeyer be made to live up to the Chiang-Mountbatten 
agreement of 19^3* This is unlikely, however, as Churchill was now 
essentially going it alone in Southeast Asia.
While General Carton de Wiart was passing Wedemeyer's objections 
to Dening, the problem was further complicated by a split among the 
American officers at SEAC, most of whom wanted Siam and French Indochina 
to remain within SEAC. Lieutenant General Wheeler, now Deputy Supreme 
Allied Commander, ended up playing a double game on occasion. As a 
Deputy Supreme Commander he owed a measure of loyalty to his boss, 
Mountbatten, but as a U.S. officer there were times when he felt obliged 
to try and block Mountbatten over policy in Indochina. It was a difficult 
position for him, and on the whole he. was held in high regard by SEAC.
In Chungking the British Ambassador Sir H.Seymour was trying to
pin U.S. Ambassador Hurley down and find out exactly what the United
States policy was, and what lay behind U.S. suspicions of a French,
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Dutch and British "nefarious 1combinazione' ". The lack of a definite 
area policy had everybody guessing as to what the attitude should be 
towards the French. Were they "people to play with or to ostracize, 
whether to encourage their Indo-China activities or the reverse." The 
British, thought Seymour, should not turn their backs on the French, yet 
the Americans were uneasy and assuming that the British and French were 
generally up to no good. "The Americans probably feel left out of this 
kind of thing; and I should say that this, combined with a general vague
feeling that Powers holding colonies are not likely to be up to much 
good anyway, would account for the vague suspicions which are certainly 
current."
The French had now made it clear that they would actively resist 
the Chinese, even if the Chinese were led by Americans, but if one or 
two battalions of French or British troops would lead an Allied invasion, 
that would be acceptable. In July 1944* the resistance in Indochina had 
advised the French Provisional Government that for effective action they 
needed a minimum of five to six hundred officers and men familiar with 
Indochina and trained in modern war —  thus the Corps Leger was formed. 
However, the U.S. Chiefs had not approved its movement to the Far East, 
where it could organize groups to take on the Communists (very much a 
minority group at this time) and Japanese.
Mountbatten scheduled a trip to Chungking to try to thrash this 
problem out with Wedemeyer, but was informed that Wedemeyer would not 
be in Chungking at that time; they did meet in Calcutta a few days later. 
Seymour recommended that Mountbatten come ahead anyway or the Chinese 
would think that the main reason for the trip was a conference with 
Wedemeyer (which it was).
Seymour's discomfort over lack of clear guidance concerning the
French was shared by Dening, who asked the Foreign Office, "Are we
going all out to help or should we hedge every time we receive a request 
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from the French?" The French were in a bad way and were trying to do 
their best to hang on. Dening thought that now they were back in France 
the French should fight their own battles with the Americans. He may 
well have had Fenard1 s comments in mind when he said that he was getting 
the impression that the French were either "mal Slaves or just stupid 
or trying to pull a fast one." The Foreign Office reply repeated their 
standing view. They wanted stability in the Far East and to build up 
France. Uncertainty was dangerous for all territories awaiting liberation 
(including British territories). A strong France was essential for 
postwar security, and would play a major role in containing Germany from
the west. It was thus essential that her ports and air bases remain in 
friendly hands, and France would be a useful sully with many common 
European and Imperial interests. It was the British who had continually 
pressed the Americans to recognize de Gaulle's French Provisional 
Government, and who had secured a French zone of occupation in Germany 
and a seat for France on the German Control Commission. France was,
also, to be a counterweight to Russian influence in Europe. The Foreign 
Office, however, did on occasion express annoyance with the French when 
the latter tended to be upset because the British were not prepared "to 
part brass rags" with the Americans in order to get the French what they 
wanted.
Dening* s frustration showed in his increasing correspondence with 
the Foreign Office. He was by now despairing of convincing Hurley and 
Wedemeyer of the longterm dangers of their obstructionist policy in 
Indochina. When Dening saw Wedemeyer on 20 February, Wedemeyer told
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him that he was **180 degrees at variance" with Mountbatten over Indochina.
During the conversation Dening said that he had heard rumours of sinister
British plots with the French and Dutch, and that the British were
supposed to be harboring evil designs on Siam as well. Hurley was quick
to respond that he too had heard them, but brushed them aside and said
that the U.S. and Britain must not bicker. Dening had thus confronted
Hurley with Foreign Office feelings that Hurley was suspicious of British
"imperialism" and was lending an ear to stories of the British scheming
with the French and Dutch behind the back of the United States. For
some time now Sir H.Seymour had been "patiently trying to disabuse him
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of these suspicions." J
During the meeting Wedemeyer again openly aired his own suspicions
of British intentions everywhere, telling Dening that Britain did not
want a unified China. Dening said that he simply had no time to prove
him wrong. Wedemeyer next went on to express contempt for the French 
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in Indochina and doubted that they would be of any use in ejecting
the Japanese. Dening sighed, "Someday some better man than I may find
time to convince General Wedemeyer that we are not as sinister as he
11 *5
thinks we are. It will be a difficult but worthwhile task."
The atmosphere in Chungking must have been something to experience.
As negative as the American mission was in general, John Davies was so 
venomously anti-British that even Hurley was forced to remove him. He 
was sent to Moscow.
While these talks were taking place General Carton de Wiart sent 
Churchill a report of his own conversation with General Pechkoff, the 
French envoy to Chungking. Pechkoff went to see de Wiart "not as a 
French Ambassador but as a soldier." Pechkoff, reflecting French 
fears of a Chinese move, said he had information that two Chinese divisions 
and some Americans were on the Indochina border, and the Americans were
known to be helping the Annamite revolutionaries. He said the French 
would fight if the Chinese entered Indochina.
De Wiart also sent General Ismay further information on the
seemingly irreconcilable problem in Southeast Asia. "Wedemeyer was
quite frank to me about his plans, and I think he, for military reasons,
would like to see the Indo-China question solved. It would simplify
military operations and give him an opportunity of doing something big;
scattering his army, just to occupy the Japanese is a poor role for a
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commander, and would leave everything for Mac Arthur." And on a more
personal note, "A friend of Hurley's tells me he badly wants an English 
decoration, as he told him rather sourly that he had been such a good 
friend of England's before and during the war. This was said in the 
course of the conversation about Wedemeyer having got a C.B."
De Wiart himself was approached about coordinating clandestine 
activity on the China side for SEAC, but demurred. It was a full time 
job, and he would not be able to devote the necessary attention to it 
and continue to keep up with diplomatic affairs. "I also have to do all 
the talking with the Americans who, as you know, are very touchy, and 
have to be carefully handled.
In London the Foreign Office was wondering about Wedemeyer. He had
been an agreeable sort while Deputy Supreme Commander; what now were his
motives? Was he merely trying to play a big American role in China and
cut the British out? Or was he an extremely conscientious, high-principled
and rigid man carrying out the letter of his instructions, regardless of
all else? Was he really well-disposed to the British but following
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contrary orders from Washington? Wedemeyer answered the question 
himself in a later talk with Dening.
At this time, on the other side of the world, the Indochina problem 
was still very much on the table. A 23 February report by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff Joint Planning Staff referred to the French Resistance 
in Tonkin, and specifically to the French statement that air support 
would be needed to support the resistance in the north. The French would 
also like to put a knowledgeable officer on the 14th Air Force staff.
The French were advised that 14th Air Force intelligence was good enough 
and French liaison was not needed. Furthermore, the Joint Planners 
professed that the reference to an Allied Headquarters in China was 
"notunderstood", since Chiang Kai-Shek was the Supreme Commander there 
and Wedemeyer merely commanded U.S. Forces in China Theatre. The French,
with everyone else, could not tell it by Wedemeyer's actions and words.
The French could not be spared any air supply, said the Planners, as 
everything was needed for more official operations. Finally, there was 
"No likelihood of major operations against Indochina requiring large- 
scale assistance from the French resistance movement in the near future," 
and until the question of Allied Command in Indochina was settled they 
could not talk to the French about it. In other words, to the French 
it was the old "Don't call us, we'll call you."
The war was not standing still for SOE either. And while the 
politicians fenced they decided to help things along with a little sleight 
of hand which would make the badly needed Corps Leger disappear from North 
Africa and reappear in Southeast Asia. It was a good try and may well 
have worked, but the Foreign Office's Sterndale-Bennett was quick to 
catch on and stopped it. SOE may have been driven to extreme measures 
by the failure of the political leaders to discuss Indochina at Argonaut. 
Mountbatten was not surprised at this oversight; in a memo of 25 February 
to Dening he acknowledged, "Presume that this was done in deference to 
the President's known feelings."
SOE wanted the Foreign Office to grant visas to certain French 
individuals from the CLI going from Algiers to Colombo. These French 
personnel were somehow going to be the whole unit, but when the numbers 
began to grow someone caught on. The War Office and SOE then owned up. 
They expressed regret at all the inconvenience and said that they thought 
the Foreign Office knew all about it; it really was an "oversight" that 
the F.O. had not been fully informed. So SOE sent a Major Last (probably 
the junior officer) over to the Foreign Office with the relevant 
correspondence to try and explain the situation —  which only made things 
worse, for one of the papers, an internal SOE document, said that the 
F.O. had "authorized" the move. SOE also said that Dening at SEAC 
obviously must have known about it.
Sterndale-Bennett expressed astonishment at hearing the poor Major
give his defence, saying it was contrary to all the facts. The F.O.
had agreed that a small group of CLI men could go out to SEAC as members
of SOE, and not as a body. At the time the British were still awaiting
American concurrence to moving the CLI, so SOE here and Force 136 in the
Far East were trying to pull a fast one. In fact, Sterndale-Bennett was
alleged to have been the Foreign Office official to have approved the
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move. "Major Last put up a somewhat confused defense." Sterndale-
Bennett was particularly incensed and took Force 136 to task for
implicating Dening, saying "It was one of the lamest defences I have
ever seen." With reluctance the move was blocked. It was not that
Sterndale-Bennett disagreed with the move; he fully recognized the
need for the CLI to get to work in Indochina, but their transfer was
being actively opposed by the U.S. Chiefs, and to move them arbitrarily
would entail a political explosion which at this particularly delicate
stage they were not prepared to face.
Mountbatten met Wedemeyer in Calcutta and took up the issue of
his "Gentleman's Agreement" with Chiang Kai-Shek. Mountbatten recorded,
"I warned him that it was my intention to confirm personally from the
Generalissimo in Chungking that he regarded his gentleman's agreement
with me as still binding, and I particularly invited General Wedemeyer
to have one or two representatives present when I made this statement.
After demurring, he finally agreed that he would arrange for General
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Gross and an American interpreter to be present." Wedemeyer
reiterated his opposition to the agreement, and Somervell's lack of
authority to negotiate, and now said that he was going to tell his
superiors in Washington about it. Rumours had it that Wedemeyer's plans
called for training 36 Chinese divisions to attack Indochina, an invasion
122which Dening thought would be "lamentable from every angle."
Mountbatten thought he knew one of the reasons for Wedemeyer's
suspicions. It went back to the previous year when the "Seed of distrust
was firmly implanted in Wedemeyer's mind in July 1944..” -It that time
Force 136 made an "unfortunate mistake" in infiltrating a French officer
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to Indochina bearing a letter of introduction from General de Gaulle. 
Wedemeyer had some justification for his suspicions, but the quarrel 
between the two theatre commanders retarded meaningful operations in 
that vitally important area. When Kunming airfield was closed to Force 136 
operations on 24 January 194£, the Saigon area and Cambodia had to be 
omitted from Special Duty plans due to extreme flying ranges from Jessore.
The War Cabinet took note of the slowdown of operations in French 
Indochina, and of Wedemeyer's theory that his new position overrode the 
Chiang-Mountbatten agreement, which at the moment was Mountbatten's 
bridge to Indochina. "Early in January he told Admiral Mountbatten 'that 
he would have to inform the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Supreme 
Allied Commander was still acting on his agreement with the Generalissimo' 
and he expressed great astonishment on being told by Admiral Mountbatten 
in reply that instructions to United States Commanding Generals were
of no special concern to the British Chiefs of Staff and certainly did
1 2 1 +
not give General Wedemeyer any Allied rights over Indo-China."
On 13 January SEAC wanted to call forward the CLI, then in Algiers, 
to engage in guerilla operations in Indochina. Wedemeyer was opposed 
to this, but there were sound political and military reasons for 
turning them loose now. When the SEAC staff had reached agreement,
General Wheeler, the American deputy, threw a bombshell into the plan; he 
produced a telegram, which he had been hiding up to now, from the U.S. 
Chiefs which forbade the movement of French forces to the Far East, 
and said that "Admiral Mountbatten as an Englishman could do what he 
liked but as the Supreme Commander of an Allied Command he was not 
entitled to take such action without the authority of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff." 12^
On l+ March Eden asked Churchill to intervene with Roosevelt
to stop "the present sparring" between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer, which 
would lead to trouble. Churchill always kept his Cabinet replies short.
His response was simply "Yes; W.S.C; 6.3.1+5," referring to Eden's last 
sentence asking if the Prime Minister would "consider an approach to 
the President," for "no other course is likely to produce a decision."
As the problem was explained to Churchill, the British Chiefs of Staff 
had asked the Combined Chiefs to approve increased French participation 
in the Far East. The U.S. Chiefs, reflecting Roosevelt's views, had for 
several months now refused to reply. But the President had, in the 
meanwhile, told Halifax that he was prepared to turn a blind eye to 
Mountbatten' s preoccupational activities in Indochina, but now Wedemeyer 
was the problem. Since Wedemeyer was in Washington at this time it 
would be a good idea to send a message to Roosevelt.
Unfortunately, in the midst of all this the long-dreaded event 
occurred when the Japanese on 9 March finally struck down the French, 
an event of calamitous consequences, for the Viet Minh, with American 
help, now had a free hand to accelerate the build up of their own movement.
On the day following the Japanese coup Field Marshal Wilson, Chief
of the Joint Staff Mission in Washington, reported the results of a
meeting he had with General Wedemeyer, who had been in Washington for 
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a few days. Wedemeyer was hoping to "cannibalize" the Chinese 
divisionsin order to create a few good ones. Most Chinese divisions 
were understrength and half-starved, despite huge amounts of American aid. 
It was so bad that Wedemeyer had to attach an advisory staff of about 
1+0 Emericans to each division, and was now having a difficult time finding
enough Americans to go around. He hoped to withdraw the U.S. regiment
from Burma and considered the French in Indochina "rotten to the core" —
it was useless to rely on them, so there was no potential maquis in the
country. He strongly objected to Mountbatten1 a preoccupational activities
in Indochina and seemed to have personally nullified the agreement made
between Mountbatten and Chiang Kai-Shek.
On 12 March General St. Didier, of the French Mission in Washington,
asked the Combined Chiefs to send help to the beleagured French columns
in Indochina. The reply was not very helpful, and no increase in the
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French staff at Chungking would be permitted. Wedemeyer would meet
Blaizot if necessary, and look into the situation. At this time
Wedemeyer was returning from Washington to Chungking, and the British
Chiefs and Foreign Office were hoping to persuade him to return via
London. He begged off this, and on 12 March Ismay told Churchill that
the U.S. Chiefs had probably dissuaded Wedemeyer from stopping off in
London lest those crafty British sway him from his plans for a great
offensive by the Chinese armies, which would settle the Indochinese
question once and for all. Churchill was really preoccupied with bigger
things, and this flaring Indochina problem was something of a nuisance.
Before writing- to Roosevelt he asked General Ismay to "Let me have a
short note, not more than one page, on what has happened in Indo-China
since the beginning of the war. How is it there are French troops and
a Governor-General there now? Are they survivors of the Vichy period?
Have they not yet joined up with de Gaulle? I have not followed the
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affairs in this country for some time."
On 12 March, also, the French. Ambassador, M.Massigli, told Anthony
Eden that the Japanese coup had been expected. He also said that he
understood the Americans were now helping the French. As it was they
were not, save for some strafing of Japanese positions. Massigli said
that these developments made it more imperative than ever that the Corps
Leger be flown to the Far East. He knew that the British wanted this
but the Combined Chiefs would not give their approval. If the U.S.
Chiefs continued to object, he pleaded, could not the British provide 
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the transport? After all, the outcome in Indochina may well influence
the Burma operations, and Lord Mountbatten had always been anxious to 
build up and fortify the loyal French underground. Eden could not add 
much to this, as the matter was now in the hands of the Prime Minister.
On 13 March, on hearing of the inactivity of the USAAF concerning 
help for the retreating French forces in Indochina, de Gaulle asked U.S.
Ambassador Caffery to see him. The French leader said that he had
received word that U.S. forces had refused to assist the French, and
the expeditionary forces for Indochina were stalled because the Americans
had prohibited their movement to the Far East. He said he failed to
understand American policy. In a cold fury he turned on Caffery: "What
are you driving at? Do you want us to become, for example, one of the
federated states under the Russian aegis? The Russians are advancing
apace as you well know. When Germany falls they will be upon us. If
the public here comes to realize that you are against us in Indochina
there will be a terrific disappointment and nobody knows to what this
will lead. We do not want to become Communist; we do not want to fall
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into the Russian orbit, but I hope that you do not push us into it."
The War Cabinet's initial assessment of the coup revealed, that
at the moment the Japanese action appeared to be limited to major centres.
Eight of the W/T stations, built up originally during the "Belief" sorties,
went down, although 15 were still up. Ten new sets recently delivered
131had not been able to begin operations as yet. There was an urgent
requirement for drops of food and arms to the retreating French columns.
On 11 March l+ RAF B-21+ aircraft loaded with arms had flown to the French 
in the vicinity of Thai Nguyen, in Tonkin; 2 sorties were successful.
One of the few places where the Japanese surprise had not swept the French 
away was at Moncay, in far northern Tonkin, where the French reported that 
their troops had surrounded the Japanese and no Japanese reinforcements 
had yet arrived; but they badly needed supplies there to sustain their 
fight.
On 16 March the War Office informed the Foreign Office that RAF
Liberators were being diverted to drop supplies to the French, but the
USAAF just across the border had announced that they would not drop supplies
to the French unless authorized by Washington; they would continue their
normal scheduled bombing operations in the interior.
On 17 March, with the RAF straining to sustain the French in this
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fighting retreat, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt, He told Roosevelt that
he had heard that there were "certain difficulties" between Mountbatten
and Wedemeyer about operations in Indochina; he went on to bring Roosevelt
up to date on those operations:
"Under existing decisions of the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff Indo-China is still within the China Theatre.
But Mountbatten has a vital interest in Indo-China as 
well as in Siam since it is through them that runs 
the Japanese land and air reinforcement route to Burma 
and Malaya; and as you know he has an oral understanding
with Chian# Kai-Shek that both he and the Generalissimo 
shall be free to attack Siam and Indo-China and that 
the boundaries between the two Theatres shall be decided 
when the time comes in accordance with the progress 
made by their respective forces. The Generalissimo 
agreed after SEXTANT that this understanding extended 
to preoccupational activities."
Churchill concluded by saying that General Wedemeyer "feels 
difficulty in recognizing this oral understanding," and "harmful 
friction" could come about. He suggested that they clear it up by 
addressing the oral agreement, "which seems a sensible and workable 
agreement." Roosevelt replied five days later, but in the interval 
much happened which affect U.S.-French relations to this day.
As far as Mountbatten was concerned, he was standing fast on his
verbal pact with Chiang. On 17 March, as Churchill was writing to
Roosevelt, Mountbatten wrote to Somervell thanking him for the gift
of a new automatic pistol which was personally delivered to Mountbatten.
The Supreme Allied' Commander said he hoped to find a Japanese straggler
or two, when Mandalay fell ("waiting to be finished off"), and would let
Somervell know if he had any luck. Wrote Mountbatten, "I have just
got back from Chungking and it brought , back many memories of our stay
together there. I was delighted to find that the 'Gentleman's Agreement*
between the Generalissimo, you and me on S.E.A.C./China Boundaries was
still being honoured although it still rests on our words and has not been
133signed; really rather a wonderful thing and all due to you." J 
Wedemeyer would have disagreed with the prose.
On 18 March the news from Indochina was worse. On behalf of the 
French Government the Head of the French Naval Mission pleaded with the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff for help, particularly for the 1000 French 
troops at Moncay who were resisting the Japanese and crying out for arms 
and ammunition; the latter was of particular urgency as Japanese policy 
had been to keep the French Army short of ammunition. In Chungking 
General Gross (Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff) was asked to parachute Bren 
guns and 60 cases of ammunition stored there. He refused, to do so, citing 
(it might be thought somewhat cattily) previous French requests that the 
U.S. stop sending arms to Indochina. These earlier requests had, of 
course, referred to American support of Communist revolutionaries who 
were the Viet Minh backbone. The French Government stated that if help 
were not forthcoming immediately the battle at Moncay would be over. The 
French, over "Such a misunderstanding... should deeply resent not to see 
our Allies bring them immediately all possible help in their traditional
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brotherhood';" ^ they urgently requested help from the U.S. 1i|.th Air 
Force sitting across the border in China. From Washington, in his memo 
to the Cabinet, Field Marshal Wilson said that if anything was to be done 
for the French it must be quick. In his view the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 
would support General Gross and refuse to permit the 1ij.th Air Force to 
aid the French. Wilson suggested that, in view of the desperate 
circumstances of the French, Mountbatten should be asked to throw in 
everything he could spare in order to give the French a chance, while 
keeping Wedemeyer informed of course.
On the same day, 18 March, as Churchill^ message was en route
to Roosevelt, General Marshall received a message from General Gross.
Miarshall passed the message to Field Marshal Wilson without comment.
While the French were being cut to pieces across the border by the common
enemy, the best Gross could do at this critical juncture was to complain
again of SEAC's philosophy that they could operate in Indochina without
receiving permission from Wedemeyer, so long as they did not stage out
of China. Wilson cabled the British Chiefs:
"From the military point of view, Mountbatten1 s interest 
in what goes on in French Indochina is obvious and if 
military considerations were the only factors that had 
to be taken into account, no doubt a solution could be 
found which would be acceptable to both Wedemeyer and 
Mountbatten. But the difficulty in the background all 
the time is political and springs from the different 
attitude adopted by our two Governments to the French 
position in F.I.C.* H.M.GIJ’* on the one hand wish to foster 
the French resistance movement and the U.S.G.*** on the 
other take an entirely contrary view. We want to work 
with the French and make increasing use of French man­
power to increase clandestine resistance to the Japanese 
but feel that the American inclination is to exclude 
the. French altogether." 135
Churchill had had enough by now. On 19 March he wrote to Wilson
asking him to tell Roosevelt and Miarshall that "it will look very bad
in history if we were to let the French force in Indo-China be cut
to pieces by the Japanese through shortage of ammunition, if there is
anything we can do to save them." He went on to hope "that we shall
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be agreed not to stand on punctilio in this emergency." ^ Wilson 
immediately saw Marshall and asked him to tell Wedemeyer to help the 
desperate Frenchmen at Moncay. Should Marshall be reluctant to do so, 
or Wedemeyer refuse, then the British would tell the U.S. that Mountbatten 
would do it for them anyway, while keeping Wedemeyer informed. Actually, 
Mountbatten was already helping the French as best he could, and on the
^French Indo-China ** His Majesty1 s Government *** U.S. Government
same day (11+ March) the British Chiefs wired Mountbatten to ask if he 
could increase the present scale of air support for the French groups 
operating in Indochina. "In particular could you, if so instructed, 
deliver by parachute supplies, ammunition and Bren guns to the French 
at Moncay?"
On 20 March Churchill, despairing of an American change of heart 
and prompted by the terrible condition of the French in Indochina, decided 
to go all out. He brushed aside Wilson1 s caution that Indochina was 
in the U.S. sphere and ordered Mountbatten to do everything he could to 
assist the surviving Frenchmen. When Marshall heard of this he immediately 
ordered Chennault to start helping the French. However, several days 
passed before his order was acted on by China Theatre forces.
On 21 March Mountbatten replied to London. With an eye on the 
political implications he wrote that it was never his intention to supply 
French regular forces, but the Japanese coup had now mixed the French 
regular forces and underground together. His previous policy had been 
to establish a radio net with the underground and supply selected 
centres with limited quantities of arms and supplies for training and 
future use by guerillas. The supply problem had been of the utmost 
difficulty due to the extreme distances and adverse weather conditions 
involved. In one month (from 6 February to 6 March 19U5) only 28 of 77 
Liberator sorties had been successful. He could possibly have done more 
but political considerations (American objections) had prohibited him 
from accepting a French offer to man aiid maintain two squadrons.
Although Marshall (probably the best American officer produced in
this century —  and perhaps the greatest ever), had ordered U.S. forces
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to help the French, Wedemeyer had still not acted by 22 March; J for 
Blaizot forwarded to the French Government a message from General 
Alessandri in Indochina. Alessandri reported that he expected Son La 
to fall to the Japanese on 23/21+ March, at which time he would fall 
back to -Bi&n Bien Phu or Tu&i Giao, and urgently asked for radio equipment, 
mortars and whatever help he could get from "11+ American Air Force" across 
the border.
On 22 March Roosevelt replied to Churchill*s request that Wedemeyer 
honour the Mountbatten-Chiang agreement. Roosevelt said he knew about 
the agreement, and "This appears perfectly sound to me." However, he 
noted the obscurity in the agreement in dealing with preoccupational 
activities, and thought that Chiang (through Wedemeyer) had insisted on
controlling all non-Chinese clandestine activity in Indochina. So
Roosevelt essentially did not accede to Churchill's request, and went
on to say that Wedemeyer should have the final say. Since the two
theatre commanders were independently running their own air operations
and intelligence, confusion may occur which "mightresult in placing
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the two -theatres unintentionally in conflict." Actually, it was
highly unlikely that Chiang even knew what the OSS was doing in that
part of the world. On 2k March 19U5> U.S. Ambassador Caffery and
Samuel Rosenman called on de Gaulle. As they were leaving de Gaulle
said to Caffery, "It seems clear now that your Government does not
want to help our troops in Indo-China. Nothing has yet been dropped
to them by parachute. " Caffery muttered some excuse about the distances
involved, but de Gaulle snapped, "No, that is not the question; the
139
question is one of policy I assume."
On 27 March Ambassador Hurley was back in Washington, and Wilson 
had a talk with him. Hurley told Wilson that "American policy as 
regards Indo-China was still nebulous, and he could add no more to 
that, so that Wilson was unable to discuss the question of subversive 
activities with him. But Hurley did say that the President and State 
Department were going to give the British a rough time over Hong Kong, 
which they wanted to give to the Chinese (but as Eden had noted, FDR 
had not simultaneously offered to return Puerto Rico to the Spanish). 
Hurley also predicted future trouble over the use of land-lease equipment 
being used after the war to recover colonial territories, beginning 
with the French divisions for Indochina, to be followed by the Dutch 
and probably the British in Malaya.
Little by little the British were turning away from the Combined. 
Chiefs on this issue, beginning with their giving Mountbatten the green 
light over going all out to supply the retreating French columns.
They were about to take another decision over the Corps Leger. On 27 
March a meeting in London (of various planning directors) was held 
to discuss Indochina. The participants were Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck 
(Foreign Office), Air Vice Marshal Whitworth-Jones (SD Operations,
SEAC), Mir. Dening, Colonel Taylor (SOE) and the War Office Strategical 
Planning Section. The centre of discussion was the urgent need to 
move the Corps Leger to the Far East, and the fact that the only objection 
to its move was political, since it appeared that on military grounds 
the U.S. Chiefs had no objection to the move. Since U August 19W j.» the 
British Chiefs had proposed to move the CLI east, and the U.S. had
persistently refused to agree to the move although the U.S. Chiefs had 
raised no military objections. The U.S. was advised that the British 
would inform the French why the CLI could not be moved; the British 
were "reluctant that the odium of this refusal should fall on us."
Word had now come in that in Tonkin the column of Commandant Capponi, 
consisting of 500 Europeans and 1000 Vietnamese troops, had been 
neutralized by the Japanese on 27 March; only 27 Europeans escaped.
In Thakhek, Laos, 250 French troops were wiped out, and the Japanese 
there had executed all French government officials, including the 
President de France, two bishops, and the Mother Superior of the convent.
On 30 March the Joint Staff Mission forwarded to the Foreign 
Office a report of yet another note from Admiral Fenard to the Combined 
Chiefs in which the French repeated their requests to have the Corps 
Leger moved to the Far East and their troops and resistance fighting 
in Indochina resupplied, saying it was "both embarrassing and unfortunate 
that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should continue to give the French 
no encouragement whatever with regard to any form of French military 
activity in this French possession." The note was aimed at the U.S.
Chiefs.
On the same day the British Chiefs of Staff examined Roosevelt's 
reply to Churchill and were not impressed with it. On their strong 
recommendation Churchill replied to Roosevelt, reiterating Mountbatten's 
vital interest in Indochina and saying that it made more sense to fly 
supplies direct to South East Asia from India or SEAC rather than via 
the long and indirect route over the "Hump", and India was the great 
base supplying both China and Southeast Asia. But he was now finished 
with trying to evoke a sense of urgency in Roosevelt and bluntly stated 
that he was empowering Mountbatten "to conduct pre-occupational activities 
in Indo-China from whatever base appears to be most suitable" keeping 
Wedemeyer informed. He did not even say south Indochina. Of Mountbatten's 
directive, Churchill amended this sentence by hand to read, "You may 
conduct from whatever base appears most suitable the minimum pre- 
occupational activities in Indo-China which local emergency and the
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advance of your forces require." Churchill continued, "Now that 
the Japanese have taken over Indo-China and that substantial resistance 
is being offered by French patriots, it is essential not only that we 
should support the French by all means in our power, but also that we 
should associate them with our operations into their country. It would
look very bad in history if we failed to support isolated French 
Forces in their resistance to the Japanese to the best of our ability, 
or, if we excluded the French from participation in our councils as 
regards Indo-China."
By 30 March, when Churchill's directive was en route to Mountbatten,
General Chennault still had not done much to help the French. This is a
puzzling part of the story, for in his autobiography written several
years ago he wrote that he strongly opposed the policy of refusing aid
to the French columns falling back in the hills, and wanted very much 
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to help them. However, the recently opened archives tell a different
tale. In a telegram to his superiors, when he was acting theatre 
Commander in Wedemeyer's absence, he complained that the British were 
helping the French at Son La and Moncay, and said that the "French 
continued representations for assistance to their resistance groups 
in Indo-China." As an excuse he reported that "Fluidity of situation, 
bad weather conditions, and non-availability of surplus equipment have 
materially limited action." He then stated that this sort of thing 
(the. RAF B-2i+s assisting the French) would give a bad impression, as 
people may think that the Americans were now helping the retreating
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French columns. Some of his reasoning was a bit thin, as the couple
of hours of weather time his crews would have to face must be contrasted 
with the 15 to 20 hours the tired RAF crews were already flying.
Chennault went on to say that any assistance to the French must be 
weighed against a return value for effort expended. However, in a 
primarily moral issue, as this was, it was not easy to come up with a 
value for money; a lot of it had to do with conscience. In this 
astonishing complaint to Marshall, Chennault said that on 1i+/15 March 
a shot down 1i+th Air Force pilot reported seeing British B-2ij.s dropping 
food and supplies to French forces at Sdh La. What was more, he 
reported indignantly, some of the food dropped were cases of American 
K-rations.' Also, on 20 March two Allied (RAF) Liberators had dropped 
supplies and arms to French forces at Moncay. Some of the supplies had 
fallen beyond French reach,and luckily, said Chennault, friendly Chinese 
had picked up these few crates. While protesting that Mountbatten should 
coordinate operations in Indochina with Chungking, his main problem 
seemed to be that these actions "may lead to erroneous reports of China 
Theatre operations in French Indo-China." The supplies he mentioned which 
may have, but for the Chinese, fallen into Japanese hands consisted of a
few rachine guns and 20 Tommy guns, plus of course those K-rations —
all hardly likely to make much of an impact on the Japanese war effort
one way or the other.
Marshall agreed that there may be problems if Chungking was not 
informed of Mountbatten1 s operations, but did not appear overly upset 
about the rest of Chennault*s protests. And although Chennault thought 
that if he helped the French it would inevitably lead to a "reduction 
of effort against the enemy," in fact, excepting the air strikes, this 
was the only effort against the enemy going on at this time in this 
part of the world.
On 31 March the British Chiefs pressed Churchill for action on
moving the Corps Leger out to the Far East. Churchill replied that he
was a bit reluctant to over-burden the President with this as FDR was 
hard-pressed and "I like to keep him as much as possible for the biggest 
things," noting also that "the telegram he sent me (on pre-occupational 
activities) was obviously not his own."^^ On 3 April he told General 
Hollis of the War Office that he was prepared to bring it up to Roosevelt 
"in a day or two." What he really meant by all this was that he had 
decided to act and would tell the President about it —  not ask him, but 
inform him.
Churchill's attitude reflected the mood of the Foreign Office. On 
the question of command boundaries and the dispatch of the Corps Leger 
to the Far East, the Foreign Office noted that it had been over three 
weeks since the French Ambassador had appealed to the British for help. 
Wrote Sterndale-Bennett: "The time has come to grasp this Indo-China 
nettle and to tackle the Americans on the whole issue;" the British had 
no wish to "lose respect by our subservience in this issue." The 
next day the British acted.
On 5 April Admiral Fenard again wrote to the Combined Chiefs about
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the CLI. The French resistance in Indochina needed reinforcement 
cadres. Since the French troops were obliging the Japanese troops to 
fight them (Japanese who could be used elsewhere), it was desirable to 
keep those Frenchmen in good fighting condition. He had thus been 
instructed by the French General Staff to ask for permission to transport 
100 officers and men of the Corps Leger to the Far East; these men were 
familiar with Indochina and the resistance in that area. The remaining 
men of the CLI could go on one of two French cruisers, the Suffren or 
the Georges Leygues. The Suffren was being overhauled and would be ready
for sailing in early May; the GeorgesLeygues was part of the Allied 
fleet which, if released, could sail on 15 April. The cruiser would 
stop at Diego-Suarez on the return leg to bring personnel and supplies 
from Madagascar to France. The British Chiefs supported this approach, . 
and now the Combined Chiefs had no objections, for this was also, the 
day when the British instructed the Joint Staff Mission to inform the 
U.S. Chiefs that the British would send the Corps Leger to the Far East.
As the Combined Chiefs were studying Fenard*s message, in South­
east Asia Mountbatten was preparing for a visit by Wedemeyer. Both 
their plans were now overtaken by events and a face to face meeting 
was overdue. Mountbatten asked London how he should receive Wedemeyer: 
as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-Shek, in which case any information given 
to Wedemeyer would be passed to the Chinese, with the "well-known 
consequent lack of security", or as the Commanding General of U.S. Forces 
in a neighbouring theatre (as Mountbatten recommended). The Foreign 
Office replied that Wedemeyer should be received in his capacity as 
Chiang's Chief of Staff, and Churchill raised the issue with Roosevelt 
with this in mind.
When Wedemeyer arrived at SEAC, Mountbatten went over the whole 
history of the negotiations and clandestine activity, and took Wedemeyer 
into the super-secret Clandestine War Room to show him the extent of 
SEAC Clandestine activity in Southeast Asia. Tie meeting was reported 
to the Foreign Office by H.N. Brain, of Dening*s Foreign Office staff 
at SEAC. Brain said that the two commanders had had a long talk on 
French Indochina, during which Wedemeyer was under the impression that 
the "Gentleman's Agreement" was never approved by higher authority in 
Washington and was "astounded" when shown evidence that both the President 
and the U.S. Chiefs had approved it. Wedemeyer admitted that he must 
have seen these papers while on Mountbatten's staff, but said that the 
British had accepted the inclusion of French Indochina in his sphere 
of operations. Mountbatten retorted that the British had never been 
consulted about it and had thus considered it "purely a question of
11 7
control of American forces and as such no concern of ours." The 
talks did much to clear the air, even if they did not ultimately settle 
the issue; however, Wedemeyer was reaffirmed in his power to veto 
operations which conflicted with his own. As they parted Mountbatten 
asked Wedemeyer if he could now tell the Chiefs of Staff that they had 
"buttoned up" these problems, to which Wedemeyer replied, "Certainly."
Mountbatten reported that Wedemeyer "once more assured me that nothing 
was further from his mind than to exclude British activities as long 
as they contributed to the overall effort against Japan."
As Wedemeyer returned to Chungking the Foreign Office was receiving 
a folder from Colonel Taylor of SOE. Taylor was passing on a message 
from Colin Mackenzie in Delhi (Mackenzie was Commander of Force 136). 
Mackenzie's message was an update of the French-Japanese fighting in 
Indochina* and contained the following main points. The French 
were continuing to cause the Japanese trouble, and some of the initial 
sabotage plans were carried out. Three special groups introduced had 
successfully recruited about 100 guerillas. "If we had (the) 5th 
Regiment (Corps Leger) thus ensuring further special groups (the) 
position would have been most promising." The French troops were 
getting tired and their morale was declining. The main deficiencies 
now in Indochina were of transport (to carry essential supplies), new 
blood of young officers (the absence of which was preventing columns 
from being split into smaller guerilla parties), and the continued hold­
back of the Corps Leger (which constituted a breach of faith). Continued 
Mackenzie, as things stood all the sacrifices and effort would be in 
vain as the columns faced extermination, with the exception of those 
falling back to China. Force 136 had requested SACSEA to send in jeeps 
and trailers, and were wanting to drop in a couple of liaison officers 
as a gesture, but the real answer lay with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
A particularly depressing incident had occurred on 29 March, when the 
Americans flew in two sorties (possibly 10th Air Force C-^7a), one for 
their own needs (presumably OSS exfiltration), and one to evacuate 6 
U.S. airmen (who had been brought out by the French). For the ragged 
and desperate Frenchmen around, this studied callousness had its effect: 
"In neither plane were there any stores, not even medical stores or 
cigarettes. American name is mud repeat mud with French and British alike 
in this whole episode." Mackenzie pulled no punches: if the British 
did not go all out to help, "our position will be little better than 
that of the Americans."
On 12 April Franklin D.Roosevelt, overall probably one of the half 
dozen greatest presidents the U.S. ever had, died, worn out by his 
heroic efforts to carry the terrific burdens of the wartime presidency*
Churchill's disagreements with Roosevelt were political; the two 
leaders had enjoyed a warm personal relationship. When FDR had earlier
sent a birthday message to Churchill, the Prime Minister responded:
”1 cannot tell you how much I value your friendship or how much X 
hope upon it for the future of the world, should we both be spared.'*
And after the 1944 Presidential election Churchill told Roosevelt 
(8 November 1944)»
"I always said that a great people could be trusted 
to stand by the pilot who weathered the storm. It 
is an indescribable relief to me that our comradeship 
will continue and will Kelp to bring the world out 
of misery... things are afoot which will be remembered 
as long sis the English language is spoken in any 
quarter of the globe, and in expressing the comfort 
I feel that the people of the United States have once 
again cast these great burdens upon you, I must avow 
my sure faith that the lights by which we steer will 
bring us sill safely to anchor.”
Now the Pilot was dead.
On the narrow issue of his Indochina policy, La Feber may be as
close as any with his comment that "The President's Indochina policy
in 1943-44 is a case study of how supposed idealism, in this instance
149anticolonialism, can blend perfectly with American self-interest.”
—  a drive for postwar access to new markets and new materials and 
Third World influence. But in the end, like many other limited vision 
policies, it did not work out that way.
The accession of Harry Truman sparked a current debate as to 
whether he continued or departed from Roosevelt's policies. Although 
it may be argued either way, what followed appeared to favour the 
"break” theorists. Regardless, some of the old prejudices lingered on.
Just before de Gaulle visited Washington in 1945 for an initial
meeting with Truman, the President asked an experienced newsman to sum
up de Gaulle. When told that the French leader could hold his own
against any leader, Truman got angry and banged the desk saying,"Dammit,
why doesn't anybody ever tell me the truth! The State Department's
always been telling me de Gaulle is stupid. As it turned out,, it
certainly was not de Gaulle who was stupid. Within a few days of his
assuming office Truman wrote to Churchill, noting that Mountbatten and
Wedemeyer had appeared to have patched up their quarrel, and that
Wedemeyer had been instructed to do what he could for the French resistance 
151groups. ^ On 20 April General Ismay* wrote to Churchill, referring to 
Truman's message that the U.S. Chiefs were issuing a directive to
*Later Field Marshal Lord Ismay.
Wedemeyer# That directive had now arrived, and the British Chiefs
considered that the directive "although not altogether satisfactory,
it is a great advance on anything that the American Chiefs of Staff
have hitherto prepaired to do in this matter, in that it implicitly
recognizes that Admiral Mountbatten is entitled to have plans, intuitions
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and intelligence as regards Indo-China."
All of this was fine, but a few days earlier Colonel Taylor of SOE 
had informed the Foreign Office that the French resistance was almost 
over?they just did not get enough help in the crucial early stages.
Some Frenchmen were escaping to China, while those crossing into Siam 
would be captured. _ The golden chance to use the Corps Leger had now 
been lost due to American resistance to its move to Indochina, and it 
now could not be profitably used. After sharp fights at Apachai arid 
Hon Neua on 29 April General Alessandri had decided to fall back to 
China. Worse, a couple of weeks later the French survivors were struck 
yet again, this time by typhus epidemics at Muong Sai and other places.
If Truman had assumed that the Wedemeyer-Mountbatten dispute was
at an end, he was wrong. A couple of days after Truman had written to
Churchill, Wedemeyer wrote a letter which was "Personal" to Mountbatten
and Wheeler (with copies to General Marshall and Cordell Hull in 
153Washington). It opened all the old wounds. Wedemeyer professed 
ignorance of the Mountbatten-Chiang arrangement. Also, Hurley had 
had several conferences with Chiang about theatre boundaries and areas 
of operational responsibility, during which Chiang had made available 
his copy of the formal minutes of the meetings in October 1943*
Wedemeyer "carefully reviewed" those minutes and reported that he could 
find "no reference concisely to French Indo-China and Siam." Chiang 
also passed over some memoranda covering a formal concurrent discussion 
about French Indochina and Siam. Wedemeyer stated that the basis for 
his discussions with Mountbatten and Washington was "the so-called 
gentleman's agreement based on information furnished by Mountbatten."
Chiang Kai-Shek reaffirmed the two stipulations in what Wedemeyer 
repeatedly called "the so-called gentleman's agreement", namely that 
both theatres may launch attacks on Siam and French Indochina, with 
the political questions to be discussed at Chungking. But Wedemeyer 
insisted that Chiang had stipulated that these arrangements must be 
made in advance, and had agreed only to that proviso, and had not 
agreed to operations being conducted by Mountbatten or anyone else from
outside China Theatre into China Theatre's areas (French Indochina 
and Siam) without Chiang's prior clearance; and Somervell!s notes 
were said to confirm Wedemeyer* s claim.
Wired Wedemeyer, "I am now placed in a position of revealing the 
fact that Mountbatten has either unwittingly misinterpreted the 
Generalissimo's intention and desire as expressed in 19^3 "that the 
Chinese are attempting to abrogate commitment made in so-called 
gentleman's agreement." He said that he was thus in a "delicate position", 
as he did not want to stir things up between Allies (China and Britain —  
although the Chinese did not seem to care as much about all this as 
Wedemeyer).
This was strong stuff. Mountbatten, who was all but called a 
liar by Wedemeyer, was stung by this and hit back immediately. He wrote 
to London, saying that since Wedemeyer had sent this message to Marshall 
and Hull, implying that Mountbatten had deliberately distorted the 
Generalissimo1s wishes and that the question of clandestine activities 
in French Indochina and Siam were never the subject of a gentleman's 
agreement between the two, perhaps the Joint Staff mission in Washington 
would now place the true version before Marshall and Hull and attach a 
copy of his reply to Wedemeyer.
Mountbatten stated that he understood that the problem of clandestine 
activity in Indochina had now been settled at the highest level, but:
"As a matter of record, however, I should like to 
point out that I am not surprised that the formal 
minutes of the meetings held in October 19U3 contain 
no references to French Indo-China or Thailand. It 
has never to my knowledge been suggested that they 
did; and this in fact is why the subsequent gentleman's 
agreement was ever necessary.
In SEACOS 18 of the 9th November 19U3* which was shown 
to you as my DCOS, I reported that I had made it clear 
at the informal meeting with the Generalissimo after 
dinner on 19th October that I reserved the right to 
gather my own intelligence and to carry out pre- 
occupational activities.
You will remember that when I noted that this had 
been omitted in Somervell's written version of the 
gentleman’s agreement, I made a special point of 
raising this question with the Generalissimo. In 
my telegram number 89006, addressed personally to 
you on 30th November 19U3 after I had left you 
behind at the Cairo conference I informed you that 
I had that same day asked the Generalissimo at 
Ramgarh to confirm that he did not mind my sending
agents into Siam and Indo-China from then onwards.
I further informed you that he had confirmed this, 
but had asked me to keep him generally informed of my 
activities, and that I had replied, 'I will of course 
do the same as you do.*
As I have from that day to this received no information 
whatever from the Generalissimo or any member of his 
staff, concerning activities in FIC or Siam conducted 
by the China Theatre, I have refrained, in view of 
the known lack of security in China, from telling the 
Generalissimo anything about our activities.
I have always made a point, however, of seeing that 
my American staff here, originally headed by yourself, 
were kept duly informed... of all our activities in 
Siam and Indo-China." 151+
But while the Chiefs fiddled the French resistance sputtered, then 
died. The TJ.S. Chiefs, in now agreeing to the move of the Corps Leger, 
still found it necessary to add the stipulation that although 
authorizing the move, they could not offer "any assurance as to the 
timing or scope of employment of the Corps Leger d 1Intervention in 
Indo-China."-' ^
In May a summary of clandestine operations was prepared at SEAC
for Cabinet distribution. It recalled that in January 191+5 attempts
were made to reinforce the Free French forces in Indochina with arms
156and ammunition, and to reestablish French influence. The effort
increased, and over the next three months over 300 sorties were flown,
of which fifty per cent were successful.
"At the end of February the Japanese, well aware of 
our activities, turned passive occupation of French 
Indo-China into active military occupation. Regular 
French units fought the Japanese and in some cases 
retreated into the mountains, fighting as guerilla 
bands. Many of the guerilla parties were overpowered 
although they fought well. It is to be regretted 
that lack of aircraft prevented us from giving them 
all the supplies we would have wished. The movement 
has gone to earth again and is supplied by a modest 
effort of about 1+0 sorties a month which is as much 
as can well be afforded." 137
In the Burma battle area, from 1 January 19U5 to 27 May 19U5>
Force 136 guerilla operations had accounted for £169 Japanese killed, 
735 wounded and 50 prisoners taken; Force 136 losses were I4.J4 killed 
and U9 wounded.
The SEAC Joint Planning Staff thought that two corps would be 
needed to clear Indochina of the Japanese; these forces would consist
of six infantry divisions, a tank brigade and a commando brigade 
in a naval assault role* In April General Blaizot informed 
Mountbatten confidentially that in his capacity as Commander of French 
Expeditionary Forces in the Far East, General Sabattier was to be 
appointed Commander in Chief of French Forces in Indochina; Blaizot 
wanted permission to contact Sabattier directly, but Mountbatten, 
cognizant of IT. S. hostility, could only refer the matter to the Chiefs 
of Staff.
For Wedemeyer and Mountbatten, the fundamental reason for their
quarrel over Indochina had largely disappeared. In Mountbatten's
case, there were not many Frenchmen left to organize, and their ragged
and starving remnants had either escaped across "friendly" borders
or were killed. The OSS in the north now had a pretty free hand with
Ho Chi Minh and the Yiet Minh, although that sad story makes distressing
reading in the light of subsequent history.
Mountbatten's sharp earlier reply to Wedemeyer had its effect.
After having shown the message to Marshall, Wilson wired the War
Cabinet and Mountbatten: "I think you may dismiss from your mind
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any anxiety you may have had about this verbal agreement." Wedemeyer
did not strengthen his case much by asking Mountbatten what the initials
"D.G.E.R." meant, in response to Mountbatten's report that DGER personnel
and regular troops were mingled in retreat. This must have caused some
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astonishment at SEAC since it was like asking what "OSS" stood for.
Even as Marshall was telling Wilson that the Indochina question
was settled, Wedemeyer continued to press his objections, and an
apologetic Foreign Office told Mountbatten that "this tiresome question
seems to elude all our efforts to reach a.satisfactory settlement."
And on 6 May 19^+5 Mountbatten was forced to write to Wedemeyer and
remind him that French Indochina had originally been in South East
Asia Command, but the U.S., without asking anyone, had decided to give
it to Chiang Kai-Shek for face-saving reasons. To Mountbatten,
Wedemeyer continued to miss the point that the whole ptirpose of the
gentleman's agreement lay in keeping it unofficial so that the
Generalissimo would not lose face with the Chinese people while letting
Mountbatten operate; it was a formula designed to permit greater
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pressure on the Japanese while preserving Chiang's prestige.
At the same time Mountbatten sent his deputy, General Wheeler, to 
see Wedemeyer, after which he wrote to Anthony Eden:
"... I don't think you will be left in any doubt 
as to the true position, namely, that while Wedemeyer 
was on my staff, he was supporting me enthusiastically 
over the question of our operating in French Indo-China.
Now that he has gone as U.S. Commanding General in the 
China Theatre, and Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, 
he seems to think it is his duty to try and upset all 
the agreements which he has subscribed to before, in 
the mistaken notion that he is looking after American 
interests, in preventing the British or French from 
getting a foot into French Indo-China. 61
Mountbatten then addressed the emotive issue: "Fortunately for British
interests, he has behaved in such an unfriendly manner to the poor 
French in Chungking, and been so unhelpful about their wretched troops 
who have been driven across the Chinese border," that the French would 
be even more well-disposed to the British. Now that Burma was liberated 
there was a better chance of driving to French Indochina.
The acrimonious exchanges between the two senior commanders 
gradually took on a more personal note. As the debate continued into 
May, Mountbatten informed Wedemeyer of his intentions to fly particular 
clandestine sorties into Indochina, giving details, target areas, 
and so on, while noting that he had to date failed to receive any 
reciprocal information from China Theatre. Perhaps the final 
psychological break came with Wedemeyer*s reply of 25 May to Mountbatten, 
a copy of which Wedemeyer sent to the U.S. Chiefs. Wedemeyer, whose 
messages to Mountbatten were taking on an increasingly highhanded tone, 
wrote:
"Your message 106 was referred to me and I regret 
and express surprise that you have adopted course 
of action revealed in your message. It has never 
occurred to me that you would presume that you had 
authority to operate in an area contiguous to your 
own without cognizance and full authority of the 
commander of that area. ^62
While complaining that Mountbatten was not giving him detailed 
enough information on clandestine sorties, Wedemeyer continued, "You 
did show me diagramatically your plans for Indo China, but time was so 
limited when I was in Kandy, it was impossible to examine or evaluate 
them in detail." In light of what is now known of OSS activities in 
his own theatre, little enough as it is, this is a somewhat specious 
statement as it appears that Wedemeyer was never really well informed 
on what the OSS was up to in his own command.
Wedemeyer, who failed to see the need for meaningful air support 
for clandestine activities (as stated in a previous message to 
Mountbatten), said he found it "difficult to comprehend the urgent 
operational necessity of your operations in this theatre." By this 
Wedemeyer, greatly irked, was referring to a message from Mountbatten 
in which SACSEA had stated that he had given Wedemeyer the necessary 
information and could wait no longer for a reply as several parties 
in Indochina depended on the supplies, and the sorties were now being 
carried out.
After pointing out that Mountbatten was contradicting the 
Generalissimo's wishes, Wedemeyer finished on a high note. "Your 
action clearly indicates that we have been unable to agree in what 
I consider an important matter and therefore I have no alternative 
but to refer the entire matter to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
Mountbatten*s attitude, backed by the British Chiefs, was now one of 
inviting Wedemeyer to refer his complaints to wherever he wished. Indo- 
China was too important to permit pro-Western elements to be overwhelmed 
through American obstruction.
As Mountbatten was grappling with these problems, another big 
headache cropped up, this time from General Sultan of Indo-Burma Theatre. 
Sultan wanted the return of USAAF "units to support the Chinese; these 
were an important part of SEAC, and included the 7th Heavy Bomb Group, 
UI;3^d Troop Carrier Group, 1st, 2nd and 3^ cl Combat Cargo Groups (which 
were helping to supply llpfch Army), 2nd Troop Carrier Squadron and the 
80th Fighter Group. After 1 June there would be no more U.S. units 
available to SEAC. Mountbatten had nearly lost them a year earlier 
but had strongly justified his requests for the Air Commando and Combat 
Cargo Squadron; they were the important ones, for he had enough fighter 
and fighter-bomber strength of his own.
Mountbatten won a few, too. By COSSEA, 16 May 19^ 4-5» he was informed 
that the U.S. Chiefs had told Sultan to place, all OSS activities in 
Thailand under the more experienced Force 136 group; thus in Thailand 
at least the failures of Indochina were averted (although this obviously 
was not the only reason). But it is relevant, in the wake of current 
American efforts to exert more effective controls on the CIA, to reflect 
on what happened when an intelligence body ran out of control in the 
periphery —  it ended up making policy, not conforming to it, and the
results were a disaster the magnitude of which has not yet been fully 
comprehended.
As Allied operations in Southeast Asia were increasingly successful
and the focus on Indochina sharpened, the dispute between the two
theatre commanders worsened. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed to
Wilson's suggestion that he should privately see Marshall again.
"In addition, we suggest that you should point out 
to General Marshall that Wedemeyer's inquiries... . 
go far beyond what is required from Admiral Mountbatten 
by his recent directives... and also, if a suitable 
opportunity presents itself, that the tone of Wedemeyer's 
telegram is not exactly calculated to promote that 
intimate collaboration which has before so markedly 
characterised all Anglo-American dealings."16k
Field Marshal Wilson was talking to General Marshall within I48 
hours. Marshall was not pleased over the bickering in Southeast Asia; 
he deplored it and added that Ambassador Hurley was not helping by 
sending out "strongly worded telegrams on the subject with a strong 
anti-British bias." He alBo thought that the French working both ends 
may be a problem, and felt it would be a pity if "good relations should 
be jeopardized over a dispute arising over matters of such low importance 
as clandestine operations in Indo-China, when placed in relation to the 
overall primary task of the attack on Japan." Alas for the lack of 
political foresight —  but in those days the United States was fairly 
new in the business of Free World leadership. That excuse is less 
relevant today.
Marshall's comments gave cause for hope, but a week later it was
back to square one. Wilson now reported that Marshall had, for some
unknown reason, reversed himself on Indochina and had surprised Wilson
by sending him a letter saying that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could
not do much from this distance. Wrote Wilson, "I have a feeling that
there is more in it than meets the eye and he probably does not wish to
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commit himself to writing." ^ Another week later, on 16 June, Wilson
had another talk with Marshall, during which Marshall said that he had 
heard no more about Wedemeyer, but was now worried about an open feud 
between the two top American officials in China Theatre: Hurley (who 
was backing Chiang Kai-Shek "at all costs") and Wedemeyer (who felt that 
the Communists had some military value against Japan) were now openly 
warring with each other. Wilson also reported that Brew Pearson, who 
seemed to have access to anything he wanted, had printed the texts of 
several secret messages between Hurley and Wedemeyer on that subject,
plus a "graphic description of a 'near fist fight* at a Chinese
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Cocktail Party between Hurley and Wedemeyer?s Chief of Staff."
Churchill was disgusted with the continuing leakage of state
secrets in the United States. Since Pearson was also printing
British state secrets which were passed to him through Washington,
Churchill asked Wilson:
"Cannot you persuade General Marshall to press 
the inquiry into Drew Pearson's betrayal of our 
secrets...? We have had no satisfaction for our 
joint complaint and the leakage seems to be 
continuing. There must be some corrupt connection 
between Drew Pearson and someone in the United 
States Departments. I have been repeatedly assured 
by very high people sent to me by the President and 
others that the Americans are on the track of these 
guilty persons, but many months have passed and 
nothing emerges except that the leakage continues.
It is of the utmost importance that we should have 
the means of sure and secret communications. You 
must remember that the actual text of the Scobie 
telegram was published by Drew Pearson, described 
by President Roosevelt as a 'chronic liar1." 167
The British were now approached by the French for facilities 
to train about a hundred French Administrators. As the Foreign 
Office noted, "The idea is that these men when trained would be 
available for cooperation with whatever Allied force may eventually 
go into "French Indo-China.""^ It is likely that the F.O. had a 
pretty good idea as to which Allied force would go into at least part 
of Indochina. The British, who had historically been less specific 
in absolute guarantees to the French, concurred with the request with 
the proviso that there were no promises to their use or commitment 
regarding Allied operations in French Indochina. And in keeping with 
the increasing divergence of views the Foreign Office continued, "We 
see no reason to consult the U.S. Gcvemment, but in accordance with 
our policy of close liaison with the U.S. in matters affecting French 
Indo-China we should like to inform them of the French request and of 
the reply which we are about to return to it." They would thus inform 
the State Department "without repeat without asking for observations.” 
As Stemdale-Bennett told Dening, this was done so that the British 
could not be accused of working behind the back of the U.S. and 
presenting a fait accompli. The French must also have been betting on 
British forces initially entering Indochina, for back in March 19U5
M.Massigli had proposed to Sir Alexander Cadogan that a Civil Affairs 
agreement be worked out for French Indochina, similar to that agreed 
for Metropolitan France.
Things were now slowly coming to the boil. A decision on more
than just clandestine activities in Indochina would soon have to be
made. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had the scent of victory in the Pacific
in their nostrils and were rapidly losing interest in Southeast Asia.
It was now a sideshow and as far as they were concerned Mountbatten
could go ahead and mop up the Japanese out there; they would concentrate
all their considerable energies on the thrust to the heart of Japan.
So the U.S. Chiefs agreed to an earlier British suggestion that from
the military viewpoint French Indochina should be divided at fifteen
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degrees north latitude; however, Chiang should be consulted. The 
U.S. also proposed that, very shortly, they should turn over all their 
responsibilities in the SWPA (South West Pacific Area) to SEAC, thereby 
completely freeing U.S. resources for the drive on Tokyo; the turnover 
date was to be 15 August. Unfortunately as will be seen, no one thought 
of telling Mountbatten this at the time, with unfortunate consequences.
The U.S. Chiefs were thus interested in Southeast Asia only as it 
impacted on overall Allied operations and Lend-Lease requirements.
On 18 July the British Chiefs responded and concurred, but called
on the U.S. Chiefs to support a move to transfer South Indochina to
South East Asia Command. On 22 July the British Chiefs, after examining
the lines of communication in Indochina, altered their proposals slightly
to make the line of demarcation between commands the 16th parallel. As
to the politics of it, the French were getting stronger and the United
States position now reflected one of its fascinating changes of direction:
"... the discussions on trusteeship at San Francisco, 
as indeed the whole of the San Francisco discussions, 
were as you know directed toward the establishment of 
international machinery and great care was taken to 
avoid discussing the solutions of particular problems 
of substance. Subject to that general reservation, 
however, I confirm that nothing was said by the American 
delegation during the trusteeship discussion to imply 
that French authority in Indochina was not acknowledged 
by the United States Government. Equally, however, no 
positive assurance on this was given.
I do not know what conversations the United States 
delegation may have had behind the scenes with the 
French delegation, but in view of our very close 
relationship with the French, I think it is certain 
that if the Americans had said anything which cast 
any doubt in the minds of the French they would have 
been around on Lord Cranbome's doorstep at once.
As a matter of fact, Commander Stassen, who is handling 
the trusteeship discussion for the United States 
delegation, was at great pains both at the Big Five 
meeting and in the full committee to emphasize the 
voluntary nature of the trusteeship system and requested 
a number of amendments from the Egyptians and others who 
would have imported a compulsory element into the system.
In particular at one stage the Australian delegation 
put forward a proposal the broad effect of which would 
have been that the General Assembly could in certain 
circumstances decide to put people's colonies under 
trusteeship whether the colonial power concerned liked 
it or not. The United States were as firm in their 
opposition to this as anybody."171
At "Terminal" (Potsdam) the Combined Chiefs of Staff highlighted 
the shifting emphasis from Europe to the Pacific. "The invasion of 
Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme 
operations in the war against Japan... No other operations will be 
undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations." 
This confirmed SEAC in its secondary role.
The Combined Chiefs also recommended the Russian entry into the war 
against Japan —  in retrospect not a great idea. The British Pacific 
Fleet was to participate in the overall operations, along with the RAF 
Very Long Range (VLR) bomber force of 10 squadrons (increasing to 20 
when airfields became available). For the final invasion of Japan 
a British Commonwealth land force of 3^o 5divisions would be operating 
beside U.S. assault forces, along with a small tactical air'force.
The land force would not include an Indian division because of the 
language problem. The South West Pacific Area would go to SEAC on 
15 August 191+5» a decision of profound importance which spared U.S. 
forces from handling the violent nationalist uprising which erupted 
in many parts of Southeast Asia —  Indochina, Java, Sumatra; the British 
got stuck with this bloody, thankless but critically important and 
complex side of it.
Overall grand strategy called for an intensification of the blockade 
and aerial bombardment of Japan from bases in Okinawa,. Iwo Jims., Marianas 
and the Philippines; this should create favourable conditions for the 
assault on Kyushu, which in turn would help in the decisive invasion 
of Honshu. Resources scheduled for the postponed, invasions of Miyako 
Jima and Kikai Jima were diverted to Okinawa. The Combined Chiefs 
believed that only the defeat of Japanese forces in the homeland would 
facilitate an unconditional surrender; hopefully this defeat would 
convince Japanese in outlying Pacific areas to lay down their arms.
Mountbatten1 s primary task now was to open the Straits of Malacca.
He was also to complete the liberation of Malaya, keep the pressure on 
the Japanese on the Burma-Siam frontier, capture key areas of Siam 
and establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra for subsequent clearance 
of these areas. But the task of the Commonwealth Force in the main 
invasion against Japan took priority in SEAC resources and staff effort. 
For this study a key decision taken here by the Chiefs was to assign 
operations in southern Indochina to SEAC, "since these are more closely 
related to those of South East Asia Command than to those of China."
The Chiefs recommended an approach to Chiang by the President and the 
Prime Minister, with a view to perhaps later adding all of Indochina 
to SEAC. What that would have meant to subsequent history is worth 
thinking about.
The Potsdam Conference covered a lot of ground: war reparations, 
Polish frontiers, administration of the Ruhr, Yugoslavia, war crimes, 
break up of the great German industrial cartels. It also brushed 
Indochina. Acting on the advice of the Combined Chiefs, the President 
and the Prime Minister sent a message to Chiang. The Foreign Office 
had long recommended the direct personal approach, leaving out past 
history in order to avoid bringing Siam into it. Their suggestion was 
to emphasize that the division of Indochina was for operational "purposes 
(their italics), undertaken to secure China's flank. The U.S. Chiefs 
preferred a governmental approach rather than the personal approach from 
Truman and Churchill, a move which the Foreign Office thought would 
lead to interminable delay —  and perhaps that was the reason. In fact 
the British Chiefs, in concurring with the F.O., felt that "further 
reference to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, who have now returned to America, 
on method of approaching (the) Generalissimo would lead to undesirable 
delay." At any rate, on 1 August a message went to Chungking saying 
that the President and Prime Minister had agreed to propose to Chiang 
that southern French Indochina be assigned to SEAC. The two leaders 
would also send personal notes to Chiang. Midway through the conference 
an ungratefill British public had thrown the Conservative Churchill, their 
saviour, out of office and ushered in the highly debatable years of 
Socialist government with Clement Attlee of the Labour Party.
The personal messagesto Chiang were similar. The Prime Minister's 
173was as follows: v
1. At the Potsdam Conference the President of the 
United States and I, in consultation with the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, have had under consideration 
future military operations in South East Asia.
2. On the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
we have reached the conclusion that for operational 
purposes it is desirable to include that portion 
of French Indo-China lying south of 16 degrees 
north latitude in the South East Asia Command. This 
arrangement would leave in the China Theatre that 
part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected 
Chinese operations in China and would at the same 
time enable Admiral Mountbatten to develop operations 
in the southern half of Indochina.
3* I greatly hope that the above conclusions will 
recommend themselves to your Excellency and that, 
for the purpose of facilitating operations against 
the common enemy, Your Excellency will feel able to 
concur in the proposed arrangements.
At Kandy, SEAC officials were relieved at winning a battle (if not
the war) over Indochina. Yet Dening, whose brilliant political prophesies
were ultimately nearly always fulfilled, was worried.
"The division of French Indo-China by the parallel of 
16 degrees north, if persisted in, is going to cause
a lot of trouble... The division is purely arbitrary
and divides people of the same race, while raising new 
and unnecessary problems to divide French civil 
administration between here and Chungking.
Nor can we ignore that penetration by Chinese forces 
into Indo-China will seriously complicate the already 
delicate political situation in French Indo-China.
The history of Far Eastern theatre boundaries has not 
in the past been a happy one. With the termination 
of hostilities I suggest that a more realistic approach 
is necessary.
If it should.be decided that Indo-China is to be placed 
in its entirety in Admiral Mountbatten's command, then 
I hope the position will be clearly put to the Generalissimo, 
since it has been the failure to notify him in advance of 
the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff which has 
been the cause of most of the trouble. I think he should 
be told quite frankly that Indo-China has been given to 
Admiral Mountbatten because SEAC is the most convenient 
theatre from which to dispatch liberating forces, to­
gether with the necessary Civil Affairs administration 
and supplies." 174
The war had been over for three days and Dening's forebodings were 
well-founded. As we shall see, Mountbatten's urgent preparations to 
speed a force to Indochina received a setback when General MacArthur, 
in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
directed subordinate theatre commanders to delay landings in Japanese- 
held territories until his surrender ceremonies in Tokyo were completed —
this directive, given with some justification, had enormous consequences 
in Indochina, for a political vacuum was created which was happily 
filled by Communist leadership. That leadership is still there.
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CHAPTER V
FIRST ENCOUNTERS
"I remember being met on the runway by all the 
Japanese generals lined up in their uniforms —  
they were all looking very smart with their 
Japanese swords... All the populace had seen 
the two Dakotas circling... They knew we'd come 
to the hotel [Continental Palace] and they were 
all waiting there, French people as well as 
Annamite... There was a large number of Japanese 
soldiers lined up in a row just outside the hotel..
And suddenly they all came to attention with a 
tremendous rattle of guns... it was a very sharp 
action and they called out something.,. And it 
was such a shock to me that I thought I'd been 
shot —  I really didJ And I was sort of expecting 
myself to collapse, but I didn't."
RAF Squadron Leader. 
Saigon, 6 September 1945*
By early August the staff at Headquarters South East Asia Command 
were anticipating the cessation of hostilities. Although the war was 
still going on, and operations planning continued, senior staff officers 
were beginning to be aware of the immense problems associated with 
postwar reoccupational duties. Final planning for "Zipper" [the assault 
on Malaya] was in progress, and the 20th Indian Division, an 
experienced fighting formation under a singular commander, was marked 
as one of the spearhead units in the invasion force. During these 
early August days the division were strung out along a hundred miles 
of road, rail and oil pipeline north from Tharawaddy (north of Rangoon) 
to Letpedan, resting but for small-scale patrolling and skirmishing.
On 15 August a telegram had been sent by SACSEA to the Political 
Intelligence Department in London. It was extremely basic in nature 
and reported the general guidance given by SEAC to the Civil Affairs 
staff in planning their reoccupation tasks. The two basic essentials 
were that SEAC must firstly ensure that the Japanese complied fully 
with British instructions, and secondly that law and order were 
maintained "in regard to populations of occupied countries." This was 
the bedrock which underlay all reoccupation policies.
In Kandy, a meeting was held at SACSEA Headquarters to discuss 
general future policy in the event of a Japanese capitulation. Attending 
were M.E.Dening, senior Foreign Office representative at SEAC, the 
SEAC Joint Planning Staff, Director of Intelligence, Civil Affairs Officer,.. 
Political Warfare Staff and others. From all quarters there were 
urgent demands on SEAC's limited resources, and it was decided that 
immediate policy would concentrate on three areas, and be dictated 
by military and humanitarian considerations. The Allies would seize 
strategic areas with forces ready to deal with any attempt by the 
Japanese to resume hostilities, disarm and concentrate surrendered 
Japanese personnel, and recover Allied prisoners of war and internees 
as soon as possible. Allied forces (which would be British) would 
take over Japanese occupied territory as soon as possible in order to 
disarm and concentrate all remaining Japanese forces, establish and 
maintain law and order in liberated areas (an important consideration 
of which much will be heard later), introduce food and other essential 
supplies and set up appropriate civil administration (another consideration 
which will figure prominently later in this study).
The sudden cessation of hostilities caught the British unprepared 
to assume peacetime occupational duties. The situation was best
described by General Slim, Commander of Allied Land Forces South 
East Asia [ALFSEA]:
"The area of South-East Asia Land Forces had 
suddenly expanded to include Malaya, Singapore,
Siam, Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Hong 
Kong, Borneo, and the Andaman Islands. Each 
confronted us with special and urgent problems.
In two of them, Indo-China and the Dutch East 
Indies, nationalist movements armed from Japanese 
sources, had already seized power in the vacuum 
left by the sudden surrender, and were resisting 
the restoration of French or Dutch sovereignty —  
fighting had already begun or seemed inevitable 3
Slim described the very heavy burdens placed on his forces, 
commitments which were expanding almost beyond capability while his 
forces were being released and demobilized by the Labour government 
in response to political pressures at home:
"Appeals from our French and Dutch Allies, cries 
for help, demands for troops, threats of continued 
Japanese resistance, apprehensions of wholesale 
massacre, forebodings of economic collapse, warnings 
of the starvation of whole populations, poured into 
our headquarters from every quarter." h
On 13 August the British Chiefs of Staff had laid down the 
priorities for reoccupation after Singapore: Indochina, Siam, Java 
and Sumatra. Indochina was placed first on the list because Saigon 
contained the Headquarters of the Japanese Army in that part of the 
world. According to Air Chief Miarshal Portal, the RAF in South East 
Asia had 12 transport and 14J1 heavy bomber squadrons available for 
the job.
Earlier, while these discussions were taking place, the Duke of 
Windsor and a British diplomat had called on President Truman, who 
said that he had just received a report from the Swiss Charg£ d*Affaires 
in Washington. The telegram received from Tokyo by the Japanese 
Legation in Berne "did not contain the message awaited by the whole 
world." Truman remarked sadly that he now had no choice but to order 
an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo. As it was, Nagasaki and not 
Tokyo was bombed, and the Japanese capitulated. But when they agreed 
to lay down their arms on 1$ August, the position was one of an 
armistice or ceasefire, not a formal surrender.
In mid-August the British and French Governments agreed by 
memorandum on the broad objectives of Allied Forces in Indochina.
These were the disarmament of Japanese forces, the liberation of 
French authorities and the maintenance of public order. They further 
agreed that the French would be responsible for the administration of
Indochina, and that this French administration would possess the
7
powers of a state of seige. The definitive agreements signed later 
(in September and October) were in the form of five memoranda, and 
covered such areas as administrative control, currency, and other 
matters.
At about the same time that Memorandum Number One was agreed 
to in Paris, Slim, in Kandy, suggested that the head of the proposed 
Control Commission to the Japanese Headquarters be a divisional
Q
commander. Mountbatten concurred. There was hope that the Madagascar 
Brigade could increase the size of early French representation in 
Indochina, but reports of low morale and. poor discipline in that unit 
moved SEAC officers to recommend that it stayed in Madagascar for the 
time being.
Prior to receiving guidance from the Chiefs of Staff, SEAC had 
decided independently that the priority of occupation would be Singapore 
and Malaya first, followed by key areas of Siam and Java, then the 
rest of SEAC's area of responsibility. Twelfth Army would be charged 
with providing forces for occupying Burma and Siam (including Indochina), 
and 11+th Army would be responsible for Singapore and Malaya, Java and 
Sumatra.
The big question was whether speed of occupation or a strong show
of force was more important in the establishment of an Allied presence
9
in Japanese-held territory. And what were to be the priorities of 
occupation? More specifically, the SEAC Headquarters Joint Planning 
Staff stated that any occupying force would have a number of tasks 
in addition to accepting a Japanese surrender. British forces would 
be faced with the immediate reoccupation of the maximum number of key 
points, and then would have to dispose of Japanese forces, speedily 
evacuate Allied prisoners of war and internees, preserve law and order, 
protect vital installations(and food and arms supplies), prevent 
sabotage and looting, provide for the relief of the civil populations 
and take emergency steps to rehabilitate key facilities pending the 
assumption of these responsibilities by civil authorities.
Long range planning —  in these hectic days four weeks hence was 
long range —  called for French Indochina to be occupied by one division 
supported by one fighter squadron, both confined to the Saigon area.
This force would be enough provided it were not charged with maintaining 
internal security far beyond the city limits. One brigade would also
be sent to Tourane (later known as Banang).
Mountbatten1 s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General P.A.M. Browning,
10
addressed the Japanese position in a paper dated 15 August 
A "Binding Act of Surrender" would be signed by the Japanese at 
Government House, Rangoon, as soon as possible. The more elaborate 
formal surrender was to be carried out at a later date, "with the 
utmost ceremony possible", at Singapore. But before all this could 
be done it would be necessary to hold a number of meetings with 
Japanese envoys to agree on principles and clear up various key 
matters. It was thoughtthat a series of three meetings would probably 
be needed, the first to establish the Japanese credentials, after 
which a copy in English of the Instrument of Surrender would be 
handed to the Japanese; the Japanese would be responsible for the 
translation from English. The second meeting would be held to clear 
up points in the document, and the third would be for the actual signing 
of the document. There would be no negotiations regarding terms, as 
the Japanese surrender was unconditional.
The Japanese would be treated according to rank. They would 
not be searched on arrival, and salutes to Japanese officers would be 
returned but not initiated. One infantry platoon would be assigned 
to guard the Japanese envoys, while a mobile escort of mounted infantry 
in jeeps and on motorcycles would surround the Japanese en route to 
protect them from the local population. The Japanese officers were to 
have British officer escorts at all times except in the privacy of their 
quarters.
The Japanese flight plan was to be from Saigon (Tsm Sdn Nhrft) to 
Moulmein, Burma, then to Mingaladcnvia Elephant Point. A maximum of 
two aircraft were cleared for the flight, and they were to circle 
Elephant Point at one thousand feet, wheels down, before beginning 
the final leg to Mingailadon. The distance from Saigon to Mingaladon 
was 850 miles. To leave nothing to chance the Japanese would be told 
to depart at 1030 hours, and the drive from the airfield to Rangoon's 
Government House was fixed at 27 minutes. "B" day for planning would 
be when the SACSEA team arrived at Rangoon; this was actually 25 August. 
The Japanese team was to arrive on D + 1.
The SACSEA team nominated by Mountbatten to meet the Japanese 
at Rangoon was headed by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Browning, 
the paratroop officer who had been involved in the planning of the
200
airborne assault on Arnhem the year before, and who had correctly
expressed misgivings to Montgomery. Since this primary meeting was
to be Chief of Staff to Chief of Staff, Browning was to meet his
11
counterpart, Lieutenant General Tatazo Numata, of Field Marshal 
Count Terauchi1 s staff. Browning was supported by M.E.Dening,
Brigadier Nicholson (intelligence), and Brigadier Maunsell, former 
Chief of Staff to General Slim and recently appointed Chief of Staff 
to Major General Douglas Gracey, who would go to Saigon before very 
long as Head of the Control Commission to Japanese Headquarters and 
Commander of Allied Forces in French Indochina. But before the two 
sides met a number of things happened, one of which may have had 
profound effects on the course of events to come. This was MacArthur1 s 
thunderbolt to hia subordinate commander [his general order to hold 
all reoccupation plans in abeyance until 2 September], which is discussed 
below.
Since Force 136 operations in Indochina had been severely restricted
by the American-British political disputes, it may be worthwhile to
ponder what might have been if the two principal Allies had cooperated
more fully with one another. Force 136 operations during the period
1 January 191+5 to 15 August 19h5f a period of only months, resulted
in the killing of 13>055 Japanese soldiers, for a Force 136 loss of 
12
93 killed! But the American and British/French clandestine 
organizations to some extent had been competing against one another, 
and the SACSEA Control Commission would soon find itself in a difficult 
environment created in large part by the dispute.
13The makeup of the Control Commission was set forth on 1$ August,
as shown in Table 1. A lift of 25 C-4+7S was planned for the Commission,
including one for maps, stationery and a 10 day supply of field rations.
General discussions on the functions of the Commission* centred on
controlling the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces
in the Southern Region (also known as Japanese Southern Army) as a 
1)
first priority. The Commission would "exercise general control," to 
include insuring that Allied surrender orders were carried out, to act 
as a channel for the transmission of orders, to set up a message filter 
and monitoring service, examine documents and collect operational 
intelligence and logistical data. As it was, many intelligence or
* "Commission" is emphasized here, as the Allied Land Forces had 
completely separate responsibilities.
other secretive units were attached to larger, more conventional 
sections for cover, so that it is difficult to list a precise order 
of battle for the entire Saigon occupation force.
It was hoped that the Control Commission would accompany General 
Numata back to Saigon in late August, and the Commission was placed 
on 2i+ hours notice to move from 0900 hours on 18 August. Mount batten 
had earlier been confidentially told by the Prime Minister at Potsdam 
about the atomic bomb, and was thus anticipating an early capitulation 
by the Japanese. His staff were trying desperately to anticipate 
future movements, but hastily drawn contingency plans were being 
changed almost as fast as they were conceived. Underlying the changes 
of plans was the question of Japanese intentions (which could not be 
assessed until the Browning-Numata talks). But planning could not 
wait until the last moment. The Joint Planning Staff [JPS] and Dening 
were agreed that a strong escort was required for the Control Commission 
but
"FIC is low on the order of priority for reoccupation, 
and in view of the number of Japanese in FIC and in 
particular Saigon/Dalat, an escort sufficient to ensure 
the safety of the Commission in the event of wholehearted 
treachery on the part of the Japanese, would in effect 
reach the size of an occupying force capable of controlling 
the country and enforcing Japanese disarmament." 1?
The report concluded:
"We must either considerably delay the mission so 
that it has some force to protect it or we must 
accept that the Commission is sent in earlier with 
about two companies as escort and that the Japanese 
can be trusted." 16
The mission would be more effective if it went in early, so the 
JPS recommended that at Rangoon SEAC extract a promise from the Japanese 
guaranteeing the safety of the Commission, accept the "risk of treachery 
and fly it in with a token escort of one Indian infantry company. The 
risk would be taken as a test case of Japanese intentions. As it 
happened, Dening had strong reservations about sending the mission with 
such a relatively weak escort, and a compromise was reached whereby 
Gracey and the Commission eventually arrived with slightly more than 
two companies —  something on the order of a battalion or so, which 
was enough to protect the mission, but not much else. It certainly 
could not control the Japanese Headquarters or enforce correct 
behaviour of the Japanese, and in fact the Japanese were not really 
brought under control for several weeks, when Gracey finally had his 
whole division in Saigon.
While all this was going on, and occupation forces assembled
and in the process of being dispatched to a number of widespread
areas, a message was received from General MacArthur which caused
an uproar at Kandy. On 19 August Major General Penney,* visiting
MacArthur*s headquarters in Manila, cabled Browning that MacArthur
had strongly requested that all subordinate commanders (including
Mountbatten) delay any operations to or landings in Japanese territory
until MacArthur had accepted the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo 
17on 28 August. MacArthur*s reasons were as follows: first, the
Japanese had so far only declared a willingness to accept the Potsdam 
terms, and had actually signed nothing. The Japanese appeared to 
be stalling and the only orders to date from Tokyo to the field 
concerned a cessation of hostilities. Second, any unilateral action 
by theatre commanders would "prejudice the whole peace settlement."
Third, Field Marshal Terauchi may not obey any orders from Mountbatten, 
and the developing situation could have incalculable consequences. 
MacArthur*s blunt final words to Penney were "Tell Lord Louis to keep 
his pants on or he will get us all into trouble." Mountbatten told 
his representative in Manila, Lieutenant General Gairdner (and Penney, 
who was on a visit), to tell MacArthur that Wedemeyer and Malinovsky 
were contravening MacArthur*s orders, and added, somewhat lamely,
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"Tell him that I will keep my pants on if he will take Hirohito*s off."
In pressing General Gairdner, Mountbatten was informed that
MacArthur was adamant, and precipitate action would jeopardize good
relations between the Commonwealth and the United States. In a reply
which he kept from MacArthur*s view, Gairdner telegraphed, "As a
19personal view I would urge utmost caution.as air is electric."
At his 17th (Miscellaneous) Staff Meeting on 20 August 19U£>
Mountbatten read out the telegram from MacArthur: all reoccupation plans
were suspended until 28 August, or until the surrender in Tokyo. As it
turned out, a typhoon delayed the actual signing in Tokyo Bay, and the
formal surrender was not effected until 2 September. Mountbatten told
his staff that
"he was at a loss to understand why General MacArthur 
should wish to impose such a dangerous delay. It was 
in the nature of the Japanese that they would concentrate 
all their wiles on trying to evade the full implications 
of unconditional surrender and there was already evidence 
that they were engaged in illegal actions which, although 
not actually proscribed in the Potsdam Declaration, were 
entirely contrary to the Allied conception of capitulation.
* Director of Intelligence, Headquarters SEAC.
An instance of this was the movement of Allied 
prisoners of war from Siam to French Indo-China.
The more time that elapsed before the arrival 
of Allied control forces, the greater were the 
chances of the Japanese evading the proper 
fulfilment of the surrender terms. 20
Mountbatten personally preferred to see the Japanese experience 
defeat in the "unmistakable form of successful invasion of their 
homeland." The Russians, he noted, had ignored all this formality and 
had kept on fighting to achieve their goals. He shared MacArthur's 
distrust of the Japanese, but did not support his reasons. For 
Mountbatten, the longer the Japanese were given to recover, the harder 
they would be to control and the more evasive they would become. He 
particularly drew attention to the fact that only he seemed to be 
obeying MacArthur, as Malinovsky and Vedemeyer were not acting in 
accordance with MacArthur1 s request. Furthermore, Mountbatten could 
see no reason why a signature in Tokyo would make his task any easier; 
in fact, to him the reverse seemed to be the case.
As some of Mountbatten*s reoccupation forces had put to sea six 
days before the receipt of MacArthur*s telegram, Admiral Power expected 
a 30-^0%  casualty rate in small ships due to mechanical breakdown and 
the adverse winds brought by the monsoons. The forces in the small 
ships would also run out of food and water, and even the larger ships 
could not hold at sea for an extended period.
The Control Commission thus got off to a late start. The original
plan called for transporting the Commission and one infantry battalion
to Indochina by sea on 27 August, to arrive in Saigon on 2 September.
[As it happened, 2 September was the date of massive rioting inspired
by the Viet Minh, but the British, delayed by MacArthur*s ruling, were
not in Saigon to prevent or control it]. These first contingents were
to be followed within a week by one brigade of the 7th Indian Division;
alternatively, the first two groups would fly in on 2h August, providing
that "Zipper" [the assault on Singapore] was cancelled by midnight 
2"t
17/18 August. On 17 August the plan was amended and 20 Indian 
Division was nominated instead as the Allied Land Force to go to Saigon 
after 7 Indian Division had established a staging base in Bangkok. In 
any event, British/Indian troops would have been in Saigon at an earlier 
date, before the Viet Minh movement was able to consolidate what power 
it had.
A perhaps more serious concern was the fatal effect of the delay 
on the question of life or death for many of the Allied prisoners of
war. Many of the dying POWs were being moved by the Japanese this 
moment. Terauchi had not responded to broadcasts from SEAC, and 
MacArthur declined to assist in contacting Terauchi through facilities 
in Tokyo. Mountbatten felt that he could delay his operations no 
longer than 28 August, or his dispersed reoccupation forces would 
have to return to their bases. The peaceful version of "Zipper" 
might even be affected. If the impending talks with the Japanese 
in Rangoon proved satisfactory, Mountbatten intended to proceed as 
planned on 28 August. He requested support for his plans from the 
British Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs initially agreed with Mountbatten, 
but were overruled by the Labour politicians and on 22 August were 
obliged to direct Mountbatten to conform completely to MacArthur* s 
wishes.
The effect of MacArthur *s edict was outlined by the Commander 
of Allied Land Forces South East Asia. Describing the operations 
being readied, or already being executed, [to move the 7th Indian 
Division to Siam, 20th Division to Indochina, 5th Division to Singapore, 
3 Command Brigade to Hong Kong, and 26 Division to Sumatra and Java], 
Slim wrote:
"All these operationswere about to begin, indeed 
the first ships of the Malayan force were already 
at sea and all headquarters buzzing with activity, 
when, on 19th August, a very considerable spanner was 
thrown into their busy works... He [General MacArthur] 
decreed that the formal surrender in South-East Asia 
could take place only after it had been ceremonially 
completed in his own theatre. This, though inconvenient, 
might not have mattered so much had he not ordered, 
also, that no landings in or re-entry to Japanese-held 
territory would be made until he had personally received 
the formal surrender of the Japanese Empire." 22
Dismayed senior commanders in SEAC, many of whom saw something 
more personal in MacArthur*s edict than the officially listed reasons, 
had weighed the consequences of his orders to remain in place. After 
satisfying themselves that the Japanese would obey the imperial order 
to cease hostilities, which was confirmed at these Rangoon negotiations, 
they decided, on humanitarian grounds, not to be confined to obeying 
the letter of MacArthur*s edict. Slim led the resistance:
"But the delay could have had most serious consequences 
for our prisoners in Japanese hands. Admiral Mountbatten 
... decided, in spite of the ban on landing, to fly in 
help to the prisoners. Our men and those of our Allies 
were daily dying in their foul camps; thousands were at 
the limit of weakness and exhaustion. Had he delayed 
for even a few days in sending supplies and relief 
personnel, many more would have died pathetically at the
moment of rescue...
The state of these canrps and of their wretched 
inmates can only he realized by those who saw 
them as they were at this time... It was horrifying 
to see them moving slowly about these sordid camps, 
all emaciated, many walking skeletons, numbers 
covered with suppurating sores, and most naked but 
for the ragged shorts they had worn for years or 
loin cloths of sacking. The most heart-moving of 
all were those who lay on wretched pallets, their 
strength ebbing faster than relief could be brought 
to them.11 23
And finally, in a statement which remained the touchstone of his
policy towards the Japanese:
"There can be no excuse for a nation which as 
a matter of policy treats its prisoners of war 
in this way, and no honour for an army, however
brave, which willingly makes itself the instrument
of such inhumanity to the helpless."2U
This led to another defiance of MacArthur*s wishes, in the matter 
of the surrendering of swords, which will be discussed later. Still 
another fundamental disagreement between South East Asia Command and 
MacArthur*s Headquarters lay in the repatriation of the Japanese.
MacArthur wanted them out as soon aB possible; SEAC thought that the 
half million Japanese soldiers were a source of labour to be used in 
rebuilding Southeast Asia. The Japanese, to put it succinctly, should
be made to rebuild what they had destroyed. But above all was the race
which would mean glorious relief or miserable death for perhaps 
hundreds of suffering Allied prisoners. Mountbatten has also underlined 
this overriding problem. In the Preface to Section E of the Report to 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff he wrote, "My first and foremost task 
was the recovery of the Allied prisoners-of-war and internees." The 
records of 232 Group (RAF) state that as a result of the sudden delay 
in operations to occupied territory, POWs were left waiting on the airfield,
in hangars and on the taxiways, for up to 36 hours with only a cup of tea
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to sustain them. However, on 28 August a C-U7 of 19U Squadron did 
proceed to land at Don Muang airfield, Bangkok (possibly on the pilot's 
initiative), and brought out a load of ex-prisoners, who expressed the 
common disappointment at not being evacuated earlier.
As soon as the Japanese delegates returned to Saigon, Operations 
"Birdcage" (leaflet dropping) and "Mastiff" (supplies and medical 
personnel) were put into effect; these will be discussed later. By 
MacArthur*s estimate there were still up to 7,000,000 Japanese under 
arms. The Japanese armies in the field were still generally undefeated, 
and they were very much conscious of that fact. It was emphasized at
SEAC that Japan*s position was the reverse of Germany. In Japan,
capitulation was at the centre first; in Germany, capitulation had
been in the field first, when her forces were defeated, and surrender
in the centre came later. The Japanese were still capable of stiff
fighting and surrendered only when ordered to do so by the Emperor.
In the Southern Regions, Luzon fell completely only after receipt of
the imperial order to cease hostilities, and Terauchi would not
commence negotiations until the arrival of Prince Kanin.
In a response to Browning, Mountbatten stated that although
ALFSEA would provide most of the personnel for Saigon, the Control
Commission "would be a Hq.SACSEA responsibility." The initial SEAC
26
postwar garrison commitments* were formidable, and it was under 
these pressures that Mountbatten resisted Leclerc's pleas to include 
all of French Indochina within SEAC*s responsibilities. As Mountbatten 
reported:
"From a purely military aspect I am not anxious for 
the inclusion at present of the whole of FIC in SEAC 
for the following reasons:-
(a) I shall have great difficulty with the resources 
likely to be available to me in meeting my 
commitments in.my present command, which will be 
further increased when I take over additional areas 
from the Australian Command.
(b) Although the French will in time take over the local 
and administrative control of FIC, it is certain that 
I should be called upon to provide some forces, 
particularly administrative, which would strain my 
resources even further." 27
Leclerc pursued this point, and M.E. Dening, at Mountbatten*s request,
called on Leclerc on 22 August to state the Foreign Office and Allied
position. The general, reported Dening, "spoke with considerable vigour"
on the question of boundaries in Indochina, and preferred that the
Japanese stayed on until Mountbatten (with French forces) could take
over, rather than let the Chinese in. Even if the boundary question
remained unsettled, there would be no problems if the Chinese stayed
out of Indochina. Dening replied that the problems were with Chiang
and Wedemeyer. But both were in agreement about the overall importance
of Indochina, which in the view of the British Chiefs of Staff was the
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"key to the defence of South-East Asia."
* Burma 3 divisions 6 RAF Squadrons
Malaya 3 " 10 " "
Saigon 1 " 2 " "
Siam 1 " 2 " "
Java 1 " 1+ " "
Sumatra 1 " 3 " "
The staff at SEAC Headquarters were agreed that a base must 
first be established in Bangkok before Saigon could be occupied, due 
to the distances involved. The Halifax aircraft could not do it, so 
an all-Dakota fleet would have to be gathered. It was still not 
possible to designate a date of execution for the plan [a **Z*' day].
As the plans were discussed over and over-, a definite outline took 
shape. The most likely candidate seemed to be a scenario calling 
for one brigade group to arrive in Saigon on Z + 8 to 19, with the 
rest of a division arriving from Z + 27 onwards. As always, the 
big question which pervaded all planning discussions was the attitude 
of the Japanese.
Field Marshal Terauchi had informed Mountbatten that he would not 
negotiate without a  royal decree. Since a prince of the royal blood, 
Prince Kanin, had delivered this on 19 August, there remained the 
attitudes of fanatical subordinates. However, the planned earlier 
landings at Penang and Singapore would provide an indication of 
Japanese attitudes. Someone even thought of moving Terauchi*s 
Headquarters near the sea so that Royal Navy warships could protect 
the Commission. In any case, the Planning Staff recommended that the 
Commission be completely formed and concentrated in Rangoon immediately.
On 22 August Mountbatten telegraphed Terauchi, reminding him of 
Tokyo's agreement to permit reconnaissance flights and supply drops to 
POW camps and mine sweeping in certain waters. Mountbatten repeated 
the texts of the Tokyo agreements in, case Terauchi had not received 
them from Imperial Headquarters, and advised Terauchi that reconnaissance 
and supply drops would commence at 1800 hours on 21+ August. Terauchi 
was asked if he was prepared to allow medical teams into POW camps. On 
23 August Mountbatten again wired Terauchi, reminding him of the large 
numbers of POWs and internees in his areas "I rely upon you to ensure 
that these Allied POW and Internees are treated with every care and 
attention and that they are not abandoned by forces under your command. '* 
Terauchi replied on the same day, by broadcast, that Lieutenant General 
Numata would travel to Rangoon to negotiate with Allied representatives. 
Mountbatten, in reply, referred to Terauchi as "Your Excellency;" he 
also assured MacArthur that these preliminary negotiations would not 
prejudice the overall surrender at Tokyo.
Terauchi*s message to SACSEA was received at 1710 hours by 
interception of Radio Saigon:
Message to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Allied 
Forces in Southeast Asia, from Marshal Count Terauchi,
Supreme Commander Japanese Expeditionary Forces in 
the Southern Region.
Your Excellency, I have received instruction from 
Imperial Headquarters of August 23rd, and have the 
honour to inform you that we are sending Lieutenant 
General Tatazo Numata, Chief of the General Staff 
of Japanese Forces in the Southern Regions, to Rangoon 
as plenipotentiary. His mission is conducting 
negotiations with regard to cessation of hostilities 
in [the] coastal area within my power and informing 
you of those details you wish to know. 29
Then, in conformance with instructions previously broadcast by SEAC
Headquarters, the message from Saigon continued:
The mission will be carried by 2 planes of M.C. type 
and will reach Mingaladcn aerodrome between 11 and noon 
Tokio time on August 26th. The plane carrying the 
military mission will be painted white with a green 
cross, both on top and underneath the wings and on 
both sides of the body.
The plane will be flown direct to Moulmein to Elephant 
Point and then to Mingaladonif weather conditions do not 
hamper the planes. The planes will fly lower than an 
altitude of 250 metres and let down their landing wheels 
over Elephant Point. On arrival at Mingaladon aerodrome 
they will act in accordance with instructions of your 
flight. The military mission will comprise of [sic]
Lieutenant General Tatazo Numata and his Assistant Chief 
of Staff.
Let me take this opportunity of paying my respects to 
your excellency. 30
A separate broadcast cautioned the British not to proceed too fast.
The Japanese acknowledged receipt of SEAC*s instructions concerning
coastal waters and mine clearing, but ”... we hope your operation
will not continue until perfect mutual understanding is established
between your command and ours." Mountbatten temporarily held up his
planned overflights of Japanese held areas.
On 2k August Chiang Kai-Shek made the speech in which he dis­
claimed territorial claims on Indochina, but wanted to see the area 
independent. Mountbatten*s diary noted that SEAC*s new area stretched 
from west of Karachi to halfway through New Guinea, a distance of
6050 statute miles. "This is 150 miles more than the distance from
31the northwest c o m e r  of SEAC to St. John's, Newfoundland! I.' " ^ One 
question arose, that of how the Japanese were going to divide their 
command to accommodate a surrender to the Chinese in the north. In the 
meanwhile, SEAC had to disabuse the Chiefs of Staff of the idea that
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the African divisions were suitable for occupational duties* In fact, 
the Chiefs had envisioned using one of the African divisions in Burma 
and the other in French Indochina. There was unani m ous agreement
at SEAC that under no circumstances could the African troops be used
for the sort of duties entailed in postwar tasking. The problem was 
that these two divisions would not be replaced; SEAC would just operate 
essentially with two divisions short,
While all these diverse problems were being tackled, the day 
arrived for the long-awaited meeting with the Japanese. As Brigadier 
Maunsell (who participated in the negotiations as General Slim’s 
representative) said:
"British Intelligence had an idea that Japanese 
Headquarters didn’t really know where its units 
were... Japanese Intelligence and Kempei Tei 
divulged nothing. The Rangoon meeting was held
to learn if it was possible to call a ceasefire
which would be effective, and would [Japanese] 
units respond to it.
The first meeting between the Japanese and Allied 
in SEAC was to discuss the ceasefire and to tell 
the Japanese what information the Allies must 
have now —  where forces were, etc., and where the 
POW camps were." 32
The British sent a 20 man delegation to Rangoon. The main party
left Kandy on 25 August in two C-LjJs. The Dakota "Sister Anne"
(Mountbatten*s aircraft) carried Lieutenant General Browning, Major
General Denning, Admiral Patterson and Chinese Major General Peng Yee.
The second aircraft contained M.E. Dening, Esquire [Foreign Office],
Brigadier Maunsell and Brigadier Gibbons of the Civil Affairs branch.
The Japanese delegation consisted of three officers and two interpreters.
Their most junior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Tomura, was later described
by Maunsell as a man "around whom everything seemed to revolve," a
capable and intelligent staff officer. The other two Japanese officers
were Numata and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Chudo. The
Allied delegation included representatives from the United States, China,
Australia, the Netherlands, France and the East Indies Fleet. Also
attending were Air Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders [Allied Air Commander in
Chief] and Lieutenant General Stopford [Commander 12th Army],
The Japanese aircraft were met off Elephant Point (at the mouth
of the Rangoon River) by Spitfires of 221 Group and escorted into Mingaladon.
On landing, the Japanese officers were accompanied by an officer escort
from the Royal West Kent Regiment, and I* men of that regiment remained
33on guard throughout the meeting.
At the beginning of the meeting, which began at 121£, a "Letter 
of Attorney" was handed by Numata to Browning. Numata identified 
himself as Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in the Southern Regions, 
appointed by Field Marshal Terauchi to represent him at the preliminary 
negotiations. Numata said that he wished to make his salutations to 
the representative of the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia 
on the occasion of the winning of the war by the Allied Forces, and to 
express his admiration on the manner in which they had conducted it.
He also expressed regret that the arrival of the Japanese delegation had 
been delayed by late receipt of orders from General Headquarters in Tokyo. 
He had brought with him the data required by the Allies. He felt 
honoured to be able to attend the meeting with Lieutenant General 
Browning and the other gentlemen, and expressed gratitude on behalf 
of the Japanese for the privilege and honour of being permitted to wear 
swords.
Browning wanted assurance that the Japanese surrender would be 
smooth and quick, as between two Imperial forces, and in accordance with 
the traditions and usages of war. Numata responded that Terauchi was 
confident that the surrender would be accomplished in accordance with 
the august command of His Majesty the Emperor. He added that the 
"suspension of arms" was a complete surprise to most units of the 
Japanese forces, especially at the far posts, and the orders to lay down 
their arms was received with a disappointment and chagrin which could 
readily be imagined. It was not so much winning or losing as going 
against the ancient traditions of Bushido. Terauchi had had a difficult 
time in getting his subordinate commanders to agree to the ceasefire, 
but he was sure that it would be done.
Browning asked if Numata knew of the surrender being scheduled 
for signing in Tokyo on 2 September; he understood that an imperial 
envoy had brought some information to Field Marshal Terauchi. Numata 
replied that Prince Kanin had arrived in Saigon on 19 August, but as 
nothing definite had been decided by then, he had no official confirmation 
of the exact date. Browning asked Numata when the agreements signed at 
Rangoon would become effective, and Numata replied that these agreements 
were separate from the general armistice to be signed in Tokyo and would 
become effective from the date of signature. Numatafs brief concerned 
only matters pertaining to Terauchi % area of command.
General Browning then listed four Allied requirements which must 
be met immediately. These pertained to day and night Allied reconnaissance 
flights over Japanese territory, the sending of supplies and medical staff
to POW camps, free movement of Allied ships in Japanese waters, and 
minesweeping in Japanese-controlled waters —  all these conditions to 
be effective from 28 August. Numata agreed to these requests.
Rear Admiral Chudo did not contribute a great deal to the 
discussions. In his own way he attempted to quibble and delay, pointing 
to the possible contradictions between SEAC's actions and MacArthur's 
desires. On this occasion he merely said that the care should be taken 
in dropping medical supplies, because the natives would probably seize 
them in areas of civil disorder.
Numata then discussed the prisoners. He said that the Japanese 
had always wanted to give them the best possible care, and now that 
hostilities were over they were getting good treatment. There were now 
some prisoners in Bangkok hotels, a statement which did not impress the 
British negotiators at this late stage.
Browning wanted to know how many days it would take for news 
of the surrender at Rangoon to reach all Japanese forces. Numata replied 
that most of the command could be reached in less than one week, 
emphasizing that Terauchi's area contained widely scattered forces. The 
longest delays would be in reaching forces in New Guinea, parts of 
Borneo, the mountain districts in the Philippines and parts of Burma 
west of the Sittang River —  these had very limited communications 
facilities. "We want your sympathy," said Numata, since Terauchi wanted 
to carry out these orders as soon as possible.
Numata then mentioned that some- Allied forces west of the Sittang 
were still carrying on the war, much to the embarrassment of Japanese 
troops there. Browning replied that, like the. Japanese, the British 
had a communications problem in that particular area. [Numata was 
probably referring to clandestine activity].
Browning then said that there were certain other points to be 
raised, in addition to the four requirements already handed to the 
Japanese. These concerned the Control Commission's move to Saigon and 
the moving out of certain areas by the Japanese. Rear Admiral Chudo 
then asked about the relationship between MacArthur and'Mountbatten. He 
understood that MacArthur was in overall command, and asked whether or 
not these local arrangements would run counter to MacArthur's wishes. 
Browning replied that nothing could be done in addition to the four 
points already discussed until the surrender in Tokyo on 2 September.*
Browning ended the first day's negotiations by saying that the 
two staffs would meet later and work out the details. The Japanese 
were then handed a number of documents and a list of further information
required.
The next day, 27 August, the two sides met again. The Japanese 
had closely studied the demands of 26 August, and Browning opened 
the session by asking Numata if he understood the orders given to him 
on the previous day. Numata replied by saying that Terauchi had 
given him a note for Mountbatten and asked permission to read it aloud, 
as it had a bearing on the present talks. In it Terauchi reiterated 
his intention to cooperate, but expressed concern at the present 
declining state of law and order in parts of his command. He also 
wanted advance notice of the arrival of occupation forces. Numata 
explained that this was necessary because the Japanese had to move out 
of their present lodgings and buil d tents and bamboo and leaf huts in 
the countryside in order to make room for Allied forces.
Terauchi then made a strong appeal to be able to disarm the 
Japanese forces himself, through the existing Japanese command chain, 
or problems might arise. He also suggested that certain units of the 
Japanese forces should retain their arms, "not exceeding machine guns", 
in order to maintain discipline in the Japanese forces and law and order 
among the civil population. [This was not an outrageous suggestion, 
since Truman's General Order Number One called on the Japanese to maintain 
order until sufficient Allied forces could do so]. Terauchi went on to 
request that Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs be permitted to wear 
swords or bayonets. Other questions touched on concerned places of 
assembly and quartering of troops, communications equipment, transport 
facilities, clothing and medical supplies for outlying areas, and 
leaving the currency systems unchanged in the interest of stability.
All the above impressed the British that Terauchi's basic idea was that 
the Japanese should not be treated as prisoners of war.
Numata then again mentioned the importance of deferring to the 
special spirit and traditions of the Japanese forces in order to insure 
a successful conclusion to the negotiations. He said that he had, in 
fact, just left a sick bed, bringing a doctor with him, to attend the 
meetings. If these requests were not granted his role would be reduced 
to one of a messenger and he would be ashamed to return 'to Saigon; this 
was his personal plea.
Browning did not respond directly, but asked If the Japanese had 
further questions. Rear Admiral Chudo then pointed out that things were 
not so simple. Marshal Terauchi had been given control of all Nippon 
forces in February 19U5* but since naval operations had ceased, 
responsibility for the Navy now rested upon the Commander of Naval Forces
in Southern Waters. Numata added that as there were no important 
questions he would like to add some views of his own. He suggested 
that some of the discussions could conform to Terauchifs note, and 
a few other points could be amended; He also proposed to express his 
views on each article of the final document. In the first part of 
the main body, perhaps the words "in accordance with the direction of 
General Headquarters, Tokyo", could be inserted at an appropriate place.
Browning interrupted Numata to say that Numata did not seem to 
understand that he had been asked if he wished to raise questions for 
clarification, not to criticize the orders. Numata then said that he 
had no questions and perfectly understood the orders.
Admiral Chudo wanted to know what the term "radar" meant, as 
that was new to him. Lieutenant Colonel Tomura had a few questions, 
then Chudo came back and reiterated that negotiations concerning the 
Navy and Naval Air Command be held with the Commander of the 10th 
Squadron. Browning replied that Marshal Terauchi was responsible for 
everything, and to whom he delegated his authority was his own affair.
But Chudo would not be put off and once more insisted that Terauchi 
no longer controlled the Navy, which now came directly under Tokyo. 
Browning repeated that Terauchi was in command. Numata asked for 
time to study the documents and met Browning privately for half an 
horn?. The agreement was signed at 181j5  GMT on 28 August 19U5*
Dening*s report of the Rangoon conference reflected his continuing 
suspicions of the Japanese. The terms- of the formal surrender ceremony 
at Singapore had been worked out, but Dening was convinced that the 
general Japanese attitude remain unchanged. Except in Burma, the 
Japanese armies had not been defeated and their outlook was thus not 
that of a defeated nation. There was, he said, a lot of talk about 
"Bushido", and regardless of the terms of surrender they would try to 
preserve its "spurious legend." The high command would obey the Emperor, 
but he was apprehensive of the lower echelons._ The Japanese envoys 
had at first tried to avoid putting their official seals to the documents, 
"but this had been speedily rectified." To Dening, it was of overriding 
importance that Field Marshal Terauchifs authority be supported, and
J
that he be held "personally responsible" in the area of his command.
It was in the light of this political guidance that General Gracey pinned 
Terauchi with responsibility for the disturbances in Saigon a few weeks 
later.
Mountbatten*s assessment of the negotiations coincided with 
Dening's. Mountbatten telegraphed London as follows:
"My mission at the Rangoon meetings gained the 
very definite impression that the Japanese forces 
in the Southern Regions do not, repeat not, appreciate 
the fact that they have been defeated, either 
militarily or as a nation. The bulk of their force
is intact and the Japanese attitude is rather that,
in this theatre, the game has been drawn; their 
armies are undefeated but have been ordered by the 
Emperor to surrender." 35
Mountbatten reported that Numata had adopted the attitude that it was
open to him to negotiate terms with Browning, and Terauchi had asked
that the Japanese not be treated as prisoners of war. The Japanese
attitude was reflected in a document addressed to Mountbatten by
Terauchi and handed over by Numata:
"In this are set forth, in considerable detail,
what amount,in effect, to the conditions which
are to govern the surrender and the subsequent 
period. Numata even went so far as to suggest re­
wordings to the orders which he eventually signed.
He said that it did not matter so much to the 
Japanese whether they lost or won a war; far more 
important to them was the preservation of the 
spirit of Bushido, or in other words, the spirit 
of militarism.
The Japanese, though dignified, were clearly 
unrepentant; I am informed that Numata, who 
professed to be sick and was accompanied by a 
medical adviser, was much discomfited at the end 
of the'proceedings." 3&
Actually, Mountbatten would soon have cause to appreciate the lingering
Japanese spirit of Bushido, for without their active assistance in
Indochina and Indonesia the British casualty rates would have caused
a political uproar.
While the staff at SEAC were feverishly preparing for the impending 
moves by the occupation forces, two more unwelcome problems appeared.
The first fell under the heading commonly referred to as "splitting 
hairs", and which expended valuable staff effort to sort out. This 
involved the very name of the Commission. When first formed in Rangoon 
the Commission was referred to as the "Japanese Control Commission No.l, 
Saigon". The War Office objected to this designation for technical 
reasons and wanted it changed to "Control Increment Headquarters 20 
Indian Division". By this time, as Mountbatten pointed out to the War 
Office, the Commission was universally known as the "Saigon Control
Commission." As late as 9 September, 1*8 hours before the actual 
fly-in to Saigon, the Commission's name was still in dispute, for the 
War Office did not like "Saigon Control Commission" either, so Mountbatten 
suggested "Control Commission No. 1, Saigon". That, too, was un­
satisfactory, and the official title became finally "Headquarters SACSEA 
Commission No.1". It was a waste of time and effort all around, for 
that body continued to be known as the Saigon Control Commission. Hy
8 September the Commission, unsure of what to call itself, was sending 
messages from what was now the "No. 1 Japanese Control Commission."
As late as 11 September, as the Commission and escort were en route to 
Saigon, SACSEA telegraphed the War Office, explaining the functioning 
of the Control Commission in objecting to the "increment" name:
"Saigon Control Commission is an Inter-Service body, 
including French members, responsible direct to SACSEA.
It cannot therefore be regarded as a control increment 
to Hq. 20 Ind Div. Moreover, 20 Ind Div may be withdrawn 
before Control Commission has finished its task. [Author's 
note: this essentially is what happened when Brigadier 
Maunsell headed a reduced SAC Mission on the departure of 
General Gracey and Headquarters 20 Indian Division],
It has been possible to deal with Control Matters by 
adding small increments to existing Hdqtrs in other places
[e.g., Singapore] where Hdqtrs of all 3 services exist.
No objection raised so far to title "Saigon Control 
Commission" and request title be allowed to stand."
The second unpleasant surprise lay in the last-minute U.S. 
withdrawal from the Control Commission. A crucial part of the Commission 
was its signals unit, which would handle all message traffic, ciphers, 
and so on. The whole mission revolved around this vital organ. Since 
South East Asia Command was an Allied command, Mountbatten had designated
9 members of a U.S. Signals Company, which was part of the SEAC staff, 
to accompany the Control Commission to Saigon. Although it would be two
weeks before the Mission actually arrived in Saigon, the American
withdrawal came when that body was on daily alert to fly out at a moment's 
notice. At SAC's staff meeting on 28 August 19U$» Brigadier General 
Timbennan, commanding US forces in Southeast Asia, abruptly announced 
that owing to the rapid demobilization programme and "certain admini-
•jO
strative difficulties"^ it was preferable that US signals personnel 
not accompany the British to Saigon. Mountbatten, knowing his politics, 
agreed, although it had earlier been made clear to Timberman that there 
was a desperate shortage of signals units and the tiny American unit 
[involving less than a dozen men] was scheduled to be in Saigon for only
6 weeks before being replaced by ALFSEA resources. As it was there 
were absolutely no replacements for these 9 Americans and their 
equipment, and a fully staffed signals office was unavailable to 
General Gracey for several weeks.
That this episode left a bad taste all around was evident in 
Mountbatten*s sharp reply during an 8 September staff meeting to 
another ill-considered objection by Timbennan, this time to French 
involvement in the occupation of Saigon. Timberman thought that the 
reoccupation of Indochina had "nothing to do with the French".
Mountbatten retorted that when he was in Berlin a few weeks ago General 
Marshall had asked him how soon he could receive French forces for 
employment in Indochina, and how he proposed to employ them. Therefore 
"it was not a question of the French being nothing to do with Indochina." .
It was apparent at SEAC that the US was avoiding the difficult 
problems (for reasons of domestic politics) and leaving a hard pressed 
Britain to do the difficult work of coping with the violent civil 
explosions in Indochina, Java, Sumatra, Burma and Malaya. With far 
greater resources at her disposal the United States restricted her 
responsibilities to garrison duties in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines, 
none of them European colonial territories. Later pleas from the United 
States, herself enmeshed in the Vietnamese war from the mid-1960s until 
the early 1970s, for understanding and support from Europe encountered 
no sympathy and no material response in solving a problem which 
resulted very largely from American actions a generation earlier, for 
now the men who for years had been actively opposed and humiliated by 
the United States, the de Gaulles and the Messmers, were now influential 
Heads of State and Heads of Government. It was, to quote an old American 
saying, a case of the chickens coming home to roost.
The Control Commission by now had to share equal billing with
Headquarters Allied Land Forces French Indo-China [to be referred to as 
ALFFIC], The same senior officer headed both'organizations, or, to use 
the military jargon, "wore both hats." Both commands were sailing into 
what were literally uncharted waters. The Civil Affairs branch at
Headquarters SEAC was barely big enough to guide British Military
Administrations in the reconquered British possessions, but was completely 
overstretched when the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), including Indochina 
and Indonesia [the worst problem areas] were added to SEAC's area of 
responsibility. The same applied to the Foreign Office representation
on the Political Affairs Staff. As late as 17 August Mr. Dening 
reiterated his unease over the arbitrary division of Indochina, a 
division decided upon for no other reason except to "save Chiang*s 
face." Said Dening, prophetically, "The division of French Indo­
china by the parallel of 16 degrees north, if persisted in, is going
39to cause a lot of trouble."-^ It was Deningfs urgent prompting of 
the Foreign Office, in early August, which had speeded the general 
agreement on Civil Affairs between Paris and London.
As early as 2 August Brigadier Gibbons had submitted a paper on 
the severe manning problem in his Civil Affairs branch. In the chain 
of command the Civil Affairs Officer reported to the Chief of Staff 
(General Browning). The CA division had a War Establishment [W.E. ] 
strength of 11* officers, and, now that SEAC was about to grapple with 
some of the most difficult problems ever faced by an army of occupation, 
only 10 of the CA officer posts were filled; Of 13 other ranks [enlisted] 
positions, only 7 were filled.^ Said Gibbons, "These numbers are very 
small compared with those of Civil Affairs branches in other commands. 
They are now becoming inadequate for the efficient processing of the 
Civil Affairs policy matters which have to be submitted to the Supreme 
Allied Commander." Worse, there was no Civil Affairs Division at 
Headquarters Allied Land Forces South East Asia [ALFSEA], the head­
quarters from which the occupational ground forces would be drawn, forces 
which would need up to the minute guidance from Civil Affairs experts 
in their duties. For it would not be' the Control Commission personnel 
who would have to take to the streets to meet the rioters, snipers and 
guerillas, or protect local populations, or escort food convoys, rescue 
hostages and mount sweeps and patrols and come into direct contact with 
the civil populations —  it was the Land Forces which would perform 
these difficult tasks, forces which had no Civil Affairs personnel 
whatsoever. The CA branches in Europe [Italy, Germany, etc.] were fully 
staffed, but in Southeast Asia, where the problems were truly dangerous 
and the threat of civil war imminent, the Civil Affairs branch was 
understrength.
Gibbons emphasized the point: "Unless a CA Branch is established 
there [at Hq. ALFSEA] an essential link will be missing." SEAC 
Headquarters did not have any adequate knowledge of CA branches in 
Australian Army Group, either. The French group, though small in number, 
would help; they were now being trained at SEAC, for "with regard to
French Indo-China His Majesty*s Government have recently agreed, with 
the knowledge of the United States Government, that French Administrators 
should be mobilised and trained, by the French authorities, for French 
Indo-China in this command*
One fundamental problem which affected all of SEAC*s plans was 
the acute shortage of transport. As Slim later noted, his air transport 
capability was halved as soon as the ceasefire was announced. The US 
immediately prohibited the further use of all lend-lease equipment [unless 
they were bought by cash, which was unavailable to SEAC].
But US policy continued to cause last-minute annoyances. When the 
Japanese laid down their arms the USAAF immediately cancelled spare 
parts for 200 C-4j.7s of the earlier Mark I, II, and III types used by 
ACSEA; 1600 American aircraft and gliders would soon be unserviceable. 
Even on a cash and carry basis, under the new rules an aircraft had to 
be grounded before a spare part could be requested. P-i+7 Thunderbolts 
were among 8 types of aircraft affected, although they would soon be 
engaged in the vicious fighting against nationalists in Java, fighting 
which, but for the last minute shift of territoiy from SWPA to SEAC, 
would have been an American responsibility.
A study by the Chiefs of Staff on the shipping outlook painted
another gloomy picture. The "Overall Shipping Review" covering the
h.2
period 1 October 19^5 to 30 June 19^6 discussed the situation. Military 
movements fell into the following categories: Ex-POW, PYTHON release 
[the name given to the Labour Government's system of early return of 
British servicemen], normal reinforcements, repatriation of Dominion 
and Colonial forces, movements of formations, occupational forces, Allied 
forces for occupational duties in the Far East, civilians, and enemy 
POWs. British and Allied ex-POWs received the highest priority. There 
were complex demands for shipping, and forces such as the 20th Indian 
Division were carried as and when they could be fitted in.
In October 19U5, for example, the British worldwide demand was 
forecast as 357,800 slots, but only 279,500 could be carried by the 
totality of shipping available [ leaving a deficit of 78,300 in October]. 
Deficits in November [when French forces would arrive in Indochina] and 
December were 108,900 and 92,900 respectively. Only in January 19U6 
could demands be met. By then the British task in Indochina, for example, 
would largely be at an end. The demands listed above did not include 
the requirements of the Dutch, Norwegians, Greeks, Yugoslavs, French, 
and so on, nor did they take into account the capacity of the two Queens
(on loan to the Americans until the end of 19U5)« However, if the 
two Queens were included, and the Aquitania [also on loan to the 
Americans], plus the British share of captured German shipping, the 
October deficit would still have amounted to 90>800, and November's 
loss cut to 9U»700. However in September, when SEAC was pressed to 
move forces like the 20th Division to Saigon, and could not, the U.S. 
was still using the Queens and the Aquitania. as well as the British 
share of the German shipping, and had not given Britain the 16000 
spaces per month agreed to at Terminal [Potsdam].^
It was in the light of this information that Mountbatten estimated 
that by mid-October he would have lost a lift of 67000 because of RAPWI 
operations to the UZ and Australia. This would leave him with a less 
than modest lift of 30,000, "which will be insufficient to meet my further 
reoccupational commitments and routine movements." ^  In fact, by 
9 September he would be down to 10 LSI ships on hand, including !+ of 
the "Empire" class [which had longer range and carried their own 
small craft], and the War Office advised him that no more LSIs would 
arrive at SEAC before the end of November, and some of those could be 
Red Ensign ships without smaller landing craft. The requirements 
generated by the violent disturbances in the Netherlands East Indies 
alone were 3 LSI and 30 LST, which exceeded the total lift capacity 
available to SEAC.
It was a continuing problem to try and keep track of Allied POWs 
in Southeast Asia. Prisoners were constantly being moved from camp 
to camp and across national boundaries. An important source of inform­
ation was the Swiss consul in Saigon, who did what he could in visiting 
the camps. He reported that as of November, 19^3, there were 1900 
POWs distributed between Niih bJ [just south of Saigon], the immigration 
building, and the Petrus Ky School. Twelve hundred had been sent to 
Thailand [probably to work on the Burma-Siam "death railway"], and the 
remainder were mostly British from Singapore. - There were also some RAF 
Special Duty aircrews (shot down over Tonkin), Australians, South Africans 
(from Singapore), some Merchant Navy crews and a few Americans from 
Corregidor. There were reports of some fights between British and 
American prisoners.
The prisoners worked in uniform, and were generally assigned to 
three main areas: the loading docks, Phu Thq and Tan Sdn Nhut airfields, 
and the railways and auto repair shops. They went to work under guard 
in Japanese trucks, often singing, and worked 11 hours a day, usually
hatless and shirtless. The prisoners were fed a diet similar to 
that received by Japanese troops: portions of rice with a fish base.
They were paid in Japanese yen, plus a ten cent daily work indemnity.
For Christmas in Saigon, the civil commission in charge of French- 
Japanese relations asked the Japanese to authorize the distribution 
of Red Cross gifts of food and cigarettes, with the stipulation that 
the POWs would receive less than the Japanese wounded. This was 
permitted by the Japanese, and the commission managed to add 10 pigs 
to the distribution of gifts. However, escapees were severely dealt 
with. Two Australians, one of whom was a doctor, had attempted to 
escape. They were recaptured, beheaded, and their hearts were cut out.
The British who died were buried in a common grave near Tan Son Nhut, 
one on top of another. There were successful escapes. Of an attempt 
by 7 men to escape, 3 were shot down while running but h got away.
That the condition of POWs in Indochina was far better than in 
other areas, like Malaya and Siam, was due in large measure to some of 
the French, many of whom smuggled medicines, food and supplies in to 
the prisoners. One mining engineer named Godard became something of a 
local legend; he actually periodically took prisoners out of camp at 
night, entertained them at an out of the way restaurant, then returned 
them to camp before daybreak. He was never detected. One Frenchman 
passed on photographs, taken by telephoto lens, to the Allies; these 
showed prisoners being punished by being stripped and laid out in the 
hot sun, wrists tied to ankles.
In 19U5 the list of POWs and camps in Indochina was as illustrated 
in Table 2 . For a number of reasons, plans to unilaterally drop supplies 
into the camps during the war were frustrated. After the war a sharp 
operation was launched to drop leaflets to all known POW camps to tell 
the inmates and guards, [and local populations] that the war was over 
and to pass them instructions; this was Operation "Birdcage", which 
commenced on 28 August, the day after the Rangoon agreement was signed. 
Seventy-two sorties were flown by P-i+7s and B-2I4.S to 90 camps and 2 3 6  ‘ 
areas spread over Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya and Sumatra. Targets 
as far away as Hanoi, Tourane (Danang) and Saigon were covered. The next 
effort commenced before the "Birdcage" operations were terminated on 
30 August. This was operation "Mastiff", designed to introduce medical 
personnel, RAPWI personnel and supplies to the camps. This involved 
9 squadrons of general reconnaissance and Special Duty Liberator squadrons 
and one squadron of Dakotas. Camps in Indochina and Siam were covered
Ly 159*355 and 398 Squadrons, while 8,160 and 357 Squadrons operated 
to the Netherlands East Indies from Ceylon and the Cocos Islands. The 
C-U7s were from Mingladon. RAAF Catalinas were moved from Borneo 
to Saigon to help in evacuating the Australians.
Headquarters ACSEA [Air Command South East Asia] felt the 
consequences of MacArthur*s orders to remain in place. The records of 
3U5 Wing reflect the frustration caused by the sudden order to cease 
activity. On 1U August this Dakota Wing had received a warning order 
to move from Patenga to Hmawbi [Burma] to get ready for POW evacuation. 
On 19 August the Wing's advance party, plus 219 and 117 Squadrons, 
moved to Hmawbi, and the Wing was ready to operate 30 sorties per day 
as of 0800 hours on 21 August. Because of the demands created by 
"Mastiff", Hmawbi and Mingladon became the scenes of great confusion. 
They were small fields of limited capability, and not designed to 
hold 9 o t 6 transport squadrons, each complete with support units; to 
make matters worse, Headquarters RAP Burma was in the midst of moving 
from Calcutta to Rangoon, which would overload Mingladon even more.
If there was confusion in the leading echelons at their new forward 
bases, there was chaos in the rear elements. Vaccilation, last-minute 
admendments and cancellations of orders, etc., drove morale down, and 
disciplinary problems, including crime, increased. One Dakota crew 
had been subjected to so many sudden cancellations that on 2 September, 
their patience exhausted, they ignored an order from the control tower 
to hold and took off on their planned mission. According to the records 
of 3U5 Wing:
"During the abortive period of false starts, sudden 
changes and general indecision no explanation was 
offered by higher authority and the patience of 
aircrews and ground crews were alike severely strained.
A belated statement of the political difficulties 
involved was ultimately issued by ACSEA. " U5
To make matters worse:
"... few games of football have been-possible owing 
to spasmodic torrential rains which flooded all 
fields. Games which have been played have been note­
worthy for the perserverence and tenacity exhibited 
by the players in their attempts to adhere to the rules 
of Association Football under conditions more fitted 
for water polo."
This fairly well summed up the state of affairs in SEAC while the 
forces waited for MacArthur to get on with his ceremony in Tokyo: troops 
confined because of torrential rains, ships trying to mark time at sea, 
morale and discipline deteriorating while civil disturbances erupted 
everywhere, and scores of weakened and exhausted Allied POWs slowly
dying with help by air just minutes away.
On 1 September ACSEA finally dispensed with the daily "hold" 
orders and advised all squadrons that sorties to Siam and French 
Indochina were postponed until MacArthur had completed the ceremony 
in Tokyo. However, an RAF Dakota dropping supplies to Allied prisoners - 
at Takhli, Thailand, looked the strip over and decided to land. The 
aircraft brought out 25 happy ex-PQWs, and the crew, in explanation, 
reported that the repeated orders not to land were just "not heard" 
on their radio. Even "Mastiff" was held up, to be resumed on 3 
September.
Main Headquarters, RAF Burma, bombarded with these abrupt orders 
to suspend air operations to Japanese-held areas, were now confused 
as to exactly when the fly-in to Bangkok would begin. ALFSEA had told 
RAF Burma to start on 2 September and follow through on 3 4 September.
However, ACSEA had alerted RAF Burma to execute the fly-in on 3* 4 and 5 
September. Who was correct, ALFSEA's 12th Army or ACSEA? RAF Burma 
finally cabled ACSEA: "Appreciate difficulties and necessity for changes 
of plan but would help if ACSEA and ALFSEA were on same wave length."^
On 3 September ACSEA replied: "Appreciate your difficulties, but MacArthur, 
and SAC, state categorically no landings would take place before surrender 
Tokyo signed 2 September."
The Japanese would remain an enigma until Allied forces actually 
met them face to face. Some of the Japanese forces were in a truly 
ghastly state. The Burma Area Army had received no reinforcements 
whatsoever in 191+5 (since December 191*4* precisely), and units simply 
disappeared from the rolls as they were destroyed. The Japanese 18th 
Army in New Guinea was last supplied with anything in April 1944- Some 
units were reduced to cannibalism, and records indicate that some U.S. 
airmen were killed and eaten in New Guinea by starving Japanese soldiers. 
At the ceasefire the Japanese Commander appealed for food to enable 
his troops, riddled by starvation, beri-beri and malaria, to march to 
the concentration areas.
Indochina was in better condition, at least in the. south. The 
north suffered from famine because the transportation system, devastated 
by Allied bombings, was unable to move surplus rice from south to north.
That the Japanese fought so well was due to the determination and 
discipline of the Japanese soldier. In the final days, with the 
Japanese knowing that they had lost the war, Allied aircrews making 
morale-lifting flights over POW camps reported the most intense anti-
aircraft ground fire of the war, perhaps a last defiant gesture by 
the Japanese. The Japanese High Command was hampered by an extremely 
crude and ineffective communications system. In answer to Mountbatten* s 
query, Field Marshal Terauchi reported:
1. There was no reliable telephone link between Saigon 
and Bangkok.
2. There was only one radio and one cable link between 
Saigon and Bangkok, and the Japanese had a continuing 
problem with communications cables due to "thefts inside 
Thailand," [a problem not unfamiliar to American forces 
a generation later].
3. There was no reliable phone link between Bangkok' and 
Singapore; there were one cable and two radio links, 
but the cable was not very good.
4. There was no reliable phone link between Moulmein 
[Burma Area Army] and Bangkok; there was one radio 
link.
In assessing this poor state of communications, it seems clear that 
Japanese actions regarding nationalist movements in different countries 
were frequently the result of independent decisions by individual 
commanders.
On 29 August the day after Numata returned from Rangoon, General
Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in the Southern Region
sent a message to Headquarters SEAC, requesting that SEAC send two
officers by air to make arrangements for the arrival of the Control
Commission. However, Terauchi was apparently unaware of MacArthur's
ban and he was told that no liaison team was forthcoming* Mountbatten
did, however, remind Terauchi of his responsibilities in a telegram
in which Mountbatten passed on reports of Japanese in Bangkok burning
their barracks, an allegation denied by the Japanese. Mountbatten
cabled, "I would remind you that the preservation of property intact
and the maintenance of law and order are responsibilities agreed to by
49your plenipotentiary at Rangoon." Terauchi was ordered to take 
disciplinary action against Japanese commanders who violated these 
strictures. The first warnings to Terauchi on the maintenance of public 
order thus came from the Supreme Allied Commander, and not from the 
head of the Control Commission.
Mountbatten ordered Terauchi to return Numata to Saigon, this 
time with powers to give orders to Japanese forces throughout Southeast
Asia. On 31 August Gracey told Mountbatten that Terauchi had cabled
a suggestion that the Control Commission remain in Rangoon for the
time being and maintain contact with Saigon through Numata in Rangoon.
Gracey agreed with this suggestion:
"It is felt that there is considerable advantage 
in maintaining contact with the Japanese on our 
own ground, where we are in strength and where 
we can impose our will, rather than in enemy 
occupied territory, where, on present plans, we 
shall be in a very considerable minority and unable 
to impose our will if the Japanese choose to 
oppose it... If they do this, there is nothing 
which the Control Commission can do, for the time 
being, to alter the situation which the Japanese 
have created." 50
Numata was to return to Rangoon on 4 September to stay there and return
to Saigon with the Control Commission. SACSEA advised ALFSEA and 12th
Army that "The Control Commission will thus begin to fulfill its functions,
as enumerated in the Directive issued to General Gracey from this
Headquarters on 29th August, at Rangoon instead of Saigon and will act
at Rangoon as the intermediary for the passing of SAC's orders direct
51to such Japanese commanders as he may wish to instruct."
Mountbatten was worried about reports that General Itagaki in 
Singapore, had vowed to fight on rather than surrender, but on 1 September 
Terauchi denied this by saying that this sort of disobedience to the 
Supreme Commander could never happen in the Japanese Army. Terauchi 
also told Mountbatten that he (Terauchi) had difficulty in walking and 
standing and would not be able to attend the grand surrender ceremony 
in Singapore. He also delayed sending Numata back to Rangoon because 
he would not authorize Numata to issue orders in the name of the Supreme 
Commander.
It should be mentioned that the old British-American dispute over
Indochina persisted to the end. On 31 August Mountbatten, who had kept
his small clandestine parties intact in the north, received a message
from Headquarters BRITCHIN (British Forces China), stating that there
was no relaxation of the anti-British/French attitude by US China Theatre
Headquarters. BRITCHIN reported that the US attitude wa.s that since the
war was over there was no longer any need for SACSEA to support the
French resistance movement, and if the French were in need they should
52contact the Chinese.
On 31 August Dening reported the results of the Rangoon conference 
to Stemdale-Bennett at the Foreign Office.^ The Chiefs of Staff 
concurred with Dening1 s proposal that he start a "war of nerves" with
the Japanese by sending them a message saying that the atmosphere at
British Headquarters was growing worse. Theytold Terauchi, among 
other things, that Numata had the temerity to question the wording of 
the surrender document when he was only asked if he had any questions.
A much subdued Numata was to return to Rangoon in early September to 
plead "with some emotion" for the "aged" Field Marshal Terauchi (who 
was 66). Numata recounted the incident in the Russo-Japanese War 
when General Nagi handed back General Stoessel*s sword, and urged 
that Terauchi be spared a humiliation. Browning merely replied that 
the surrender would take place in accordance with the British tradition.
The Japanese were dignified, but obviously under strong emotional
stress. Dening reemphasized his fears: "They do not consider that they
5khave been defeated and say so quite openly." They reiterated that 
they had laid down their arms on the Emperor*s orders. Wrote Dening:
"We are thus in a position that, in a few days 
time, we shall be setting out to disarm an 
undefeated army... There was every evidence at 
Rangoon that they have not changed in one 
respect, namely, their capacity for evasion.
They will get away with what they can if we 
let them.
As we are everywhere going in in inferior 
strength in the first place, the situation 
is still fraught with danger, and until we 
have a stranglehold I think we shall be wise 
to let the Japanese, to 3ome extent at any 
rate, follow their own concept of surrender.
This appears to be that Field Marshal Terauchi, 
as the appointed agent of the Emperor, makes 
himself solely responsible for the orderly 
surrender of all his forces. If, therefore, 
his authority is undermined too early, there 
is no knowing what will happen."
Dening knew that the delay in swiftly clamping control over 
Japanese headquarters, coupled with the relative weakness of British 
forces in SEAC*s huge area of responsibility, gave the Japanese a 
free hand to make their own local political dispositions, distribute 
weapons to various nationalist groups [including the Viet Minh in 
Indochina], manipulate funds and funnel vast sums of money to under­
ground groups, and permitted a not inconsiderable body of Japanese 
soldiers to desert and join local guerilla groups. Continued Dening:
"We have not got the interpreters, let alone 
forces, to assume direct control of the hundreds 
of thousands of Japanese involved in the surrender.
It is my view therefore that, whether we like it 
or not, we shall have to let the Japanese very
largely carry out the main tasks themselves, 
under their own officers. I regard this as 
very unsatisfactory from the point of view of 
the future, but the war having ended in the 
way it did [and in my view too soon], I do not 
think there is any other alternative. We have,
I think, a very difficult time ahead." 55
On 1 September Mountbatten cabled his intentions to Terauchi, 
informing Terauchi that occupation forces would be arriving in Bangkok 
and Saigon on 3 and 11 September respectively. The complete message 
was as follows:
"I shall initially land forces by Air in SIAM 
and F.I.C. as shown below:
(A) BANGKOK (DON MOANG) on 3/September —
1350 personnel and 190 tons of stores. These 
will be almost entirely Medical personnel. You 
will co-ordinate with the Regent of SIAM adequate 
measures for the safety of this Force.
(B) SAIGON (o4 n  SAN NHUT) [sic] on 1'1 /September,
1i+00 personnel, you will be responsible for the 
safety of this Force. Subsequent arrivals will 
be notified to you later.
2. You will provide the following to meet my Forces 
on their arrival:-
(A) BANGKOK(DON MDANG) 18£ load carrying vehicles.
20 Communication Vehicles. 300 Civilian Labour.
(B) SAIGON (TAN SAN NHUT) 21+0 load carrying vehicles.
50 Communication Vehicles. 300 Civilian Labour.
The above includes the demand for transport for the
Control Commission set out in para.17 of Annex 2 to
the local agreement signed at Rangoon on 27/August 19^5*
3. I understand that you are withdrawing Transport 
from RANGOON area. This will cease immediately.
U. I am meanwhile continuing to evacuate Allied P.O.W. 
by Air from SIAM.
.
5. Acknowledge receipt of this signal. " J 
On 2 September MacArthur completed the long-awaited ceremony in Tokyo 
Bay. With the Indochina operation approaching, a final tally listed 
POW camps in Baria, Nhk Be, Long Thanh, Vientiane, Hanoi Gialam, Sept 
Pagodes, B&c Ninh, Thakhek , Mytho, Phnom Penh and -Dalat-; Saigon contained 
5 camps. On 2 September SEAC intercepted a radio report from an eye­
witness describing conditions in Hanoi. Five thousand French officers
and civilians were imprisoned in the citadel in Hanoi, and there had
been scattered attacks on the defenceless French population. Outside 
Hanoi two Catholic priests [who had cared for 50 "half-caste" children 
during the war] were murdered and their bodies were thrown into the
river. There was a paradox in Hanoi in that starved "bodies were piled
on the Boumer Bridge while the fine shops were stocked with luxury
silks and clothes and the Hotel Metropole was serving six-course meals.
57The Japanese were well fed.
On 3 September SEAC picked up a broadcast from a British POW
in Saigon. He was broadcasting from Radio Saigon, which was still
controlled by the Japanese. He reported that the Allied prisoners
were relatively well fed and in reasonable health, thanks partly to
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outside help from the local French population; they had also been
kept fully informed of world events during the past 3h years. The
broadcast was made by an officer from a camp near the docks, and he
thanked the Red Cross, YMCA and the French people for the "magnificent
treatment" given to -the POWs. He also gave a count of 920 POVs from
Singapore in his group.
By now ALFSEA had come up with an outline plan of how they hoped
to move the bulk of the occupation force to Saigon after the initial
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fly-in. On 30 August 12th Army received the following schedule:
Approx. departure date Method No.of personnel No.of vehicles
16 September Air 1280 0
20 " Air 1280 0
21+ " Air 1280 0
21+ " Sea 10,000 1 200
29 " Sea i+000 900
This gave Gracey a sort of rule of thumb by which he could plan his 
tasks, although the available evidence suggests that Mount bat ten at 
first wanted to withhold the buildup of Gracey*s forces; this will be 
discussed later.
On 1+ September a paper titled "Situation in Indo-China, as on 1st 
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September 191+5»" was published. It was pertinent to SEAC Headquarters 
since General Gracey and the Control Commission were only nine days away 
from Saigon. The general summary took note of Japanese intrigue with 
the revolutionary groups, and stated:
"Since the announcementof the Japanese capitulation 
the Annamite countries from Tongking to Cochinchina 
have been troubled by various nationalistic 
revolutionary movements (Viet Minh, etc.) or Communist 
movements, etc., which seized power several days ago 
while the local governments set up by the Japanese 
after the 9th March 191+5 resigned. "
And as Gracey*s subordinates emphasized later when interviewed:
'The unanimous opinion of French observers in the 
interior is that only the intervention of armed
Allied forces, excluding the Chinese, who are 
considered an additional element of disorder and 
agitation, can save Indo-China from very serious 
and bloody trouble,”
Concentrating on the area of most acute interest to the Control
Commission, the study continued:
"The Southern Regions, which are of the most 
immediate interest to SEAC, are unfortunately 
those on which we possess the least information,.. 
on the 27th August a revolutionary government 
(Communists and Viet Minh, jointly) proclaimed 
the Republic of Southern Viet Nam. Since then, 
events have taken a grave turn and the revolutionaries 
have proclaimed a state of seige. Great confusion 
reigns at Saigon. The Communists have seized cross­
roads and strategic points and have cut off electricity. 
Newspapers have been suspended. The French population 
is practically interned in the area of Japanese 
surveyence."
The report went on to say that the Viet Minh had killed a member of an 
SA team dropped in on 31 August, and concluded by stating, "Only an 
armed force can restore order... The Japanese game in French Indochina 
leaps to the eyes."
The publication of this paper coincided with the receipt at SEAC 
of news of the huge Saigon demonstration of 2 September, and the 
accompanying French deaths.
Gracey did have some knowledge of conditions in Saigon. On 1
September a U.S. Dakota doing OSS work had ignored MacArthur's orders
and landed at T&i Son Nhiffc to extricate the few American prisoners of
war in Saigon; it departed on 3 September. An OSS sergeant engaged in
RAFWI work passed on the information that the airfield was in good
condition, the Japanese "nauseatingly helpful", and there were about
50 Japanese aircraft on the field (transports, fighters and fighter- 
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bombers). The Continental Palace Hotel was in good condition but 
crowded with French refugees. Public services appeared to be in order, 
and the "City [was] beflagged and bill-posted by Annamese welcoming the 
Mission." The Japanese appeared to be in control, although there were 
about 1000 "badly armed" Annamese in the streets. [The latter's presence 
was contrary to British orders to the Japanese to disarm the revolution­
aries], The POWs were well organized and in good condition. The report 
continued, "FW of all nationalities cannot speak too highly of French
assistance often at great risk. Sympathies are entirely with [the]
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French and many [POWs] stated they wished to remain to help them."
There was no visible bomb damage in Saigon, although the sergeant had 
not visited the docks [which had been struck on 7 February by i+U B-29
Superfortresses bombing by radar through the low cloud cover;
there had been considerable collateral damage to the surrounding area,
including a hospital, and a number of civilians had been killed].
It has been mentioned earlier that by now the Control Commission 
was officially established and working in Rangoon, and General Gracey 
was already acting as the Supreme Allied Commander's agent in 
communicating with Japanese Supreme Headquarters in Saigon. President 
Truman had also earlier told Prime Minister Attlee that the Japanese 
were being held responsible for the maintenance of public order in 
territories occupied by the Japanese forces, a policy which was re­
affirmed at SEAC and ALFSEA. It was in this context that Gracey sent 
a sharply worded telegram to Terauchi when news of French deaths in 
Saigon reached Rangoon.
Gracey said that he had heard that a French officer had been killed 
in Saigon, and another severely wounded, by the Annamites, and that 
Annamites were molesting other Europeans. He reminded Terauchi that 
under the local Rangoon agreements and in accordance with the Supreme 
Allied Commander's orders he was personally responsible for the maintenace 
of law and order in French Indochina and the protection of Allied 
nationals. While still in Rangoon Gracey began to stamp his authority 
on the Japanese Headquarters:
"No further occurences of this nature will be 
permitted by you. You will at once investigate 
the incidents which have occurred and report 
to me the names of the Senior Japanese Commanders 
in the areas concerned. You will immediately 
place these Commanders under arrest pending my 
arrival. You will replace them by Japanese 
Commanders who are capable of carrying out the 
Supreme Allied Commander's orders to the letter...
You will imprison any of the local population 
concerned in these outrages and hand them over 
to me on my arrival. You will take immediate 
steps to suppress all political activity directed 
against the interests of the Allied Nations. You 
will rigorously suppress any subversive activity 
by Japanese or Japanese controlled regular or 
guerilla forces or police or by local authorities.
You will immediately issue orders to this effect 
to all Japanese Forces including CLANDESTINE 
organisations and to all Japanese Civil and 
Political agencies within FRENCH INDO CHINA. You 
will immediately issue proclamations to this effect 
to all local governments and municipalities."63
And in a statement referring to the capture of Jean C^dile and his
colleagues, Gracey concluded:
"I am further informed the FRENCH Officers 
who have been sent by the Supreme Allied 
Commander to assist Allied Prisoners of 
War and Internees have been hindered in 
their duties and in some cases detained by 
Japanese Forces. You will forthwith release 
these officers and you will give all possible 
assistance to Allied personnel in the 
execution of their duties. You will at once 
investigate all cases in which they have been 
hindered or detained."
Terauchi was also ordered to arrest the Japanese officers
involved in what were regarded as hostile acts against Allied
representatives. The Japanese did not heed Gracey*s strictures to
the letter, and in C^dile's case merely removed their guards to make
way for Viet Minh guards.^
Also on k September, a meeting was held at 1J+30 hours in the office
of Brigadier Barrington, of Headquarters ALFSEA, Kandy; attending were
representatives of SACSEA, ALFSEA and two French representatives. The
question of the availability of French troops for Indochina was discussed.
Barrington proposed three alternatives. One commando regiment could be
moved on the French battleship Richelieu from Trincomalee on about 20
September; one commando regiment could move on 20 Indian Division ships
from Madras, India, around 16 September; or one Special Air Services
battalion could be moved on the Richelieu.
One of Mountbatten' s representatives asked Barrington whether 350
to 500 troops could be equipped in Ceylon* After a short discussion
Barrington replied that it could be done by 16 September. The French
representative reminded the group that the troops would be used as
commandos and would require full commando equipment. Specialist
equipment was available in Dehu, and would have to be flown in. Ordinary
*
equipment was available in Avadi and would be moved "white hot" by rail.
It was agreed that vehicles would not be shipped, as the French would 
take over Japanese transport from 20 Division in Saigon. The French also 
concurred in ruling out the use of flame-throwers and PIATS at this 
time. The meeting ended with Barrington saying that any small shortfalls 
of equipment must be accepted, to which the French agreed. By 1800 
the decision had been made, and both ALFSEA and SACSEA agreed that it
* Dehu and Avadi were both small towns, important for their ordnance 
factories. Dehu was in west central India, near Poona and Bombay, 
while Avadi was in east central India, near Madras.
** Projector Infantry Anti-Tank.
would be easier to equip a light commando. At this time General 
Headquarters, ALFSEA, was informed by telephone of the proposed make­
up of the initial French forces, while the French representative 
departed to inform the 5th Colonial Infantry Regiment in the French 
Camp *
On 5 September a message was sent from ALFSEA to Army Headquarters 
in India (ARMHTDIA) , SACSEA, 12th Army and 20th Indian Division informing 
them of the makeup of the initial French force to be moved to Indochina. 
Five hundred and seventy-nine men of the 5th RIC were to proceed from 
Trincomalee to Indochina on the Richelieu, arriving about 1 October. A 
small company of the 5th Regiment would also accompany the first units 
of 80 Brigade to be airlifted to Saigon.
On the same day, Mountbatten addressed Terauchi on the worsening
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situation in Indonesia. On 19 August, four days after Japan*s 
announced surrender, Terauchi had declared [apparently unilaterally] 
the populous island of Java to be independent, with Sukarno as President. 
Mountbatten now ordered Terauchi to repeal his declaration, but it was 
too late. Terauchi at first denied responsibility, but on 7 September 
he admitted his part in this matter, which he described as "preparations 
for independence of the East Indies", but said it was done "according 
to the orders I have received from the Imperial Headquarters", and he 
had discontinued further efforts after the Japanese peace overtures.
At the SAC*s 279th Staff Meeting of 5 September, Gracey*s message
to Terauchi was discussed. General Slim backed Gracey*s firm line by
reporting that "Field Marshal Terauchi had been given clear instructions
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that he was to maintain law and order."
On 5 September, also, the first medical team was parachuted into 
Saigon under Operation Mastiff, to work through senior camp officers. 
Supplies had been dropped into the camps since the Japanese had agreed 
to it on 26 August, the date of Numata*s arrival in Hong Kong. Among 
other things, a skeleton clothing issue for 9000, including clothing 
for several hundred women and children, had been dropped to the Saigon 
area by SB B-2l|.s. Terauchi acknowledged the arrival of- this first party 
and said that he was discussing the POV problem with a Major Pias. On 
6 September the first uniformed British troops arrived at Tan Son Nhut 
airfield, a small detachment (less than a platoon) of the 1st Battalion, 
19th Hyderabad Regiment of India [1/19 Hybad]. They were a token escort 
for the 20th Indian Division advance party, which consisted of an 
Intelligence team, Engineers, RAF detachment and medical officers. This
advance echelon brought radio sets with them, with which to radio back 
first-hand reports of local conditions to General Gracey in Rangoon. 
Accompanying them were the RAFWI staff who were to supervise the return 
of the Allied prisoners of war and internees. Royal Navy Surgeon 
Captain Dirt arrived with them, specifically sent by Mountbatten to 
authenticate Terauchi*s claimed infirmities.
This first operation on 6 September was an exciting start (with 
tragic overtones) to the occupation of Saigon. As these first heavily- 
laden Dakotas climbed slowly out of Bangkok for Saigon, deteriorating 
weather conditions did much to severely restrict the operations of the 
RAF transport squadrons involved in mounting the fly-in. The ferocious 
monsoon thunderstorms had already literally t o m  aircraft to pieces 
in midair, and Wing alone had just experienced the loss due to 
weather of 9 aircraft in the span of a few weeks, 2 having broken up 
in violent air and 7 having been forced to crash-land in paddy-fields 
and fields throughout Burma.
En route to Saigon the cloud base was about 9000 feet, with the 
weather gradually deteriorating as the aircraft neared Tan Son Nhut. 
However, after just crossing the Grand Lake in Cambodia the Dakotas 
were able to descend and follow the roads leading to Saigon. Before 
they landed, the two leading aircraft overflew the city centre, with 
pilots and passengers taking a good look as they circled over Saigon. 
Neither aircraft was to escape unscathed after touching down at 
Tan Son Nhut.
As could be expected, there was a great deal of uncertainty as 
to how the Japanese would react to these visitors. A Royal Air Force 
Squadron Leader who was in the second plane described his emotions, which 
no doubt were representative of his colleagues. The following presents 
a unique personal insight into Saigon at this emotional period:
"When we went into Vietnam we had no idea how 
the Japanese would react; we went in without 
any real knowledge of whether the Japanese Command 
would imprison us, or impound our aircraft or cut 
us up into small pieces —  we were not sure. -
We had a Canadian pilot, and Lord Burleigh (i 
believe that was his name) was on the other plane, 
along with another Squadron Leader, a colleague 
of mine." 67
As the officer recalled, "Lord Burleigh" went with the Japanese 
to the Continental Hotel "to discuss with the Japanese authorities the 
question of our taking over all the POWs, to take them back to hospitals 
in Rangoon. This was our first concern, to get our prisoners out. It
was before the flights started, and we were there to arrange it."
With these last minute details arranged, the first aircraft 
departed. Returning in it were the first 25 British prisoners from 
Indochina returning to freedom. The aircraft, its crew and passengers 
were never seen again after departing the Bangkok refuelling stop.
In a tragic postscript to the war the aircraft was caught in a 
thunderstorm over the Gulf of Martaban and broke up less than UO 
minutes out from Mingaladon. The squadron's commander was also lost, 
leaving a Flight Lieutenant in temporary command at Hinawbi. The 
second aircraft was spared because it was immobilized at Tan Sdn Nhut, 
having burst a tyre on landing.
Continued the officer:
"We arrived- shortly after the other aircraft had 
landed. I remember being met on the runway by 
all the Japanese generals lined up in their uniforms —  
they were all looking very smart with their Japanese 
swords."
The Canadian pilot got out and, "the Canadians being a very extrovert 
and happy-go-lucky people," saluted the ranking General [who was probably 
Numata, though the officer called him Yamashita], and shook his hand.
"I came after the plane crew. My reaction was that 
I knew I had to salute this man*, but I had only a 
week before seen the emaciated Prisoners of War,
British POWs, lying in the hangars of Bon Muang 
airport —  waiting —  and they were in such a 
shocking condition, with bones sticking out of 
their bodies, that this was etched into my mind,
and the idea of shaking hands with a man who was
responsible for this to happen was just beyond
my capability. I just couldn't shake hands with 
him, so I didn't —  whatever the consequences 
might have been. He offered his hand and I just 
walked past him."
He saluted the other generals and walked on past them to a waiting car, 
chauffered by a Japanese soldier.
This first party was then driven to the Continental Palace Hotel,
or rather to the side of the square opposite the-hotel, for a large
crowd had gathered around the hotel.
"All the populace had seen the two Dakotas 
circling, and they had waited in the square to 
welcome us. They knew we'd come to the hotel, 
and they were all waiting there, French people 
as well as Annamites (as we called them in those 
days).
*This policy was soon changed, and Allied Forces were directed 
not to initiate salutes to Japanese Officers.
I had to get out, and I was wearing jungle 
green. I didn't have a revolver or anything, 
as it seemed pointless to me to have any kind 
of weapon. And I walked through this crowd,
with the Japanese driver leading the way."
The atmosphere was highly charged as the group pushed its way 
through the large crowd and neared the hotel for their first meeting
with the Japanese. Having cleared the crowd to cross the streetto
the entrance of the hotel, the party now saw a "large number of 
Japanese soldiers lined up in a row just outside the hotel." The 
moment must have been as traumatic for the Japanese.
"And suddenly they all came to attention with 
a tremendous rattle of guns —  each one was 
carrying a gun —  I don't know quite what 
they did now, but it was a very sharp action 
and they called out something. What it was I 
don't know, because this was the first time 
I'd experienced this. And it was such a shock 
to me that I thought I'd been shot —  I really 
did! And I was sort of expecting myself to 
collapse, but I didn't."
The officer's small group were led into the hotel and given "massive"
rooms;"and they had roses in the room."
While the 20th Division's advance party was becoming acquainted 
with local conditions and radioing back reports to General Gracey in 
Rangoon, the Squadron Leader, who had flown his operational bombing 
tours in Europe and who was now a public relations officer, decided to 
visit the ROW camps. Because of the Dakota's burst tyre he was now 
stuck in Saigon, and he thought he should tell the prisoners that the war 
was over and they soon would be back in safe hands and in hospitals for 
treatment. He also wanted to tell them of the latter stages of the war. 
So he immediately left the hotel and walked up Rue Catinat,* a main 
street which led from the Cathedral to the river. He asked directions to 
the POW camp from the first person he met; it was a fortuitous meeting, 
and the stranger personally took him to the camp. **
The officer was, to his surprise, allowed into the camp by the
Japanese, "with no trouble at all." The prisoners, as it turned out,
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were fairly well informed and knew about the atomic bomb. In at
least one of the French camps the prisoners, after hearing of the war's
end on their hidden radio, had negotiated with the Japanese colonel in
command, with the result that inside the camp they were left in complete
control while the Japanese continued to maintain a guard on the outside
69
of the camp; it was a matter of "face."
* Later renamed Tu-Do.
** The helpful stranger was a Prince who later married the American 
heiress Barbara Hutton.
It was more than likely that the other camps came to similar agreements.
Since there appeared to be no Japanese problems in regard to the 
repatriation of Allied POWs, the big remaining question concerned the 
state of public order, the political situation and the disturbing 
number of armed revolutionaries at large, especially since more 
detailed reports of the recent riots were now being made available 
to the Control Commission and to Allied Land Forces French Indochina.
The figure of 1000 armed men, recently passed by the OSS man, only 
included those immediately visible, the "tip of the iceberg", perhaps.
On 6 September, as the RAIWI team and the detachment of 1/19
Hybad troops were arriving, General Manaki sent a message to General 
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Gracey in Rangoon. Manaki, in his capacity as Commander of Japanese 
Forces in South Indochina, expressed his regrets at the rioting and 
the killing of Frenchmen, but assured Gracey that the situation was 
well in hand, calm prevailed and things were not as bad as they might 
seem. On 7 September, 1 more Dakota arrived, with 15 passengers on 
board.
Terauchi had stubbornly defied Mountbatten in one matter. When 
he was ordered to send Numata back to Rangoon on k September, he was to 
empower Numata to issue orders in Terauchi*s name. This Terauchi 
absolutely refused to do, and the British had no option but to accept 
it. Terauchi stated that his power to command came directly from the 
Emperor, and, because of the essential nature of the Japanese Command, 
he had no authority to delegate these, powers to a subordinate.
Wrote Terauchi:
"My right of command over all the forces in
the Southern Region is endowed directly from
the prerogative of the Supreme Command of our 
Emperor and I am in no position to hand it down 
to any junior officer." 71
Numata was thus of limited value to the Allies in Rangoon and he 
was returned to Saigon on 9 September, as a second and larger advance 
British echelon landed in Saigon.
Captain Birt wasted no time in examining the Field Marshal; his
diagnosis was that Terauchi had suffered a slight stroke which had
resulted in mild residual paralysis in the left leg. Birt reported 
that Terauchi would be capable of going to Singapore for the surrender 
ceremony. On 8 September Terauchi cabled his "sincere thanks" to 
Mountbatten for his "heartfelt kindness" in sending Surgeon Captain Birt 
to examine him. Terauchi's telegram gave an indication that he did not 
intend to go to Singapore for the surrender, and intimated that Birt had 
concurred in this, although Birt in fact saw no medical reason why
Terauchi could not attend the ceremony. Mountbatten, however, decided 
that Terauchi might be considered a martyr should he be forced to 
attend and excused him; General Itagaki, Seventh Area Army Commander, 
signed for Terauchi. Before long Terauchi was examined again, this 
time by a board of doctors from the 20 Indian Division medical staff.
Their findings, to be discussed later, showed Terauchi to be regressing
rapidly. As for the formal surrender itself, held on 12 September 19U5, 
Mountbatten described it as follows:
"With the exception of Numata, who looked almost
human, I have never seen six more villainous,
depraved or brutal faces in my life. I shudder 
to think what it would have been like to be in 
their power. When they got off their chairs and 
shambled out, they looked like a bunch of gorillas 
with great- baggy breeches and knuckles almost 
trailing on the ground. The two Admirals were 
dressed in khaki like the five Generals, and the 
only way you could tell the difference was that 
the Generals wore spurs." 72
Slim wrote of the paroxysm of rage and the tears of bitterness 
on Itagaki1s face as he signed the unconditional surrender.
On 8 September Gracey sent Numata back to Saigon with the second 
advance group, and two days later he accused Terauchi of violating the 
terms of the Rangoon agreement by permitting movements of Japanese 
forces, for reports were being received in Rangoon that Terauchi was 
paying off and disbanding bodies of Korean and Formosan troops, including 
POW guards who would probably be wanted for trial as war criminals. 
Answering Gracey*s reprimand, Terauchi denied reports of Viet Minh 
bodies moving north with the Japanese, saying that the Japanese movement 
was in conformity with Allied orders to clear Saigon of non-essential 
Japanese, and the movement was being accomplished by oxcart and Annamite 
labour.
*
On the same day, 8 September, Group Captain Grandy, commanding 3 M
Wing, began the second wave of British occupation forces into Saigon,
flying in aircraft "V" of 62 Squadron. This lift was carried out in 26
78sorties by aircraft from all squadrons. Included in the group were 
more engineers, No.3 RABVE Control Staff and medical teams, plus 125 
Cash Office and 38 Pay Master personnel, and another token handful of 
troops to escort the cash [one officer and 6 men of 1/19 Hybad], They 
landed in Bangkok and remained overnight there. On 9 September Grandy 
led the aircraft into Tan Son Nhut.
The sole task of the first arrivals (6 September) was the care 
and repatriation of the POWs and internees. The second group was
* Now Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Grandy, Governor and 
Commander in Chief, British Forces, Gibraltar.
responsible for RAFWI problems, the procurement of information on
war criminals, and the protection of American property, such as it 
71
was, This was the message from SACSEA to the Control Commission, 
but other tasks included a survey of the political climate and vital 
points (including the airport, power station and docks), and early 
reports were radioed back to Gracey in Rangoon. Numata also arrived 
on 9 September, with orders from Gracey to release all French 
parachutists still in prison, disarm the Viet Minh police, establish 
law and order with Japanese forces and establish a curfew in Saigon and 
Cholon; the riot of 2 September had prompted Gracey to issue these 
orders.
A day earlier, on 8 September, Mountbatten had passed on to the
Chiefs of Staff Leclerc's request to fly 500 troops of the 5th RIC
to Tonkin to support the French Resistance Movement "who are in a very
75serious situation." Leclerc returned from Tokyo during this period
and, to expedite matters, reduced his request to fly in 60 paratroopers
in 3 Dakotas to Vientiane or Luang Prabang. While in Tokyo MacArthur
had told Leclerc that he should get as many French troops in Indochina
as possible, and to tell Mountbatten that he (MacArthur) agreed with
Leclerc. The Chiefs replied that Leclerc should be told to ask
Wedemeyer in China, which Leclerc knew would be a fruitless exercise.
Leclerc did, however, strenuously object to the presence of Chinese
troops in Laos; for there were no Japanese troops in that country. As
it happened, the Chinese were not interested in the possibility of
Japanese in Laos; they were more interested in profiteering and stayed
in Laos long enough to harvest two opium crops.
During the next U8 hours hundreds of men of several different
battalions moved to Bmawbi to begin a journey to what almost all of them
thought would be a welcome change from Burma, to a "land flowing with 
76
milk and honey." As the first major fly-in started on 11 September, 
the troops' expectations were at first fulfilled, but the euphoria was 
not to last long.
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TABLE I 
TEAM
A HEAD OF MISSION
B CONTROL TEAM
C INTELLIGENCE TEAM
CONTROL COMMISSION
No. of Personnel Function
28, including Head of Mission 
(Gracey) and Chief of Staff 
(Maunsell),
1+ interpretors of Japanese,
6 translators, and 16 clerks.
Command and 
Control
23 persons, including Foreign Control and
Office, Civil Affairs, RAF, examination of
RN, etc. reps. Japanese actions
on surrender terms, 
distribution of 
supplies, political 
liaison (Foreign 
Office rep), aid 
to RAFWI, French 
liaison.
1 Examination Section Collection and 
examination of 
ciphers, maps, 
documents, Orders 
of Battle, 
technical data and 
collection of 
operational and 
logistical data. -
Security
(31 personnel, including 
5 counter-intelligence 
officers)
Security of Mission, 
future plans for 
security of forces; 
Counter-intelligence 
and normal security 
duties.
[a] G.S.I.(s)
(12 pers. 6 ofcrs and 
6 other ranks)
[b] "P" Section 
(3 pers.)
Monitor and control 
Japanese signals.
Contact, control 
and collection of 
information from 
clandestine forces. 
Provision of local 
interpretors, guides 
etc.
TABLE I (continued) 
TEAM 
D SIGNALS TEAM
No. of Personnel
2 communications aircraft, 
1*0 pers, incl. aircrews 
and motorcycle drivers.
Function
Maintain Communications 
with SEAC and other 
Hdqtrs as required, 
establish Signals Centre, 
Control Japanese W/T 
stations.
E MEDICAL TEAM 2 doctors, 2 orderlies. Study medical and
supply requirements for 
BAFWI and local 
inhabitants, Medical 
treatment of Commission.
F ESCORT Pending reinforcement, Protection of Commission
1 Company of Indian 
infantry and 10 orderlies.
(Actually 1/1 GR troops 
under Lt.Col.Jarvis)
CAMP COMMANDANT (Est). 12 Provide two mess units, 
each to feed 50 British 
Officers and 20 Indian 
other ranks.
Note: This table is representative, as it reflects a somewhat
smaller establishment and differs slightly from Gracey*s own list 
(which itself was not strictly accurate as it carried the U. S', signals 
team on the rolls). Gracey's orders showed the Commission to be made 
up of a Control Team [60], Intelligence Team [25]» Signal Team [50], 
Medical Team [!+]» Administrative [53-— 51 of whom were "Mess Units and 
N.C.E.], and Attached [5U]« Under "Attached" were two F.S. (presumably 
Field Security) Sections [20], Interpreters and Translators [9],
GSO II, Signal Liaison Officer and Clerk, RCM Officer (RAF), E Group 
Officer, EIS Officer, Naval Intelligence Officers [2], Force 136 [?♦ 
including the Honorable Hugh Astor], OSS [3], ISLD [lj], and CSDIC (i) 
[3, including Louis Allen, authority on the Japanese in Southeast 
Asia and author of "End of the War in Asia," etc.].
TABLE 2
SAIGON AREA CAMPS [FO 371/U6338] 
(Source dates from November 19W+ to March 191+5*)
CAMP
Saigon Camp A (Part of 
No. 1 Camp Thailand) 
Immigration Building,
Hue Jean Eudel.
Saigon Camp B - Polyclinique 
Market Square formed by 
Hues Louis Baez, Victor 
Olivier, Bercesi and 
Vincersini.
Warehouses No. 11 and 11 
(near docks)
Civil Jail
69 Hue de la Grandiere
POWs
520 UK, 60 AUST/NZ, 
180 USA, 500 BUTCH, 
250 Misc.
Work Camp, Saigon- Cap 
St.Jacques Road (67 Km 
from Saigon)**
Airfield between Saigon- 
Cap St. Jacques (77 Km 
from Saigon)***
Nha Be
(Synthetic Petrol Plant)
Tan Sdn Nhut
(main Saigon airfield)
1100 UK, 500 AUST/NZ, 
750 BUTCH
11+0 Mi sc (known to contain 
French, possibly UK)
1+00 UK, i+00 DUTCH
200 UK
50 AUST/NZ
300 INDIAN
SAIGON Area Total:
TOTAL
2000
1U0
800
200
59.
J00
ftoo
* The Japanese coup of 9 March eliminated most of Force 136's sources.
** Thought to be the Baria airfield.
*** Thought to be the Long Thanh field, which was not quite as far 
from Saigon.
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CHAPTER VI
GRACEY ARRIVES IN SAIGON
In this Division there must be NO SURRENDER 
under any circumstances whatsoever. Remember 
the Zulu Chief*s exhortation when surrounded:
MIf we go forward, we die;
If we go back, we die;
Let us go forward, my brothers.'1
Major General Douglas D.Gracey, QBE, 
Commander, 20th Indian Division.
13 April 19U2.
General Gracey*s role in postwar Saigon has generated a great 
deal of heat, if little light, but it is necessary to define and trace 
his terms of reference before any intelligent assessment of his actions 
is possible. This proper definition of his directive is precisely what 
has been missing or misrepresented in nearly all accounts published to ■ 
date of the British involvement in French Indochina.
The Potsdam decisions, the highest policy-making level, have 
already been discussed in their relation to Indochina. Since the 
Chinese were militarily and politically incapable of action in Indochina, 
the decision to assign the northern half of Indochina to China was taken 
for the purpose of saving Chiang Kai-Shek's "face,f, or political 
reputation. This arrangement also permitted the United States to enter 
behind the Chinese and work for the exclusion of Prance from Indochina. 
After the political decisions had been made, the British Chiefs of Staff 
in turn delegated the task to the theatre commander, Lord Mountbatten.
The British Chiefs of Staff sent Mountbatten a broad overview of 
British tasks following the surrender of Japan. In reference to the 
first task ("Reoccupation of key areas of occupied territories, in order 
to secure effective control and to enforce surrender and disarmament of 
Japanese Armed Forces"), the Chiefs said:
"The dispatch of a force to Saigon to ensure control 
of the headquarters of the Japanese Southern armies.
We are arranging to ship Prench forces and civil
affairs personnel to follow up your forces, which 
should not occupy more of Prench Indo-China than is 
necessary to ensure the control of the headquarters of 
the Japanese Southern armies." 2
Mountbatten created two distinct organizations to deal with the
problems of Prench Indochina, both of which were commanded by the same
3
officer. The first of these was made up from South East Asia Command
resources and was responsible directly to Headquarters SEAC; this was
the numerically smaller Headquarters SACSEA Commission No. 1 (the Control 
Commission). The second organization was Headquarters Allied Land Porces 
French Indo-China (commonly referred to as ALPFIC), a far larger 
organization containing British and French land and air forces, including 
the 20th Indian Division and attached units. To appreciate more clearly 
the role of the British in Vietnam, it is necessary to understand from 
the beginning that these two organizations had one thing in common, and 
one thing only: the Commander [and even that was no more than nominal, 
for Brigadier Hirst, as will be seen, actually ran the 20th Division in 
Gracey*s name, Gracey being preoccupied primarily with Control Commission 
affairs].
The two organizations were tasked by two separate headquarters 
and reported to separate headquarters. The Control Commission was 
tasked by and reported directly to Headquarters South East Asia 
Command (Mountbatten). Allied Land Forces French Indo-China was tasked 
by and reported directly to Headquarters Allied Land Forces South East • 
Asia (Slim), going through 12th Army for routine matters.
Gracey1 s directive as Head of the Headquarters SACSEA Control
Commission was contained in a document dated 30 August J\9bS> the following .
statement composed most of paragraph two (Organization)!
The following directive refers to your duties 
in that capacity in which you will be responsible 
directly to me. ** Your duties as Officer 
Commanding Allied Land Forces will be detailed in . 
a further directive from Commander-in-Chief ALFSEA.
As Head of the Commission, Gracey was given 9 tasks, which are 
summarized as follows:
1. Assume control of Headquarters Japanese Southern Army 
and supervise the surrender.
2. Transmit Mountbatten*s orders to Japanese Headquarters.
3- Obtain information regarding Japanese dispositions and 
supplies.
1+. Control Japanese communications.
9. Study the RAFWI problem and render all possible aid.
6. Report on Indochina*s lines of communication, airfields 
and port of Saigon.
7. Open river and sea approaches to Saigon, using Japanese 
resources.
8. Reduce the size of Japanese Headquarters as soon as possible.
9. Maintain liaison with the local French Government, keeping 
Mountbatten informed.
These, then, were General Gracey*s tasks as Head of Commission.
There is nothing in his terms of reference which even remotely suggested 
liaising with the Viet Minh or regarding anyone but the French as the 
legitimate government.
The lineage of Gracey*s directive as Commander of Allied Land 
Forces French Indo-China will be discussed in descending order. President 
Harry S.Truman*s General Order Number One stated explicitly that the 
Japanese were responsible for maintaining law and order in their occupied 
areas until Allied forces could take over. Because of the erroneous 
nature of later writings about the occupation of Saigon, it is necessary 
to begin here, for in this supreme document there is no mention of
* This directive is to be found in Appendix I.
** Mountbatten.
Communists, Viet Minh, Huks, or any other group maintaining the public
order anywhere in occupied territory.
The Headquarters South East Asia Command Joint Planning Staff (JPS)
issued Force Plan 1, "The Occupation of French Indo-China." Although
this will be discussed in detail at a later stage, it is pertinent to
examine the key points at this time. The JPS stated that "the eventual
reoccupation of FIC is a matter for the French", and this statement
dictated the conduct of the whole operation. The objective was to
introduce a force into Southern French Indochina "in order to control
Japanese Southern Army Hq, to concentrate and evacuate Allied prisoners
of war and internees and to disarm Japanese forces." There would be
two phases to the occupation, with Phase I coinciding with the British
occupation and Phase II with the takeover by French military forces
and civil affairs personnel. Under "Army Considerations," the following
was directed:
"The primary task of army forces will be to secure 
the Saigon area, including* control of Japanese 
Southern Army Headquarters. Other tasks which 
should be undertaken as soon as sufficient forces 
are available include
(a) disarming and concentration of all Japanese 
surrendered personnel.
(b) collection and evacuation of Allied Prisoners 
of War and Internees.
(c) maintenance of law and order and protection
of vital installations.
/ "6 (&) apprehension of war criminals.
On 23 August the Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces South
East Asia, issued ALFSEA Operational Directive Ho.8 to his four senior
**
subordinate commanders ; this directive discussed the broad outlines
of reoccupation tasks and priorities. In carrying out the plans "to
■ * * *  7
effect the military occupation of BURMA, MALATA, FIC and HEI", the 
general policy would be as follows:
(a) disarm and concentrate all Japanese forces,
(b) protect, succour and subsequently evacuate,
Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees;
(c) establish and maintain law and order,
(d) introduce food and other civil affairs supplies,g
(e) set up the appropriate civil administration.
* Italics added.
** Lt.Gen.Stopford (12th Army); Lt.Gen. Dempsey (l^th Army); Lt.Gen.
Christison (15 Indian Corps); Lt.Gen. Roberts (3U Indian Corps).
*** prench Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies.
The general priorities for reoccupation were now, in order,
Malaya, Saigon (FIC) and Burma; Siam; NEI. In keeping with Mountbatten1 s
directive, Allied commanders were ordered to control the Japanese
through their existing chain of command. There were also to be five
phases of reoccupation:
PEASE I - Present phase including Operation TXDERACE,
the initial stages of Operation ZIPPER, and 
completion of occupation of BURMA.
The establishment of an air staging base at 
BANGKOK and the Military Mission at SAIGON.
PHASE II - Completion of modified Operation ZIPPER and
the re-occupation of MALAYA.
PHASE III - Completion of occupation of FIC and SIAM.
PHASE IV - Regrouping to form BURMA Command and to re-allot
responsibilities of Twelfth and Fourteenth Annies.
PHASE V - Further regrouping to include forces for NEI.
It was emphasized that because of the overall fluid situation phases
may overlap and phase timings were uncertain.
*
The ALFSEA directive to Gracey was prefaced with the clarifying
statement that these tasks were separate from those of the Control
Commission, in which capacity he would be directly responsible to SACSEA.
In his role as Commander of Allied Land Forces French Indo-China, Gracey
"will come directly under command Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces,
9South East Asia." Gracey would remain under 12th Army until his arrival 
in Saigon, at which time he would report directly to General Slim at 
ALFSEA. The following tasks were given to General Gracey as Allied Land 
Force Commander:
(a) Secure the SAIGON area, including Headquarters,
Japanese Southern Army.
(b) Disarm and concentrate all Japanese forces in 
accordance with the policy laid down in this 
Headquarters* letters 10028/G(0)1 dated 19 and 
28 Aug 1*5.
(c) Maintain law and order and ensure internal security.
(d) Protect, succour and subsequently evacuate Allied 
prisoners of war and internees.
(e) Liberate Allied territory in so far as your resources 
permit.
You will give such directions to the French Indo China 
Government as are required to effect these tasks. In 
these matters you will consult the senior French Land 
Forces Commander. ^0
* Allied Land Forces South East Asia Operational Directive No.12, 
28 August 191*5 —  see Appendix G.
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This ALFSEA directive, the "basic "Masterdom" document, was
**11
retransmitted to the 20th Indian Division. The one common thread
through all command levels was the maintenance of public order, which,
it will be seen, was common to the Foreign Office as well. Thus by
the end of August General Gracey, who was supervising the Control
Commission from Rangoon, had his directives in hand.
The Foreign Office minutes reflect the concern felt in London over
the delicacy of the problem of keeping the public order. It was suggested
that General Gracey himself was asking that the impending civil affairs
agreement with France not commit him to maintaining law and order, as he
wished to concentrate on the affairs of the Japanese. Dening echoed
the general unease over this potentially dangerous issue; in a telegram
of "particular secrecy", Dening told the Foreign Office that he was
worried about the attitude of the French civil affairs officer at SEAC 
12
headquarters. Dening warned that the British should be wary of
committing themselves to becoming involved in law and order. He recalled
that there was a history of resistance in Indochina, long before the
Japanese arrived in Southeast Asia. The French would claim that the
resistance movements were Japanese-inspired and would call on British
troops to quell Annamite uprisings. Having said that, Dening did
recognize that the European French were in real danger from internal
disorders. Said Dening prophetically:
"I think we should avoid at all costs laying 
ourselves open to the accusation that we are 
assisting the West to suppress the East. Such 
an accusation will rise very readily to the 
lips of the Americans and Chinese and would be 
likely to create an unfavorable impression 
throughout Asia."13
Dening .concluded his letter (marked "Important" by the Foreign Office)
by recognizing the difficult task which lay ahead of General Gracey:
"I do not know the answer but feel I should 
warn you of the situation which is likely to, 
arise and the difficulty with which the Force 
Commander will be faced in Indo-China."
Dening1s message reflected the worry felt throughout South East
Asia Command at the prospect of becoming involved in what the British
Army (with their long eiicperience in it) called Internal Security duties.
It was, to the British Army, one of the most difficult and least rewarding
tasks and one which they would avoid if at all possible.
* The code name for occupation of French Indochina.
** As 20 Indian Division Operational Directive No.13? 3 September 19U5«
This question was raised when the draft Anglo-French civil affairs
agreement was sent by the Foreign Office in London to South East Asia
Command for comment. It was specifically met head-on hy Brigadier E.
*
Gibbons , Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer at Headquarters SEAC. In
his reply Gibbons noted that COSSEA 31k had defined a limited British
role in Indochina, and objected to paragraph 5(c) of ALFSEA Operational
Directive No. 12 to General Gracey; this, "which charges him with the
task of maintaining law and order and of ensuring internal security,
apparently without limitation of area, looks overwide. For the
same reason he objected to the London text of the Anglo-French civil
affairs agreement (Memorandum No.1), which "could well lead to serious
commitments, political as well as military, and it is recommended that
a less definite undertaking, which should be subject to the Allied
Commander-in-chief1 s primary task not being compromised, should be
15substituted for it."
The Foreign Office minutes, in commenting on Lening*s note of
caution on how far to commit British forces to law and order, noted
that the War Office had echoed Deningfs question, especially in regard
to Cambodia. The fact was that there were not enough troops immediately
available for the job:
"From the military point of view the main 
difficulty is that owing to the very small 
number of British forces involved it will 
be quite impossible for the Allied Commander
in Chief to ensure the maintenance of public ^
order if so requested by French authorities."
In fact the draft Memorandum was reworded to reflect these fears,
and paragraph two stated that the French would ask the Commander, ALFFIC
(Gracey) to maintain law and order in particular areas where necessary;
a second redraft said almost the same thing, with the maintenance of
public order being one of the three main tasks "where the competent
French authorities will have so invited the appropriate Allied commander."
The final redraft stated that the involvement -in the maintenance of law
and order in any but the British key areas was to be referred to
Mountbatten for decision. It can thus be seen that the British responsibility
for the maintenance of public order was never an issue; the only question
was the area of involvement, and the highest political and military
officials were agreed that the Commander of Allied Land Forces was charged
with the keeping of public order in his key areas, which included most
of Saigon.
* Gibbons had wide pre-war experience as a Civil Affairs officer in Africa.
In his examination of the London text of Memorandum No.1, Gibbons
made the following remarks. The principle effect of the memorandum
was to "•place squarely unon French shoulders responsibility for conducting
17the administration of the country." A second result was to place General 
Gracey open to demands from the French to maintain public order "in such 
areas as the French authorities might invite him to take over." Wrote 
Gibbons, who as principal Civil Affairs Officer was cognizant of the 
dangerous situation facing the Allied Land Force Commander in Saigon:
"I think it must follow from COSSEA 311+ (which restricts 
the British to key areas) that the Allied Commander-in- 
Chief must be armed with full authority, including 
authority for administering the civil population, in 
respect of those areas of French Indo-China which he 
finds it necessary to occupy *to ensure control of 
the Headquarters of the Japanese Forces *, but that 
his responsibilities should not extend beyond the 
limits of these areas. He will presumably control 
the *occupied areas1 through French Civil Affairs 
Officers who will be attached to him and responsible 
to him."
In view of the above, the areas to be occupied must be more clearly 
defined and qualified. Gibbons went on to warn Mountbatten of the 
"considerable" consequences, political and military, in taking on the 
maintenance of law and order in other than the "occupied areas."
Gibbons wrote:
"I incline to the view that the Supreme Allied 
Commander should be chary of taking on this quite 
undefined commitment. Certainly paragraph 5(c) of 
the directive dated 28 August issued by Hq
ALFSEA to Major General Gracey, which charges him 
with the task of maintaining law and order and of 
ensuring internal security, apparently without.. q 
restriction of area, looks dangerously wide." ”
Finally, Gibbons recommended deleting the appropriate paragraph 
(5c) in the ALFSEA directive and replacing it with "a less definite 
undertaking of assistance in maintaining order, subject to this not 
involving interference with the proper discharge of the primary tasks." 
Furthermore, French forces should come under General Gracey, but if the 
French were to be responsible for the rest of the country an independent 
French Command in Indochina was "immediately necessary."
As it turned out, the force of Gibbonfs argument persuaded 
Mountbatten further to define Gracey*s responsibility for law and order, 
but the establishment of an independent French Command was simply not 
feasible at that time. Also, the War Office had told Mountbatten that
they were under "considerable pressure" from the Foreign Office and 
French authorities to complete the draft civil affairs agreement.
It was thus that Gracey appears to have received an amendment
to paragraph 5(c), ALFSEA Operational Directive No.12, literally as
he was departing Rangoon for Saigon. This was the amendment dated
12 September 19U5> whose text is as follows:
Para five C ALFSEA OP Directive number twelve 
dated 28 Aug is being amended in view of a 
memorandum defining administrative] and 
jurisdictional questions connected with the 
presence of Allied Forces in FIC. Memorandum 
still in draft stage pending approval by War 
Office [,] SACSEA and French Authorities.
Amendment will not be issued until paper 
finally approved...
Your primary task as defined by SEAC Directive 
to you dated 30 Aug is by controlling HQ 
Japanese Southern Army to enforce the surrender 
and disarmament of all Japanese Forces. You 
will report earliest possible the areas you 
require to occupy to ensure this control and 
any other area necessary to ensure release of 
RAPWI. This need not necessarily include all 
of Saigon as indicated in para Five A of ALFSEA 
Directive Number Twelve. Such areas defined as 
key areas. 20
At Mountbatten1 s direction, Slim provided Gracey with the final
(and only) amendment to his directives? re-emphasizing that the French
were to be responsible for civil administration:
In these areas you will exercise full authority 
over both military and civilian but working 
through French Civil Adm. Outside such areas 
Administration] will rest solely with French 
authorities exercising powers of state of seige.
You will not have any ■ responsibility for the 
maintenance] of law and order outside key areas 
unless called upon by the French authorities.
In such event the request will be referred to 
HQ SACSEA before action taken. 21
[As will be discussed later, there is some question as to whether
this amendment actually reached Gracey prior to 19 September].
Dening had reinforced this view at a staff meeting.on 8 September, 
when he again raised the question of action by British troops against 
forces not under Japanese command, and reiterated that this should be 
avoided. Mountbatten*s staff also had no intention of disarming all 
irregular formations, only those under Japanese control. An exception 
was made in the case of the Yiet Minh whose disarmament was ordered 
when their violent impetuosity began to seriously hamper the work of
* Appendix- H.
disarming and concentrating the Japanese.
Foreign Office minutes of that time noted that British troops
were "not to subdue unruly elements in the country apart from the
Saigon area, as that will be left to the French, who say that they
have adequate troops standing by in France and Madagascar awaiting
transportation." It was also noted that under the surrender terms
the Japanese were responsible for maintaining law and order, and that
reports were being received that small parties of Japanese were joining
Viet Minh attacks on the French. There was complete anarchy in
areas controlled by the Vi&t Minh (which was recognized as a largely
Communist organization); in these areas the economic situation was
deteriorating rapidly, and (anticipating Gracey*s proclamation) the
22
area would have to b.e administered under martial law. The Foreign 
Office was also aware that the advance party in Saigon had reported 
great unrest and agitation and had urgently requested the dispatch 
of British troops.
Published discussion of the Saigon occupation is voluminous, so 
that it is surprising to find that no mention has been made of the 
most important consideration of all, and that is what may well be called 
the "Athens connection." Experience of events in Athens shared by many 
of the staff officers in the Headquarters of South East Asia Command, 
engendered extreme reluctance to become involved in Saigon and was 
ultimately responsible for the despatch of the amendment to ALFSEA 
Directive Number Twelve to Gracey. This restricted his role as far as 
was possible without making his trip to Saigon completely useless. It 
was also the reason why Mountbatten initially gave serious thought to 
withholding the rest of Gracey*s division from him in the mistaken belief 
that if Gracey was so weakened he could never become involved. As has 
been mentioned, the palpable Allied weakness in the early stages produced 
only the reverse result by encouraging the Communist-led Vi|t Minh to 
aim higher and become more intractable. It was a lesson which Western 
leaders learn and relearn, akin to periodically reinventing the wheel.
The influence of the Athens operation was so important to the planning 
of the occupation of Saigon that it would be well worth while to discuss 
it briefly prior to moving to Saigon with Douglas Gracey.
In 1 with the Germans no longer a factor in Greece, Britain 
sent General Scobie to provide general humanitarian relief for Athens, 
which was invested by the EAM, a large Communist guerilla group called, 
in the manner of Communist insurrectionary organizations, the "National
Liberation Front." Although the need for guerillas was by then at 
an end, the EAM and ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army) refused to 
disband.
Not long after Scobie arrived (with the Greek government) the 
Communists, surprised by the weakness of the British occupying force, 
made a violent bid to overthrow the government and seize power. By 
this time they had (as in Vietnam) set up a provisional government, 
eliminated most of their rivals and were in control of all Greece 
except for Athens and Salonika. The only group to resist them was 
the organization of Colonel Zervas.
ScobieTs forces consisted mainly of units being reconstituted 
and civil affairs personnel, all of them spread very thinly throughout 
Athens, so that at the onset of the Communist assault he found himself 
in desperate straits at the port of Piraeus and, in Athens itself, the 
savage fighting forced the British to abandon the RAF Headquarters in 
order to consolidate a perimeter around Scobie*s own headquarters. 
Reinforcements eventually arrived and, in a series of bitter battles 
[in which tanks had to be employed], the Communists were pushed out 
of the capital. As the Communists were beaten back the Left, in their 
characteristic and often effective fashion, orchestrated an anti-British 
campaign which reached a crescendo in the United States. So powerful 
was it that Roosevelt feared the political consequences of support for 
Britain on the issue.
The British had no liking for this deadly little sideshow; to them 
it was an internecine squabble, Greek against Greek, and Greek politics 
at the time were of extreme complexity indeed. But, had the British 
not been there, the Communists would unquestionably have seized power 
in Greece.
Churchill appears to have been genuinely hurt by Roosevelt *s lack 
of support or sympathy. In a message to Roosevelt the Prime Minister 
wrote:
"I hope that the British reinforcements now 
coming into Attica may make a more healthy 
situation in Athens. You will realise how 
very serious it would be if we withdrew, as 
we easily could, and the result was a fright­
ful massacre, and an extreme Left-Wing regime 
under Communist inspiration installed itself, 
as it would, in Athens. My Cabinet colleagues 
here of all parties are not prepared to act 
in a manner so dishonorable to our record 
and name... Stern fighting lies ahead, and 
even danger to our troops in the centre of
Athens. The fact that you are supposed to he 
against us, in accordance with the last sentence 
of Stettinius1 press release, as I feared has 
added to our difficulties and burdens." 23
Roosevelt went so far as to suggest disbanding the famous (and
anti-Comraunist) Greek Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Squadron. With
Roosevelt being more and more influenced by Stalin, Churchill again
dug in by himself:
"The disarmament of the Greek Mountain Brigade, 
who took Rimini, and the Sacred Squadron, who 
have fought so well at the side of British and 
American troops, would seriously weaken our 
forces, and in any case we could not abandon 
them to massacre... I am sure you would not 
wish us to cast down our painful and thankless 
task at this time. We embarked upon it with 
your full, consent. We desire nothing from Greece 
but to do our duty by the common cause.
In the midst of our bringing food and relief 
for a Government which has no armed forces, we 
have become involved in a furious, though not as 
yet very bloody struggle.
I have felt it much that you were unable to give 
a word of explanation for our action.... "
Roosevelt responded with a lame reply about American public opinion 
and the local political situation. In the words of the senior British 
officer^ intimately involved in Greek guerilla operations [one of many 
officers who went from the Mediterranean to South East Asia Command], 
the British "got their fingers severely burned" in the Athens insurrection. 
To them, Gracey*s occupation of Saigon, appeared analogous to Scobie*s 
operation and they feared the possibility that he would be dragged into 
a civil war, with the events of Athens repeating themselves exactly in 
Saigon. Hence it was that successive restrictions were placed on Gracey*s 
freedom of action until the very safety of his initial force was in 
jeopardy. This too was the reason why Dening, a most talented political 
officer, made his comment that should the British be involved in a fight 
against the native revolutionary government, accusations would "rise 
very readily to the lips of the Americans."
Although this comparison was widely made at SEAC, the view that 
the Athens and Saigon situations were similar was not universally shared. 
General Penney , for example, disagreed with Myers about this, pointing 
out that the French were overthrown by the Japanese, and not by a local 
Vietnamese rebellion, and the Viet Minh did not appear to be significantly 
stronger now [21*. September] than before the war. Nationalist sentiments, 
however, had clearly been given impetus by the Japanese, but it was
* Director of Intelligence, SEAC.
doubted whether the Vie't -Minh commanded widespread popular support.
Penney *s intelligence summary was wired to the Cabinet:
"I have gained [the] personal impression that 
there may be [a] tendency to consider situation 
in FIC as similar to that in Greece and Venezia 
Giulia on re-occupation. I think this incorrect.
Only real point of general similarity is that 
in all 3 cases our action has tended towards 
reestablishment of prewar situation at expense 
of leftist movements and minority control. In 
dealing with FIC and later NEI we should consider 
the situation in relation to our general position 
in the Far East and not be led astray by comparison 
with situations in Europe."
Gracey*s original plan, submitted to ALFSEA on 9 September and 
approved, called for him to occupy the following areas: Saigon-Cholon- 
Thu Da.u Mot; Mytho; Nha Trang-Ba Ngo; Phnom Penh; -Dalat. In view of 
the amendment of 12 September he was directed at the last moment to 
further confine his key areas. He was thus limited to the Saigon area 
until in October the Chiefs of Staff authorized him to expand his control 
to Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa.
The mechanics of the move of the Commission and the 20th Indian 
Division to Saigon were contained in a document titled "Force Plan 1", 
published by the Headquarters SEAC Joint Planning Staff. Both "Army 
Considerations" and "Political Considerations" ("a matter for the French") 
have already been discussed, as have Phases I and II (the occupation of 
key areas and follow up by French forces). The document stated that 
political advice would be available from the Foreign Office representative 
to the Commission. [However, this expert advice did not become available 
until late September]. The plan also called for a staging base to be 
established in Bangkok prior to flying in the Commission, but the latter 
was flown in through Bangkok before the base was fully built up.
An overview of the main plan was as follows: (a) Hospital and 
RAFWI groups fly to Bangkok on 3/k September; (b) 1 infantry brigade 
group of 7th Indian Division plus RAF to Bangkok; (c) 1 infantry brigade 
group of 20th Indian Division, plus Control Commission and BAF components, 
to Saigon through Bangkok; (d) remainder of 7 Division flown to Bangkok, 
vehicles by sea; (e) remainder of 20 Division to Saigon by sea; (f) 26 
Division to Bangkok by sea, if required.
Navy forces available for the occupation of French Indochina were
as follows: 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 2 HMDLS, 1 Flotilla of auxiliary 
*
minesweepers, l+ Escorts, 1 LSH, 3 (D), and the Richelieu and
* Numata, in Rangoon, was ordered to bring all ships and craft (including 
lighters and minesweepers) available to the Japanese on the Saigon river 
to a state of operational efficiency by 11 September; all river pilots, 
regardless of nationality, were to be assembled in Saigon for the Royal 
Navy Port Party *s arrival on 6 September.
Trionrohant of the French Navy. From the Army, the 20th Indian was
■X1
provided, plus the following French forces: 1 Company of the SAS 
Battalion, the 5th RIG and 1 Light Commando from the 5th RIC. Air 
forces available for the operation were 5 C-l+7 Dakota transport 
squadrons. The force being airlifted would be moved to Saigon between 
Z+6 and Z+11+, with a smaller proportion being moved in sorties lasting 
to Z+27 (Z day being 5 September, the date of the occupation of Singapore]. 
The Control Commission and an infantry brigade (80 Brigade) were to be 
airlifted to Saigon, the rest of the division (32 and 100 Brigades, 
plus supporting units) being moved by sea.^ A grand total of 25»7U8 
troops of all kinds, including RAF and French personnel, were involved, 
plus 21+00 vehicles. The last brigade was not programmed to arrive 
in Saigon' (by sea) until mid-October.
The Navy was tasked to sweep and open the Saigon River, organize 
port services, dan channels and check the marked channels, and impose 
the surrender terms on Japanese naval surface and air forces. There 
were British and American airdropped mines in the main channels, but 
these were supposed to be sterile by now. The sweep was to begin on 
Z+25 and last two days.
The Army was advised that the Japanese 38th Army, which was 
responsible for Indochina, had its headquarters in Hanoi (SEACfs area), 
and would have to be controlled through the supreme Japanese headquarters 
in Saigon.
The Royal Air Force was to provide one single-engine fighter
squadron and one reconnaissance squadron (28 Squadron with Spitfires,
and 681+ Squadron with Mosquitos)? 273 Squadron actually replaced 28
Squadron, which went to Bangkok in a simple switch of destinations. As
the operation got under way the RAF provided the Staging Post at Saigon,
**
technical facilities, and ran airline services through Saigon for all 
points East. A unique "Gremlin Task Force" was also established, of 
which more will be said. The RAF expected to lose one flying day out 
of three in September, but the weather actually turned out to be worse 
than that.
All clandestine organizations were ordered to maintain their cover 
until further notice, and were directed to provide guides, local 
intelligence and related duties.
* Special Air Service
These included BF Approach Control with DF capability, VRF/LF, Beacon 
(ASV), limited ground radar cover, UHF airfield control world Guard 
channel, and HF point to point net.
Headquarters SEAC recognized a series of VPs (Vital Points) which
*
were considered to be targets for immediate seizure by Allied Forces; 
these were modified later in view of the restrictions added to the 
Allied Land Force CommanderT s tasking. It was again reemphasized that 
the Japanese were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in 
conformity with Truman*s. General Order Number One.
Japanese troop strength in French Indochina was listed as 71»000.
Of these, 1+0,000 were in the south, primarily in three divisions (2nd,
22nd and 55th), 1 Independent Mixed Brigade, and Headquarters and non- 
divisional troops in the Saigon area. In Saigon were located the 
Headquarters of Southern Army (with a detachment in Dalat), part of 38 
Array (2250 men), and the 2nd Division, which had recently been withdrawn 
from Burma for reforming (8000men). The remainder of 9000 included 
Navy and Air Force strength. What was left of the l+th Air Brigade (which 
for three years conducted offensive and defensive air operations from 
Burma) was now scattered through southern French Indochina; it was down 
to 58 Army and 9 Navy aircraft, also scattered everywhere (16 in Saigon 
and 9 i& Bien Hoa).
Force Plan 1 directed that relations with the Japanese were to be 
"correct and coldly polite"; there would be no shaking hands with the 
Japanese, who would, if they cooperated, be granted certain priveleges 
not including the general bearing of arms. All Japanese, regardless of 
rank, were to salute all Allied officers, and failure to do so constituted 
an offence. No Japanese officers were to be saluted, and there would be 
no feeding in the same room or sitting at the same table. Since the 
first objective was the disarmament of the Japanese, it was necessary 
to avoid friction until this had been accomplished. At the discretion 
of the senior Allied officer (with the minimum rank of Major General), 
the Japanese could be treated as either Surrendered Personnel or Prisoners 
of War. [In fact, however, this decision was taken at the highest level, 
and the Japanese, with certain exceptions, were treated as Surrendered 
Personnel, which left them in formed bodies, responsible for their own 
maint enanc e].
A source of trouble later on was the policy of using the Japanese 
to guard their surrendered weapons until relieved by the Allies, but 
with the British area of control now practically reduced to Saigon city, 
not much else could be done during the first few weeks. At the senior
* Saigon and Phnom Penh power plants, wharf area, foundry, ship repair 
and barge building works, navy yard and arsenal, machine shops, Cam 
Ranh Bay base, Nha Be oil storage depot, T£h Sdn Nhtft airfield, Saigon 
Radio station.
Allied commander*s discretion, a small number of rifles only could be 
issued to Japanese forces for self-protection. Also, "no orders or 
warnings will be given by Allied Commanders which cannot be enforced, 
if necessary, by strong military action.”
Exceptions were made to the general policy of treating the Japanese
as surrendered personnel in the case of members of the following groups,
all of whom were subject to immediate arrest: the Kempei Tei (the
"Japanese Gestapo”); the Tokumu Kikan (Japanese Intelligence Organization)
Hikari Kikan (Japanese/Indian Organization); Japanese General Staff
Intelligence and associated personnel; war criminals, and guards of POW
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and Internee camps. Gracey also carried with him a booklet containing 
"black” and "grey" lists, recording the names of 61+ prominent known or 
suspected French and Vietnamese collaborators. The next day, on 1 
September, the External Affairs Department, Government of India, to 
clear the air, queried the Secretary of State for India on the delicate 
question of cooperation with the French missions in India:
" Question of (?paramount) urgency has (?arisen) 
of grant of facilities to French organisations at 
present on Indian Soil for movement to and from 
French Indo-China under military auspices. One 
of these organizations is entitled French Colonial 
mission and corresponds to Civil Affairs Service 
for (?omission) of re-estabiishment of French 
authority in F.I.C. Decision must turn on H.M.G.*s 
policy (?toward)s French in Indo-China.
2. Subject to your comments we propose to assume 
that it is H.M.G.fs policy, to facilitate re­
establishment of French influence in F.I.C. and 
to that end to afford reasonable facilities under 
control to the organisation.” 27
On 3 September the Secretary of State for India replied:
"Your assumption is correct. Subject to concurrence 
of S.A.C.S.E.A., to whom you will no doubt repeat 
these telegrams, all facilities may be accorded 
to French organisations." 28
And it was only on 1+ September that the 15 August warning order 
alerting 100 Brigade for a move to the NEI was rescinded.
At last the time came to fly the main party of the'Control Commission 
and escort into Saigon. The RAF*s 3i+1 and 3l+5 Wings (of 232 Group, 
Transport) provided the Squadrons, which a few days earlier had been
* As Gracey stated after issuing his Proclamation of 19/21 September, 
the Japanese were to be responsible for enforcing it outside the 
key areas.
** Telegram reproduced verbatim.
moved around to their final bases. The troops to fly in (excluding 
the small detachment of 1/19 Hybad which had flown in a week earlier) 
were two companies of 1/1 Gurkha Rifles (GR) and two companies of 1/19 
Hybad, plus 80 Brigade Headquarters, a tactical headquarters, and a 
minimal number of drivers and engineers,
A 1/1 GR newsletter had this to say:
"On the 13th [of August] we had first heard 
of a prospective move of 20 Div. to take 
over a part of Japanese occupied territory.
Great speculation followed, and most of us 
plumped for the Butch East Indies, though it 
was not many weeks before we realized how 
very fortunate we had been to escape going 
there and having a battle with the Indonesian 
Nationalists. We had originally expected to 
move before the end of August, but it was 
not until the 10th September that the first 
contingent of the Bn moved off to HMAWBI 
airfield near RANGOON en route to SAIGON.
Half of the Bn was to move with the Military 
Mission with the special and honourable duty 
of forming the bodyguard of General Gracey, 
the GOC.
The detachment was composed of an advanced 
Bn HQ, administrative details, two pis [platoons] 
each of A and B corp [companies], and one pi each 
of C and B. Thus all corp were represented...
The remainder of the Bn was to move by sea «« 
together with the rest of 100 Bde [Brigade].1’
Gracey might have been expected to take one of the other Gurkha
battalions first, such as the 3/1 Gurkha Rifles, which had been in the
division from the beginning, fought at Imphal and walked down through
Burma. The 1st Gurkhas were relative newcomers to the 20th Bivision,
but they were Gracey's old regiment, so he picked them to be his own
escort. The fly-in began on 11 September, although most of the troops
arrived on 12 September, so as to be in place when the senior officers
(such as General Gracey and Brigadier Maunsell) arrived on the 13th,
The Gurkha advance party was led by Lieutenant Colonel Cyril E. Jarvis,
the battalion commander. On 10 September, 1$1 Gurkhas, including the
battalion headquarters, motored down to Hmawbi. The airfield was in a
chaotic state of bustle, reflecting the fact that major decisions were
still being made, literally at the last moment. It was not until this
* 62 and 19U Squadrons [in 3 M  Wing] at Mingaladon; 96, 117 and 215 
Squadrons [in 3U5 Wing] at Hmawbi; 232 Group, with 9 Squadrons in 
l+ Wings, was operating into 16 bases (and air dropping at 8 others) 
from Saigon to Soerabaja and Chittagong.
date, for example, that the decision was made to substitute the 11i+th
Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, for the 2nd Indian Field Regiment
[making the 111+th the only British troops in French Indochina, apart
from the RAF — - the rest were Indian, Gurkha and French].^ The
decision to limit further Gracey*s area was still two days away. Wrote'
the 1/1 GR recorder, "The complete absence of any administrative
arrangements for reception, which was to be so typical of the next
31few days, was here first a p p a r e n t . A t  0900 on 11 September the
Gurkhas left for Mingaladon,where at 12l*5> they began the journey to
Saigon in 7 sorties, arriving in Bangkok at 1600 hours for an overnight
stop. The Gurkhas were not overly impressed here, either:
"At Bangkok, reception arrangements were less 
than inadequate; no one had heard of the hot 
meals so .facilely promised in Rangoon."
One platoon did not arrive as "it had engine trouble and had
returned spluttering to base." On 12 September the group began the
final leg at 0530, arriving at Tan Son Hhut airfield at 0900, where
they waited for an hour before being driven into Saigon by the Japanese.
The barracks was the Annamite girls school, L*Ecole des Jeunes Filles.
By evening guards were posted on Gracey*s residence, the mission
compound and signal exchange. Arriving with the Gurkhas were two
companies of the Bybads, who immediately took over guard duties at Tan
32Son Nhut airfield, one of the prime VPs. They were deployed along the 
main north-south runway, and at the east end of the field, on which were 
located the administrative, repair and control buildings. The Head­
quarters of 80 Brigade were located in the Japanese Staff Quarters, across 
the street from Headquarters, Southern Area Army (in the southwest of 
Saigon). At 1200 hours on 12 September, the Control Commission closed 
down in Rangoon and simultaneously opened in Saigon.
The RAF, having noted that morale flights over P0W camps had at the 
end met with intense AAA fire, described their arrival in Saigon on 
12 September:
"The outward welcome accorded to the Allied 
Forces from both the French and Annamese 
alike on our entry into French Indochina 
was decidedly embarrassing. Our Forces 
obviously found themselves in a divided 
house." 33
A large crowd of French civilians had gathered at Tan Son Hhut 
to cheer each aircraft of 62 Squadron as it taxied up to its parking 
spot. The RAF reconnaissance parties immediately inspected JAF
A (
installations at Tan Son Hhift, and their verdict was "most disappointing." 
Few aircraft were discovered, and they were all unserviceable. All
serviceable aircraft had been withdrawn to Japan to defend the homeland 
or to Fhu M^ y airfield, twenty miles east of Saigon, at the cessation of 
hostilities.
/
Tan Sdn Nhut was the main engine repair and maintenance base for 
French Indochina, but only 2 engine test benches were found. All sorts 
of equipment were jumbled up, and no detailed records of bench stocks 
or issues were discovered. The RAF expressed surprise that any required 
items could be found. The arms discovered did tally with the Japanese 
lists, but it was emphasized that there was no way to prove that the 
lists were accurate:
"Judging by the aggressive attitude of the 
Annamese towards the French at this period, 
it may well have been that considerable stocks 
of Japanese arms had not been declared." 3U
Also arriving on the 12th were the dozen or so members of the 60U
Field Security Section, a specialized unit detailed to gather intelligence
and track down war criminals; one of their men would be murdered before
long. Gracey then received a message from these first arrivals to say
that all was prepared for his reception, and he and the senior staff
landed with a smaller fly-in on 13 September, touching down at Tan Son
Nhut at 11 0^0 hours. As his Dakota came to a halt in the reception
area, the door was opened and his personal bodyguard of 7 Gurkha soldiers
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scrambled down the steps and fanned out around the aircraft. Gracey 
then stepped out, paused for a second to take in the scene, then walked 
on down to the ramp, followed a step behind by his Control Commission 
Chief of Staff, Brigadier M. S.K. Maunsell. The entire field was strongly 
surrounded by Japanese troops. Across the tarmac were about 8 senior 
Japanese officers, including Lieutenant General Numata and the senior 
officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force; Terauchi was not well enough 
to be on hand. Off to one side was a small group of Annamites; neither 
Gracey nor Maunsell were prepared for their presence. Said Maunsell of 
them, "We didn*t know who they were —  they were just a little group 
which turned out to be the Viet Minh."
The Vi&t Minh started forward, talking, to intercept Gracey, but 
at that moment the Japanese stepped up, saluted and bowed to Gracey, who 
walked past the Viet Minh to the waiting Japanese generals.^ It was 
shortly after this that a Japanese officer, through their "marvelous" 
American Nisei interpretor (who had apparently been caught in Tokyo by 
the Pearl Harbor raid), pointed out the Viet Minh to Gracey.
After the preliminaries were over, Gracey asked to be taken to his 
headquarters. The Viet Minh came forward to speak but Gracey waved them
* They set up headquarters at 12/11+ Rue Colombert.
aside to enter Terauchifs car for the drive into Saigon. The road to
Saigon was lined with Union Jacks and cheering throngs, with most of 
the French population in the streets to greet the senior Allied officers. 
With Gracey and Maunsell seated side by side and two armed Gurkhas in the 
front, they were conveyed to the Mission area in Terauchi's "wonderful" • 
old Chrysler convertible.
Air Commodore (later Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter) Cheshire, 
senior RAF officer on the Commission, recorded his impressions of 
Saigon:^ ®
"It was attractively laid out, with broad tree- 
lined roads and many large houses in well-kept 
gardens. There was also something indefinably 
French about the whole place. Saigon had not 
been much ravaged by war and, compared with Rangoon , 
it presented a superficial air of prosperity."
Of the arrival at Tan Son Nhut:
"At the airfield we were welcomed, among others, 
by Japanese staff officers ready to carry out 
our orders. Waiting also was an assembly of staff 
cars ordered for our use. It was of interest that 
not one of these cars was of Japanese make, all 
had been requisitioned in the early days of the 
occupation either locally, or from as far afield 
as Singapore. At a later date various original 
owners appeared at our H.Q. to claim their cars.
The car allotted to me was driven by a Japanese 
soldier. He was a thrusting driver and firmly 
believed that his passenger's seniority entitled 
him to priority at cross-roads. This was a 
perilous assumption because there were several 
other Japanese drivers with similar ideas about 
the right of way and it needed many alarming 
near-misses to convince ray driver that seniority, 
which could not be determined in time, conferred 
no precedence.
The members of the Mission were not the first 
Allied representatives to reach Saigon following 
the Japanese surrender, as we had been preceeded 
there by RAF Transport Command crews, some Army 
personnel, and a few French representatives."
Concerning the drive into Saigon, Cheshire said:
"Nevertheless, some people turned out to greet, 
us, among them some friendly locals and a few 
rather subdued French. I was surprised to see 
one of the banners of welcome inscribed in Russian.
At that stage I had scarcely heard of Ho Chi Minh, 
and certainly knew nothing of his political 
affiliations, but his influence and its orientation 
soon became apparent."
Cheshire described the mansion in which Gracey, he, Maunsell, Brain 
and other senior Commission members were housed:
"The Senior Officers of the Mission were housed 
in a splendid mansion, formerly the residence 
of the Governor of the Province of Cochin China.
In the turmoil following the surrender this 
building had changed hands more than once and, in 
the process, some of its furniture had disappeared 
with the departing occupantb .* To make up for the 
deficiencies so created some of us had to make do 
with camp beds and their utilitarian appearance 
made a sharp and amusing contrast with the remaining 
interior opulence of the residence.
The building was rat infested, and these unwelcome 
inhabitants made their sorties noisily at night.
When the civil war flared up in earnest and 
marauders were about, it was difficult to determine 
in the dark whether the intruders were rebels or rats."
So ended the beginning of the occupation of Saigon with the troops, 
soon to be disappointed, expecting a pleasant sojourn in the Paris of 
the East. The following are a few typical recollections.
Colonel Jarvis mentally noted that most of the cheering crowds were 
Annamite, who outnumbered the French. He had been one of those hoping to 
go to the Netherlands East Indies because British liberals had for years 
compared British rule in India unfavourably with Butch rule in the NEI, 
so that he was eager to inspect that reputed paradise. All the troops 
expected a largely ceremonial role only, so when Jarvis was asked what 
he wanted from the regimental centre in India he asked for the pipes 
to be sent out to add a little class to the guard mounting. The pipes 
were used for that purpose, and were said to be good for the morale 
of the colons. But what really excited spectators was the order: "For
X x
Inspection —  Draw Kukris!" However, he soon wished that he had 
brought the battalion mortars instead.
Major Peter Prentice, a 20 year old Captain and company commander 
at the time, remembers how poorly armed were the first British/Indian 
troops to arrive in Saigon. The infantry companies brought only small 
arms with them —  rifles and one or two light machine guns, having left 
the medium machine guns and mortars behind. The word had not yet filtered 
down to the soldiers that troubles might await, and the ceremonial role 
was prominent in their planning. The Gurkhas made sure that they arrived 
with white belts and white gaiters to add colour to their honour guard.
* Gracey later ordered the Viet Minh to return the furniture and crockery.
** The distinctive Gurkha weapon, with a large, curved blade somewhat 
bigger than a Bowie knife.
The first few days were indeed all that was expected. The Gurkhas 
made up for their cold meals in Bangkok by benefitting from an 
administrative error in Saigon, for they discovered that their barracks, 
the Annamite girls school, had been prepared to house the Control 
Commission. As the Gurkhas trooped into the building, excellent food 
and delicacies were served to them in the mistaken belief that they were 
members of the Commission staff. The Gurkhas very quickly took advantage 
of this unexpected windfall, and the Control Commission had to do without. 
But the Gurkhas, accustomed to sleeping out in the open during the Burma 
campaigns, could not adjust to the soft beds, and the soldiers took to 
sleeping on the floor beside the beds.
On 12 September a total of 1091 personnel and 26 tons of stores
had been flown in; on 13 September the totals were 211 personnel and 
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11 tons. Thus at the end of his first day in Saigon Gracey had with 
him a total of 1302 men, most of whom were Control Commission Staff, RAF, 
RAPWI, hospital, pay corps, and engineer personnel.
On 11+ September a few more sorties arrived, carrying the 917th Air 
Landing Ground headquarters detachment from Meiktila, plus more flying 
control personnel. The total airlift effort covering the period from
ft
1 to 11+ September resulted in a total of 1181 personnel arriving in Saigon, 
and 9271 POWs evacuated to Bangkok on the return legs.^0 Of the total 
1181 personnel ferried to Saigon, no more than a third were infantry, and 
taking into account duty shift schedules, rest periods, sick calls and 
so on, there were probably no more than a light company of soldiers —  
perhaps a 100 to 120 men or so —  on duty throughout Saigon at any period.
So predominant was the idea of a peaceful role that over a fourth 
of the infantry troop strength —  and perhaps a third ■—  was Immediately 
appropriated by senior officers to fulfil the position of batmen (valets), 
drivers, and so forth. As the chronicler of the 1/1 Gurkhas wrote on 
1U September:
"The only other fighting Imperial troops in SAIGON 
were a Coy of 1/19 Hyderabads & a pi G.R.** So 
tight were the guard duties of the Bn that the 
JAPANESE quarter guard on our own compound remained 
■unrelieved by us for several days. Extra guards
* These were personnel carried by 232 Group; as ALFSEAfS total is 121 
greater, these were obviously ferried in by other units, perhaps 
Special Duty Squadrons.
** Who were temporarily seconded to 1/1 G.R.
were provided for the meeting of the GOC* and 
the local JAPANESE Commander** and the subsequent 
meeting between the Mission and the JAPANESE 
Staff."
On 11+ September, a platoon from B Company, 1/19 Hybads, took
over the Saigon power plant, relieving the Japanese guard. The hotels
Continental and Majestic, which housed most of the Mission staff, were
still guarded by Japanese soldiers. On the morning of 11+ September,
his second day in Saigon, Brigadier Maunsell decided personally to
reconnoiter Saigon and Cholon in order to try to get the feel of the city.
He ordered Terauchi's car to be delivered, and began his tour at 1130.
His driver and an additional bodyguard were both Gunners from his own
artillery regiment, and unlike Gracey (who used only Gurkhas), Maunsell
used British soldiers in these duties.
A Union Jack flew from the car's pennant in accordance with a
decision that only officers of flag rank might do so, a decision later
criticised by the US which claimed that the OSS senior officer would not
have been killed had he been permitted to fly the American flag. [However,
i u1this had no bearing on his death, which will be discussed later J.
Maunsell was, in effect, taking the city's pulse, checking "for
normal traffic control, the state of the shops, the markets, whether
U2
Cholon was active, and so on." ^ He was out for an hour, and found that 
Saigon appeared to be fairly quiet, and half under control of the Japanese 
"who only acted when they felt like it." The Viet Minh claim to control 
the city "was a laugh" —  they had no. control, and the one or two traffic 
policemen on duty were Frenchmen. The shops were open, and Maunsell 
particularly recalled the "absolutely marvellous" flower market, something 
he had not seen for five years. In short, Saigon seemed to be a sort 
of municipal illustration of Newton's law of motion —  daily life was 
going on regardless of what was happening at the top. At that moment 
there was no sign that Saigon was not a "completely and utterly quiescent 
city." Maunsell, who was accompanied by the Senior Commission intelligence 
office, reported back to Gracey that if there was underlying dissent it 
was extremely difficult to recognize.
That afternoon C&lile arrived at Mission headquarters for a long 
talk with Gracey and Maunsell. C£dile was described as "an awfully nice, 
charming, liberal-minded - a scholastic man rather than military." He 
was doing an extremely difficult job in waiting for Leclerc, who was "an 
explosion" in himself. Cedile knew Leclerc, and did not wish to aggravate 
the situation by committing Leclerc to policies which might later have
* General Officer Commanding [General Gracey].
** Field Marshal Terauchi.
to be disavowed. He was in a position familiar to officers in every 
generation, of having responsibility but not authority.
C^dile at the time looked older than his years —  short dark hair, 
round full face, jowled —  "a sad man, and a very nice man." He 
occasionally "let his hair down" with the British, and entertained 
supreme contempt for most of the French in Indochina; they were 
considered the collaborators with the Japanese, disloyal and active 
resisters to Free France. It now struck Gracey and Maunsell that they 
might well have serious difficulties with the French as well. But 
during these early days the French information was basically valuable.
Scarcely had they arrived in Saigon when the British began to receive 
from the colons invitations to parties and dinners, but these were not 
accepted until very much later.
On 15 September the Commission distributed leaflets throughout 
Saigon and Cholon, telling the population that the British/lndian troops 
had certain tasks to perform and that the populace must maintain "the 
strictest order and discipline" during this period. Another leaflet 
announced that "In certain areas Europeans have been attacked, killed, 
and wounded, by extremist elements of the population." The peace and 
prosperity desired by all "can only be prejudiced by these outrages 
committed by irresponsibles." The message concluded:
"Be warned that such criminals will be tracked 
down and punished. All personB found guilty 
of promoting civil disorder will be severely 
dealt with".U3
The leaflets were prepared by the "Forward Base, Psychological Warfare 
Division, SEAC."
September 15 saw a slowdown in the air operation to Tan Son Nhut; 
no British troop reinforcements arrived on this day. However, one of 
the important (if less glamorous) units landed in Saigon, namely the 
advance party of No.23 Anti-Malarial Control Unit. It's members 
immediately began checking mosquito types and sprayed the primary areas 
at Tan Sdn Nhut and transient aircraft. From mid-September on, when its 
commander was released and returned to the U.K., this forgotten unit 
simply carried on without one, for nobody bothered to replace him. The 
unit's log pointed this out just "for information" only.
At this time, back in Burma, the first of the 20th Indian Division's 
vehicle convoys, including the guns and transport of the Hl+th Field 
Regiment, began rolling down to Rangoon.
Even at this early date the activities of the OSS detachment were 
so blatantly subversive to the Allied command that within 1+8 hours of
his arrival Gracey felt compelled to summon its chief, Lieutenant 
Colonel Peter Dewey, to appear before him. Dewey's actions were both 
conspicuous and seemingly pointless, so that the reasons for them 
remain a mystery. The small OSS team was in Saigon because the 
occupation was an Allied effort, and it had only two relatively straight­
forward tasks: "One, to watch over American interests, including POW
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property. Two, to assist British Counter-Intelligence Staff." The
latter directive was concerned largely with the compilation of information
on war criminals. Dewey, however, did not confine himself to his
directives, but spent a great deal of his time flitting furtively in and
out of obscure alleys and remote cafes in his dealings with the Communists
and the Viet Minh. But, as Messmer pointed out, it is very difficult for
a caucasion to flit furtively anywhere in the Far East, and Dewey's
activities were recorded, step by step, by almost everyone —  the Japanese,
the Vietnamese, the French and the British intelligence personnel. In the
event, his machinations did no great harm to the Allies, being more of
nuisance value —  he was, however a danger to himself and his group, and
despite repeated warnings from the British at all levels down to that of
an infantry company commander, he consistently refused either to cooperate
with the Allies or, indeed, to associate himself with them in any way.
Dewey deliberately maintained his villa and office outside the British
area, and rejected all suggestions that he was at risk out there. The
whole episode would have assumed no importance had he not been tragically
and needlessly murdered at the hands of Viet Minh assassins. More will
be said of this later.
Warned by Gracey on 15 September to confine himself to his assigned 
tasks, Dewey complained to his headquarters in Ceylon:
"At General Gracey®a request I must discontinue 
assistance to managers [of] American interests, 
collection of documents, and war crimes investigation, 
until directive for this work and presence embankment . ^  
is clarified. There is no other US authority in Saigon."
The Headquarters SEAC Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Browning, 
asked Gracey about the difficulties with the OSS, which."has two functions, 
both under your coordination."
In his report to the Foreign Office in London, Dening commented on 
the displeasure occasioned at all levels by the OSS activities. He 
reported that General Gracey was not satisfied with .OSS actions in his 
area.^ Lieutenant Colonel Peter Dewey had appeared and informed Gracey
* Italics added.
that he was charged with Consular duties, but his claim carried no 
conviction. Gracey had been informed by the Chiefs of Staff that the 
only tasks permitted OSS by SACSEA. were the repatriation of POWs and 
internees of special interest to them, the procurement of information
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on war criminals, and the protection of American property. If the 
US Government had wanted a uniformed officer to discharge consular
duties, wrote Dening, then it should first have approached the Supreme
Allied Commander.
"I am afraid that what lies at the root of the
matter is that OSS applies to go to places to
fulfil one or more stated purposes only to 
engage in other activities which they do not 
disclose, which makes a very bad impression.
There is nothing very sinister in undertaking 
Consular functions but there is no reason why 
Supreme Commander should not be consulted in 
the first instance." 1+8
Governor C^dile also remembers Deweyf s entrance to Saigon. He had 
first met Dewey while C^dile was serving on the headquarters staff in 
Libya; Dewey had been assigned there because he spoke French, but there 
was never any friendship between the . two men. C£dilefs comments on 
Dewey typify the attitude towards the two OSS heads of mission, Patti 
in the north and Dewey in the south, of all who had any dealings with 
them, namely strong personal dislike. The British senior officer in 
Hanoi described Patti as "an awful man," and Dewey in Saigon was remembered 
as "not at all a nice man," and "a very unattractive man —  not a man 
many people liked," "an unpleasant man," and several opined that they were 
scarcely better liked by their own colleagues. It has been said that such 
interest as was evinced in Dewey derived from the fact that he was the 
nephew of New York Governor Thomas E.Dewey.
The Americans in Saigon deliberately shunned the society of both 
French and British, and even boycotted the Cercle Sportif, which can 
scarcely have helped them in their task of information gathering.
On learning one day that an American plane was about to deposit a
passenger in Saigon, C^dile ordered the new arrival to be detained. He
was Colonel Dewey and he freely admitted his OSS mission, saying "of
U9course he knew we were on the same side." Recalling the meeting,
Cedile said, "I reproached him for not informing us of his coming and 
told him 'We could easily have shot you.’ I told him, after all, at that 
time we were all a little bit trigger-happy."
Cedile then asked Dewey, "Why didn*t you tell us you were coming?"
Dewey replied that he had come by himself, "without any troops, without
anybody else", just to look around a bit, and he did not intend to
see anyone in particular [which, in Mingant*s case at least, was not
entirely true]. C^dile released him, and later recalled, "Of course,
all this didn*t last very long. I was told several times after that
he had been seen here and there, and he was killed very soon after.
We never found him, and never knew quite how it was that he was killed,
but presume it must have been the Vi£t Minh, for no French soldier
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would have shot an American officer."
Colonel (then Captain) Marcel Mingant of the French colonial forces 
was in Saigon during August. Having been a captive of the Japanese since 
March, he was in the hospital when Dewey reached Saigon. His name had 
apparently been given to Dewey by OSS headquarters in China, and Dewey 
sought him out. Mingant left the hospital temporarily to meet Dewey 
at the Continental Palace hotel, where they talked about the general 
situation for a while, after which Dewey asked if he might meet Mingant 
again in 8 days, as he had business in the countryside at that time. 
Mingant warned him against travelling in certain areas, but Dewey replied, 
as he did repeatedly in Saigon, that his American nationality would 
protect him. When Mingant returned to keep the rendezvous he learned that 
Dewey had been murdered.
Meanwhile, Saigon was the scene of continuing isolated murders, 
usually in areas far from the scattered presence of Graceyfs small force. 
On 16 September the Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces South East 
Asia, General Slim, arrived in Saigon to make a personal assessment of 
the situation. A guard of honour was provided for him by 1/1 GR*s B 
Company.
Slim immediately recognized the virtual impossibility of Gracey*s
task, and took back with him the strongest recommendation to Mountbatten
that the rest of Gracey*s division should be sent to him as quickly as
possible. [Gracey was not only short of troops; on this date he sent out
an urgent plea to SEAC for additional typists and clerical staff, for his
officers were becoming bogged down by bureaucratic congestion.] Slim
further reported that, the British troops in Saigon were, in effect,
confined to barracks by the unfavourable fiscal rate of exchange which
placed local prices beyond their reach. One piaster exchanged officially
for 1 shilling, though its true value amounted to only two pence, and
51pressure was applied to the French to make up the difference. Note 
circulation had increased ten-fold over the 1939 figure, as had the prices 
of gold and silver. By 19i+U the wholesale food prices had increased to 
the following levels: rice, meat and fish had doubled, tobacco had
increased six-fold, cooking oil had tripled, and sugar had increased 
between four and five-fold. ^  On the 16th also, 2/8 Pun jab* s "A"
Company (80 Brigade *s defence company) flew into Saigon as 1/1 Gurkha 
Rifles took over the task of guarding a Japanese arms dump on the Quai 
de l*Argonne; they were in turn relieved during the night by French 
troops.
On 17 September, after h full working days in Saigon, Gracey 
submitted a report to Browning which described the routine established 
so far. The normal workday was divided into tasks under 3 headings: 
scrutiny of documents submitted by the Japanese, conferences and staff 
meetings to implement the tasks in Gracey*s directive, and internal 
administration of the Commission [to which was added the administration 
of British forces in Saigon, since 20 Division*s headquarters had not 
yet arrived] *
On 17 September, too, Gracey held his first plenary meeting with 
Field Marshal Count Terauchi, the Japanese Commander in Chief, though 
Maunsell had earlier been sent by Gracey to visit him. On that occasion 
Maunsell had instructed Terauchi to order the Japanese to acknowledge 
British orders immediately, and informed him that he would be held 
personally responsible for this. It was a "fairly typical set of 
instructions from victor to vanquished.
Terauchi lived not far from Japanese Headquarters, in the southwest
51iof Saigon, in a residence described as a "fairly scruffy little house." 
Terauchi was waiting at the top of the steps as Maunsell drove up.
Maunsell himself recalled that his first shock came when he noticed that 
Terauchi did not really look like a "typical" Japanese. He was completely 
white-haired and "looked like any old countryman of any nation —  rosy- 
cheeked. " Maunsell walked up the stairs with Terauchi leading the way.
It was Terauchi *s first meeting with the British.
In the prominent hall of the house stood a table with four chairs, 
and Maunsell *s next shock came when he saw that on the table were six 
glasses and a bottle of "Dimple" Haig Scotch whisky, a brand Maunsell 
had not seen since 19^0. A third shock arose from the discovery that 
Terauchi had several cases of it downstairs.
Maunsell sat down as he had been briefed to do, and said to Terauchi 
who dragged one leg slightly as a result of a stroke but still had most of 
his mental faculties: "Because of your age and your infirmity you may be 
seated." Terauchi replied, "I will never be seated in the face of a 
representative of my conqueror." Maunsell responded, "As you wish."
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The Nisei interpreter then read out each paragraph of the instructions
while the old man stood there, his head bowed* and said that he would
ensure that these were carried out as the Supreme Allied Commander wished.
He then asked, "May I say something?" To Maunsell*s affirmative reply
Terauchi said, "Tomorrow is the anniversary of the death of the Emperor
Meiji." Maunsell, who had never heard of Meiji, later discovered that
this was the emperor who decided that Japan should be Westernized.
Terauchi continued, "I was brought up the son of the Japanese Ambassador
to the Court of Saint James." He then burst into tears, which streamed
down his face, and in a scene of dramatic pathos, struggled to finish.
"I fought for an understanding between my country and yours until the
outbreak of hostilities, and no shame can be greater than mine than I
am the leader of a vanquished army in the face of my conqueror, Admiral 
*•*
Mountbatten." It was Maunsell*s opinion, that Terauchi was fast approaching 
senility, and though he did his best to carry out the instructions, he 
was continually undermined by his intelligence and Kempei Tei staff, 
who created great problems with their anti-British and anti-French activities. 
Maunsell had believed that the Japanese could be controlled by very 
stringent orders, but later found that the British had underestimated the 
large number of Japanese who were collaborating with the Viet Minh. It 
was not forgotten that Terauchi had been accused of encouraging the harsh 
treatment of captives and had provided the aircraft in which Chandra Bose 
had attempted his escape to Manchuria.
When Terauchi came face to face with Gracey, it was again emphasized 
to him that he was personally held responsible for Japanese activities. 
Terauchi finished by asking about the ceremony in which he was to hand 
over his sword. He asked Gracey to tell Mountbatten that he wanted to 
hand over his special sword, which was in Tokyo, and not his "comparatively 
rough and everyday sword," and expressed regret at being unable to go to 
Singapore to sign the instrument of surrender himself.
At this time Gracey told Mountbatten that it was essential to occupy 
Thu Dau Mot - Bien Hoa - Lai Thilu area north of Saigon, in which the 
main body of Japanese forces would initially be concentrated. Gracey 
said he fully understood the "position vis a vis the French Administration." 
Slim approved this proposal but Gracey was not permitted to carry it out 
at that time.
* The scene was repeated later in Mountbatten*s presence.
** Said to Mountbatten; to Maunsell on the first occasion, the words 
"Admiral Mountbatten" were omitted.
As Gracey vras talking to Terauchi, leaflets were being distributed 
throughout Saigon stating that the British Commission would leave this 
area as soon as the object of disarming the Japanese had been achieved.
On 17 September, 20 Indian Division Operational Directive No.1,
*
"The Occupation of French Indo-China," was published. This was the 
document which conveyed to the company commanders the tasks they would 
carry out, and it embodied the main points of the governing directives 
previously published. It began by stating a fact: "The political situation 
within FRENCH INDO-CHINA is still obscure,"^ and then proceeded to assess 
that situation in the light of what was known:
"As far as our information goes at present, it 
appears that there is a revolutionary-cum- 
nationalist movement called the ‘VTET MB®*, 
which is causing trouble. This party is 
reliably reported to be in possession of plenty 
of arms. It is Anti-French and as we are going 
to INDO-CHINA to take over the country on behalf 
of the French, we may expect it to be equally 
Anti-British."
The troops were warned:
"It is NOT our intention to become involved 
in politics, in fact we must NOT do so. Our 
sole job in this connection is the maintenance 
of LAV and ORDER. But in order to carry out 
this task it is necessary for Comds** to keep 
abreast of political happenings."
Under duties connected with the maintenance of public order, two 
kinds of bodies were mentioned as deserving special attention: "(a) Armed 
bands of revolutionaries, bandits, etc.; (b) Mobs intent on rioting, looting 
or killing French Civil Officials, etc. These will be treated as enemies 
and the minimum ruthless force necessary... will be used to suppress them."
Mobs and civil disturbances were to be treated with the "normal ‘Internal 
Security‘ principles." Commanders were "reminded that in dealing with 
hostile mobs, troops must NOT be used as police." The principles were 
repeated:
"Charging a hostile crowd with pick halves or 
rifle butts has been proved to be useless.
Actual physical contact with the crowd must 
be avoided.
Exactly the same principles as have always 
been used in peace for dispersing hostile 
crowds will be used, i.e. Draw the attention 
of the crowd to the fact that if they do not 
disperse, the troops will open fire. If it 
is necessary to open fire, then only the 
minimum force necessary will be used trying at 
first to obtain one's object by shooting the 
ringleaders." 57
*1 Appendix J.
** Commanders
A curfew was in force from 2130 to 0530 hours, which applied 
to the British force except for soldiers on duty. All ranks would 
at all times carry their personal weapons, including bayonets. "Parties 
leaving unit lines or barracks areas must not be less than three in 
number. This refers equally to officers who must always be accompanied
by their personal escort who should walk some paces in rear to guard
against attack from behind... Until we hear to the contrary we must 
guard against the possible terrorist, or fanatical nationalist, endeavouring 
to assassinate officers."
After dealing with general principles on the procedures to be used 
in relieving Japanese guards, the directive left no doubt as to what 
was expected of the British/Indian soldiers. All troops would at all 
times be "spotlessly turned out", would always walk about at a smart 
soldierly pace, and saluting would be perfect.
"If two or more men are walking together they
must come up to the salute and down from the
salute at the same time. As representatives 
of the British Imperial Forces we have a big 
responsibility and we will continuously and 
at all times be watched by the critical eyes 
of many different nationalities. Unit Quarter 
Guards... must be placed in a conspicuous 
place where the populous can see them and the 
more ‘spit and polish1 there is about the 
Guard area the better. When we land... ensure 
that the marching is faultless, that the troops 
swing their arms, look up and throw out their 
chests. They know that they are better than 
anyone else there —  let them show it."
The directive was signed by Brigadier Rodham as officiating 
Commander of 20th Indian Division, since General Gracey was in Saigon.
And on this date, as on the 16th, the 1st Gurkhas took over another arms 
storage area from the Japanese, to be again relieved in turn by the French. 
This was the pattern until the British left Indochina, for the Japanese 
would not cooperate directly with the French. This particular supply 
of arms was located across the street from the' Garde Civile, just west 
of the Botanical Gardens. So by the 17th the French were solely 
responsible for guarding two substantial arms storage areas, and had 
begun the process of rearming the ex-POWs of the colonial forces.
On 17 September there occurred the incident which probably did as 
much as anything to persuade Gracey to act against the Communist-led 
Committee for the South. Until then Gracey had been fully occupied with 
his efforts to control the 70,000 heavily armed Japanese with his few 
hundred soldiers, and he remained powerless to stop the growing anarchy 
in a city which, by Allied direction, was his personal responsibility.
Japanese intelligence staff were actively opposing him and abetting
the Viet Minh, the French appeared to be about to confront him with a 
further problem and, to add to his existing worries, the Vi£t Minh 
now decided to call a general strike. Their decision proved to be a 
miscalculation of some magnitude, for up to that moment Gracey simply 
had not had time to notice the Viet Minh, let alone take any steps 
against them, [although he probably would have had to do something 
about them sooner or later]. By putting the city at peril they forced 
him to drop everything and to concentrate all his attention on them.
It was the first of many serious miscalculations for which the Viet 
Minh leader, Treln Vdn Gi&i, was eventually removed from office by the 
Central Committee in Hanoi.
The ensuing situation was described in part by F.S.V. Donnison 
in the official history:
" On the 17th September the Viet Minh leaders gave 
wide publicity to the establishment of the 
Independent Republic of Viet Nam, and the claim 
of the Republic to administer the whole of the 
territories of Tongking, Annam, and Cochin China.
In fact, however, the republic had at this time 
little or no authority and there was no effective 
civil administration, and no maintenance of order 
whatsoever. Looting and attacks upon the French 
were common. Vituperative and provocative broad­
casts and press articles against them poured out 
from Hanoi, the headquarters of the Republic of 
Viet Nam, and also from Saigon. Nor could the 
Republic, whose government was Communist in 
character, count upon the mass of the Annamite 
people for these, nationalists though they might 
be, were by no means all supporters of Communism." ^
And commenting on Gracey*s problems:
"It was in any case some time before these 
[Civil Affairs Staff] officers arrived to take 
up their duties. No financial adviser was posted 
to the Commission or to the headquarters of the 
Allied Commander in Indo-China and no political 
adviser became available until some ten days after 
the arrival of General Gracey." 60
On this day the Viet Minh called a general strike, .ordering all
Vietnamese to leave French employ and ordering markets to be closed to
the French from the following day. SEAC radio monitoring services had
intercepted an English-language broadcast from Saigon Radio which described
three ways that the Viet Minh could oppose the French reoccupation. They
could engage in, "(a) active resistance, (b) boycotting the French
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population, (c) a general strike." The last two measures were now in
effect. The Viet Minh attitude at this early stage was already 
inflexible: "They feel that any compromise now would be a defeat...."
Later that night, at 2230 hours on 17 September, 15 armed Viet Minh 
police tried to enter the power house, but were turned away without 
incident by the 1/19 Bybad platoon leader, Havildar Kan Singh.
On 18 September an advance party from 3/1 Gurkha Rifles flew 
into Saigon as a Frenchman was murdered by 3 Annamites about two blocks 
east of the race course. Two of the murderers were arrested, and a mob
howling down Rue Taberd, behind the Governor Generalfs Palace, was
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dispersed by Dutch ex-POWs,
At noon on 18 September, the labourers in the power house stopped 
work for two hours, saying that they were afraid of being beaten by the 
Viet Minh for possessing French passes. They were then offered British 
passes, but were still afraid of retribution. The matter was resolved 
and protection guaranteed after a meeting between the manager and the 
leader of the workers. Shortly afterwards the news was received of the 
suicide of Numata*s Deputy Chief of Staff, who had been cooperating with 
the Allies. On hearing this, the SEAC Director of Intelligence, Major 
General Penney, remarked, "Unfortunately, the less cooperative members 
have not yet committed suicide."
To complete the picture of the first five days, a hospital was
established by 18 September. The medical representative on the advance
party, Lieutenant Colonel Adams, RAMC (who later commanded the i+2nd
Indian Field Ambulance Unit) had arrived in Saigon on 6 September. He
had been busy prior to the arrival of the Mission, earmarking buildings
for future hospital sites. As for those being used by the Japanese for
hospitals, "Orders were passed for their evacuation, cleaning, and overhaul
63
of the water, lighting and sanitary systems." J The report continued:
"The 7 Jap hospitals in Saigon were inspected and 
priority for their evacuation arranged. It was 
decided that the 2 largest could remain holding 
the more serious cases, for at least a month, after 
which there would be only 1 large Jap hosptial in 
Saigon. The Japs were also ordered to produce I4OO 
beds and mattresses."
The original plan had called for all of 55 Field Ambulance and 
2k CCS to be flown in during the initial stages, but "owing to the bad 
weather, shortage of aircraft, and the absolute necessity for getting 
in more fighting troops the plan was changed." The medical fly-in was 
temporarily held up and "the small hospital Lt Col Cockbum had with him 
had to provide all medical cover." As RAFWI commitments were lighter 
than estimated and casualties few, there were no problems. The Medical
History traced the founding of the first hospital:
"They [Lt.Col.Cockburn*s staff] set up an 
MI Room on the air. strip and the MDS and its 
attached units moved into L*Ecole Superieur 
Des Jeunes Filles in Rue MacMahon (afterwards 
renamed Rue General de Gaulle) on 18 Sep, and 
became the first British hospital in Saigon.
The school became its permanent residence in 
Saigon." 6k
With the Commission came the medical administrative organization, 
under Colonel G.B.Jackson of the Indian Army Medical Corps, a surgical 
team, a Field Hygiene Section, Anti-Malaria Unit, and the 20th Indian 
Division Psychiatrist (Major J.W. Miller, of the Royal Army Medical Corps).
On 18 September the airport and the port of Saigon took on an even 
greater importance, now that the Viet Minh were attempting to strangle 
the city. The senior officer, a brigadier, in charge of movements 
and transportation wrote:
"The local political situation is of interest 
as it may become a factor affecting work in 
the port. At the present public, services 
appear to be in the hands of the Viet Nam 
party, a puppet government established by the 
Japanese." 65
The report stated that the party demanded independence and was 
"violently anti-French". With Cedilels approval, a meeting was held 
between the brigadier, the Royal Navy Commander and Viet Minh party 
officials. The Viet Minh leader said that he was willing to restore all 
port facilities and operate under British direction alone. A Port 
Sub-Committee was formed, which included two Viet Minh officials, and 
the plan worked. The British senior officer reported:
"If promises are kept,.the civil [Vietnamese] 
authorities will be responsible for such matters 
as labour, lighting, cranes, machinery and pilots.
Detailed planning has started and at the present 
time there seems a reasonable hope of success but 
the situation may well become complicated when 
French civilian authorities become available to 
take over if they desire to do."66
The narrative should, perhaps, be interrupted at this juncture by 
a brief comment on the development in the docks. The British were 
perfectly content to collaborate with the Vi8t Minh provided that common 
goals were met, and entertained no particular preference for the French, 
whose arrival, everyone knew, would see the start of unwanted trouble.
But although these local accommodations with the Viet Minh were made,
they contravened the Allied charter which forbade official contacts 
with groups such as the Viet Minh —  it was expressly laid down that 
all civil administration was to be French only. Yet decades later, 
when the British officers [from Chief of Staff level to infantry 
company commander] had retired from active service, not one officer 
interviewed expressed any anti-Viet Minh or pro-French sentiments.
In fact, the reverse was true, for most had favoured Vietnamese 
independence. Even when the British/Indian troops were fighting the 
Viet Minh, the feeling was more of compassion, and of professionals 
doing a job, than of dislike. As Major C.U. Blascheck, commanding 
D company, 3/1 GR, said later:
"We had no antagonism towards the Viet Minh 
on our arrival. We knew that independence 
was coming for India, and thought that the 
Vietnamese should also have their independence —  
and we were all largely sympathetic to them."
The genuine anger occurred in isolated cases of torture and 
mutilation of Indian soldiers or where cases of mutilation of French 
women and children were found.
Meanwhile, the fly-in continued intermittently as the atrocious
weather conditions allowed. Crews were briefed on the following
information before departing for Saigon. After leaving the aircraft 
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at Tan Seta Nhiit they were to walk over to the canteen adjacent to the 
parking strip where they would be briefed on the local situation, after 
which they would be transported to their transient quarters on the field. 
Liberty buses would take them into Saigon as needed, to return by 2130 
hours before the curfew commenced; the return journey starting at 2100 
hours from the Continental Palace Hotel, The aircrew briefing notes 
continued urgently: "Crews should take care over the local liquor." There 
was an excellent light beer available, "but there are a number of very 
pleasant aperatifs, notably amongst them being a white liquid called Anise 
which has a delayed action with disastrous effects on those not used to 
it.-6?
On 18 September, in view of the deteriorating local situation, 1/1 
GR relieved the Japanese guarding the Majestic and Continental Hotels 
(where most of the Mission staff lived). By the afternoon of the 18th, 
General Gracey and the Control Commission had spent five full days in 
Saigon. For historical interest it may be useful to describe these first 
days as the British recorded them at that time. The narrative will be 
resumed with the "controversial" Proclamation No.1 of 19/21 September.
First, the background as set down by General Gracey*s own hand.
On 3 October 19 4^-6 Gracey, now a Lieutenant General and busily engaged 
in building the Pakistan Army, responded to the official South East
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Asia Command (i.e. Mountbatten*s) version of the occupation of Saigon.
It was already clear at this early stage that he took strong exception 
to the report, which appeared to hold him responsible for every difficult 
situation and praise Mount bat ten for every success. This official 
report possibly formed the basis for Mountbatten * s Section "E" report 
to the Combined Chiefs, which has been used by historians ever since in 
writing of these events. Up to now, Gracey*s rebuttals have remained 
unknown, and these will be introduced where appropriate throughout this 
history.
Gracey, not a man to go to the block quietly, begins his rebuttal:
1. The chapter on F.I.C. gives a false impression of the
situation and of events. There are many inaccuracies 
and chronology is incorrect. Before setting down 
detailed comments and criticisms, I therefore give an 
account of what in fact occurred. This, especially 
as regardB dates, should be checked by Brigadier 
MAUNSELL.
2. The Storv.
Shortly after V.J. day General GRACEY was summoned to KANDY, 
where the situation was discussed in conference with S.A.C. 
and General SLIM and their Staffs. Two directives were 
issued, one by S.E.A.C., dealing with the evacuation of 
prisoners of war, the control of the Japanese Southern 
Army H.Q., located at SAIGON, and the disarmament and 
concentration of Japanese -forces in Southern F.I.C., 
and the other by A.L.F.S.E.A., dealing with the action 
of the troops to carry out the above. This latter 
specifically stated that General GRACEY was to keep 
law and order in F.I.C. south of the 16 degrees parallel.
He was to command all the Allied troops in F.I.C. and 
he was given to understand that he would have the whole 
of his 20th Division to carry out his tasks, in addition 
to many other technical, medical and welfare units.
The whole build up of the Force was based, in fact, on 
the whole of the Division being sent.
Commenting on his pre-departure knowledge of the Saigon 
situation, Gracey stated:
3. It was known at the time that an Annamite government 
was in power, put there hy the Japanese [Gracey also 
knew that it was communist led], that French troops 
were in various prisoner of war camps, and French 
civilians either interned or under very close 
surveillance in various groups in the country, the 
great majority being in SAIGON, 
k» During the first ten days of September, the Allied
Control Commission H.Q. was formed in RANGOON, during 
which time the Chief of Staff of F.M. Count TERAUCHI, 
with various naval and military staff officers, was 
summoned to a conference.
At this conference, the Japanese commander was ordered 
to maintain law and order, to ensure the safety of all 
French and other nationals, to stop handing over arms 
to the Annamite forces, and not to recognize the 
Annamite government, which, in accordance with general 
Allied policy, being a Japanese sponsored government, 
was not recognized by the Allies.
Gracey then traced the evidence of anarchy in Saigon:
It was evident at the time that the situation was 
very tense in F.I.C., particularly in SAIGON, and 
that the Annamite and communist Chinese press was 
inciting the Annamite troops, police and government 
supporters to acts of violence against all other 
nationalities who did not support the puppet government, 
particularly against the many French people and loyal 
Annamites.
6. A serious riot, in which several French civilians were
killed by Annamite police and armed forces, took place
on September 2nd, and was only stopped from assuming
very serious proportions by the very courageous action
of various released British and Australian prisoners
of war who were unarmed, and the few R.A.P.W. I, officers
*
who had already been flown in. Later, Japanese officers 
took firmer hold. As it was, numerous acts of barbarity 
and much looting took place by Annamite police and
* Apparently surreptitiously, for no documentation was found for this
during the research for this study. Terauchi, on % September, did report 
negotiating with a Major Pias about the condition of the POVs.
hooligans, including man-handling of French women.
In the outlying districts, similar demonstrations, 
accompanied by unpleasant incidents, took place.
It was clear that the Annamite puppet government, 
vociferous on paper as regards democratic and 
even communistic plans for the future, was quite 
incapable of keeping law and order. It was also 
clear that there was a very large hooligan element 
out to make mischief, many of whom were criminals 
of the worst type, who had been let out of jail 
in March 19Uf>» and many of whom were in possession 
of arms. It later became clear that this criminal 
element largely composed the Annamite government 
army.
Mountbatten, in his Section E report, states that RAPWI officers, 
introduced earlier, had helped to contain the riot of 2 September.
The next report of importance was the Political Report of the Saigon 
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Control Commission, x the object of which was "to record the political 
history of SAIGON area since the Saigon Control Commission arrived in 
SAIGON." The report was divided into three phases; Phase 1 covered 
13 to 23 September, Phase 2 from 23 September to 1 October, and Phase 3 
from 1 to 8 October. The first part stated;
2. On arrival on 13th September, 19i+5> the Commission 
found that a Government was installed in the HOTEL 
m  VILLE in SAIGON; this was an ANNAMITE government 
calling itself the HEAT) OF THE SOUTHERN REPUBLIC OF 
THE VIET NAM.
3. The head of this VIET MINH government, for that is
the name of the political party concerned, Is at HANOI; 
the government at SAIGON was a subsidiary entirely 
controlled by HANOI.
After tracing the inefficiency and loose control of the Viet Minh, 
and the mob violence and reprisals, the report continued:
(a) an ANNAMITE government ruled in SAIGON, as a 
subsidiary to the main, central, government at 
HANOI: this government had been installed with 
full acquiescence and assistance from the Japanese 
Forces.
(b) No proper law and order was enforced and the republic 
of southern VIET NAM was without legal writ.
Anti-French, and, to a lesser extent, anti 
European sentiments were frequently demonstrated 
by ANNAMITES both physically and very much more 
strongly and more frequently in the daily press. 
Administrative services were at a standstill 
except for a minimum of the essential services 
of SAIGON and CHOLON.
Many of the more temperate ANNAMITES were too 
frightened to carry on with any of their normal 
business routine where it involved trade or contact 
with French nationals, having constant fear of 
reprisals from armed extremist elements of the 
ANNAMITES,-
The "History of 20th Indian Division [The Post War Period, Part 
I - Burma]", recorded the role of the division as follows. It recorded 
the tasks assigned to the division commander, and commented.
"... the administration of the SAIG0N/CH0L0N area 
during the early stages of the occupation had to be 
undertaken in the absence of any effective local 
government. In fact, the maintenance of essential 
services, and food control in the city remained a 
responsibility of the British forces for the greater 
part of their stay in F.I.C....
There was at this time no proof of TOKTO's ability 
to enforce the cease fire amongst its far flung armies 
and it was, therefore, necessary to plan the move of 
the Division to French Indo- China as an operation of 
war. The planning stage produced more than the usual 
number of headaches for the Divisional Staff, due 
mainly to a rapidly changing order of battle for F.I.C., 
and the detailed planning required to ensure that all 
the numerous non div units which were scattered all 
over S.E.A.C. did eventually arrive at their destination."
Brigadier Taunton, Commander of 80 Indian Infantry Brigade,
70
submitted a report to General Gracey on 1i4. November 19U5. The object 
of the report "is to trace accurately the build up of 80 Bde."
Wrote Taunton:
2. I take phases already shown in the Political History 
and show what troops were available in SAIGON: how 
and why they were employed and make comments on 
each phase. The comments are entirely my own personal
(c)
(d)
(e)
opinion.
3. It should be remembered that the original
programme aimed that the complete Bde group
*
with its Bde HQ, three bns, Fd amb, minimum 
essential ancillary services and one bn of 
100 Bde should arrive in SAIGON between 13 
and 22 Sep
U* This program broke down utterly for two 
main reasons :-
(a) Bad weather*
(b) Maintenance of aircraft and supply of POL.
A third reason affected the fly-in later, and
that was the question of more ammunition and 
some 3” mortars. Events made it necessary
to have both, because we had aimed at getting 
in bodies, with only a reasonably safe margin 
of small arms ammunition reserve and had not 
flown in 3" mortars.
5* In fact 80 Bde did not complete its concentration 
in SAIGON until 29 Sep and even then 1/1 GR were 
still short of one coy.
Taunton recorded that by 13 September the troops available to 
him were "the equivalent of a composite bn less its HQ and Adm Coy
but with a very reduced and improvised scale of Jap tpt" [transport].
Commenting on the period from 11}. to 17 September, Taunton wrote that 
there was no further fly-in until 18 September (due to bad weather). 
"This was unfortunate for by 16 Sep I should have had the following 
tps in SAIGON:- 1 Bybad, complete; Bde HQ, complete; an ADS; a large 
det 20 Div Sig[nal]s."
Taunton continued the sequence of events:
2. It was at once apparent that the most important 
Vital Points must be taken over as soon as 
possible. With no knowledge of when or what the 
fly-in would produce, commonsense decided that 
the 1/1 GR should be used in SAIGON. It would 
be simple for them to operate there as the 
Mission was in SAIGON, [and] that 1 Hybad should 
be used in CHOLON and/or suburbs of SAIGON.
* Field ambulance.
Although there were some 2000 ex-PW in SAIGON 
they were as yet unarmed and badly in need of 
training.
Important Vital Points were taken over as under:- 
On 11 and 1ii Sen- Two pis 1 Bybad. Vital Points 
in TAN SON NOT [sic] airfd.
NOTE:- This was vital to us for all 
sups and tps from BURMA until 
first elements 20 Div could 
arrive by sea ETA 10 Oct 1*5.
One pi - the Power House CH0L0N.
This one power house worked the 
complete water and electric light 
systems in SAIGON and CH0L0N. It 
also worked the electric light for 
THOMUMOT-LAITHiE'U-BIENHOA etc.
On 16 and 17 Sen - Two large dumps containing 
arms, amn, and some equipment were
taken over from the Japs. Within
12 hrs these were handed over in toto 
to the French under Lt.-Col. Rivier.
Comments on neriod 1k to 17 Sen k5.
1. It is important to grasp a true outlook of
conditions and get a fast impression of topography.
This can only be done by the Comd with a Staff offr 
and a good 10; an adv party of Sigs and a pi for 
immediate protection being flown in before all others.
Only an adv party of this type can assure the best possible 
dispersion for tps when they arrive and ensure prompt 
operational commitments after they arrive.
Although the Adv party sent was also- essential, it 
was not enough to do more than send infm to the 
Mission and fix in broad outline accommodation.
Too much time was wasted on our arrival in learning 
topography and recces to get comns [communications] 
going.
2. Tps available were being employed 100%. Those 
not guarding vital points were continually on recces —
paying great attention to the dispositions of 
armed Annamites who were still in control of 
Police Stations, Post Offices, Jail, Pumping 
Stations, Railway, Radio SAIGON, etc. etc.
The scene is now set for discussion of the Proclamation No. 1.
This was issued as an extraordinary letter sent by Leclerc to Mountbatten, 
which touched a raw nerve at SEAC Headquarters.
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CHAPTER VII
20 APRIL 1977:
3 OCTOBER 191+6:
CRACKDOWN
Gracey would never knowingly embarrass 
Mountbatten or His Majesty*s Government. 
We didn*t think at. that moment we were 
wrong... Douglas would never do that. 
Had I thought that he was doing that 
I*d have stopped him.
Brigadier M.S.K.Maunsell 
Chief of Staff
HQ SACSEA Commission No.1, Saigon.
It was during this time[2£ September onwards] 
that the Allied Commander was warned that the 
whole of 20th Division might not be made 
available for F.I.C., and was also ordered to 
restrict the activities of British forces to 
a perimeter... .
Lieutenant General Sir D.D.Gracey, C.B.,C.B.E. ,M.C.
On 19 September, k/^7 Dogra began the move to Saigon:
"The Battalion m s  the last of the [80th] Bde to 
be flown while M.T. personnel with their vehicles 
and baggage parties went by sea under Captains 
Atma Singh and Mota Singh. The C.O. with Subedar 
Mohar Singh flew early, constituting the Bn advance 
party, and after spending the night in BANGKOK 
arrived on the 20th." 1
And echoing a theme common throughout the 20th Division and 
HAP personnel, the Dogra chronicler wrote:
"It seemed strange at first to have to depend on 
Jap drivers and Jap M.T. until our own arrived, but 
we got used to it, and the Jap's discipline m s  
excellent. The fact that many of them had already 
met the Division under different conditions on the 
IRRAWADDY may have had something to do with it.
The lay out in SAIGON itself was that while 80 Bde 
would be responsible for SAIGON itself and its 
sister town of CHOLON, 32 and 100 Bdes on arrival 
would look after the approaches while French troops 
on arrival would garrison the countryside. The 
task in front of the Division m s  the disarming and 
concentration of the seventy odd thousand Japs in 
the British portion of F.I.C., and the general
maintenance of law and order while the country
settled down again and while the French authorities 
got into their stride. Our own task was to have 
two companies deployed in CHOLON as guards on 
warehouses, dumps etc." 2
The first of Gracey es airborne punch arrived on 19 September, the 
Spitfires of 273 Squadron arriving over Tan Son Nhut to peel off and 
make a circling approach to land, at which time the pilots registered 
their amazement at the situation. They had earlier provided the escort 
for Numata1 s aircraft when he had arrived in Rangoon to negotiate with 
Browning.
The squadron had been looking forward to the move to Saigon: "Morale
is boosted once more owing to the squadron moving once again, this time
into liberated territory, namely Saigon, in Indo-China, via Bangkok.
On 11 September, 10 Spitfires left their home base at Mingaladon for 
Bangkok. They had a delightful stay in Bangkok:
"Pilots and airmen highly delighted with Bangkok 
strip, living quarters good and owing to superb 
cooking the food was magnificent; eggs and chicken 
frequently seen on the plates of everyone. Being 
promised with a day off in the near future, aircraft 
serviceability improved with pilots cleaning their planes."
On 19 September, the 273 Squadron log continued:
"The planes left Bangkok today with the pilots 
in high spirits, hoping Saigon lived up to its 
name, 'Paris of the East'. They were not 
disappointed, being greeted by smiling airmen 
on landing."
Then, echoing the familiar shock:
"Everyone a little dazed with having Japanese 
chauffeurs and guards, the Japanese being 
fully armed."
At the Supreme Allied Commanders 80th Staff Meeting of 19 September,
it was stated that Headquarters SACSEA has received copies of monitored
broadcasts from Saigon and Hanoi.. These repeated the text of Gracey*s
proclamation.^ The "so-called Viet Nam Government" had made the
broadcasts, and Mountbatten ordered Gracey to immediately seize Saigon
Radio from the Vi&t Minh and to begin censoring all broadcasts. Dening
addressed the assembled officers and spoke, for the record, of the wider
political implications of the problems in Frsich Indochina:
"The Supreme Allied Commander said that he wished 
to reiterate, for the sake of Press guidance, 
the intention of British policy in F.I.C. The 
object of H.M. Government, in sending British 
troops into F.I.C., was fourfold —  to control 
Field MarshalTerauchi1 s Headquarters, which 
commanded the Japanese Armies in the Southern 
Regions; to disarm the Japanese; to release and 
repatriate Allied prisoners-of-war and internees; 
and to maintain law and order until the arrival 
of French forces. He stressed that H.M. Government 
had no intention of using British forces in F.I.C. 
to crush resistance movements."
Hugh Astor had earlier spoken to Tran Van Giau about curbing the 
inflammatory rhetoric being broadcast over Saigon Radio, to no avail.
When he accompanied the troops who finally dislodged the Viet Minh 
from the station it suddenly occurred to the British that the station 
was no good without the transmitter, which was some distance away, 
so they made a hectic dash and seized it before it could be sabotaged.
Gracey now had temporarily to suspend his other activities in 
order to deal as a matter of urgency with the Viet Minh, who had inter­
jected themselves between him and his task of disarming and concentrating 
the Japanese. It is not difficult to understand why the Viet Minh 
decided to force the issue within a week of the British arrival. Seventy 
thousand Japanese constituted an excellent diversion from Vi&t Minh 
activities, and a factor adding confusion to the local situation, especially
since many Japanese were aiding, training and even leading Viet Minh 
forces. Once the Japanese had been concentrated and repatriated, 
the Viet Minh became more exposed and would lose a lucrative source of 
arms. With the passage of time the French would return in greater 
strength, lessening the chances of a successful Viet Minh power seizure. 
The optimum time for the Vi&t Minh challenge was obviously while both 
British and French forces were far weaker than the Viet Minh, and while 
the Japanese were still present in strength. But Gracey adopted a course 
of action which the Viet Minh had probably discounted: he applied
pressure on the Japanese to control the situation until the Anglo-French 
forces should become strong enough to take over, a step for which later 
writers of the political left have never forgiven him.
Taking a more objective view, S. Woodbum Kirby stated in Volume V 
of The War Against Japan:
"By the 17th attacks on French and other Europeans 
by Annamites had broken out on a considerable scale 
and Gracy decided he must intervene. He had already, 
early in September, sent a strongly-worded order to 
Terauchi reminding him to take immediate action to 
ensure law and order in Saigon, and to arrest and 
hand over to the Allied Control Commission any local 
inhabitants concerned in outrages, but there had been 
little improvement." 6
But, the Viet Minh did not confine themselves to inciting the general
population; they now attempted to subvert Gracey*s own soldiers. Viet
Minh propaganda leaflets were left in British/Indian troop areas and
quarters, and Annamites were caught in the act of propagandizing. One
of the leaflets, an "Appeal to the Indian Officers and Soldiers among
the British troops," said in part:
"Please do remember that over there in your 
fatherland, your countrymen just like us are 
fighting hard for freedom. Our goal being, 
thus, but one and the same we both must go 
side by side, hand in hand, love each other.
We must not be divided by anybody... Let it be 
that in the days to come we do not shoot at 
each other any more.
INDIAN VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP FOR EVER ■ ‘
CHEERS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDIA 
CHEERS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM.» 1
Another tract noted that India and Vietnam had "partaken together 
in intimate relation and friendship in the pure and pacific atmosphere 
of Asia," and both vowed to build a second "fine and ideal paradise for 
two common races." It went on to daub the French and British imperialists
with the same brush and concluded:
"Indians, donft forget that you are heroic 
sons of Gandhi, don't forget that many of 
your compatriots have been massacred in 
building imperialism bases at India, and 
don't forget that the more you vanquish 
on the land of Viet-Nam the more you, your 
Vietnamese friends and all the peoples... 
have to stiffer for ever under bondage.
Remember that, hitherto, you have sacrificed 
yourselves for the evil purpose of your 
oppressors and foes, remember that you and 
your Vietnamese friends, are the most hapless 
and unhappy upon the world and at least, 
remember that helping your Vietnamese friends 
in their fighting for independence is escaping g
yourselves from pains and drudgeries of slavery."
This skilful attempt to turn the Indians against the British proved 
completely ineffective for one obvious reason:, there was hardly a single 
Indian solder who did not know that negotiations were well under way 
to grant India independence. And the fact that the Indian Army was an 
all-volunteer, professional army generally rendered them less susceptible 
to subversion anyway.
As the official history was later to record:
"On the 19th Gracey therefore took drastic 
action. He stopped the publication of Saigon 
papers, all of which had been stirring up 
trouble, and sent an officer deputation to the 
puppet President ordering him to stop requisitioning 
buildings, return some of those already requisitioned, 
furnish a list of Annamite Armed Police and other 
forces of the Vietminh with their present locations, 
and order them to remain where they were until 
further orders. With them he sent a copy of a 
proclamation which he proposed to issue on the 
' 21st." 9
The above is a short but accurate description of events. The 
officer deputation to the Viet Minh and the Committee for the South 
was headed by Gracey*s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Maunsell.
The official documents best describe the situation. Gracey reported 
the events in a telegram to Mountbatten, the subject of which was the 
"Internal Political Situation in F.I.C. with special reference to Annam." 
Gracey said that on his arrival on the 13th he had interviewed Colonel 
C&iile, General Leclerc's representative. Cedile traced the recent 
history of the area, including the abdication of Bao Bai and the Saigon 
riot of 2 September. The Annamite Government's control was in name only, 
no legal writ was in evidence and pillaging and looting were on the
increase. Wrote Gracey:
"After 6 dayB personal examination I decided 
that although the situation was not serious, 
the Annamite Government constituted a direct 
threat to law and order through its Armed 
Police Gendarmerie and Armed Guarde Civile.
In addition the Annamite Press published in 
Annamese, showed very strong anti-French 
tendencies and daily became more violent 
in character. A sheet published in English, 
was aimed at subverting British troops against 
the French." 10
Having given the reasons for his action, Gracey described the steps
he took to clamp his own control over Saigon:
"On 19th Sept I therefore sent an Officer 
deputation to the puppet President to deliver 
the following orders:
*1. I attach a copy of a proclamation which 
I am about to issue.
2. In order to ensure no provocation or 
incitement to unruly and lawless elements 
of all Nationals all newspapers at present 
published in SAIGON CHOLON in any language 
will be suspended immediately. I have already 
given the necessary orders to the Japanese 
forces under my command to effect this.
3.(A) Yo u  will immediately cease requisitioning 
any more buildings, land or other property.
(B) Yo u  will evacuate at once without removing 
any furniture, crockery or other removable 
property NO. 1+2 HUE LA GRANDIERE which you have 
recently occupied.• '*11
Gracey then directed the Viet Minh to furnish lists of Viet Minh
police units and the names of their commanders, and these units were
ordered to remain "in their present locations and barracks." Gracey
characteristically added:
"6.(B) 'Yo u  will overcome all difficulties that 
you may experience.
(C) I will accept no excuses of any kind for 
non-compliance with these rules.* "
The proclamation itself is as follows:
"1. With the unconditional surrender to the Allied Nations 
by all Japanese Forces signed in the name of the Emperor of 
Japan at Tokyo on 2nd September, 19US the Supreme Allied 
Commander of all Allied Forces in South-East Asia Command, 
Admiral Lord Louis MOUNTBATTEN, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O has 
delegated to me, General D.D. GRACEY, C.B., C.B.E.,M.C. the 
command of all British, French and Japanese forces and all 
police forces and armed bodies in French Indo-China South of 
16 latitude with orders to ensure law and order in this area.
"2. Let it be known to all that it is my firm intention 
to ensure with strict impartiality that this period of 
transition from war to peace conditions is carried out 
peaceably with the minimum dislocation to all public 
and utility services, legitimate businesses and trade 
and with the least interference with the normal peaceful 
activities and vocations of the people,
f,3* I call on all citizens in the name of the Supreme 
Allied Commander to cooperate to the fullest extent to 
achieve the above object and hereby warn all wrongdoers 
especially looters and saboteurs of public and private 
property and those also carrying out similar criminal 
activities that they will be summarily shot.
"U. The following orders will come into immediate effect.
(A) No demonstrations or processions will be permitted.
(B) No public meetings will take place.
(C) No arms of any description, including sticks, staves,
bamboo spears, etc., will be carried except by British 
and Allied troops and such other forces and police
which have been specially authorised by me.
(D) The curfew already imposed on my orders by the
Japanese authorities between 2130 and 0530 
repetition 0530 hours in SAIGON and CH0L0N will 
be continued and strictly enforced."
'The Proclamation given above is being thoroughly billposted in
all languages on 21 September throughout SAIGON and GH0L0N under
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Japanese arrangements ,M wrote Gracey to Mountbatten.
The three principal figures responsible for the proclamation 
were Gracey, Brigadier Hirst (who was the division1s Artillery commander 
and ran the 20th Division for Gracey) and Maunsell. It was, according 
to the senior surviving officer, Brigadier Maunsell, formulated in a 
period of increasing disorder and tension, as described by Gracey. Part 
of the proclamation was actually written by Maunsell, part by the 
intelligence officers on the Commission. It was evident that the Viet 
Minh were set to challenge the Allies for control of Saigon.
These three senior officers discussed the situation well into the 
night, and decided that time was running out for them and they must act 
immediately. Ironically, Gracey acted for precisely the same reason that 
the Viet Minh did, for he thought that unless he moved immediately the 
Allies would be outdistanced by both factions —  the Viet Minh and the 
Japanese, who were by then already wondering whether the British really 
did exercise control. Indeed a major concern of the three British 
senior officers was the question of what the Japanese were thinking.
Said Maunsell:
"We were terribly thin on the ground. They 
[the Japanese] still had their arms — - 
we still hadn't disarmed them. They still 
had their ammunition —  they still had access 
to it. We still distrusted every action the 
Japanese took. We talked at times as to whether 
there was any likelihood of a sort of land 
kamikaze aspect.
There we were —  we*d been there for days, 
we appeared to be losing control, nobody 
appeared to be very excited by our arrival —  
mostly because they realized we had no teeth 
(no real teeth), and if one's going to be really 
honest, I believe that it was for two reasons:
I believe one was that we felt we had got to
act, and number two, we felt (which is under­
standable if you've just finished a war) that 
it was well within our terms of reference to act
on that basis, because we felt it was 99 and 9/10
to do with law and order." 13
Maunsell remembered the occasion very well:
"Douglas Gracey felt very strongly about this 
aspect of his responsibilities, for he felt 
that unless the country was pacified, and 
quickly, none of his other tasks could be 
successfully accomplished. But most of all, 
he felt that under the terms of his original 
directives he'd been given tasks to do, which 
must be done, and this was an essential 
preliminary to doing any of them and within his 
terms of reference.
We talked about it through most of one night 
before retiring."
At 3 A.M. Gracey padded into Maunsell !s room and awakened him. 
Gracey said, "I've been thinking, we haven't time." They discussed 
it again, and decided to act.
Maunsell stated one more reason why Gracey acted:
"Throughout all this Gracey was thinking 
that he must make certain that whatever 
action he took would support, would buttress, 
would underpin, would excite the unknown, 
quantifiably, but the existing body of support 
for the French that we were told on every hand 
was there." 1U
Brigadier Maunsell was delegated by Gracey to give Tran Van Giau 
a copy of the proclamation which would be published on the 21st. So on 
19 September Maunsell ordered Terauchi's car and, with the Union Jack
fluttering from the pennant, drove up to the front of the Hotel de Ville,
A
which was still occupied and guarded by the Viet Minh and the 
Committee for the South. It was a short drive, for since Gracey?s 
residence was next door, he had only to drive around the block. A 
rumour had spread that something important was afoot, perhaps initiated 
by senior French officials, for as Maunsell drove around the Hotel de 
Ville he was cheered by crowds of Frenchmen.
Maunsell, proclamation in hand, ascended the steps of the city
hall and entered the building for the first time, expecting to find
a government in being. Instead, he paused in complete astonishment
at the scene which confronted him. As far as the eye could see, there
were scattered groups of totally unconcerned Vietnamese squatting
around their cooking pots, which were bubbling over open flames and
exuding thick smoke and pungent aromas. Screaming, half-naked urchins
tumbled about the floor. Maunsell could hardly believe it. As he later
said, it was not quite what he had expected from the Provisional
15
Government of South Vietnam. The reception committee consisted mainly 
of yelling children and women cooking; the City Hall was little more 
than a squatter's haven. He then asked at random where the government 
was located, or where the head of government could be found. No one 
spoke English, so he picked his way around and asked in French.
Finally, someone nonchalantly grunted and pointed upstairs. Maunsell 
walked upstairs, followed by another officer, wondering whether he was 
rash to do so and apprehensive lest something unpleasant should happen.
On reaching the landing he noticed a number of rooms opening from it, 
some with doors ajar and some with doors closed. So total was the 
absence of any signs of authority or organization that the scene created 
an impression "almost impossible to convey,"
As Maunsell commented years later, "There was an air of lack of 
permanency, or else better arrangements would have been made for use 
of the ground floor besides for cooking."
But one door was, somewhat conspicuously shut tight, and Maunsell
thought that if anything was going on (or if indeed there was anybody
here at all), it would be found in there. So he advanced, opened it,
and discovered some extraordinary form of meeting in progress, "which
to Western eyes didn't look hopeful of anything meaningful coming from
16
it, to judge by the posturing, etc."
One man was lying down on a sofa, some were sitting at a table, one 
man was looking out of the window, and half of them did not appear to 
be taking any interest in what was going on in the room. But one man
got up immediately —  Tran Van Giau. He appeared amazed at being 
confronted by a British officer in uniform, as he had been given no 
official warning of the visit,
Tr&n Van Gi&u had been seated at the far end of the table, and he 
walked around it and up to Maunsell. He appeared to be highly agitated, 
and he stood there, eyes blinking furiously and continuously, probably 
from complete surprise* Maunsell announced, "I come in the name of 
General Sir Douglas Gracey." He then asked Tran Van Gi&u in French if •
N.
he understood. Tran Van Gi&u stood there as if in a stupor, eyes still 
blinking furiously, and Maunsell thought that he would have to introduce 
himself all over again. So he said, in his best French, "I will now 
repeat it, very slowly," which he did. He then handed Tran V&n Giau the 
proclamation, bowed to him and the assembled company, "who had so far 
evinced not the slightest interest in the entire proceedings," and 
departed, wondering if his French had been faulty.
But Maunsell "appreciated from that moment on that to say that that 
group were in real control is something which I cannot believe." He was 
"ready to believe that they possibly had pockets of control, or that 
they were in touch with various elements or groups." But atrocities were 
being all too frequently committed, and the photographs seen by the 
Commission staff were terrible and chilling, "in keeping with the worst 
typically thought representative of the Far East." Maunsell will not say 
that the Committee for the South were responsible for these acts, or 
even agreed or disagreed with them, but he is certain that they had little 
knowledge or control of what was really going on. This was his feeling 
during all subsequent dealings with the Viet Minh, and his lasting 
impression of them: "Good talkers, quite attractive men from an
intellectual point of view; but of those that I met, I would not have
17
thought that executive control was ever going to be their strong suit."
The proclamation was made public on 21 September, and contemporary
photographs show Japanese soldiers putting up -the posters in various
parts of Saigon. The curfew part of the proclamation was meant to go
into effect immediately, but the problem arose as to how to enforce it
or to police it. The British had only a couple of battalions of troops,
the French were of little real use, and at this moment there were no
plans to use the Japanese in a fighting role. Gracey, in fact, was
"trying desperately not to fall into the trap of using them, for severe
18
criticism would follow."
On the night of the 21st, the first full day of the proclamation’s 
publicity, Maunsell sent two Intelligence officers, including the head 
of the Control Commission’s Intelligence staff, with a small bodyguard, 
to go twice around Saigon and Cholon during the curfew and report on 
its observance. The reconnaissance party reported that the curfew was 
not being observed, especially by the Japanese. The Cholon dance halls 
and night "establishments1' were operating full blast, and numbers of 
Japanese soldiers were frequenting these places. That same night a 
drunken Japanese soldier hit a French officer, which added to the problems. 
Furthermore, the French population were not paying any attention to the 
curfew, so the following day Gracey and Maunsell talked about it.
The Viet Minh police had also ignored the curfew. * If there was toa*
be a curfew and the British were unable to enforce it, then they would 
look very silly, and they might even sink to the "level of the French 
troops during the past four years." They then decided to make a spot 
check of a local Viet Minh police station, and, by using some drivers 
and Control Commission staff, scraped together a small platoon which
entered the station. An arms and ammunition count was made, and the
building was checked to see if it was being turned into a strong point.
Several members of Gracey1 s staff were pressing him to use the 
Japanese troops, but Gracey resisted it "step by step, hour by hour." 
Maunsell clearly remembers Gracey*s hatred of the Japanese, and the 
archives amply bear this out. According to Maunsell, Gracey felt that 
rearming the Japanese would be seen as weakness on his part. There was
one way by which the need for large-scale Japanese rearmament might be
avoided, and that was speeding effective French control of the city.
But eventually the use of the Japanese became unavoidable, for Maunsell 
remembered some nights when he and Gracey wondered if they would live to 
see the morning. Although they had both seen a lot of war, street 
fighting was new to them, and the nightly sounds of mortars and small 
arms were magnified in the city. Of this more will soon be said.
Mountbatten described his reaction as follows:
"While appreciating that the military situation 
in Saigon was grave, with only a small Allied 
force available and the river not yet open, I
felt that this proclamation - addressed, as it
was, to the whole of Southern F.I.C., and not 
merely to the key points - was contrary to the
policy of His Majesty's Government; and since
proclamations of this nature may well appear
to be initiated by Government policy, I warned 
Major-General Gracey that he should take care 
to confine operations of British/Indian troops .g 
to those limited tasks which he had been set."
Having registered his official displeasure, Mountbatten went on:
"At the same time I approved the military measures 
which he proposed to take: this consisted in the
first place of bringing home more strictly to Field 
Marshal Terauchi his personal responsibility for 
ensuring that the Japanese obeyed their orders;
Major-General Gracey further proposed to empty 
Japanese troops for keeping the northern approaches 
to Saigon clear, moving British/Indian troops out 
to the approaches - and finally, he proposed to 
extend and consolidate his perimeter as soon as the 
remainder of 20 Indian Division arrived. The 
categorical orders to Field Marshal Terauchi had 
the desired effect; and in the future the Japanese -q 
were to fulfil their obligations satisfactorily."
Mountbatten reported that after consulting Generals Slim and
Leclerc, and in view of the situation in Saigon, "I telegraphed to the
Chiefs of Staff on the 2i+th September that I considered that Major-
General Gracey, in issuing his proclamation, had acted with courage and
determination in an extremely difficult situation." If "the riots he
feared had developed," his small force and the French population might
well have been in grave danger. Gracey was in a very dangerous situation
indeed, and there is no doubt that, had he waited for the trouble to erupt
before acting, he would have been more severely criticised, and casualties
on both sides would have resulted. At. the moment it was only a battle of
words and wills. But Mountbatten touched on the fundamental problem when
he wrote "I was told that French forces, with Civil officials, would be
responsible for the administration of the country, Civil administration
being carried out by the French even in the key areas in which my forces
21would be operating."
The Viet Minh chose to meet Gracey*s attempt to assert his authority 
by challenging him head-on; they immediately called for a complete strike. 
Gracey reported this to Mountbatten and said that he did not expect an 
armed resistance at this time, there were alternative sources of labour 
[notably the Japanese], and many workers would resume work when the threat 
of victimization by the Viet Minh was removed.
Gracey had no illusions as to what Mountbatten * s reaction would be.
In telegraphing the Supreme Allied Commander he said:
"I would stress that although it may appear that 
I have interfered in the politics of the country 
I have done so only in the interest of the
maintenance of law and order and after close 
collaboration with the senior French representatives*
The alternatives would have been:
(A) To issue orders to TERAUCHI to disarm and round 
up Annamese elements* In my opinion this would 
have inevitably ended in a considerable number 
of wanted Annaraite persons disappearing before
the round-up took place and without our knowledge and 
without the means to check or trace them.
(B) To leave such action to the French. This would 
have precipitated bloodshed. In addition there 
are unsufficient French troops available. 22
The Viet Minh, while calling for an intensified strike, replied to 
Gracey’s proclamation in a letter to him. The ’’Executive Committee of 
Southern VIET-NAM Republic” said it was doing ’’its best to make the 
population accept your decisions” in order to give the country ”an 
example of calmness and dignity” while cooperating with the British forces. 
The letter continued:
’’Nevertheless it is our duty to draw your kind 
attention on the unpopularity of some of those 
measures which might be interpreted as an interference 
with our internal affairs. On the other hand the 
suspension of all newspapers will be a serious handicap 
for the Government regarding the control of public 
opinion. * 23
We are obliged therefore to decline all responsibility 
concerning any incident which might occur in the future.
However in view of reaching an agreement on both sides 
we respectfully ask you to authorise all newspapers 
to be published again under the censorship of the 
Government of VIET-NAM, thus we shall be in a measure 
to control all rumours which are being spread in 
SAIGON.” 2^
Gracey considered this a "definite climb-down from previous utterances, 
and replied to the Viet Minh, as follows:
”1 have received your letters dated 20 September,
19^ +5 with their attached maps and papers. I 
commend your prompt obedience to my orders which 
has shown me that wise counsels have prevailed.
Realising fully the imposition on the general 
public of complete suspension of the press I am 
now willing to receive applications for the 
renewal of publication of all papers that are 
owned by men of integrity and high repute. I 
have also received your communication dealing 
with Radio Saigon. I have already directed 
that immediate consideration should be given 
to the use of the broadcasting facilities of
* The ’’control of public opinion" by the Viet Minh press was precisely 
why, among other reasons, Gracey had acted against them.
SAIGON in the best interests of the country."*^
All of this was passed to the Cabinet by Mountbatten, who said 
that he had instructed Gracey to remain inside the Saigon key areas.
Gracey*s reference to Radio Saigon reflected a directive from Mountbatten 
to clamp down on the stream of subversive propaganda emanating from the 
Viet Minh controlled station.
Mountbatten replied to Gracey*s telegram:
"I must point out that the proclamation you 
have issued is contrary to the policy given 
you by ALFSEA... in that you have announced 
that I have made you responsible for the whole 
of FRENCH INDO-CHINA South of 16 degrees North.
2. However, since you have taken this particular 
line and you are the man on the spot, it is my
intention* to support you as you will see from
SEACOS [4,90... which I am having repeated to you.
3. You are not repetition not to employ British 
forces outside the SAIGON key area and must rely 
on the Japanese and French forces to enforce 
your orders. If the French call upon you to 
send forces outside your key area the request 
must be referred to His Majesty's Government 
through me." 26
As Maunsell was delivering the proclamation to Tran Van Giau, the
veteran Communist revolutionary, the Control Commission's senior
intelligence officer wrote to Major General Penney, Director of Intelligence
at SEAC. Penney *s attention was called to the fact that the Commission
was lacking expert guidance on political, financial and Civil Affairs 
27
matters. On 19 September Gracey telegraphed directly to Mountbatten:
*
"The deficiency from my staff of 2 CAS Officers and one Foreign Office
representative is becoming increasingly serious. Advice on political
problems is essential and I would therefore be most grateful for arrival
28
these officers urgently." However, with anarchy visible on the horizon 
and murder on his doorstep, there was none of the promised expert advice 
available to Gracey. But unlike some senior officials, Gracey was not 
afraid to make decisions.
At the 100th PSO's meeting on 20 September, it was.noted that
"Major General Penney had received a letter from the Senior Intelligence
Officer on the Saigon Control Commission which complained expert guidance
29was lacking on political, financial and Civil Affairs matters.
*-*
Mountbatten responded by hastening the departure to Saigon of Harry Brain, 
of his Political Affairs Staff, and asked the War Office in London to
*Civil Affairs Staff ** Later Sir Norman H.Brain
speed up the assignmentcf 2 Civil Affairs Officers to SEAC, saying
that "Their absence from the Commission is handicapping their work
30
and is becoming increasingly serious."
Dening sent his own assessment to the Foreign Offices
"... a situation is arising which is even more 
serious, than I had contemplated since objection 
is being taken at the very outset to the presence 
of British troops as supporting French Imperialism.
It is not improbable that there is both Japanese 
and Chinese instigation behind the various movements 
in Indo-China.
To my mind we cannot escape our duty, which is 
to liquidate the Japanese Headquarters at Saigon 
and Japanese forces South of 16 degrees parallel, ^
and to evacuate Allied prisoners of war and internees."^
Dening then, apparently independently, arrived at the same 
conclusion as Gracey and his senior officers in Saigon when he continued:
"That objective can only be attained if law and 
order are maintained in areas occupied by British 
forces. Unless the population of the areas concerned 
are willing to maintain law and order themselves, 
steps may have to be taken to enforce it, but in that 
case the populations concerned will themselves be 
responsible for such action as may be necessary.
I fear, however, our forces are going to have a 
difficult time and will require all the support
H.M.G.* can give them..." 32
Since this message was sent on 20 September, it most likely was 
written on the 19th, as Gracey was preparing to do just what Dening 
thought must happen if they were to get anything done. It is interesting 
to note that the senior Foreign Office representatives were consistently 
closer to Gracey 's thinking in these problems than some of the military
■JHfr
officers on the SEAC 3taff, as shown by the appropriate Foreign Office 
minutes and correspondence between the SEAC Political Affairs staff and 
the Foreign Office in London.
While these exchanges were taking place, events continued to move 
quickly in Saigon. On 19 September, as Maunsel-l delivered the proclamation 
to Trsin Van Gi&u, Brigadier Taunton issued disarmament and concentration 
orders to General Manaki. And a good fly-in of 22 sorties brought the 
remainder of 80 Brigade Headquarters staff, additional 1/19 Hybad and 
2/8 Punjab defense company personnel, and 55 Field Ambulance.
On 20 September, 1/1 GR took over the Central Jail, This was 
described in part by Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis, commanding 1/1 Gurkha Rifles,
* His Majesty's Government.
** However, the most senior officers [Mountbatten excepted] also consistently 
backed Gracey, as will be seen.
who recalled the incident with amusement.
The young officer designated to carry out the task, probably 
the Assistant Provost Marshal, had held a meeting with his personnel 
and had expressed his anxiety over the action and his possible reception 
at the jail. He "earnestly” asked Jarvis, who was backing him up with a 
complement of 1/1 Gurkhas (and who had considerable experience in "aid to 
the civil power” duties), to set off and arrest a high ranking official 
if within 10 minutes of entering the jail the young officer had not 
displayed a white towel from an agreed window.
Jarvis escorted the officer and his small force to a suitable starting 
point from which the Gurkhas could provide covering fire should resistance 
be met. The Gurkhas took up their positions; the young officer swallowed 
and entered the jail..
Ten minutes passed. No white towel appeared at the window, and no 
sounds came from the building. Being "fully aware of the pitfalls of 
military interference with the civil powers,” and the adage that "time 
spent on recce is seldom wasted,” Jarvis decided to have a look inside the 
jail before arresting a high Viet Minh official. He took a couple of 
Gurkhas, rifles at the ready and, revolver in hand, cautiously entered 
the jail, making for the designated room with the signal window. As he 
stealthily approached the room he heard voices coming from another room.
The voices sounded "social, even convivial.”
The Gurkhas burst open the door and beheld an amazing, totally 
unexpected scene. The young officer and his group and the prison staff 
were clinking glasses and toasting each other's health with champagneI 
Seeing Jarvis’s face he could only say, quite unabashed, "Sorry, old boy, 
the window was too high for me to reach. Gome and join us for a drink."
His relief was so obvious that Jarvis did join in the toasting, saying 
later, "After all, the war was over, and that was one more obstacle 
surmounted, and it seemed unfair to spoil his fun.” Jarvis also thought 
it more important to maintain a united front than to reprimand him. And
anyway they had not seen champagne for years and the comic aspect of the
33episode predominated.
Mountbatten, back in Kandy, told the Chiefs that Gracey's proclamation 
left him with two possible courses of action. He could give Gracey his
full support and assume responsibility for administration throughout the 
whole of southern French Indochina, or he could restrict the area of his 
responsibility to the control of the Japanese Supreme Headquarters only.
The latter option represented the narrowest possible interpretation of
the Chiefs of Staff direction —  and perhaps narrower, as will be seen.
Mountbatten emphasized that the first option, which he called 
Course A, would require a full division to implement until such time as 
the French were ready to take over. He also thought that it exceeded 
his instructions. Course B required Leclerc to reaffirm the proclamation-, 
which in Mountbatten*s opinion would be dangerous to revoke. Leclerc 
was willing to do this, but only after arrival of the 9th D.I.C. 
Mountbatten recommended the adoption of Course B, which meant that the 
senior French officer would have to be instructed by the French Government 
to exercise civil and military control outside the key areas. Course A 
would also entail SACSEA controlling all French forces and Civil Affairs 
until Leclerc should assume that responsibility.
Mountbatten told the Chiefs that Leclerc had "expressed his warm 
appreciation of what GRACEY had done." Leclerc thought that French forces 
under SEAC control could operate outside the key areas. Mountbatten 
anticipated general unrest in Indochina, but continued to the crux of the 
problem:
"Nor do I see how I can divest myself of my 
responsibility for the maintenance of law 
and order which is a normal military respons­
ibility of a Commander throughout his theatre.
This is also very strongly the point of view of 
General LECLERC' who maintains emphatically that 
the French Government must hold S.E.A.C. responsible 
for the functions which the French are not yet in 
a position to carry out." 35
While Mountbatten admonished Gracey over the proclamation, he himself 
posed the same questions to the Chiefs of Staff:
"In fact we cannot have it both ways. Either F.I.C. 
south of 16 degrees north is firmly in my theatre, 
or my boundary must be redrawn 'to exclude it, and 
to place the full responsibility on the French 
Government not only for law and order but for the 
safety of prisoners of war, for the disarming of 
the Japanese, and for the apprehension of war 
criminals." 36
That was precisely what Leclerc was- pondering aloud. In a telegram 
to the French Government he asked how the British could Gontrol, disarm 
and concentrate the Japanese, most of whom were scattered throughout South 
French Indochina, if Gracey was to be restricted to Saigon only?
Again under Course B, Mountbatten seemed to think that the Chiefs 
were hinting that he stop the build-up in FIC, but Leclerc protested 
vigorously that the plan called for a division (the 20th Indian) and it
would be dangerous to renege on this now.
Leclerc discussed the situation in a telegram to the French 
Minister of War. He reported that Gracey's proclamation was "very 
important in Mountbatten's eyes in light of restricted instructions 
received from London. These new instructions were badly defined..."
Said Leclerc:
"I declared that General Gracey had in my opinion 
taken the best possible measures in the circumstances 
because if he had shown any weakness the situation 
might have become critical." 37
Mountbatten, speaking officially, requested that Leclerc suggest 
to the French Government that a "precise and detailed declaration" be
made promising independence and dominion status to Indochina. Leclerc
continued:
"The above declaration should take into account the
important differences between British Imperial aims
and local conditions in Indo-China. Mountbatten 
insisted that this declaration would have am excellent 
effect from two viewpoints:
(a) It would stop all fighting for self-government, 
officially promised, and facilitate occupation.
(b) It would have beneficial effect on English ,0 
opinion especially and on the American attitude."
The last phrase was significant. Gracey's strong stand had set off 
vociferous left-wing complaints in the press* In Saigon itself a well 
known and hard core left wing American reporter was sending out what, 
by any reasonable standards of objectivity, amounted to hysterical reports 
on the local situation which all but portrayed Gracey as the very devil 
himself.
The proclamation thus generated a great deal of controversy, and much 
was said and written - both pro and con - about it. Everyone, it seemed, 
but Gracey had something to say about it. But Gracey did express himself 
on the subject of the proclamation, in his long-buried, little known 
rebuttal to Mountbatten's scribes at SEAC Headquarters. This document 
provides a unique insight into Gracey's predicament and, what is more 
startling, challenges the widely circulated published allegations that he 
was an unfeeling, bumbling blimp who disobeyed orders and decided to do 
what he could to resurrect the colonial system. There is a very strong 
possibility that Gracey had in fact never received the ALFSEA amendment 
which limited his responsibility for law and order to the key areas of 
Saigon, despite Slim's visit to Saigon, and there are indications that
some of the SEAC staff quite deliberately attempted to make a scapegoat 
of Graces perhaps out of their loyalty to Mountbatten and his concept 
of his place in history.
Gracey took strong exception to the SEAC staff’s version of events
covering the period of the proclamation. In his letter of 3 October 19U6
to the SEAC Recorder, Gracey charged that the SEAC version "is NOT
in chronological order, and gives the impression that the Allied commander
was insubordinate and irresponsible." Gracey flatly stated:
"It is absolutely untrue to say that ’the 
proclamation covered the whole of F.I.C.’
It is not correct to talk about key areas 
at this stage. This is most misleading.
The question arose later1.1 * 39
The SEAC report apparently went further, for Gracey correctly 
denied threatening to use "’all the weapons at my disposal. * This I did 
much later in a pamphlet dropped over certain Annamite rebel forces, 
when it was absolutely necessary to do so, to prevent unnecessary bloodshed.
Continued Gracey:
"Surely, the Recorder is confusing the operations 
in F.I.C. with those in SOURABAYAJ ** The 
proclamation could under no circumstances have been 
interpreted as coming from ’the sovereign government 
of a state* as the Allied commander clearly stated 
what his forces were in the country to do." ij.0
More important, Mountbatten’s superior appears to have fully backed 
Gracey in this affair. In the same document Gracey wrote:
"It was obvious to all in SAIGON at the time - and 
the later acceptance by the C . O . S ^ i n  their COSSEA 
366 of the measures taken confirm this view, coupled 
with what Lord ALAN BROOKE himself said to me 
personally - that the proclamation was essential 
in the form and at the time of its publication." 2+1
Lord Alanbrooke was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and met 
Gracey during the CIGS’s visit to the Far East in December 19U5*
Brigadier Maunsell confirms this view. Gracey was a good soldier, 
and all three senior officers in the Allied Command agreed that it was 
well within their terms of reference to issue the proclamation. Said 
Maunsell:
* Italics added. Gracey appears to be referring to Telegram NGS,106 
(WO 172/178U* Mountbatten to Gracey, 2b September 19U5)- The message 
would have arrived on the 25th.
** The scene of some of the worst street fighting in the Netherlands 
East Indies.
*** Chiefs of Staff.
"Gracey would never knowingly embarrass 
Mountbatten or His Majesty’s Government.
We didn’t think at that moment that we 
were wrong. If I had thought that Gracey 
was doing anything wrong I would have 
stopped him. It was an absolute, plain, 
straightforward misunderstanding.
Douglas would never do that —  had I thought , - 
that he was doing that I’d have stopped him." ^
Another officer on Gracey* s staff questioned the timing of the
limitation of Gracey *s area of responsibility. In backing Gracey after
32 years of silence, the officer concluded by saying that "Well, I can't
prove it, and furthermore it's no good me saying it because Dickie
*
Mountbatten will say I’m  wrong... it’s a long time ago."
Finally, by Mountbatten's account, one of Slim's reasons for 
visiting Saigon was to assess the strength of forces required by Gracey 
to fulfil his tasks. But Gracey was never told that Headquarters SEAC 
was even remotely considering withholding his division. It was a very 
difficult situation in which to place Gracey, and the consequences might 
well have been a catastrophe, for Gracey predicated all his actions on 
having the entire division to back up his decisions. To anticipate for a 
moment, Gracey wrote:
"It was during this time [from 25 September onwards] 
that the Allied commander was warned that the whole 
of 20th Division might not be made available for 
F.I.C., and was also ordered to restrict the activities 
of British forces to a -perimeter.** which was large 
enough to ensure the safe working of the port of SAIGON, 
the safety of the airfield, and the speedy concentration 
and disarmament of the Japanese forces in Southern F.I.C.
As it would have been impossible with the forces at 
his disposal to carry out these tasks, the wise 
decision to send the whole of 20th Division, instead
of the contemplated part, was made by S.E.A.C. and
A.L.F.S.E.A.
It was due to this and the speed-up in the arrival of 
French troops that by the middle of January it was 
possible to concentrate and disarm over 8 CP/0  of the 
70,000 Japanese troops in F.I.C. without a hitch of 
any sort, and to dispense with 32 Brigade to BORNEO 
on 25 December, and 80 Brigade to the CELEBES in 
the middle of Janizary. This was a remarkable 
achievement." i+3
While this was going on in Saigon, another small crisis erupted 
within Headquarters South East Asia Command itself, over a letter written 
by Leclerc to Mountbatten; it generated anger in some quarters and
* the officer who remains unnamed at his own request was interviewed
by the author in 1977*
** Italics added.
evoked a spirited response from the SEAC staff. Although an archival
copy was undated, the letter was very probably written on the 17 or 
18 September, for the furious responses from various SEAC staff agencies 
are dated 19 September.
Leclerc, of course, received information regularly from his officers 
in Saigon, and as he watched helplessly from afar the growing anarchy and 
intimidation of the French population, he was impatient to introduce 
French forces to Indochina before the situation got out of hand. Having 
seen France humiliated there, he, like de Gaulle, desperately wanted to 
make sure that French troops restored French sovereignty in Indochina.
And he wanted to make sure that French troops should arrive before Gracey 
had solved the problem for him and for France. Wrote Leclerc to Mountbatten 
(the letter is quoted in its entirety):
"Since my arrival a month ago you have several 
times repeated your feelings of friendship for 
France. You have displayed these sentiments on 
several occasions, your subordinates have acted 
in the same way viz-a-viz my own subordinate 
officers; we have all of us been very appreciative.
Also the general policy of your Government seems 
sympathetic to the idea of France re-establishing 
herself after the disaster.
I am making use of these friendly overtures to 
make to you a personal, respectful, and energetic 
protest on the subject of Indo-China.
It is evident to me, beyond all doubt, that in 
spite of all the public declarations, diplomatic 
negotiations etc., there are certain people who 
desire to kick us out of North Indo-China.
There is only one method of contesting such a 
manoeuvre: that is the rapid arrival of French 
troops in sufficient numbers. That is the reason 
why several weeks ago I bid high for the move of
the 9^h Division, which is armed and ready in
France, as quickly as possible after the small 
combat group which is being transported in French 
warships. Yesterday I learnt from Paris that the 
War Office* states that they have never been 
given notice by your staff of the demand for 
transport in respect of the 9th Division; I do 
ask you to try to make good this delay by demanding 
this transport as a top priority.
You, Admiral, will make objection to me that your
Government and yourself have urgent transport 
commitments to meet —  relief of divisions, 
repatriation of prisoners, etc.; but you must 
recognize that the situation is not at all the 
same as far as France is concerned. Great Britain, 
from the beginning of this war, has obviously met
* London
great difficulties in this theatre, hut as a 
result of her power the final outcome has never 
been in doubt. Let me explains if Burma is 
only put in order a month or two later this is 
obviously serious, but in no way does it change 
your position. As far as we are concerned, however, 
if the 9th Division, for example, arrives a month 
too late, the problem of the final issue of Indo- 
China rears its head. I ask you then, once again, 
to agitate as energetically as possible in this 
direction.
France has at her disposal a second means of 
gaining time and maintaining the situation: that 
is by parachuting a few men into regions where 
guerilla forces are still resisting against the 
revolutionaries. I refer to Laos.
You have promised me your help, yet one month 
after my arrival it has not been possible to do 
anything on these lines, whilst our adversaries 
do not bother to respect all the mutual agreements.
It is indeed obvious that in this case, as in the 
other, that pretext could and can still be found 
against such a weak operation. The fact which will 
dwell in front of French and world opinion is that 
sixty Frenchmen could not descend in time to 
succour their friends, although all the material 
means for so doing existed.
I do not know if this double protest on my part 
will be of any use whatever, but what I can definitely 
assert is that if I fail in the task which has been 
entrusted to me, to return Indo-China to France, all
Frenchmen will know the reasons for it." i+U
The French staff at first tried to soften the impact by translating 
the last phrase as "all Frenchmen will want to know the reasons for it."
There were serious charges in this letter, and the result was a 
spirited defense by the SEAC staff agencies involved with the French.
As soon as he heard of this, Kimmins, the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
dashed off a note to Browning which began with, "Although a strong 
supporter of the French cause I do not wish to conceal my indignation 
at the tone of General Leclercfs letter." ^  Kimmins said that while in 
London he had "devoted a disproportionately high part of my time to helping 
the French military authorities in London to create order out of chaos." 
While at SEAC the staff had worked hard to satisfy all the French demands 
and overcome their difficulties, and every decision had had French
agreement. "I am therefore at a loss to understand the discourteous
insinuations made in General Leclerc*s letter." There were no delays 
expected in the arrival of the 9"th Division, and Kimmins concluded:
"Finally, I would draw your attention to the 
translation of General Leclerc*s last sentence, 
which has been inaccurately done by his staff.
What General Leclerc said was:
'The entire French people will know the reasons.'
In the translation the phrase has been watered 
down to:
'The entire French people will wish to know the 
• reasons.1 "
Kimmins then presented the facts and figures of the record. The Chief 
of Staff, Browning, was given a point by point refutation of Leclerc *s
letter. The answer began with paragraph 1, "General Commentary", as
follows:
"The urgency of the need to send French formations 
into F.I.C., to which Gen Le Clerc [sic] draws 
attention in his para U is understood as well at 
S.A.C.S.E.A. as it is at F.H.Q.* Together with the 
other Allied Powers we have accepted the responsibility 
for re-establishing French sovereignty in that 
country. Gen Le Clerc®s veiled allusions to 'certain 
men* who 'wish to see us thrown out of Northern F.I.C.'
(para 3) only produce ill feeling and lack of
enthusiasm by the British for a task, which already
entails for us endless diplomatic complications, 
considerable expenditure of British resources and no 
small danger of British forces having to fight."
Paragraphs 1* through 7 were dealt with by the Special Duty staff officers.
On Leclerc *s comments about Burma, the following biting reply was given to
Browning.
"General Leclerc's thesis that Burma can wait but 
F.I.C. cannot is both impertinent and bears no 
.relation to the logistical difficulties of the 
Python and Release schemes, repatriation of RAPWI 
and movement of occupation forces. His demand in
para 5 that we *&atch up with this delay' i.e. the
alleged delay in demanding shipping for the 9 D.I.C. 
is based on his ignorance of the fact that there 
has been no delay. In spite of having received no 
French demand for the calling forward of 9 D.I.C. 
in advance of the Madagascar Brigade until 5 Sep 
the necessary shipping can (and will) be provided . r 
so long as the telegram reaches London by 20 Sep,"
SEAC logistics officers added that Leclerc failed to mention the
"extraordinary measures which have already been taken to equip the various
parties of 5 RIC in accordance with French desires, which have constantly
changed." They stated that they had not even heard about the "French
wishes to get in 9 DIC before the Madagascar Bde, which was originally
their first priority, ahead of the Combat Cmd, and we had no clue to the
priority of the Combat Cmd till 31 Aug." From a logistical viewpoint,
* French Headquarters.
the staff noted that "whatever French wishes may be, it is inviting 
disaster to put in 2 1/3 divs on a base organization designed for 1 div. 
And finally, India was objecting to the French diverting the return of 
Indian divisions back to India and the British did not want to see any
*
"interference with the flow of British Army drafts or essential MINERVA 
units*"
The chain of events leading to Mountbatten * s decision to authorize 
a French overflight of Thailand en route to Vientiane was described as 
follows, which suggested that it was "plainly untrue" for the French to 
say that "nothing further had been done about this idea" of dropping 
French parachutists north of the 16th parallel.
"During the month which General Le Clerc claims 
nothing was done to give effect to his suggestions 
for dropping French troops inside the China theatre 
the following action was taken to obtain clearance 
for the specific question proposed:
8 September - SAC 21239 sent Personal for C.O.S.
Rpted J.S.M. from MOLNTBATTEN. Briefly this said:-
(a) Hayes had reported that Wedemeyer considered 
there was no further need for S.A.C.S.E.A. to 
support French resistance Movement North of 16° 
and that he (Wedemeyer) would definitely NOT 
give clearance for such ops.
(b) Le Clerc wished to drop 60 French parachutists 
on VIENTIANE or LUANG FRABANG.
(c) Le Clerc stated he had got verbal agreement 
from MacArthur to fly in small French parties 
into Northern F.I.C.
(d) Should Le Clerc be given permission to fly 
these men in or must S.A.C. clear it with 
Generalissimo?
11 September - Answer from C.O.S. (9633) that LeClerc 
should clear direct with Wedemeyer.
13 September - Browning signals Mountbatten (Kanmo 262) 
suggesting that the matter is cleared with Wedemeyer 
in S.A.C.rs name.
13 September - Mountbatten signals Ismay saying 
Carton de Wiart (who is on his way home) is 
fully briefed on the matter.
1ii September - Mountbatten signals Browning (S.E.A.C. 276) 
agreeing Kanmo 262.
19 September - As signal to Wedemeyer about to be sent 
(it was actually drafted) signal CFB 8089 received 
from Wedemeyer out of the blue, the general tone 
of which made it appear useless to ask his permission 
to carry out any operations however deserving North 
of 16o.
* Movement of forces and supplies from Europe to Southeast Asia.
** Chiefs of Staff.
16 September - S.A.C. returned from Singapore.
18 September - S.A.C. gave approval for French Dakotas
to fly over any part of Siam (subject to A.C.S.E.A's 
direction) to provide succour for French civilian 
internees who had arrived on the Siamese side of the 
MEKONK (sic) from VIENTIANE (some 20 miles away).
With this ruling the French appeared thoroughly 
satisfied.'1 V 7
According to SEAC, the 60 French parachutists were to protect 
about 120 French internees, including women and children, since there 
were no Japanese troops in the Vientiane area. On 17 September Mountbatten 
decided to try again to secure approval from Wedemeyer, who was rigidly 
opposed to the French, but on the 18th the French let it be known that
the internees had been evacuated to Thailand some days earlier. Thus
"It can only be assumed that the French thought that S.A.C. would look 
upon this operation with less favour were he to realise that its object 
had altered."
The Special Duty officers were next. They listed a history of 
changing French plans and desires, and concluded by saying:
"The first we heard of 9 D.I.C. being required 
early was about 5 Sept... General LeClerc's 
statement that he insisted on the movement as 
urgently as possible 'some weeks ago' is therefore 
an exaggeration... Our difficulty has been to 
obtain a firm program from the French. 9 D.I.C. 
was not ready before mid-Sept.”
The War Office had said that shipping for French forces could be 
arranged provided the request was passed to them by 20 September, but as 
yet no request had been made. Leclerc was ignoring the fact that the 
5th RIC had "been equipped up to the maximum number of men available to 
be ready to go in with 20 Div," the equipment coming by air and "white-hot" 
priority rail movement.
"In addition we have undertaken to accept the Combat 
Comd of 2 Armd Div without any French maintenance 
backing. We cannot accept more without inviting 
a breakdown. A base organisation designed for one 
div. cannot possibly maintain 2 y divs."
Having amassed these examples of British endeavour and French 
fickleness and ingratitude, Kimmins concluded by suggesting that "Gen 
Le Clerc be made to appreciate the need for diplomatic finesse in this 
theatre," and that "Gen Le Clerc's staff be enlightened as to the World 
shipping situation and receive an explanation of all the factors involved 
in its detailed allocation within the India/SEAC Commands." If the French 
"fully understood the tasks to which S.A.C. and C-in-C India are irrevocably 
committed, whether it be politically, economically or merely in connection
with the movement of occupation forces, they would be less distrustful 
of our motives and more appreciative of our assistance."
And what was more, sniffed one SEAC officer, Leclerc was a brand 
new four-star general, having been but a division commander not long 
ago.
The Foreign Office was following the unfolding drama in Saigon 
with interest, and it is evident that the professionals in the Foreign 
Office were more closely allied to Gracey's thinking than were the 
Labour politicians in the newly elected government and Mountbatten at 
SEAC. For it was Gracey who was resisting, with all the limited means 
at his disposal,the "revolutionary outbreaks" feared by the Foreign 
Office. A lengthy memo by Wilson-Young of the Western Department noted:
"It is clear that we shall have to proceed with 
the greatest care in Indo-China. As a colonial 
Power it is in our interest to see that evolution 
towards ’progressive self-government'* is smooth 
and gradual and is not accompanied by revolutionary 
outbreaks which could but have an unsettling effect 
on the native populations of our own territories in 
South East Asia and in the meanwhile might also 
affect the quantity of rice available for export to 
famine areas." ^8
Again, in line with Gracey*s understanding, the minute continued:
"The responsibility of SACSEA extends under General 
Order No. 1 up to 16° N... We must recognize that 
the presence of our forces in Indo-China can in 
itself lead to no advantages for us while according 
to the policy adopted it may involve us in difficulties 
with the Americans, Chinese or French. If the British 
forces endeavor to suppress anti-French revolutionary 
activities we shall open ourselves to attacks from 
American anti-imperialist quarters and no doubt from 
the Chinese, whereas a policy of complete non­
intervention in domestic affairs would no doubt be 
interpreted by the French as a further step towards 
our long-term objective of pushing the French out 
of their colonial territories."
Wilson-Young noted that the delay in calling forward French forces 
(the 9th DIC) was caused by SEAC's "concern about the provision of their 
supplies." The Foreign Office view, as stated below, comes closer to 
Leclerc's later suggestion to Mountbatten:
"But in view of the delicate political situation 
would it not be advisable to give a higher priority 
to the provision and transport of supplies for the 
French troops even at the cost of operations elsewhere 
so that French troops can be allowed to proceed to 
Saigon without delay? The French are anxious that 
the first troops should be all white, with modern
* as envisaged by de Gaulle.
equipment, and these will have to proceed from 
Marseilles and take three or four weeks en route.
Transport, however, will not he allocated until 
the troops have been called forward by SACSEA 
and I think we might suggest to the Chiefs of , q
Staff that this be done without any further delay."
Wilson-Young was not to know that Leclerc at the same time was
suggesting the very same thing to Mountbatten at SEAC Headquarters.
And he presented an official view from London which even rejected 
Dening's suggestion that "our position should be made clear to the 
world in an official pronouncement stating that our sole object is 
the liquidation of Japanese headquarters at Saigon and of the Japanese 
forces in Indo-China south of 16° N and to evacuate Allied prisoners
of war and internees and that when it is accomplished our forces will
be withdrawn." As Wilson-Young declared:
"The trouble with this suggestion is that it might 
well be interpreted as an indication of our intention 
to wash our hands of all internal developments in 
Indo-China and as indicating that we do not even accept 
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.
The revolutionaries would regard this as an invitation 
to proceed with their activities and the French, who 
have been pressing us in vain for months for transport 
to carry their troops to Indo-China - would feel that 
their worst suspicions of our motives were confirmed."
Again in line with Gracey, the memo continued:
"On the assumption, however, that the Supreme 
Commander cannot allow the position to drift 
might it not be advisable for him to issue some 
statement to the effect that, while it was no 
part of the task of the Force Commander in Southern 
Indo-China to intervene in the internal affairs of 
the country, he could not in the fulfilment of his 
task of liquidating the Japanese situation and of 
arranging for the release of Allied prisoners of war 
and internees tolerate activities on the part of any 
political groups which did not serve to contribute 
to the orderly administration of the country pending 
the resumption of control by the French. If approved, 
this suggestion might be put urgently to the Chiefs 
of Staff."
The suggestion was approved by the Eastern Department, and the 
Chiefs soon released Gracey from the restrictions imposed on him by 
Mountbatten. It seems that practically everyone supported Gracey except 
Mountbatten, perhaps for reasons of politics bearing on his own future 
career.
There is an old saying that troubles come in threes, and as far 
as SEAC Headquarters was concerned it was the absolute truth. Even before 
the reverberations from Leclerc*s letter and Gracey1s proclamation had
died down in Kandy, a third crisis arose to confront the staff —  the
coup of 23 September. "Coup" is perhaps a somewhat exaggerated term 
to apply to the events of the 23rd, for if Gracey had disposed sufficient 
British/Indian units on hand perhaps little more would have been heard 
about it and 23 September would have slipped anonymously away like any 
other day.
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CHAPTER VIII
COUP D'ETAT
Indian and Gurkha troops took over the 
security of important positions before 
the coup d'etat, otherwise it would NOT 
have succeeded, nor would it have been 
attempted... It is misleading to say 
the French engineered the coup d'ltat.
It was done by the Allied commander on 
his sole responsibility, after consultation 
with the French adviser, Colonel CEDILIJE. 
French forces, few in number, were naturally 
used to take over the government buildings.
Lieutenant General Sir Douglas D.Gracey, 
3 October 19U6.
Though political problems were rapidly coming to a head in 
Saigon, the build-up of the 20th Division and ancillary units remained 
slow and ponderous. For of course Gracey and his Commission and fighting 
troops were but the tip of the iceberg. Supporting units as well (field ' 
bakeries, veterinarian services, post office, RAF Regiment, Kinema and 
ENSA staff, FMYs, canteens, workshop companies, and so on) were arriving 
one after the other, mainly from various locations in Burma. The 20th 
Division veterinary staff tried to fly in on the 18th, but dangerous 
flying weather forced them to return to Bangkok and try again on the 
19th. It was no better then, and they finally arrived on 20 September, 
when they set to work with the Japanese vets to inspect working animals 
of the Japanese Army.
The mundane administrative tasks in Saigon (billeting, feeding, etc.) 
were largely in the hands of Line of Communication Sub-Area, whose 
main party embarked for Saigon from Madras on 19 September on LST 311; 
though one of their officers, Major I.W.Hussey, had left earlier by air 
on 19 September. The experiences of one small core of officers and men 
typified the movement problems of the day; they arrived in Calcutta for 
airlift on to Saigon, only to find that no tickets were available on the 
18th. The same thing happened on the 19th, and the proposed journey was 
cancelled altogether on the 20th. They were then embarked in. a ship, but 
the sailing was cancelled. The group finally made their own way down to 
Rangoon where they managed to board a ship with Headquarters 20 Division.
One of the most vitally important units was the 237th Docks Operating 
Company which, with other port operating units, remained behind (by French 
request) after 20 Division and the Control Commission had left Saigon.
On 19 September a small advance party left for Saigon on the H.T. Harpy lice, 
with the main body remaining in Chittagong, where a few days earlier they 
had lost a man by drowning in an organized water polo game.
While Gracey anxiously awaited the arrival of the rest of his
division, these sorely needed battalions were languishing in temporary
transit camps in Burma, their commanders doing their best to keep the
men occupied. The experience of 1+/2 Gurkha Rifles was typical. On 19
September they had arrived in Rangoon, where they marched to their "very
comfortable" transit camp. For the next 10 days "we amused the troops
by doing P.T. and drill in the mornings and thereafter organizing bathing
1
parties, cinema parties and trips into the Town, zoo, Pagoda, etc." On 
the 18th the second 20 Division vehicle convoy had rumbled down from 
Tharawaddy to Rangoon prior to embarkation. On 19 September the "Masterdom"
order of battle was published, and on the next day the 2nd Indian Field 
Regiment began to depart to join 19 Division.
Although the build-up of his force was proceeding at what seemed 
to Gracey a painfully slow pace, he carried on with his methodical 
plan for disarming the Viet Minh police* These operations, carried 
out over a period of several days, led up to the "coup" of 23 September; 
the combined Franco-British action on the morning of 23 September was 
but the culmination of these events. The seizure of the central jail 
on 20 September was part of the process. Another key move was the take­
over of two main banks in Saigon, the Yokohama Specie Bank (located in 
the Hong Kong Bank building) and the Bank of Indochina nearby. The 
Yokohama Bank was to be closed permanently, and its seizure planned as a 
surprise move to preclude the Japanese from destroying any remaining 
documents and securities. The Bank of Indochina was to be temporarily 
closed "in order to evict Jap controllers and secure their books and
2
documents which will then be handed over to the French authorities."
The banks were guarded by a small platoon of 1 Japanese officer and 20 
men with a machine gun. On D minus 1 Lieutenant Colonel Forrester of 
the Commission would go down to Mytho with a 1/1 GR escort and return 
with Mr. Ferrier, former manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 
(whose premises had been taken over by the Yokohama Bank).
The first the Japanese would know of the operation would be when
80 Brigade brought Lieutenant Colonel Kamatomi (a General Affairs Staff
officer) and 2 interpreters to brigade headquarters at O63O. Majors
Hand and Beer were to reconnoiter the buildings "as unostentatiously as
*
possible before D day" by "driving past or round the building the 
mininwiTTi essential number of times and over a protracted period and in 
' different vehs each time." Detailed instructions were given about sealing 
entrances, relieving Japanese guards, entering vaults, etc. Both 
American and French officers were to be denied access to the banks until 
an inspection had been carried out.
Leclerc had made the French position quite clear. He professed 
himself unable to accept Mountbatten’s restricting Gracey so severely, 
for the Supreme Allied Commander’s commitment "which is under the terms 
of POTSDAM and TOKYO" was "to disarm all Japanese forces South of 16° 
North."
Leclerc stated that "disarming Japanese troops brings trouble if 
they are not replaced by other troops for the purpose of maintaining 
order. Therefore the maintenance of order is a SACSEA responsibility
* D Day was 23 September. The code word for the operation was "Banco" I
until such time as sufficient French forces are available to relieve 
British troops." Leclerc had little doubt, as did Gracey in Saigon, 
that much of the troubles in Cochinchina and Annam were the work of 
"bandits and assassins taking advantage of the gap which must occur 
between the Japanese and Allied occupations, I have showed that the 
political unrest was backed unofficially by the Japanese who have never 
renounced their aspirations for their future programme for a Greater 
Asia." Leclerc had no doubt that "Any sign of weakness or lack of 
agreement would play the game of the Japanese and might lead to grave 
consequences for the future of the white races in Asia. It is essential 
that Great Britain continues their previous action until the arrival 
of the Division."^
On 21 September the SEAC Deputy Director of Intelligence, Brigadier
Nicholson, asked the War Office for whatever information they had on the
political parties, and their aims and strengths, in Indochina and the
NEI. In Saigon, Lady Mountbatten arrived on the 21st for a quick visit
and look at the FOW camps, and was escorted by members of 1/1 GR’s fB*
*
Company as 1 Bybad was taking over the Commissariat de Police in Place 
de Marechal Joffre in another contribution to the coming coup.
The visit of Lady Mountbatten was one of the few occasions during 
which female members of the Viet Minh were in evidence. As soon as her 
presence in Saigon became known Viet Minh women made their public appearance. 
Maunsell at first had no idea who they were. They were attractive and 
intellectual, aged between 30 and 1+5 > and like the men were great idealists 
and talkers. But, like the rest of the Viet Minh, they made claims to 
control which were seldom supported by facts or personal observations.
On the 21st, 3U7 men were flown in and 1/19 Bybad was complete less 
3 sorties. During the night of 21/22 September, 1/19 Hybad took over 2 
more police stations and the civil jail immediately to the west of the 
Colonial Artillery barracks, relieving armed Viet Minh police as part of 
the continuing process of methodically replacing the Viet Minh occupation 
by the French. One of the police stations was near the river front on 
Tuf Do, next door to the Japanese Naval Officers Quarters; the other was 
between the railway station and the Arroyo Chinois. A total of 1+5 rifles 
and 75 bayonets were seized and 212 armed Viet Minh were escorted away 
for questioning. The Hybads also took control of the Treasury, and at the 
same time 1/1 GR surrounded and took over the Saigon Post and Telegraph 
Office from the Viet Minh. As Brigadier Taunton wrote a few weeks later,
*from the Japanese.
"The stage was now set for the coup d'etat by the French to take 
over the civil administration in SAIGON from Annamites."
These remarks by Taunton confirm Gracey's own suggestion that he 
planned to remove the Viet Minh as soon as possible from the few 
official buildings they were guarding. As will be seen, it is not 
unlikely that he had already decided this even before he left Rangoon.
Gracey would have preferred to wait for the arrival of greater Allied 
forces, preferably French, which policy would have resulted in the 
easing of the Viet Minh to one side. But the fact that by 20 September 
Mountbatten had still not called forward the 9th DIC —  Leclerc alleged 
this and was supported in his allegation by the Foreign Office —  left 
Gracey to grapple with the problem alone. It therefore became very much 
a question of who would strike first —  Gracey or the Viet Minh. Gracey 
himself wrote:
"On the arrival of the Allied Control Commission 
on September 13th, the situation was appreciated 
afresh and it was quite evident that unless the 
puppet government was evicted and the French 
government reinstated almost immediately, in fact 
strong measures taken, not only would the puppet 
government's hold on the country be consolidated 
and their plans for subversive action and 
hooliganism be made firm, but also landing by
air and sea of troops and supplies would become
daily more hazardous. All this would be playing 
into the hands of the Japanese, and would seriously 
delay their disarmament and concentration." 3
This is significant because it suggests that Gracey may have decided, 
before he left Rangoon, to pry loose the Viet Minh, slowly but firmly,
from whatever grip they claimed to have on Saigon. But Douglas Gracey was
not only a highly experienced officer who had known his immediate superiors 
for years —  decades in fact —  he was also a meticulous planner and a 
man of high intelligence with a well developed sense of humour and a 
flexible mind* It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that he 
would eject the Viet Minh without seeking authority from at least Slim 
beforehand. As some of the archives of the period remain closed, a few 
assumptions based on available evidence, experience and common sense must 
be made. Slim visited Gracey in Saigon on 16 September, and it is impossible 
to believe that Gracey did not discuss with him, or at least inform him of, 
the operations which were planned for the coming week. One of the reasons 
for Slira's visit was to carry out a personal inspection of the situation, 
and the fact that he did not prohibit Gracey from proceeding with his plans 
very strongly suggests that Slim was satisfied with these.
On 20 September the radio link between Terauchi and SEAC 
Headquarters was broken; all traffic now passed through the Control 
Commission. From 15 through 21 September, the airlift squadrons of 
232 Group had flown no more than 25 sorties to Saigon because of the 
dangerous flying weather; there had been 60 weather aborts, and 335
personnel with rations, medical and canteen stores and bitumen were
flown in. Total British/Indian personnel flown to Saigon by 232 Group 
were now 1516. Ex-POWs and internees were backloaded from Saigon, and 
19^ Squadron said of these flights:
"From the emotional if not necessarily the material
point of view, this month has brought the squadron
its most rewarding task ever... The manifest joy 
of the former prisoners —  many of whom had been in 
captivity since the fall of Singapore —  was something 
to be remembered, and was reflected in that of the 
aircrews whose concern was their evacuation. Rarely 
if ever has the squadron —  one might reasonably say 
any squadron —  enjoyed a more wholly satisfying and 
rewarding duty than this." 6
The crews also spoke highly of the.Gurkhas:
"The various occupying forces —  mainly Gurkhas —  
flown in, were excellently disciplined, as were
the Free French Forces, who were lifted to Saigon;
all gave no trouble whatsoever and set a perfect 
example to any airborne troops."
It is not surprising that South East Asia Command resources, 
structured to fight a war, found it difficult at times to cope with 
the unexpected strains of reoccupation on so vast a scale. Perhaps in
a reflection of this chaotic state of affairs the squadron's own little
radio station had the call sign of "N.B.G."
Despite Gracey's advance warning to the Committee for the South, 
the proclamation did not deter the Viet Minh attempts to propagandize 
and subvert his troops. One of the more bizarre attempts to split the 
Indians away from the British was revealed by the following leaflet, 
which was addressed directly to "Indian Soldiers1" It tried to spread 
confusion by stating that Gracey had been killed, and may well have been 
meant for release to coincide with Gracey's assassination. It was 
distributed throughout the troops living areas and read as follows:
"Indian Soldiers!
Gracey, Lt.General of the British army 
has been shot down at 11,^3 P.M. of the 
20th of this month and of yours."
The leaflet then resurrected memories of the great Indian Mutiny:
"A bloodish battle occurred between you 
Indian soldiers and one part of yours under 
the control of British soldiers*"
Then, to warn of impending Viet Minh action, the tract continued:
"In the future, our Vietnam’s troops will 
advance in a fight on Saigon and Cholon 
area, if you understand our sacred aim, you 
must show to us your white flag and we will 
not shoot at you.
Indian soldiers! You are our friends because 
your people is under British imperialism. You 
and your countrymen are struggling for your 
independence, as we are doing, why are we 
struggling against each other?
Indian soldiers.* Stop to fight for we have 
the same hope to get our freedom.
VIETNAM*S TROOPS. " 7 
The hand-written comments on Gracey*s personal copy of the Control 
Commission’s official report of the period 13 to 23 September provide 
perhaps a greater insight into the situation than does the official 
report itself. This document traced the situation in Saigon, describing 
the growing anarchy, lack of public order, and how the illegally 
constituted revolutionary government was terrorizing the general population 
through murder and brutality [which has been its trademark ever since].
The report stated that to carry out Gracey*s tasks
"... it was clear that the situation of inactive mob * 
rule then existing could not be allowed to continue; 
it was of the greatest importance, not only to SAIGON 
and CHOLON but also to the remainder of French Indo 
China, that administrative services should be made to 
function properly as soon as possible and that, therefore, 
law and order and proper security must first be re­
established in the SAIGON-CHOLON area.
8. It was therefore inevitable that the French should 
re-establish control with, as a first step, the 
assumption of police responsibilities and the necessary 
disarmament of ANNAMITE armed elements." 8
Under the last paragraph, concerning the replacement of the Viet
Minh armed police by the French, a pencilled question asked, "Can they
control any better than the Annamites?" It was a moot point, as Gracey's
government was committed to facilitate the resumption of French sovereignty
over her territories in Indochina.
* In context, this refers to the preceding paragraphs which described 
Gracey*s main tasks in his capacity as Commder of Allied Land Forces 
as securing the Saigon area, disarming the Japanese, and maintaining 
law and order and ensuring internal security.
On the first page of the report [which dealt with the recent 
history of events], the pencilled comments express satisfaction with 
the summary, saying "Good", with a heavy square drawn around the word.
On the bottom of the page the following was written by hand:
"A good exposition of the case, which is an almost 
exact parallel with Burma. If only the French 
would promise progressive sovereignty to be complete 
at a very early date (say two or three years) AND 
the Annamites would be equally ready to meet them 
the situation might clear up." 9
But since neither condition was likely to be fulfilled due to the 
extreme intransigence of both sides, and Gracey knew it, all parties 
concerned proceeded with their own plans for future action.
To make the operation as bloodless and as easy as possible, Gracey*s 
own troops unobtrusively disarmed the greater part of the Viet Minh police 
during the previous few days. It was left to the French, perhaps for 
reasons of amour nronre as much as politics, to legitimize the operation 
by completing the final and largely ceremonial steps in the plan. Most 
of these installations in Vi&t Minh hands had already been taken, one 
by one, without resistance, by the British troops, after which many of 
them had been handed over to French forces. It was a brilliant operation 
and marked a departure from the traditional concept of the violent 
coup d'etat, for it avoided confrontation between French and Viet Minh.
It was left to the French to add the finishing touches, and that is when 
the problems began —  but even then it remained a fairly bloodless operation, 
for there were only a couple of participants killed and both of them were 
French.
A considerable body of literature has since been published about 
the coup. Some versions are partially correct, and some bear very little 
resemblance to what happened, but no one account is wholly correct.
C£dile did indeed see Gracey about the French role in the coup, but as 
has been written the French did not have the dominant role in the eviction 
of the Communist controlled Viet Minh, [for it was the Communists who 
directed and controlled the movement, as their later writings admit]. As 
the French were rearmed they began to reconstitute their units; it was 
by necessity a rushed process involving much improvisation. As Cedile 
said, "We had a body of officers, and by force of circumstances we began 
to form little commando groups, putting them in charge of a captain or a
10 *
commander, but they were not real unite*"
On 21 September, 20 Indian Division Headquarters closed at Tharawaddy
i j | i i^ »
at 0900 hours and moved to the "R" Marshalling Camp in Rangoon as the 
vehicle party of the 102 Indian Company (RIASC) sailed for Saigon; 
the Company's personnel would follow in the "Masterdom One" convoy 
in 9 days. On 21 September, also, Gracey was informed that there would 
be a delay of 2 to I* days in shipping 20 Division from Rangoon.
On 22 September, vehicles of the 100 Indian Company (RIASC), 20 
Division Transport, began the journey to Saigon, with some vehicles 
going to Borneo; it was thought even at this date that part of the division 
was bound for Borneo. An advance party from 100 Brigade, including a 
tactical headquarters, arrived in Saigon under Lieutenant Colonel E.D.
"Moke" Murray, Commander of 1+/2 Gurkha Rifles (who was to go on to 
Phnom Penh as Gracey*s representative in Cambodia); other members of the 
100 Brigade party were Major D.H. Wenham of 1U/13 Frontier Force Rifles,
Major A. Arnold of U/lO GR and Captain A.I. Akram of 1U/13 FFR, representing 
all of 100 Brigade's battalions. On 22 September, also, the Commander 
of the U22 (QVO Madras) Indian Field Company was named Garrison Engineer 
in Saigon, with his sappers acting as escorts and part-time infantry.
On 21 September SACSEA queried Gracey on assurances from the French 
Mission at Kandy that trained, hand-picked French troops were on hand; 
a "large number of French and loyal Annamite troops" were now said to be 
available in French Indochina for internal security duties. At the same 
time Gracey wired Mountbatten that no official civil government existed 
and order was being kept by the Japanese with Allied troops on selected 
VPs; the Viet Minh were on guard over many public buildings. But "Viet 
Minh claims to be facto government and to have resisted Japs throughout.
Both claims childish. No legal processes exist and [there is] ample
11
evidence in fact [that they were] puppets of Japs and actively cooperated." 
The Viet Minh police were carrying out arbitrary political arrests and 
were suspected of murdering some of the initial French parachutists. The 
spot check of a Viet Minh jail (referred to by Brigadier Maunsell) on 19
* Before Gracey*s arrival, British,Australian and Dutch ex-POVs 
armed with bamboo staves did invaluable service in maintaining 
a semblance of order in Saigon.
** The Golf course.
*** Royal Indian Army Service Corps.
September
"revealed numerous political prisoners ITTJW two 
French officers who parachuted FIC and two French 
sailors. These [were] released. Only one European 
French National volutarily released by alarmed 
Annamite governor... French population has been 
very nervous with many wild rumours current.
Confidence now returning. Viet Minh violently 
anti-French... Woefully short security personnel 
who have many heavy increasing tasks unusually 
complex situation." 12
On 21 September, also, a cryptic intelligence summary had been sent 
from Saigon. The telegram was from the Control Commission to SACSEA 
and said in part:
"Political situation and low strength own troops 
hitherto precluded much intelligence action.
Interim period used collect info through staff 
meetings Japanesef,] activities other agencies.
Progress satisfactory and plans in hand action 
when circumstances permit... No effective civil 
government exists." 13
On 22 September the Control Commission's Movement and Transportation
Officer informed SACSEA that the railway workers were under the grip of
the "Viet Nam Party", and the Japanese, (who still controlled the
railways) issued orders to the Viet Minh-led civilian workers. The port
would also stay in Viet Minh control until clearance (under Allied direction)
of the first two convoys, at which time it would probably revert to French 
1 )
hands. Daily off-load targets for the port were 700 tons,rising soon to 
900 tons, subject to the local agreements remaining firm; 200 vehicles per 
day were also required, and this high number was due to the fact that the 
vehicles used were mainly Japanese, capable of small loads and in bad 
repair. The Japanese were still in nominal charge until 2i+ September, at 
which time the British were to move out of their small temporary office 
and replace the Japanese.
Enough railway rolling stock had survived to move 1000 men per week 
between Saigon and Nha Trang, and Saigon and Thu Dau Mot [which is why 
the Viet Minh moved in on the railways]; l{.5>0 tons of goods per day could 
be moved between Saigon and Mytho, and 260 tons per day between Saigon 
and Nha Trang, although the goods capability was lessened if personnel 
were moved. The best lines were from Saigon to Mytho (U hours) and Saigon 
to -Dalat (29 hours). There were engines available, all wood-burning 
(and there was plenty of wood available). The roads in the area around 
Saigon were in good shape, which would help in concentrating the Japanese.
Gracey's proclamation was discussed at the SAC's 27th Miscellaneous 
Meeting on 22 September. Mountbatten told those present that General Gracey
had acted outside the scope of his "more recent instructions" in that 
his proclamation was addressed to all of FIC south of 16° north, but 
said that "the root of the difficulty lay in the contrary instructions 
given in different paragraphs of the original telegram" [from the Chiefs 
of Staff]. The first paragraph directed Mountbatten to reoccupy key 
areas of Japanese-held territories, to enforce the surrender and 
disarmament of "Japanese allied forces" and to effect the earliest 
possible release of Allied prisoners of war and internees. The third 
paragraph gave as a particular task the control of Japanese Headquarters 
of the Southern Armies. In view of this apparent diversion Mountbatten 
was going to ask the Chiefs for definite guidance. It seems that 
it took Gracey*s proclamation to bring out the possible contradictory 
tasking in the original directive from the Chiefs of Staff.
It is evident that some blunt and spirited discussion took place 
at this meeting. Dening, speaking to Leclerc, said that it was his 
opinion that "serious trouble in FIC would cause world-wide political 
repercussions, and that it was therein that the true danger lay."
Prophetic words, indeed. The SEAC Director of Plans wanted to halt the 
buildup of Gracey*s forces and limit the use of troops to Terauchi*s 
headquarters. He also made another poorly thought out suggestion that 
the Spitfires and Mosquitos would take care of quelling any disturbances. 
Slim interjected at this point and said, first, that he could not accept 
that the British forces were in Saigon only to control Terauchi's head­
quarters. Slim said that the British had three additional objectives: 
to disarm the Japanese, bring back the AFWI and maintain law and order, 
at least in the Saigon area. Second, he did not think that they could
do it cheaply, for the Air Force would not be of much help in putting
down "riotous outbreaks." It was at this point that Mountbatten said 
that he was going to repeat Gracey*s telegram to the Chiefs, with two 
alternative courses of action to reflect the two contradictory instructions
he had received, pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of each.
The Chiefs should then give a definite ruling, A telegram from the War 
Office, dated 18 September, also appeared to limit British responsibility 
to Japanese headquarters.
Mountbatten*s Planning Staff, on a majority vote, recommended that 
the British buildup should cease and British/Indian forces should withdraw 
from French Indochina as soon as possible.
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Captain Goodenough, RN, and Group Captain Spotswood, RAF, were 
in favour of stopping the buildup of Gracey*s forces. The third member 
of the Planning Staff, the Army's Brigadier Blacker, strongly disagreed, 
using the following argument. The Supreme Allied Commander could not 
avoid responsibility in French Indochina until the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff agreed to'the formation of a separate French command there. All 
problems concerning disarmament, guarding and evacuating the Japanese 
were definitely the SAC*s responsibility, besides providing limited 
administrative support for the French. Should the British buildup cease 
and the French be pushed into assuming full control before they had 
sufficient strength, it was highly probable that they would get in trouble 
and demand assistance from the British. Under the SAC's control the 
French forces could be confined to tasks commensurate with their strength.
The establishment of a separate French command must coincide with the 
withdrawal of British forces.
Mountbatten appeared to be downplaying the seriousness of the
situation in Saigon. He thought he could control Saigon with a single
brigade, and said he was hoping that it would not be necessary to send
all of 20 Division to Saigon. Major General Pyman, ALFSEA Chief of
Staff, pointed out to Mountbatten that 80 Brigade*s vehicles were still
in Burma and were due to arrive with the remainder of the division.
Mountbatten thought that a possible solution would be for British forces
to control Saigon and the airfield while "incidentally offering sanctuary
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to women and children in the event of rioting." The telegram he 
proposed to send to the Chiefs would suggest "two definite alternative 
courses of action, founded on the two contrary instructions he had received 
and the different factors of the situation." If the Supreme Allied 
Commander was confused, it is hardly surprising that some of his subordinates 
were not too clear on what British forces should do in Saigon. More 
surprising was that it took so long to bring the Chiefs' attention to 
what appeared to some officers to be contradicting directives.
The SAC's 28th Miscellaneous Meeting was attended by Mountbatten,
Slim, Leclerc, Dening and other senior officers. Mountbatten drew Leclerc’s 
attention to Gracey's telegram, which contained the text of the pro­
clamation, and gave a summary of the political situation in Saigon. 
Mountbatten concluded his discussion by saying that "it was not quite 
clear, from instructions which had been received from London, what were 
his precise responsibilities in French Indo-China, and it might be that
17the action which had been taken by General Gracey was too wide."
Mountbatten repeated his intention to seek clarification from the Chiefs
of Staff. Leclerc asked publicly how Gracey was supposed to disarm
the Japanese in south French Indochina if he was to be restricted to
Saigon only. Mountbatten replied that this was the point he would
make with the Chiefs. Leclerc replied that while Mountbatten was at it
he could "add in his telegram that the measures taken by General Gracey
had, in fact, ensured the maintenance of law and order with small forces
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under extremely difficult conditions." Mountbatten agreed to do this.
Dening next expressed the Foreign Office view of the political 
question, pointing out that it was not strictly accurate to state that 
French Indochina south of 16 degrees north was a purely British 
responsibility. It was the SAC’s responsibility "under the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff", to which Mountbatten added that this was why Brigadier 
General Timberman [U.S.] was at the meeting.
Dening went on to say that political movements were a French 
responsibility, although admittedly it was "very difficult to divorce ■ 
the military and political responsibilities"; but he advised that Britain 
should not become involved in "political maneuvering on French sovereign 
territory." This was sound advice, if difficult to implement, but it 
appeared to run directly counter to the directive to Gracey to suppress 
Saigon Radio which was given at just that time.
Leclerc responded by saying that he wanted the British to keep law 
and order only until he was in a position to assume command and 
responsibility himself. Mountbatten asked Leclerc to urge the French 
government to proclaim publicly the autonomy of Indochina, and Leclerc 
replied that he had already urged de Gaulle and D ’Argenlieu to do so. 
Leclerc then turned to Dening and asserted that it was "fallacious to 
argue too closely any superficial comparisons between the political 
situation [in Indochina] and the political difficulties in different 
countries; similarly, there was no common solution." Leclerc believed 
that "looting and brigandage" were the main problems in French Indochina 
and felt that the people were not overly concerned with politics. Dening 
diplomatically replied that he would pass on Leclerc's remarks "on the 
true nature of the present unrest" to the Foreign Office.
Earlier during the meeting Mountbatten had pressed Leclerc to assume 
responsibility for south French Indochina on 5 October [the proposed date 
of Leclerc’s arrival in Saigon]; at that time 3250 French troops should be
ashore. Leclerc had pointed out that 1000 to 1200 of these troops 
would be ex-POWs from the 11th RIG and of only "mediocre value".
Leclerc, who was no less anxious than Mountbatten for an early takeover, 
pointed out that French Indochina was "three quarters the size of France, 
and he could not reasonably be expected to assume such enormous 
responsibilities with a force of only 3250 men." He agreed with Slim 
that he would assume responsibility when 9 DIC arrived in Saigon, and 
suggested that "General Gracey would likewise be in a position to 
exercise full control only when a full British division had arrived in 
Indo-China."
Mountbatten thought that the British and French commands should be 
separated, with the British being confined to Saigon and the French 
assuming responsibility for the rest of the country. This ran counter to 
what Dening had just said, and Leclerc could not accept it. He thought 
the suggestion unworkable and wanted the French to remain under British 
command for the time being, although he would agree the British should 
restrict their activities to the Saigon area. Leclerc said he understood 
that the British government had accepted full responsibility for French 
Indochina south of the 16 parallel of latitude, and thought it "inequitable" 
that they should abandon this responsibility when France was not yet able 
to take it on. He would be quite willing to take over as soon as he had 
sufficient strength [the 9th DIC] "even if the situation was still 
difficult." Meanwhile, he would go to Saigon immediately after the rest 
of 5 RIC had arrived, and give all the- assistance he could to General 
Gracey. Mountbatten said he would forward the thrust of Leclerc*s 
argument to the Chiefs of Staff. At the end, Brigadier General Timberman 
interjected the thought that "any improvement in the lot of Asiatic 
peoples would be well received by the American public."
On 22 September SEAC informed Gracey that 2 Civil Affairs officers
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were en route to him from the UK, and Brain should be arriving in Saigon 
at any time. At the same time the SEAC Joint Planning Staff issued the 
second draft of Paper Number 201, "Handover of FIC to the French, 
which by citing CQSSEA 350 suggested a reduced commitment for British 
forces. This telegram from the Chiefs said that "In view of French 
willingness and ability to provide forces you should do your utmost to 
reduce the British forces sent there as soon as possible." French 
willingness was fine, but the forces were not yet in Saigon and the War
* Brain was a member of Dening’s Political Affairs Staff.
Office seemed to "be suggesting that it would not be necessary to wait
for the French buildup before commencing the British withdrawal. A halt
in the British reinforcement programme was recommended, although Dening
held that the British departure should coincide with French agreement to
assume sole responsibility in Indochina. SEAC was now considering sending
the third brigade of 20 Division (100 Brigade, scheduled to arrive in
Saigon around 11+ October) directly to Borneo from Rangoon, withdrawing
it from the scheduled Masterdom convoy. All of this was being discussed
as the final touches were being applied to the impending coup in Saigon.
Back in Saigon, C^dile met Gracey for last-minute discussion of the
imminent removal of the Vi£t Minh from the few buildings they still held.
It is highly probable that Brigadier Taunton, whose brigade was gradually
ejecting the Viet Minh from their visible toeholds on the city, attended
the talks, for his Gurkhas and Hybads would cooperate with the French
on the morning of the 23rd.
Although Brigadier Maunsell is emphatic that the coup was C^dile's
idea entirely, it is difficult to divorce the earlier British actions from
the coup. These actions, as already stated, involved the taking over of
key installations from the Viet Minh and Japanese and placing most of
$
these in French hands.
As Brigadier Maunsell recalled, the coup was the idea of Cddile and
another Frenchman. The latter, reputed to be a Gaullist and the possessor
of many World War One medals, had been vouched for by C^dile. It was the
"profound belief of C£dile and others (who continually advanced it) that
the coup would be a simple affair, as indeed it turned out to be." About
3 days earlier C<£dile and his associate had, "in tremendous secrecy", said
"We’ll go up to the Viet Minh outside one of the police stations [the
headquarters], and we’ll do that to them," making a sweeping gesture with
him arm, "and it will be over. And all our friends, now silent, will
20
throng to the French."
Years later, when asked of Gracey1s worry that the coup might misfire
C^dile replied:
"Yes, there was the risk of an accident, of course,
and he had the responsibility. But he accepted it
and he agreed with me. He understood me, and as 
I later said to other officers in the next few days 
I managed to convince him. And he said, ’Well, 
you’re a brave young man and we’re going to help 
you, my dear boy.1 He was very kind." 21
This statement verifies Brigadier Maunsell*s argument that Jean
C^dile had convinced Gracey that the quickest way to resolve the "sticky"
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situation was with a lightning takeover by French forces. As Maunsell
had said six months before the interview with C^dile:
"Now Douglas Gracey was an emotional man, but he 
always required facts and information, proof —  
but he couldn’t get proof. But he became 
enthusiastic about it [the coup], and enthusiasm 
was a great part of Gracey’s makeup.
If you could get him to believe in a cause, it 
was a small step to get him enthusiastically 
behind it.
The two Frenchmen converted Gracey and got him
enthusiastic for this cause. After all, if the
French could consolidate power quickly, the
British could wind up and go home quicker. This
would be the way to unite the French in a Verdun-
like spirit and they would be able to properly
prepare for Leclerc*s arrival. And, above all,
their friends among les Annamites would all come
out and rally around the Tricoleur, It was
repeated so many times that the British came to ^
believe it in the total absence of any other information."
The coup was a combined Anglo-French operation, with the preliminary
steps being taken almost exclusively by the British. Queried about
joint planning C^dile said.
"Yes, for the coup of 23 September there was liaison.
For example, two nights before 23 September the 
Gurkhas occupied the Police Commissariat. The Viet 
Minh were in blockhouses and- bunkers and it was 
this pressure point which we took which helped the 
British troops when they became involved in the clashes.
They helped very much on 23 September and then they
left it to us. Obviously the plan had been made
because the attack was made on all sides to free Saigon...."
Brigadier Taunton, in his report to Gracey, described the gradual 
takeover of vital points during the previous few days, culminating in 
the Hybads taking the two Police Commissariats, Treasury and Maison 
Centrale from armed Annamite police, and the Gurkhas taking over the 
Post and Telegraph Office on 21/22 September:
"3. The stage was now set for the coup d'etat 
by the French to take over the civil 
administration in SAIGON from Annamites,
During night 22/22 Sep the coup d'etat 
took place and in SAIGON the French had 
taken over their Police posts, Mairie, etc, 
and established gds on the five brs** leading 
over the Arroyo d*Avalanche. 21+
* But the impression remains that Gracey, having already made up 
his own mind, may simply have gone through the motions of becoming 
convinced by the two Frenchmen.
** Bridges.
l+* 21 Sep - 1 Bybad surrounded and took over the
YOKOHAMA and INDO-CHINA banks."
Commenting on the period from 18 to 21+ September, Taunton said:
”1. When taking over vital points from the Japs, 
the policy was British take over and hand to 
•French later.
2. When taking from Annamites, in the main,
Japs took over first and handed over to British.
3. It was very apparent that the Japs had NOT 
adequately disarmed the Annamite Police."
On 22 September the final outline of the coup was contained in
80 Indian Infantry Brigade Operational Order Number 13. The order
was prefaced as follows, under "INFM":
"1. On the night of 22/23 Sep the French Army and 
Administration are seizing the Police Stations, Post 
Office and Treasury from the VIET MINH who are at 
present controlling them. Z hr will be 01+00 hrs 
SAIGON time. The following objectives will be taken 
by French tps under the comd of Lt-Col RIVIER:-
(a) Z-5 mins Post Office and Telephone Exchange 
(39) 220551+10* - One Coy.
(b) Z-5 mins Surete (1+5) 2205539!?, one coy.
(c) Z hr Commissariat de Arrondissement (98)
21705250 - one coy.
(d) Z hr Commissariat Central (not marked)
2014.59160 - one coy.
(e) Z hr Commissariat 1er [sic] Arrondissement 
(77) 228053^0 - one coy (Navy).
(f) Z hr Commissariat du Port) (99)
) 22705250
(g) Z hr Commissariat 6e ) One coy.
Arrondissement ) (Navy)
2. Later on 23 Sep French tps will also take 
over the Central Jail from 1/1 GR. All VIET MINH 
found at these objectives will be disarmed and 
interned by the French Administration until their 
credentials have been checked, when those considered 
harmless will be released.
3. Lt-Col Rivier*s HQ will be located at the French 
Barracks in the Boulevard Norodon [sic] (10) 21251+7 till 
01+00 hrs when it will move to the Post Office.
INTENTION.
li. 80 Ind Inf Bde will co-operate with the French 
Forces in their plan and will take one further objective:— 
Garde Civile barracks (not marked) I9I1O5380.
METHOD.
. . . **
5. (a) Two pis 1 Hybad comd by a BO will take the
Garde Civile barracks at Oi+OO hrs 23 Sep.
* Reference Saigon Street Plan, Second Edition, 19U5•
** British Officer.
(b) M. le Commandant Besson will accompany 
them as interpreter.
(c) All VIET MINH personnel will be disarmed, 
searched and detained under gd until such 
time as the French administration take them 
over on 23 Sep.
(d) As soon as the take over has been completed 
a report will be submitted to this HQ, by 
jeep DR. Report will incl. casualties, 
prisoners, incidents, etc.
6. (a) The Jap gd at the Post Office and Telephone 
Exchange (35) 22055MO will be relieved by 
1/1 GR (str 1 BO and two secs) at 1J+00 hrs
22 Sep.
(b) Sentries will be posted outside the building 
with a gd room inside in order that ingress 
may be effected at any time.
(c) On arrival of the French Coy at OJ^OO hrs
23 Sep they will permit them to enter the 
buildings to take over the Post Office 
and Telephone Exchange and will give any 
assistance required.
(d) The French will be responsible for any VIET 
MINH found on the premises.
(e) 1/1 GR gd will be relieved by the French Coy 
and will be dismissed after daylight.
7* (a) The 1/1 GR gd will permit French prison officials 
to enter the Central jail at 0700 hrs 23 Sep and 
will assist them to take over from the VIET MINH 
warders.
(b) The gd will be relieved by French tps on 23 Sep 
(time to be notified later).
ADM.
*
8. Tot
(a) Maj R.A. HARRIS REME will detail k cars to be 
collected by French drivers at 1500 hrs 22 Sep. 
They will be returned by the French to this
HQ by 1800 hrs 23 Sep.
(b) The Japs are being ordered to provide 10 lorries 
(formerly property of the French Army) to report 
to this HQ at 11+00 hrs 22 Sep. These will also 
be collected by French drivers at 1500 hrs 22 Sep.
(c) One jeep of HQ 80 Bde will report 'to 1 Hybad at 
2000 hrs 22 Sep for use by DR reporting completion 
of ta.sk.
9. Arms
(a) PI weapons less 2" mtrs will be carried.
(b) Pistols Signalling will be carried by all dets. 
INTERCOMN.
10. All reports to HQ 80 Ind Inf Bde Officers* Mess.
11. ACKNOWLEDGE.
* Transport.
After describing the method of issue and distribution, a postscript 
was added:
AFTER ORDER
Ref para 1 (c) and (e).
Gds on these buildings were taken over 
by 1 Hybad night 21/22 Sep. French tps
will take over from 1 Hybad at time laid
down in original plan. 25
The War Diary of 80 Brigade recorded the events of 23 September:
03hS - COUP D'ETAT during night successfully
accomplished and following is present 
position, COMMISSARIATS 22753U, 216525 
and TREASURY 226532 hand over to FRENCH tps.
0530 - POST OFFICE handed over to FRENCH tps.
YOKOHAMA BANK and BANQUE INDOCHINE 
surrounded and taken over by 1 HYBAD.
FRENCH tps guarding brs over ARROYO 
DE LALANCH [sic] at 203556 - 215557- 
217557 - 228555 - 231550 and some firing 
reported. French cas 1 killed.
1700-1900 - four fires started by ANNAMITES at rly sta 
21U528, Market 216519 and warehouse 218518 
other was Race Course area 197537.
The French force actually used was a mixture of 5 RTC, 11 RIC (ex-POW)
and armed civilians. The 11th RIC had been reconstituted only a few days
ear.liar. As C^dile said, the French POWs were not released on his arrival 
in Saigon because the Viet Minh had threatened to shoot them:
"So I had to negotiate very carefully with them 
and eventually we let the prisoners out almost 
individually and we put them into houses where 
there were women and children, but it was just
a few days before 23 September before we rebuilt
and rearmed these units." 26
This explained why the French death toll was kept to a relatively 
low level during the days between the 2 September riots and 23 September. 
Early on, around the 2 September period, C^dile described the ex-POWs 
as weak, with some having no shirts on their backs, and their arms 
consisted of bamboo staves. Fighting had been hand-to-hand, and when 
grateful civilians gave them "bottles of spirits" the effect on weakened 
bodies was immediate.
One reporter described the coup as follows:
"As clocks chimed 0300, a ragtime, grim silent 
army of 300 nien armed to the teeth, padded 
silently along the deserted streets. The Coup 
d'Etat was beginning and Saigon was about to 
become French again. This was the culmination 
of an incredible week of turbulent rumour and
imminent uprisings. Who would strike first?
Would it he the Annamese, angry, confident, 
truculent? Or the French? 'Three o'clock Sunday 
morning,' the word went round: and 300 tough 
men went out to take a city.M 27
Each Frenchman involved wore the Cross of Lorraine on his shoulder.
Christopher Buckley of the Daily Telegrauh (London) quoted a British
officer as saying (of the French), "They have the opportunity of a
life-time for starting with a clean sheet a liberal policy for the
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joint running of the country." Writing of the action, Buckley gave
perhaps the most balanced report of the day:
"The total number of casualties in the course of 
the night's and morning's shootings are trifling —  
two French killed and four wounded, one Annamese 
killed,** and an unspecified number, perhaps some 
dozens, more or less roughly handled.
It has been established that no casualties 
occurred in the taking over of the town hall...
The Annamese were taken by surprise and the French 
troops, in accordance with orders, fired at the 
walls and roof."
Buckley then described the unnecessarily brutal conduct of the
French, citing the breakdown in French discipline:
"It hardly seemed necessary that women and striplings 
should be kept seated on the ground with their hands 
above their heads several hours after the shooting 
had stopped in the center of Saigon. This I saw.
Such treatment was entirely contrary to the orders 
issued by Col. C&lile and Col. Riviere."
Buckley warned that the Annamese might well react violently to
such wanton provocation by the French. In the afternoon the city was
quiet except for some sniping in the northern suburbs, of which Buckley
wrote:
"Japanese troops are responsible for the clearing 
up of this area —  not the least Gilbertian episode 
in a situation which, while brushing the fringe of 
the tragic, has strong elements of comic opera."
* The least accurate, most politically biased, and most misleading 
reports were undoubtedly those of Harold Isaacs, whose earlier 
history of China had been "heartily recommended" to Indian 
revolutionaries by Trotsky,
** Not a single Vietnamese was killed in the whole operation.
He had introduced his story by saying, "The solution of the 
problem of rule in Indo-China will depend primarily upon French ability 
to exercise tact and conciliation."
On the morning of the 23rd the Post, Telephone and Telegraph Office 
was handed to the French at 0600 by 1/1 GR; the jail was handed over 
at 1130. However, a mass escape was attempted when the prisoners saw 
the French resuming control and a number of prisoners and Vietnamese 
warders escaped. The mutiny was contained when the Gurkhas took back 
control of the jail at 1 !+00 hours.
What should have been a simple and painless operation got out of
hand for one reason: the state of mind of the French ex-POWs and civilians.
After their harsh experience of imprisonment and humiliation at the
hands of the Asians, -the French population went wild on seeing the
Tricoleur flying once more over the city hall. Had the French troops
maintained their discipline the French civilian population would in all
probability have been held in check, but mob hysteria, like fear, is
contagious. One of the British officers who arrived in Saigon within
hours of the coup stated quite simply that fear underlay the French
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reaction in the wake of the coup.  ^ The Japanese had permitted the 
Viet Minh to take over guarding the 11th RIC, and on the 23rd, the sight 
of the fleeing Viet Minh proved too much and the French, back on top, 
lost control of themselves.
Gracey*s only real worry about the coup was the behaviour of the
French, and he had repeatedly stressed the need for discipline above all
to C^dile and Riviere, who assured him that the French troops were 
well-officered and tightly controlled. As Maunsell said later:
"There is no doubt that Gracey thought that it would
be a pushover —  he believed C<£dile and had been told 
it innumerable times. The information the British 
had about the Viet Minh was that they would not resist.
The information about the French was that C<£dile had 
tight control over them, that this was not at all a 
difficult task, and would be simply done —  and that 
once done, it would provide a substantial, useful step 
forward for the furtherance of the gradual takeover 
from the British by the French." 3°
The French state of mind, as evidenced by the events described above, 
differed greatly from that of the British. This is well described, though 
on a personal level by Brigadier Maunsell, though it helps to explain why 
the British would do all in their power to get the French reinstalled in 
city hall. Although the words are Maunsell*s own, the gist of the 
statement was echoed by every former British officer interviewed, without 
a single exception:
"Most of us had been fighting the Japanese since 
* 1+2 and had not seen our families in 3 » 3'i years.
Newsmen and latter-day academics did not understand 
the British frame of mind in this regard.
This was a very irritating postscript to the war.
We were not interested in anything past defeating 
the Japs. For 90%, the A-bomb was a complete 
surprise. Most thought that only a landing in 
Japan would end the war, and there was talk of it 
from time to time —  Tiger Force was being prepared.
Suddenly, the war was over, and I went to Rangoon 
to meet Numata —  this was the first inkling of an 
unwelcome postscript to the war. All talk was about 
the Japanese —  no one had ever heard of the Viet Minh.
Mansergh [NEl], Evans [Siam], Gracey [FIC] —  all 
talk was once they got the Japs under control in those
various places, there wouldn't be any other trouble...
It never entered our heads that there would be a
problem caused from any other source than the Japanese..."
Until the draft "Masterdom" plan was produced, neither Gracey 
nor Maunsell had given the matter much thought.
"Then it started to dawn on us that this was going 
to be something, (a), that we'd never experienced;
(b), we knew absolutely nothing about at all,
because we knew how you fought a war, and we knew
how you fought a peace, but we didn't know how you
did anything in between."
That was the view from the top. The view from the bottom was identical.
Major M. Kelleher, a 3/1 Gurkha company commander, said that none of the
officers wished to see their troops suffer casualties especially since the 
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war was over. The British were there to keep, order and ship the Japanese
home —  all the rest concerned only the French and Vietnamese, and the
sooner the French took over the better, for the sooner the British/Indian 
forces could leave. This attitude was an important factor in assessing 
British-French cooperation throughout all the coup operations. And no 
one was more loath to accept needless casualties, and is still remembered
for it, than Douglas Gracey.
Gracey's own description of the coup was written just twelve 
months after the event:
"9, By secret and very skilfully executed arrangements,
a proportion of the best of the French prisoners of 
war were armed, and in spite of the fact that the 
fly-in of 80 Brigade had been much delayed by bad 
weather, and only half the expected number of troops 
had arrived, on the orders of the Allied commander 
the French government was installed in SAIGON, on 
September 23rd, and the puppet government evicted.
This revolution was noisy but there were no fatal 
casualties to the Annamite puppet government, or 
to their evicted police, though some rough handling 
and a few unnecessary reprisals by the French forces 
took place; this was natural under the circumstances, 
but was over-emphasized by various Press correspondents, 
who had the first chance, after being unmuzzled by 
censorship since 1939 * of free and unfettered 
expression.
It would be as well to state here that, considering 
all the circumstances, the Press correspondents, 
having collected in large numbers in the initial 
stages of the occupation of F.I.C., were most fair 
on the whole in their reports and comments, with the 
exception of those few, mostly of a poor calibre, 
who were representatives of papers whose policy was 
anti-British, anti-French and in fact anti-anything 
which was sound policy. ■
10. Before the 23rd September and on that day, British 
troops had taken over from Japanese and Annamite 
troops, the essential dock area, the power house 
and key electrical installations, the head water­
works and one or two key police stations. French 
troops were made responsible for the key areas 
in SAIGON itself, and all other vital points were 
guarded by Japanese troops, including the various 
outlying areas in which French nationals had been 
concentrated." 33
Gracey felt revulsion and anger at the French reaction, but, being 
the man he was, he accepted full responsibility. Brigadier Maunsell 
still remembers vividly Gracey*s reaction when reports of French excesses 
were brought to him by indignant British officers. A few hours after 
the coup Gracey was in a "great rage." He asked Maunsell, "Have you 
heard what they've done?" Maunsell said no, he had not, and Gracey 
described the details of the French behaviour.
Gracey then sent for Colonel Cedile, who had been up all night with 
the principals in the coup. Gracey summoned them all to his office and 
"addressed them like pickpockets." Gracey began his severe dressing down 
of the shaken French leaders by saying, "Never have I been so let down 
in my life!" He ended by saying that the whole lot would be disarmed.
Cedile, who had been let down to a greater extent than Gracey, said 
how genuinely sorry he was. Gracey snapped at Cedile with "that wasn't 
the slightest good, and he was not to reappear again until he could give 
an assurance that these who should have been disarmed were disarmed, those 
who had committed excesses were to be punished, and what it [the punishment 
was, and there was nothing more to be said!"-' Cedile left, a "shaken 
man", looking like "an enormous, great spaniel which had been kicked in
the face. He looked like a nervous breakdown when he arrived; you 
can imagine what he looked like when he left!" And echoing a 
universally-shared opinion, Maunsell said, "VJhen Gracey signalled 
Mountbatten that it was on his orders the coup began, it was typical 
of Gracey to take full responsibility for the plan, once having been 
convinced of its merits.1*
Gracey*s report to Mountbatten was as follows:
" 1. On my orders early 23 September FRENCH troops
took over guard of police stations and Government 
buildings from ANNAMITE Armed Police and Guarde 
Civile. Latter are the Armed Forces of VIET MINH 
Provisional Government.
2. Take over successfully though noisely accomplished 
though some disturbances mostly sniping still occurs 
at II4OO hours, in Northern suburbs.
3. Japanese therefore ordered clear this area and 
ensure collection all arms.
1+. Throughout the principle of minimum force was 
genuinely intended by French Leaders. Recently 
re-armed untrained and indisciplined French Troops 
indulged in many FEU DE JOIE which gave wrong 
impression of battle in progress.
5. Casualties up to 1i;00 hours. FRENCH - killed 2, 
possible 3» wounded I4. ANNAMITES - killed and 
wounded Nil.
6. Excitable French civilians indulged in unnecessary 
oppression of Annamites. Cedille fully agreed my 
firm intention treating all such acts as breaches 
law and order under Proclamation just issued.
He is issuing s t e m  warning to French civilians to 
this effect.
7. There has been no known attempt by ANNAMITE or 
FRENCH to harm my Forces. Disarmament of Annamese 
by GURKHAS of [or] Indians proceeded voluntarily. 
Unfortunately insufficient own troops to accomplish 
complete disarmament.
8 . Cedille will now immediately start means to effect ^  
gradual resu[m]ption by French of overall Adm Control."
The situation immediately following the coup is best described by 
Gracey in his telegram ^f 2)4 September to Major General Pyman, ALFSEA 
Chief of Staff:
"Situation today has deteriorated due to following:
(a ) Annamite armed bands determined on Anti-French 
action and sabotage.
(b ) Lukewarm Jap a,cbion to intervene between Annamite 
and French.
(C) Success achieved by Annamite in setting 
fire to Gigareira Factory.
(D) Necessity to curb French troops activities 
owing their instability with resultant 
loss of strength.
2. Action taken.
(A) All own troops employed keeping order. Only 
serious incident involving own troops occurred 
as Annamites attempted to b u m  Power House.
Attempt frustrated with casualties. Own troops 
killed 1 wounded 2.
(b ) Japanese troops employed clearing areas 
reserved for them alone. No concerted action 
by my troops with Jap troops.
(c) On Cedilles wish am making every endeavour 
to have Annamite leaders found to assist 
control their own armed bands and to discuss 
cooperation with French.
(D) Have confined unreliable French Forces to 
barracks. Am only using minimum essential.
3. French casualties not fully known. Confirmed 7 
civilians killed 1 French Officer and 2 other ranks 
killed U other ranks wounded.
1+. Considered fly in of remainder 80 Brigade must be 
given priority. Am still short of 1^ - Battalions.
5. Appreciation follows early a.m. 25 September when 
events of night will enable me to give comprehensive 
picture and probable trend of future events." 36
Mountbatten passed the information to the Chiefs of Staff and
discussed the substance of his recent Miscellaneous staff meetings. He
drew the Chiefs* attention to the fact that "Leclerc has rejected as
impracticable the solution of parallel and independent British and 
37French commands.""^ Whereas Gracey had authorized the coup, and indeed
had based all his assumptions on the anticipated arrival of his complete
division, Mountbatten was now (on 21+ September) suggesting the following
to the Chiefs:
"The first essential seems to me to avoid building 
up our forces in FIC for the stronger we are the 
more the French will feel they can take provocative 
action against Annamites relying on presence of 
powerful British forces who may than be brought into 
conflict with indigenous population. It is mainly for 
this reason that I have recommended in my SEACOS U9G 
TOO 2^1201 Z the removal of southern FIC from my threatre 
at earliest possible date. When I suggested stopping 
our buildup to Leclerc he was quite horrified and said 
it would be surest way to invite civil strife and
bloodshed if we were weak. He claimed that since 
we were responsible for FIC South of 16 degrees under 
Tokyo surrender terms we could not evade our 
responsibilities and leave European population at 
the mercy of a native uprising. Slim agreed that 
we were not strong enough at present to prevent 
this rising outside key areas." 38
Mountbatten added that he did not press the issue with Leclerc
"As I feel that it is essential for me to maintain friendly relations
with my Allied Commanders-in-Chief. Furthermore, Gracey*s proclamation
"has in fact stabilised southern part of FIC", and Mountbatten now
"strongly" recommendedthat it not be cancelled. Continued Mountbatten:
"If we stop our building up now the French forces 
although they will actually exceed British forces 
in FIC on 20th October,39 may still seem to Leclerc 
insufficient for taking over: in which case I consider 
he should be ordered to do so by French Government 
if H.M.G. wish to avoid committing themselves indefinitely.
During intervening month I think we can maintain order 
by means of Japanese and thus avoid a clash between 
our forces and local population but there will then 
be only very weak forces to disarm 60,000 Japanese.
The Japanese, however, seem perfectly ready to 
co-operate."
The final paragraph was most significant, for this appears to be 
the first inclination that Gracey had that he was to confine himself 
to key areas:
"I have re-affirmed orders to Gracey that he is not 
to employ British forces outside key areas unless
called upon by French in which case matter is to be
referred through me to H.M.G." *
While these far-reaching events were occurring, there were less
weightly matters to consider. In "Defeat Into Victory" Slim has
described how the British ignored MacArthur's desire that the Japanese
be allowed to keep their swords. The question arose when Evans, in
Bangkok, told Slim that the Japanese 18 Area Army had received a message
from Tokyo, relaying a MacArthur ruling. The Japanese message said:
"In case sword in question is a private possession 
of Jap Officers or others we will allow the owner 
to keep such sword as there will be no military 
significance attached to it and can be recognised 
as a treasure. While wearing of such a sword is 
prohibited however." 1+0
* A similar directive went simultaneously to Major General Evans in Bangkok.
Evans had told the Japanese in his area that Slim’s orders stood, 
regardless of their citing the MacArthur edict, but wanted confirmation 
from Slim. With tongue in cheek Evans added, "Very difficult to 
discriminate private from other swords."
On 2k September Terauchi asked permission to send an aircraft with 
two officers and an interpreter to Tokyo, where they would contact his 
family in Nagano Prefecture and return with his family sword.
By 2k September, 12 motor junks had been handed over to the French 
in order to take food to Haiphong and return with coal.
On 2J4 September, also, SEAC Headquarters received a message sent
the day before by the Control Commission. It said that the gathering of
intelligence was increasing with the build-up of Allied troops. Admiral
Chudo had been taken into custody and evacuated on 23 September. He had
faked an illness but the British Medical Officer was not fooled, and
Chudo then tried to fake his temperature chart. The Japanese had destroyed
all their naval codes and ciphers. Four reconnaissance float planes had
been found in good condition at Bien Hoa. The Viet Minh boycott was
continuing, and Dutch ex-POWs had volunteered to keep the hotels and
other services going. The general opinion was that the greater portion
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of the local population were being terrorized by the Viet Minh.
On 23 September, 20 Indian Division Operational Order Number had 
been published in confirmation of verbal instructions of 21 September.
This order dealt with the proposed establishment of headquarters in Phnom 
Penh and Cam Ranh Bay, to be commanded respectively by Brigadier Hirst, 
Royal Artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray, of U/10 GR representing 
100 Brigade. It was a modest effort, involving but 31 officers and men, 
including signals personnel, to Phnom Penh, and 1+1 men to Cam Ranh Bay.
Headquarters ALFSEA now directed Gracey that in view of the attitude 
of the Labour Government he was to restrict the use of British troops to
the absolute minimum; therefore his plan to send troops to Cam Ranh Bay
was cancelled. He was advised to send French troops instead and tell 
Terauchi to instruct l:he Japanese there to obey Jh^ French. This wa.s easie 
said than done, for under no circumstances would the Japanese directly 
cooperate with the French a.t that time. Gracey replied that from what he 
had seen of French troops during what should have been a simple operation 
on the 23rd he could not concur in dispatching French forces to Cam Ranh:
"Realize French troops here not seasoned but
Corps Leger who reputed trained troops have 
no experience and are not trained sufficiently.
Possible that troops following may be better 
but they still have to be good enough to avoid 
strife by landing in very tricky situation." ij.2
On the 23rd the French had been "unnecessarily provocative and 
undisciplined. "
Headquarters SACSEA was worried about adverse publicity about the
coup and asked Gracey about the "lurid" account by the Daily Herald
correspondent. Some of the press reporting was as politically slanted
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then as it was 30 years later. Harold Isaacs, among others, reported 
that "Viet Minh sentries were shot down." He reported no French deaths, 
yet there were two Frenchmen killed and no Vietnamese at all. The 
standard of press reporting varied greatly, from extremist writing of 
this kind to the factual and objective accounts of the Times and the 
Daily Telegraph.
On 2I4 September the British relieved the French guards on the 
Artillery and Naval Headquarters, then handed them back to the French 
later on in the day. Presumably, this briefly freed French forces for 
other operations, and by late afternoon the French had also relieved 
the British from the task of guarding the Continental and Majestic Hotels. 
But as the 1/1 Gurkha Rifles War Diary noted, "Normal MISSION guard duties 
continued amid these kaleidoscopic changes."
The Vl'et Minh reacted instinctively, and two platoons of Jarvis's 
Gurkhas were sent to help the small Hybad detachment in driving off an 
attack on the power station. The Viet Minh managed to set fire to part 
of the station before being repelled with the loss of 2 dead and several 
wounded.
At 1.600 hours Major Charles Blascheck, a veteran of some of the 
heaviest Burma combat, brought his D Company from 3/1 GR to reinforce 
temporarily 1/1 GR and was in action almost immediately. As soon as 
night fell the electric power failed; the station had just been taken over 
by the 20th Division's engineers after the Annamite workers had fled.
This was "the first of a succession of irritating and nightly failures 
for some weeks." The trouble prevented the 100 Brigade's advance party 
from moving cut of Saigon, and they were now given responsibility (under 
Lieutenant Colonel Murray) for Saigon's North Sector, Saigon having 
been divided into two for more effective control immediately after the 
coup. Under North Sector were 1/1 GR, some French forces and 2 Japanese
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regiments. The area was bounded in the north by the Arroyo de 1*Avalanche, 
and in the south by Hue Verdun.
One of the 1/1 Gurkha Rifles officers expressed the generally felt 
bitterness towards some of the hostile press reporting. Similar reporting 
was later to prove one of the most important factors in ensuring 
Communist victory in Vietnam. The Gurkhas commented on the "fantastic" 
inaccuracies of the press, "always excluding the "Times" [not the 
New York Times 1. One learns at last, the hard way, the bitter truth 
that there is no truth."
A press conference, described as "ghastly" by Maunsell, was held 
shortly after the coup. Gracey was attacked by the American and 
Australian reporters, whose political sympathies were well known, and 
was "given hell" for rearming the Japanese following MacArthur*s statement 
that the Japanese were disarmed. Gracey was a "wonderful target" for the 
Press, and was asked why he was not following MacArthur's orders. No one
knew at that time that Mansergh was doing the same thing in the Netherlands
East Indies. Gracey grew angry and said that the reporters did not
understand the East. Maunsell, over 30 years later, laughed as he
described what followed. The American replied that "The East is as 
unscrutable today as it was yesterday, and following this press conference 
is even more inscrutable." This "really set Gracey off", and about that 
time the Viet Minh attacked the Power Station and the lights went off.
The conference continued in flickering candlelight, with sporadic bursts 
of gunfire and bullets whistling outside, and ended up being "really quite 
funny". '
South Sector was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Purcell, commanding 
3/1 Gurkha Rifles; under him were his own battalion less Blascheckfs 
company, 1/19 Hybads, elements of I4 Dogra, some French police and a Japanese
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regiment. Purcell^s battalion had just arrived in the afternoon of the 
2i|th, and had driven through a French-Viet Minh firefight en route from 
Tan Sdn Nhuft to Saigon, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) E. "Fairy" 
Gopsill, a big, barrel-chested officer who had transferred the Gurkhas 
from the Parachute Regiment, recalled that the battalion was driven from 
the airfield to Saigon by Japanese drivers. A few minutes after leaving 
Tan Sdn Nhu!t a Gurkha NCO, standing up in the bed of the truck, leaned 
over and tapped Gopsill on the shoulder; Gopsill was riding in the cab 
with the driver. The NCO said to Gopsill in Gurkhali, "Sahib, look over 
there.1 " Ahead of them raged a fierce gun battle between French soldiers
and Viet Minh partisans. Dead and wounded men lay alongside the road,
and the "battalion passed a busy Viet Minh first aid post situated on the
verge of the highway. The Gurkhas, rifles and sten guns at the ready,
passed through without incident.
The 3/1 Gurkha Rifles were met at their barracks, a school, by
their commander, Lieutenant Colonel "Percy" Purcell, who had flown
in several days earlier. Purcell told them, 'Gfou^e going into Cholon",
and the Gurkhas were directed to establish a base area as quickly as
possible. This they did and were immediately fired on by the Viet Minh;
this was the start of several days of heavy street fighting for 3/1 GR.
The battalion1s arrival coincided with a horrific incident in which
diehard Vichyists crucified a naked and shaven Frenchwoman upside down
in front of the Cathedral; she was a Gaullist who had operated an escape
route for downed Allied fliers, and had been betrayed by her own husband.
Il9It immediately prejudiced many of the new arrivals against the French.
Throughout the night of 2h September sporadic firing was heard 
all over Saigon, especially in the southern area bordered by the Arroyo 
Chinois, where the French and Viet Minh were engaged in a series of small 
fights. The Viet Minh succeeded in penetrating a police commissariat on 
Rue Fonok, near the northern tip of Khanh Hdi island, and set fire to it —  
the French suffered A casualties. "A" company of 2/8 Punjab were called 
out to clear the Viet Minh from an area around the cemeteries about 800
c
yards west of 80 Brigade headquarters, between Saigon and Cholon, and 
1 Vietnamese was killed —  the Hybads took the Treasury, Power Station and 
a police commissariat —  a heavy fight broke out at the power station as 
200 Viet Minh troops succeeded in setting fire to the coal dump near 
the main plant; the fire was quickly brought under control, but 1 of the 
Hybads was killed and 2 were wounded — * the Viet Minh suffered 3 dead.
A 1/19 Hybad section was dispatched to the northern area to reinforce the 
guard on Radio Saigon, and the Japanese were ordered to strengthen their 
guard on the important rice storage area on the Canal des Porteries following
A
a tip that the Viet Minh planned to destroy if.
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arrived, and 2 sorties had completed, the buildup of 1/l1 Hybad.
Of these events the Commander of 1/1 Gurkha Rifles later wrote:
"V.hat occurred now affected me more than anything 
else in these operations; this was the death of a 
sentry of 1 Hybad, with whom we had been brigaded
ever since 6 Div. the "Paiforce" Horae Guard 
["Persia and Iraq Force": this potentially 
splendid Div. spent the whole war guarding 
oil wells, except for our lucky Bde.] had been 
formed at Secunderabad in April 1 •  • • it 
struck me how tragic it was that he should have 
survived a whole ’real* war, and then have lost 
his life in a country and for a cause in which 
he had only the remotest interest. That was the 
first casualty that hit me personally; it was 
unexpected, and there were of course more to 
come which affected me more closely but not so 
deeply, because by that time we had changed gear 
back into a war-time frame of mind. I think 
that the sepoy himself and his companions would 
simply regard it as the will of God: after all 
they were simply volunteer/professional/mercenary 
soldiers (as one happens to look at it)."50
Gracey was never to waver in his belief that the coup had been
absolutely necessary, and that no alternative c o u r s e  existed at that
time. In this he was reinforced, 13 years after his death, by a former
member of the Force 136 intelligence team sent to Saigon with the Control
Commission. Said Hugh Astor:
"When the British arrived in Saigon the intention 
was to try and work with the Yiet Minh."
But there was no such thing as a "Yiet Minh":
"British Intelligence soon discovered that the 
[Yiet Minh] guards on the buildings, etcetera, 
were a facade, and that any agreement entered 
into with the Yiet Minh could easily be abrogated 
by some other equally strong' a group, such as the 
Trotskyits and others, which often disagreed with 
them. It was a hopeless situation with no foreseeable 
chances of improvement, so the coup was decided on." 51
This implies a condition of anarchy which would eventually reach a 
flash point and explode. In medical terms, Gracey lanced the abscess by 
acting decisively at a time of his own choosing, for Yiet Minh leaflets 
had stated quite clearly that they meant to launch an attack at some 
time in the future.
His official report on the coup, as distinct from his personal
feelings, said the following:
"9* The promises given to General GBACHY by 
the leaders of the French, both civil and military, 
that minimum force and iron discipline would be 
assured during the coup d ’etat proved a false 
assurance by their instability and indiscipline, 
by their emotional behaviour and unnecessary 
violence the French soldiers, their police and 
civilians, invited active counter-measures as
soon as the ANNAMITES could gather themselves 
together.
10. It has always been a matter of great 
doubt whether the ANNAMITE people would under­
stand, let alone believe,in the re-birth of 
France; the excesses of the 23rd September, “\3U5t 
ensured that this difficulty would be even greater.
The fact that a new France had fought gloriously 
to free her own country, and had proved victorious, 
was not known in French Indo-China; the reason is 
that the number of educated ANNAMITES is a very 
small proportion of the population; all such 
information therefore would have to be disseminated 
to the remainder by the small educated minority; 
under the VIET MINH control it is safe to say that 
steps would be taken to ensure that what change 
of heart had taken place in France would be mis­
represented to the ANNAMITE population, even if 
it reached them at all." 52
By 21+ September, when the Viet Minh was gathering its forces to
launch a series of attacks on the city, British forces in Saigon
comprised the whole or greater part of the following: Headquarters 80
Brigade, 1/1 GR, 1/19 Hybad, 3/1 GR, Defense Company 2/8 Punjab, Tactical
Headquarters 1+ Dogra, 55 Field Ambulance, and Headquarters Saigon Control 
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On 21+/25 September the Viet Minh began their war. Writing not long 
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after those events Trridhg Chinh, a prominent Communist theoretician, said:
"Peoples power had scarcely been founded in Viet Nam 
when the British forces... landed in Indo-China...
On September 231 armed and protected by the British 
forces, the French colonialists launched their attack 
and occupied Saigon. Our people replied by force 
of arms, and from that moment, our heroic resistance 
began." 5^
The struggle endured until the Spring of 1975*
On the night of 2J+/25 September there occurred an incident so full 
of horror that it coloured events in Saigon for some time. In a north 
central section of Saigon, the Cit£ Heyraud district, a screaming horde 
of Vietnamese appeared and entered the houses: th^y murdered about 1p0 
French civilians, a great many of J'hom being women and 'drildr^n. An 
equal number were token away, and many were subsequently tortured, mutilate 
and killed. The area was guarded by Japanese troops at the time, but 
these stood by and allowed the mob to pass through. This incident, possibl 
more than any other, may have convinced Gracey that the Vietnamese 
population was beyond the control of any responsible organization.
* A Company, which had flown in on 16 September.
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The Viet Minh and their sympathizers later blamed the Binh Xuyen 
gang for the slaughter, but this allegation is disputed by those who
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had contact with the Binh Xuyen, The Binh Xuyen was a brigand group 
which seldom engaged in any activity which did not return it profit.
The Cit£ Heyraud massacre was totally different in character from all 
normal Binh Xuyen activity and those familiar with the group refuse to 
believe it could have had any part in the affair. In fact, Colonel 
Marcel Mingant, of French Intelligence, stated unequivocally that 
subsequent investigation revealed without question that the massacre 
was the work of the Trotskyists, ^ He also independently confirmed 
Astor’s assertion that at that time and in that area the Viet Minh "was 
not an identity". The sects had not yet acquired their later influence 
and the Viet Minh was composed in large measure of 17 and 18 year old 
youths.
The momentum of violence carried over to the 25th, when a large
fire was started among disused bashas about 800 yards south of 80 Brigade
*
Headquarters. The central market was attacked and set on fire, and 2 more 
French civilians were kidnapped during the riot. Ore Viet Minh partisan 
was shot near a commissariat in Cholon. Small clearing operations took 
place all over Saigon, with heavy action occurring along the Boulevard 
Gallieni, in the South Sector. Here the Viet Minh opened fire with light 
machine guns, rifles and pistols. "A" Company, 1/1 GR, searched the 
north Saigon area enclosed by Rue Legrand de la Liraye - Rue Paul Blanchy - 
Arroyo de 1 ’Avalanche; they found no firearms but removed daggers from a 
number of Vietnamese and, more important, found y\ French women and children 
who were locked up in a house on the outskirts of Saigon, near the arroyo
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and the road to Tan Soh Nhu’t. The Viet Minh guards fled on sight of the 
Gurkhas, and the rescued civilians were probably survivors of the Cite 
Heyraud bloodbath.
The fighting along Boulevard Gallieni involved 3/1 Gurkha Rifles.
They were conducting a sweep of the large aroa between Rue de Verdun and 
the Quad Belgique (in the south, on the Arroyo Chinois). Boulevard 
Gallieni ran northeast-southwest, about 3 blocks from and paralleling the 
Arroyo Chinois. The battalion found the road heavily blocked, with the 
entrenched Viet Minh using automatic weapons and grenade dischargers "quite 
freely.
* The flames spread through the small shops and booths, as the Viet Minh 
had stolen the fire engines 3 days earlier. Smith, in OSS, accused the 
British of burning a large section of Saigon but forgot to mention this 
incident.
As the 3/1 GR historian said, "A tedious battle of street fighting 
ensued." As soon as the Gurkhas saw what they were up against they 
brought out their small 2 inch mortars and grenades and quickly cleared 
one block after another. Continued the 3/1 writer:
"Probably our greatest impression was the 
magnificent system of evacuation of casualties 
by the ANNAMITES. Red Cross Squads were 
always waiting on the scene of a battle and 
they got their casualties away remarkably quickly.
It was impossible to assess the number of 
casualties we gave the ANNAMITES by nightfall, 
when the search was completed, but we had none ^  
ourselves, despite a vast number of 'near misses'.
The confusion of the 2i+th was illustrated by the report of 2 
Vietnamese groups attacking each other, a fight which resulted in 10 
casualties.
The 2l;th may also have been the beginning of a change of heart 
towards the Japanese. The 1/1 GR recorder had written about the battalion' 
attitude on arriving in Saigon:
"The sight of Japanese sentries and armed piquets 
and the sensation of being driven by Japanese
chauffers were at first ludicrous in their
unexpectedness since we had all entered Indo-China 
with the idea of suppressing the Japs completely 
and kicking them around as hard as we could. However 
it soon became obvious that with the small number of 
troops at the disposal of the Mission, it was essential 
to make the fullest possible use of the Japanese while 
maintaining our own forces as a reserve." 58
After the 21+th there was little talk of suppressing the Japanese or
kicking them around. On returning from helping out 1/19 Hybad at the
Power Station, the 2 platoons of 1/1 GR (who were driven there by Japanese
soldiers in Japanese trucks) found the road back to the barracks heavily
blocked by felled trees. As it was getting dark the Gurkhas dismounted
and the Japanese were told to make their way back with their trucks as
best they could; the Gurkhas would return to their area on foot.
"They had not gone far however before the Japs, 
who had discovered a way round, rejoined and
drove them back the rest of the way. This was
the first; of s. series of incidents that showed
a remarkable cooperation on their part in carrying
out the terms of the treaty." 59
Although Gracey, on the 2l+th, had again asked ALFSEA to send him 
the rest of his division, as late as 26 September 100 Brigade was alerted 
for a move directly to Borneo.
On 23 September, as the coup was taking place, 2967 Field
Squadron, RAF Regiment, sailed from Madras to Rangoon, later to 
embark again for Saigon. And arriving in Saigon on the 23rd was Major 
J.H. Clark, of 92 Indian Field Company (Indian Engineers), who later 
described the critical power situation in Saigon:
!,A1 though they had surrendered, the Japs 
controlled everything, acting under British 
orders. They gave orders to the French 
civilian engineers who were responsible for 
the power station and other smaller generating 
stations, and for the water supply. These 
French engineers merely controlled the plant 
through skilled Annamite foremen and mechanics, 
and were not themselves capable of doing any 
repairs, nor did they know the more intricate 
details of the machinery, nor the layout of 
the electrical and water supply systems correctly, 
for which up-to-date plans were not available.
When the trouble started, the whole Annamite 
labour forces, skilled and unskilled, ran away, 
and it was found that the French engineers 
could not cope on their own." 60
In fact,
"The operation of the main CHOLON power house 
at this stage was distinctly international.
With a British RE Officer in charge it was 
kept going by a couple of French technicians, 
assisted by Indian sappers and Japanese Naval 
ratings, Japanese soldiers doing the stoking, 
the whole guarded by a Gurkha platoon and 
sniped and grenaded during the night by Annamites.
The 20 Division historian described the situation after the 
coup as follows:
"The effect of the coup d fetat and the elimination 
of the YIET MINH Government from SAIGON was the 
signal for'a general strike of all Annamite labour 
and, by intimidation, of nearly all Chinese trade 
with Europeans. This had been foreseen and could 
only be countered by the use of large Japanese 
labour force on the docks, airfield, power stations, 
for sanitary services etc; but it threw a big 
strain on the Divisional Engineer, Suppl3r and 
Medical Se^vic^m Jaoar.esp coeT)<a"rta.t i v~
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Gracey*s own description of the events of the past two days is as 
follows:
"Annamite reactions to the coup d'etat were 
uncoordinated, thanks entirely to its timeliness,
* In 195G Major Clark wrote an account of the Saigon operation in the 
Roya.l Engineers Journal.
secrecy and the surprise gained; very strong 
attacks were made on the power station, and 
attempts were made to seize and block the road 
between the airfield and the town. All these 
were successfully beaten off, and gradually, 
as the remainder of 80 Brigade was flown in, the 
weather having improved, the vital areas of SAIGON, 
including the docks, were made secure and the 
airfield defenses improved and strengthened.
Hooligan reaction was barbaric. Several French 
nationals, men, women and children, mostly half- 
caste or loyal Annamites, were murdered most 
foully, including some who had spent their lives 
in excellent service to the Annamites. The main 
market, some factories and warehouses, railway 
stations, and workshops were burnt, often in full 
view of Japanese troops, who were guarding vital 
areas nearby-. It was obvious that the Japanese
Army had not been informed of the necessity for
absolute obedience to S.A.C.'s orders by their 
commanders." 63
The next day, on the 25th, Terauchi was summoned to Gracey*s office,
of which more will be said later.
Of the Cit£ Heyraud massacre itself, Cedile later strongly hinted 
of possible Annamite-Japanese cooperation when he said that a company of 
Japanese troops had allowed the Viet Minh to pass through. Cedile
verified Maunsellrs account of Gracey's reaction to French behaviour.
The coup was carried out by
"French civilians, with the help of a few released 
POWs and British troops, and they together, who 
had suffered under the Viet Minh, who were their 
enemy (a very nasty enemy), they turned against 
the Viet Minh, and General Gracey was very angry 
about this. He was angry with good reason and he
ordered the POWs to be returned to barracks.
He wasn't well equipped and don't forget that the 
whole Japanese Army was still armed. The Japanese 
had only just begun to be disarmed, and he, like us, 
had very little information. General Gracey was 
saying to himself, 'well, if things start going 
badly, what should we do? There are hardly any 
planes, we're a long way from help in Singapore 
and Rangoon, ' When ho saw the fact of the French 
civilians and rearmed troops composed of prisoners 
of war, that their maneuvers were not going well, 
he wanted me to return all the French troops to 
their barracks.
I had to obey him —  be had his reasons at the 
time. But during the night there was this 
incident at the Cit£ Heyraud, and also one could 
see the Viet Minh revolutionaries, quite a lot
of them, around in the streets, shooting with 
their revolvers, and quite a lot of French were 
killed.
So I had to go and see him* This meeting was 
quite dramatic. I told him, 'General, I'm afraid 
I have the responsibility for the French civil 
population. I can't allow women and children to 
be shot and killed, so please help us by allowing 
us to bring back the rearmed POWs into the street.'
At first he said no, but then kindly agreed wijh 
me and said, in fact, 'All right, my dear boy, you 
are right,' and very soon after that we had the 
French troops back in the streets." 61+
The period was reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion, with British, 
Indian, Japanese, French, Australian and Butch contingents patrolling 
the streets of Saigon? on this occasion, however, the Americans were 
sympathetic to the other side. The Viet Minh repaid American moral 
support by immediately murdering the senior American officer.
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CHAPTER IX
THE FIRST AMERICAN CASUALTY
"I heard a long time after from the Viet 
Minh. They said, *We did a wrong thing. 
Mr. Dewey had been killed, and this is no 
good for us.f "
Colonel Miarcel Mingant 
French Army.
When reports of the coup and the Vi£t Minh counterattacks reached
SEAC Headquarters it was decided to dispatch a senior officer to survey
the situation in Saigon personally. Brigadier Mjyers, with his unique
SOE experience as Head of Mission to the Greek Resistance, was summoned
"by Major General Penney, SEAC*s Director of Intelligence, to Mountbatten^
office, where he was briefed by Mountbatten in Slimrs presence. Mirers
was told to get to the bottom of the problems in Saigon and to find out
how the British could achieve their military objectives (the disarmament
of the Japanese) without becoming involved in the Pranco-Vietnamese
troubles, which were deemed none of Britain*s business. As had been
pointed out, memories of Scobiers experience in Athens were fresh at
SEAC Headquarters.
Mfcrers was ordered to report to Slim*s office before he left, where
Slim satisfied himself on Myers's terms of reference after reminding
the latter that he was operating in Slim's territory. Myers then took
off for Saigon via Bangkok in a Mosquito aircraft. The weather was
atrocious en route to Saigon, with zero visibility in heavy monsoon rain.
At times they were flying near treetop altitude when they got lost and
eventually ran out of fuel. Due to the urgency of the mission the pilot, in
making what could well have been a fatal decision, accepted an aircraft
that had been officially classified as unserviceable. "Nothing worked
on it," recalled Myers —  even the intercom was inoperative. They were
very fortunate to find a small field which Myers spotted by chance, about
30 or i+O miles out of Saigon, where they landed their Mosquito, fuel tanks
dry. They crash-landed in the midst of a party of surprised Japanese,
who were meeting the Allies for the first time.
On 2$ September Gracey telegraphed Mountbatten that Myers had
arrived, "and after discussion I consider following immediate full report
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on PIC is urgent." Gracey went over his actions since 13 September:
"2. On arrival Saigon I considered my main 
priority tasks as Porce Comd and Mission Cmnd. were 
fa) To establish effective control of HQ, Southern Army.
(b) To ensure earliest possible succour and evacuation 
of RAPWI.
(c) To preserve law and order.
(d) To effect earliest possible disarmament Jap forces."-^
Gracey said that the "self-styled Viet Nam Southern Republic"
government "constituted [a] menace to law and order through its lack of 
control. No legal process was operative. Inactive mob rule was only 
proper description of situation". Furthermore, the Viet Minh government 
was set up "under Japanese connivance", and no administrative services
were operating in Saigon, although the "essential public services" 
were still functioning. Gracey also knew where the real power lay:
"Main control Vi$t Minh party exercised from Hanoi was definitely vested 
in this provisional govt, for all southern areas of PIC." Gracey then 
stated simply why he could not recognize the Viet Minh, although a number 
of his senior officers have stated unequivocally that his actions were 
not prejudicial:
"My brief contained instr[uction]s not to get 
involved politically. It was therefore 
impossible to have any dealings with Viet 
Minh Govt. Reestablishment of French was 
therefore urgently essential to enable introduction 
proper adm. services."
Gracey was stating that the city had been at a standstill [and great 
cities cannot stand still for very long before they begin to die]. There 
has been ample proof of this over recent years, whether the causes are war 
or natural disaster. His report continued by saying that the progressive 
disarmament of the Viet Minh Police had begun on 16 September, but 
"Insufficiency of [British] tps made it impossible for me to complete 
disarmament in this way". Cedile and Rivier then assured Gracey of the 
efficiency with which the French troops would finish the job, and 
"Although actual take over achieved success indiscipline of French troops 
and provocative acts of French civilians ensured later counter action by 
Annamese," who regard all French as Vichy and despise them. Graceyfs 
assessment of the situation was correct; there was a potential for trouble 
in Annam and Cochinchina, Laos had been infiltrated by the Viet Minh and 
could be a problem, but Cambodia was as yet relatively trouble-free. He 
then briefly traced the history of the Vietnamese resistance, mentioning 
the risings of 1930 and 19U0. His report concluded by saying that the 
Viet Minh strength had greatly increased since 9 March, the Japanese 
did not regard themselves as defeated by France, and the French had no 
prestige in the eyes of the Japanese. The appearance of French troops 
was producing a "violent reaction by Militant Annamites in their present 
mood." Japanese Headquarters was unexpectedly disorganized, and Japanese 
disarmament carried out by the French alone would bring on serious problems. 
Gracey*s recommendations to Mountbatten were:
(A) Accelerate move in of all repetition all 20 Div 
to carry out disarmament of Japanese.
(b ) Evacuate Japanese forces prior to departure
of British force.
(c) Ensure steady arrival of good tested French
tps immediately following British tps.
(D) Ensure minimum hiatus in passage of control
of law and order from British cum Japanese 
to French.
On 25 September Colonel C.R. Price, at the War Office, received 
a letter from the Foreign Office concerning "certain disquieting 
developments in Indo-China," where "In the view of the Foreign Office 
the situation is one in which we shall have to proceed with great 
caution."^- But the British objective "can only be attained if law and 
order are maintained," despite the War Off ice* s insistance on watering 
down the law and order section of the draft Civil Affairs agreement 
with the French, Although Mountbatten could call upon the Japanese 
forces "he cannot thereby divest himself of the final responsibility 
for ensuring law and order throughout the territories embraced in his 
command...."
Pricers attention was drawn to the precarious position of the 
British forces:
"Unfortunately, we must recognise that the mere 
presence of our forces in Indo-China may involve 
us in difficulties with the Americans, Chinese or 
French, depending on the policy we pursue. If 
the British forces endeavour to suppress anti- 
French activities on the part of the Vietnam 
party or other groups we shall open ourselves 
to attacks from American anti-imperialist opinion 
and no doubt from the Chinese, whereas a policy of complete 
non-intervention in domestic affairs would no doubt be 
interpreted by the French as a further step towards our 
alleged long-term objective of pushing them out of their 
colonial territories."
In view of this the Chiefs of Staff were asked to speed up the transfer
of French troops to Indochina. The British could not state publicly that
they were in French Indochina only to secure and disarm the Japanese and
to repatriate the prisoners of war and internees. No matter how tempted
they may have been to do so, "the danger is that it might be interpreted
as an indication of our intention to wash our hands of all internal
developments in Indo-China and as indicat ding that we do not accept any
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order." The revolutionary
elements would be encouraged by such an announcement, and the French
would have their "worst suspicions" confirmed.
The Foreign Office said that if Mountbatten felt compelled to make 
a statement on the situation, they would like him to state that while he 
did not wish to intervene in internal affairs he could not tolerate a 
breakdown in law and order, as this would impede his primary tasks.
The Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view, saying that "the announcement 
they propose is a fair statement of the role of British forces and that it 
should assist in the maintenance of order and thus the limitation of our 
commitment."
On the 25th, also, Mountbatten asked the Cabinet in London to
treat the move of the 9th DIC to Indochina as a matter of "over-riding
priority" and as close behind Massu*s Combat Command of the famed 2nd
Armored Division (the "Groupement Massu") as possible.
*
Exactly when Harry Brain reached Saigon remains uncertain, but
he submitted his first political report to Dening, his superior, on
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29 September. It complemented Gracey*s report, and suggested that 
the Yiet Minh leaders be brought under British protection to talks with 
Cedile and the French. Should the talks break down they "would then 
be exfiltrated from SAIGON and British protection." He thought that 
"such an action would not lay us open to blame politically and will 
demonstrate our impartiality." On 25 September a Yiet Minh broadcast 
from Hanoi radio protested against Graceyfs actions in Saigon.
In a message to the Foreign Office Dening referred to the recent 
meeting in which Leclercfs comments had produced heated discussion:
"I observed that there were political movements 
in many parts of SEAC, Burma, Malaya and Netherlands 
East Indies as well as Indo-China and I felt bound 
to advise Supreme Commander that in so far as these 
movements were political they were a matter for the 
Governments concerned and not for this Command.
General Leclerc argued that in Indo-China it was
not so much a question of political movements as
of pillage and banditry and he obviously wished to
imply that it was our duty to suppress these in
the process of maintaining law and order. He may
be right to some extent but the fact that there is 7
an independence movement is I think clearly established,"
The next paragraph was a dreary reminder that the Mountbatten- 
Wedemeyer dispute continued to the end:
"I am sending in clear further broadcasts from 
Hanoi radio. Admiral Mountbatten has already 
telegraphed to General Wedemeyer asking that 
he should stop broadcasts which are likely to 
upset law and order but nothing seems to have 
been done."
Dening*s concern, and perhaps despair, is-evident in his conclusion:
"The clouds are rolling up in the Far East 
and I think that there is a very serious 
danger of the west being regarded as aligning
* Brain was sent to Saigon to be Gracey*s Foreign Office adviser
until a permanent representative could arrive from the U.K. Brain, 
later Sir Norman H. Brain, was unsure of the exact date of his 
arrival, thinking that it was shortly after the coup [personal interview]. 
Donnison says that Brain arrived 10 days after Gracey, which would 
make it around 23 September. Gracey said that Brain arrived several 
days after the coup, but he probably arrived on the morning of the 25th.
itself against the east with incalculable 
consequences for the future of this Command 
including the set task of disarming Japanese 
forces in South East Asia. It is now clear 
in general that these forces are prepared to 
disarm themselves when we are ready for them 
to do so. Owing to lack of shipping and 
distance involved our forces are not in a 
position to maintain law and order against 
political unrest throughout the whole of the 
area of South East Asia and I would advise 
against attempting to undertake such a task.
It follows from this that if we are to avoid 
trouble full sovereignty should be resumed 
in French Indo-China and the Netherlands 
East Indies as soon as possible.
In the meantime Force Commanders in these 
areas are faced with an extremely difficult 
and delicate problem. In order to enable 
them to execute it with least possible harm 
to our assured British position in the Far
East I would urge that Supreme Commander be
given a very clear indication as to the limits 
of his responsibilities so that Force Commanders 
can be instructed accordingly."
On 26 September- Gracey, in receipt of the pertinent messages from 
Mountbatten to the Cabinet, telegraphed Mountbatten saying, irVery much 
regret that Proclamation was not according to policy, but I much appreciate
your very kind action to support me, I assure you I had no intention
of deploying my forces outside SAIGON-CHOLON key area and will not do so.
Q
I fully understand your instructions...." Gracey said that he had 
ordered Terauchi to report to Commission Headquarters in view of Japanese 
laxity in keeping the peace (and especially for their behaviour during 
the Cite Heyraud massacre).
Gracey gave Terauchi a biting reprimand:
"I expressed my views on Japanese disregard 
of orders and my orders for their future 
conduct very strongly. This includes orders 
for clearance of all roads North of the town.
I ordered TERAUCHI to live at his Headquarters 
and establish a 2b [hour? ] personal LO in a 
room of my own Headquarters. He expressed his 
shame at the events making these orders necessary 
and immediately left to carry them out."
Gracey reported that during the past 2b hours there had been a 
"considerable increase" in the abduction and murder of French men and 
women. There was "considerable evidence" of the reluctance of the
Japanese to intervene and they had been caught "red-handed" in refusing 
to fire on the Viet Minh; this is why he had called in Terauchi* There 
was an increase in road blocks all around Saigon and Cholon to a distance 
of 30 kilometers [the breaking of which was one of Massu*s first tasks 
on arrival], and bridges were being sabotaged* Mob violence had 
decreased in Saigon and Cholon "where rough treatment of two mobs and 
infliction [of] casualties estimated at 60 were killed, unknown wounded, 
by 80 BRIGADE produced less keenness." There was, not unnaturally, an 
"Increase in hostility to British Indian Gurkha troops."
Gracey stated that the strain appeared to be too much for Cedile, 
who "may collapse. His task is really beyond him. Should this occur, 
his successor must be a man of resolution and high standing. This matter 
is urgent." Gracey*s plans now were to open the approaches to the city, 
if necessary by "ruthlessly enforcing" his orders, to reopen the market 
and encourage trading, and to urge the French to broadcast a liberal 
policy over Saigon radio. French troops would be used "very sparingly" 
during these operations, and Gracey concluded by again asking that his 
20th Division be allowed to sail as their ships were loaded. He also 
wanted to accelerate the arrival of "GOOD WELL Commanded French troops."
He had instructed Brain to forward a copy of this message to French officials 
"who were useless and should immediately be removed."
Gracey, as Brain later noted, minced no words with Terauchi. During
the meeting on the 26th, Gracey opened by saying that he wished "to
reiterate and emphasise certain of the facts on the present situation
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here and to give you certain definite o r d e r s . H e  said that "The matter 
of the future government of French Indo-China has always been one for the 
French Government," and the local uprisings were not helping them to 
implement their liberal policy. The [Japanese] Emperor had recognized 
France as one of the Allied Nations, and "The whole situation in French 
Indo China and its potential dangers are well known to you." Had the 
Japanese kept to the terms of the Rangoon agreement "the present ANNAMITE 
rising would not have occurred or would have been very greatly reduced 
and quickly stopped. Practically every case of murder of Allied nationals, 
arson, pillage and looting has occurred in sectors allotted to the 
Japanese troops in which to keep law and order." Japanese troops, 
including officers, had stood by and watched the perpetration of outrages, 
including the incident in the Dakau sector (Cit£ Heyraud). Japanese 
guards on important positions were usually understrength and had no reserves.
Gracey told Terauchi, "You will he as angry'over such slip shod
methods as I am." Japanese troops were often permitted to pass road
blocks while the Allies were fired on or detained. In noting Numatats
earlier statement to Taunton that the Japanese troops were tired, Gracey
said that if this was the case then the commanding general was not doing
his job properly. Furthermore, it appeared that Terauchi did not know
what was going on in Saigon.
In view of all this Terauchi was ordered to keep Japanese efficiency
up and to correct the ills mentioned. He was also ordered to clear Thu
Dau Mot and Bien Hoa of Viet Minh, and to increase the guard over Admiral«*
Decoux in Loc Ninh. Said Gracey:
"With regard to the action of your forces in 
the above areas, objections may be raised by you
that they [Japanese forces] are not adequately
armed. My answer is that from what I saw of the 
determination of Japanese troops in action they 
are quite sufficiently well armed to deal with 
such rebels who are untrained and badly armed...
As regards to other matters, I wish to point out 
to you that the very unpleasant side of un­
conditional surrender for those who have been
compelled to do bo is fully realised."
Mountbatten had been most considerate to Terauchi personally, and
the Japanese were fully aware of the imminent Viet Minh uprising at the
time of the Rangoon agreement. Gracey said he knew that a speedy return
to Japan was uppermost in the minds of the Japanese, but unless they
cooperated they would stay where they were for the foreseeable future.
Terauchi was then ordered to move to the Japanese headquarters until
*
further notice, "sending for your kit immediately." Terauchi bowed and 
left, determined to clamp down on his forces if only to avoid the shame 
of undergoing another humiliation like this.
Gracey later wrote of the meeting:
"Without any specific instructions from S.E.A.C.,
F.M. Count Terauchi was immediately summoned and 
told, categorically, that his troops must obey 
the spirit as well as the letter of orders, and 
specific cases of disobedience or partial compliance 
with orders was given to him. His anger at this 
state of affairs was genuine, and after a few days, 
his orders having been passed, very quickly this 
time, to his officers and men throughout Southern 
F.I.C., the conduct of the Japanese forces became 
exemplary, and till the departure of the British 
troops remained so. The safety of the French
* Terauchi was actually allowed to remain living in his house; a Japanese 
Liaison Officer moved in his place. [Brigadier Maunsell, interview 
20 April 1977].
nationals outside SAIGON, and the security of 
all essential installations was therefore 
assured, though as there were not sufficient 
troops to guard every vulnerable, as opposed 
to vital, area, some factories and estates 
in the country were looted and burnt at 
intervals." 10
On the 26th the British and Japanese forces cleared roadblocks
all over Saigon, and shots were fired by snipers scattered throughout
the city. Large fires were set in several areas, especially in the
north, and some of them blazed through the night. A company of 3/1
Gurkha Rifles (Blascheck*s company) swept the banks of the Arroyo de
1*Avalanche from East to West in the disturbed northern part of Saigon
and ran into opposition in the Dakao area. They captured a minor Viet
Minh headquarters and four suspects. Three Gurkhas were wounded in the
skirmish around the house. A little later the Gurkhas, continuing their
sweep, rescued 6 French women and children from a locked pagoda, the
children saying that their parents had been murdered before their eyes 
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that morning. The company, hot and tired, returned to barracks by
about 1300 hours. They had no sooner sat down to a well-deserved lunch
when they were called out by a report that the American detachment in
the north of Saigon was being beseiged by the Viet Minh. The tired
troops scrambled out of their barracks and set off for the OSS headquarters.
The "scramble" order to Blascheck brought the news that Lieutenant Colonel
Dewey had been ambushed and killed, making him, as it has often since been
■*
said, the first American casualty in Vietnam. His death produced no 
more lasting effect than those of 50,000 other Americans in Vietnam a 
generation later.
The OSS account of this has been cited with great frequency, a book 
called OSS, by R.Harris Smith, being only the most recent occasion. The 
British version has seldom, if ever, been reported. Some published 
materials even hold the French responsible for Dewey's death, and almost 
everything in print blames someone other then Dewey himself, whose curious 
activities exposed him constantly to unnecessary danger away from the 
available protection.
It has been established with certainty that Dewey was ambushed at 
a road block. Although accounts vary, a detailed reconstruction of the 
assassination strongly suggests that the following is what happened.
* This is not, of course, correct, as Americans had been killed in 
Vietnam during the course of the war.
Dewey and a colleague were driving through the unsettled northern
suburbs of Saigon, not on a main road, when he encountered a road block
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near the golf course, between Tan Sdn Nhift and Gia Dinh. Although there 
was most certainly an American flag painted on the sides of the vehicle 
(and in front over the radiator grille for easier identification if 
Gracey's suggestion had been followed), and Dewey called out in French,
"Je suis Americain", and was wearing an American uniform, his killers 
opened fire with automatic weapons and Dewey, hit in the head, died 
instantly. A Viet Minh mob then besieged the OSS headquarters.
The OSS book by Smith seems to have relied on immediately recognizable
secondary source material for the events surrounding Dewey's death, in
addition to an account by a lower-ranking member of the OSS team. A
number of inaccuracies mar this account, one being that the French at that
time were in American uniforms. This is incorrect, because the French were
then outfitted by the British. The question of the American flag has
already been discussed, and Leclerc, despite Smith's assertion, had still
not arrived in Saigon. The OSS, consistent in their anti-French and anti-
British sympathies at that time, accused the Allies of having "embarked on
a program of massacre and brutality against the generally defenseless
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Annamese population...." The charge closely resembled those emanating 
from the Politburo of the Indochina Communist Party in Hanoi, both in 
content and language.
According to Smith, who was apparently told this by OSS personnel, 
Gracey had ordered Dewey to leave Saigon, and the latter was on his way 
out when ambushed. This is a highly questionable account, and is not 
corroborated by any of the available evidence. Interviews with senior 
British and French officials, plus an exhaustive six month search through 
the archives at the Public Record Office, have failed to reveal the 
slightest indication that Dewey had been ordered to leave Saigon. There 
would have been no reason for such an order, for the OSS were more of a 
nuisance than a threat to the Allied command, and their movements were 
well known. The OSS were a cause for concern only insofar as their safety 
could not be assured, and Dewey's death brought home to the Americans an 
awareness of conditions in Saigon which no amount of British argument 
could accomplish.
On learning of Dewey's death Gracey sent the following message to 
Mountbatten:
y n
’’Very much regret to report that LT Col Dewey 
US Army OSS was shot dead by Annamite rebels 
this afternoon... All officers of or attached 
to Mission had been warned by me previously not 
to move without escort or in dangerous places.
He was trusting to Americans being inviolate1"...
Please convey the deepest regrets of myself and 
all the Allies in Saigon to his father.*' 13
Gracey was distressed by Dewey's death, for it should never have
happened. The next day, on 27 September, Gracey telegraphed SEAC
Headquarters:
Complete examination circumstances Dewey death 
action shows following:-
(a) Dewey killed by planned ambush whilst driving 
jeep*
(b) Attack shows all signs of premeditation and 
planned attack direct O.S.S.
# *
(c) O.S.S. House flew American flag throughout.
(d) Annamite party approx strength armed men 20 
arrived and left in MT. ***
(e) Locals stated American flag over this building 
was no security owing public visits various 
Frenchmen observed by Annamites.
(f) Other incidents prove that flags or other means 
of easy identification Allied Nationals do not 
afford any protection if position is met which' 
is held by organised band determined execute 
planned raid or hold up. 1^
Neither Dewey's killers nor his body were ever found, although the
British almost had both in their hands. Behaving in a highly emotional
fashion, two American news reporters placed themselves between the British
assault force and Dewey's killers, permitting the latter to escape. The
reporters, who exceeded their professional function and authority by
interfering in the affair, were termed "highly excitable" by the Gurkha
15company commander involved. The two were Bill Downs, employed predictably 
by CBS (the Columbia Broadcasting System), and Jim McGlinty.
* This appeared to be a peculiar characteristic of some OSS personnel. 
Admiral Miles, USN, more experienced in guerilla operations in China 
than any of the OSS, wrote: "The Washington office of the O.S.S. appeared 
to have a queer, ostrich-like fixation. It was almost as if they 
thought their men wore invisible cloaks... Miles, not noted for
his liking of the British, was referring to China operations in this 
case. Miles continued, "Before we had the wit to recognize it, we 
had tied the hands of our friends and turned over quantities of arms 
to their enemy and ours." (Again referring to China; Miles, A Different 
Kind of War, p.A-91).
** This contradicts Smith's account; the flag was clearly seen by British 
troops who rescued the Americans.
*** Motor transport.
Downs dispatched the following story as a CBS "eye-witness account 
of the pitched battle at the US HQ in Saigon on Wednesday... after the 
attack on the HQ, where a U.S. Major requested British HQ to send Gurkha 
troops to go to the relief of the US Hq." The title was, not surprisingly, 
"British Have 'Bungled Job Badly' ".
"There was another sticky moment and it was 
just at this point that the firing started 
again. For by this time the British Gurkhas 
were marching to the relief of the U.S. Hq, 
which had already in effect been relieved. But 
we had sent for them. Negotiations between us 
and the Annamese ceased immediately. It didn't 
look good for us. (? McGlinty) and I said we 
thought we could stop the shooting... We 
walked down the road towards the Gurkhas waving 
our hats and our arms. The white flag was up.
Even so the British troops let off a couple of 
shots at us that sent us to the ditch.
We got out again and started walking towards 
the Gurkhas. They held their fire, and out in 
front of them was a British major. He kept 
marching up the road. We begged him to stop 
shooting,* to stop his troops. He told us to 
shut up, that he was commanding the party. He 
threatened us with arrest. We told him that we 
would walk ahead of his troops, if only they 
would not fire, and that the only thing ahead 
of him were women and children. The major got 
furious and another major came up from the rear 
ranks and got mad at us too. We never did get 
a chance to tell the British leader that there 
were four US officers virtually in hostage** and 
that their lives were at stake.... " 16
Not surprisingly, the Gurkha War Diary account differs from the 
"news" reporter's account. After logging an account of 3/1 GR's morning 
sweep of the Arroyo de 1'Avalanche, the fighting, capture of Viet Minh 
suspects, rescue of French civilians and the wounding of 3 Gurkha soldiers, 
the account continued:
"The Coy (Company) returned for lunch. At about 
1*+00 hrs it was reported that an American Col had 
been murdered and that a USA Hq was being besieged 
by the mob on the RUE MACMAHON PRO LONGEE. 3/1 Coy 
again went out to relieve the Americans, recover 
the Colonel's body and disperse the mob. Reaching 
the USA Hq they found no siege in progress but an 
irresolute mob whom they dispersed with fire 
wounding about 10; and further up the road USA press
* Only "a couple of shots" appear to have been fired.
** apparently held there by the "women and children" referred to a
couple of sentences earlier.
correspondents* negotiating with armed and 
uniformed MHAMITE leaders for the return 
of the body. It would have been simple to 
capture the hostile leaders had not the 
press correspondents interfered, stood between 
our own troops and the AMKAMITES, and argued 
that the recovery of the Colonel*s body was a 
matter of great political importance as some 
relation of his was a notorious politician 
in the States, Meanwhile, the AHNAMITE 
leaders, promising to produce the body forth­
with, slipped off, jumped into a truck and 
disappeared: not, of course, to return,1' 17
The company left the OSS villa and continued the sweep; they met
another Viet Minh armed mob and fire was exchanged, resulting in the
deaths of 12 Annamites and the capture of five with rifles. The advance
continued, but Dewey*s body was not found, and the Gurkhas wrote that
1S
the news reporting of the incident "bordered on the fantastic."
The 1/1 Gurkha Rifles newsletter also described the incident:
"On 26 Sep Charles Blascheck was frustrated by 
American journalists in his quest for Colonel 
Dewey *s body. The Colonel had been ambushed 
by Vitamins** and Blascheck was sent out to 
recover his remains. He found the body at 
the scene of the crime surrounded by the killers, 
and was about to recapture it by force, when the 
journalists intervened and attempted to use 
appeasement. As a result the body disappeared and 
has not been seen since. The Colonel was some 
relative of the Republican candidate for the 
Presidency of the U.S.A." 19
As will be seen, the picture emerging from the Gurkha official and 
unofficial diaries is one in which the two American reporters appeared 
to be more interested in the publicity surrounding the recovery of Dewey* 
body than in capturing his killers or rescuing the live Americans in the 
villa, and this is why the two British majors were "furious". Blascheck 
himself, wounded seriously in Burma, wounded again in Saigon , and to 
participate in another assault on the Viet Minh the next day, had this 
to say:
"The American correspondents wanted to 'negotiate* 
with the Viet Minh, saying that they 'understood* 
the Annamites. I replied that Dewey was dead and 
was not so important now —  the important thing was 
that several live Americans were still in the villa, 
but the Idiotic correspondents kept saying that they 
were friends of the Viet Minh and that Dewey was 
important." 20
* Downs and McGlinty.
** Gurkha slang for Viet Minh.
Blascheck said he knew perfectly well that Dewey had important 
political connections in the US and did not need the press to tell him 
that. He had received a report that the Americans were in trouble 
and had taken out his full company of Gurkhas. His instructions were 
to get the Americans out to a safe place, whereas the press were 
concerned only with Dewey*s body. He arrived to find a confused scene 
at the US Headquarters, made more so by the two correspondent who kept 
getting in the way and who finally were dressed down by Blascheck in 
no uncertain terms.
Blascheck clearly remembered seeing some Viet Minh in the house 
which he believed to be the OSS Headquarters. While he was sizing up 
the situation he saw a body thrown from a window. Although Blascheck 
could not see the face, the body was in a US uniform. It was thrown 
into a large monsoon storm drainage ditch, and as it was still the 
rainy season the drains were filled with fast moving water and presumably 
the body was washed away, down to the river or to be lodged somewhere 
under the city in the drainage system. It may or may not have been 
Dewey, but no one will ever know because of the interference by the 
reporters.
Major General Pyman, Slim's Chief of Staff, further rebutted the
OSS claim that Gracey* s ban on junior officers flying flags contributed
to Dewey's death. He reported that only the General Officer Commanding
(Gracey), Brigadiers and the senior Royal Navy and Royal Air Force officers
were authorized to fly national flags on their staff cars. He also
provided some key information which for some reason the OSS omitted in
their report. First, all cars, including OSS vehicles, were issued
paper flags; these were to be stuck to the windscreens of all vehicles.
Second, the OSS in Saigon had agreed not to fly flags on cars, but said
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that they would paint the Stars and Stripes on the bonnets and doors.
Thus had they carried out their intention the US flag would have been 
clearly visible to Dewey's killers. The OSS report was thus deliberately 
misleading or, like much of their work in Southeast Asia, badly done.
Since the OSS appeared to be less than open in their report of the 
circumstances surrounding Dewey's death, Mountbatten had to fill in many 
blanks in this report which reached the hands of Brigadier General 
Timberman, the senior US officer at SEAC Headquarters. The OSS had 
failed to mention that Dewey had been called in by Gracey and warned 
about his subversive dealings with known Viet Minh, and that Gracey
s
had forcefully warned Dewey against travelling without an escort (which 
was available to him at any time he required it). It was repeated that
Gracey did not authorize Dewey the privilege of flying a flag at
the car's pennant solely because of his junior rank, which was
standard international practice, but had urged him to fasten it across
the radiator so that it could be seen from the front (from a roadblock).
It was emphasized that in any case a small fluttering flag would
probably not be distinguishable until too late* Mountbatten, who was
on less than friendly terms with Gracey at the time? told Timberman
that he was satisfied that Gracey had done all he could to prevent the 
22
incident.
On 26 September, the day Dewey was killed, a disturbing report 
was received at SEAC Headquarters regarding OSS activity in Indochina.
Force 136 agents had now confirmed the extent of the evidently coordinated 
American efforts to subvert the French and British. The report described 
the anti-Allied efforts and the spreading of anti-French propaganda by 
the OSS "through all channels". Force 136 was so alarmed at the long­
term implications of the American operations that they recommended that 
a series of outposts be established by the British along the entire 16th 
parallel. They had a more immediate cause for concern in that they 
reported that the Americans were refusing to permit Force 136 to evacuate 
French women and children to safety in Vientiene. The Force 136 telegram 
ended by independently confirming Sainteny's later assertions; the 
Americans were taking advantage of Viet Minh attacks "to discredit French 
and declaring that French administration will not repetition not be 
permitted in Chinese zone." ^
The mentality of the OSS is illustrated by a particularly revolting 
incident in which a French officer was murdered in cold blood with the 
apparent approval of an OSS officer. On 6 October Mountbatten was so 
disgusted by the report that he complained to Wedemeyer about it. The 
incident occurred as a small party had crossed the Mekong from Nakon Fhanom
Into Laos, in the US area north of the 16th parallel. A British Force 136 
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officer and a French officer named Klotz were in Laos, accompanying an 
OSS lieutenant [whose name is available in the appropriate archives] and 
a band of Viet Minh. The Viet Minh turned on the Frenchman, but the 
Force 136 officer, arms outstretched, immediately positioned himself 
between the Viet Minh assassins and the French officer in a desperate 
effort to save his life. But 2 or 3 of the Viet Minh party slipped around
* This officer now lives in London, and was attempting to introduce 
Klotz to the Viet Minh in order to insure his safety.
the officer and shot the hapless Frenchman from the side. The 
American officer had watched all this, for when the attack was made 
he stood aside with the words, "I guess I am now a neutral.11 [in fact 
he was not a neutral hut an active ally of the Communist dominated 
Viet Minh].
Many years later, C&lile spoke of Dewey's activities:
"Well, you know there are always people who 
think they can do things better than others, 
who think they have a great talent for 
reconciliation and who want to put things 
into order —  people who are a bit more 
liberal than those who are in command and 
who have to be more careful and who have to be 
much more restrained... But he was a dilettante,
I think. .He could say whatever he wanted, 
he had nothing to risk'[politically], nothing to 
lose; no one could accuse him of anything."
While speaking in context, C£dile recalled an incident in which a
French liaison officer [Verdier] was cut off by the Viet Minh at Tah Son
1 * / \  f
Nhiffc. Due to faulty local communications the British at Tan So’n Nhut
contacted their headquarters in Singapore, Singapore radioed Saigon, and
Cddile got the message and sent a rescue force for the officer. C£dile
then continued:
"I remember feeling very annoyed. Well, Dewey 
was involved in his little adventure. I heard 
that an American mission* came to find out 
what happened, and after I left Saigon I even
heard a body was found and identified as Dewey's
by the teeth, but I don't know.** " 21+
Oolonel Mingant, French Army, added a postscript to the tragic 
affair. He remembered that Dewey, perhaps for the purpose of cover, was 
known as "Mister" Dewey in Saigon. Mingant had warned Dewey that the 
Vietnamese were not under a strong central control, but Dewey told him 
not to worry for he had nothing to fear. Mingant and the Frai ch had 
known the Viet Minh long before Dewey arrived, and said that if Dewey 
had wanted to meet any of them he had only to ask and the French would 
have brought the Viet Minh to Dewey. Mingant said that Dewey may well
have had some influence with the Viet Minh, but it was unfortunate that
he did not use it to promote a settlement, but rather backed the ViSt 
Minh blindly.
* led by Dewey's brother.
** Dewey's body was never found.
Mingant was later told by the Viet Minh that they had killed 
Dewey:
"I heard a long time after from the Viet Minh.
They said, 'We did a wrong thing. Mr. Dewey 
had been killed, and this is no good for us.' "
Mingant, then a captain, said-that Dewey was "a little shot, just 
like me. I don't think he was mistaken for a French officer, but you 
know the Viet Minh at that time had no chief exactly, not yet." Dewey 
had told Mingant that he had plenty of questions to ask him, but was 
killed before they met again.
Not much was heard from the OSS after that, except for a couple of 
other incidents which occurred at about the same time. On one occasion 
a platoon of Gurkhas was fired on when approaching the Viet Minh head­
quarters in Saigon, from bows and arrows among other weapons. One of the 
Gurkhas received an arrow in the arm and the snipers were chased down and 
captured. The Viet Minh building was flying several flags, including 
the British, American and French flags. Captain (later Major) Peter 
Prentice took them down and piled them into his jeep, and as he drove 
away an OSS jeep came up and an altercation ensued. It seems that the 
Americans were incensed at having their flag removed from flying over the
Communist building. Prentice said, "Well, all right, if you want it
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flying from there I'll take it back and put it up again." That was 
indeed what the OSS wanted and the Stars and Stripes remained the only 
Allied flag to fly over the Viet Minh headquarters. Prentice never knew 
exactly what the OSS were doing except to remember that "one had the feeling 
that they were dashing about with big radio sets."
The other notable incident occurred when OSS Captain Coolidge was 
wounded in another Viet Minh ambush the day before Dewey's death. He 
was cared for in the British hospital, and according to the Medical History. 
Allied Land Forces. French Indo China:
"... the Americans flew a special Skymaster 
hospital plane complete with Lt.Col. Surgical 
specialist, Major Medical specialist and Capt 
pathologist to remove a wounded American officer 
from our care, and also an appendicitis case 
from Hopital Grail. This dramatic incident was 
accompanied by much clicking of cameras, and 
one had the impression that our Allies were 
convinced they had saved two of their colleagues 
from a terrible fate." 27
It would, indeed, be difficult to disagree with Smith's sentiments 
expressed in his book on this period when he wrote that it was "a confused
28
team of seven OSS men" who went to Saigon, though he was wrong 
in stating that it was the "first and only Allied force to reach 
Saigon during the week of 2 September." Dewey1 s death was indeed 
tragic, but it would have been even more tragic had he not been 
previously warned of the possible consequences of his actions.
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CHAPTER X
PRELUDE TO VAR
I reported that if we continued to 
support the re-establishment of the 
French Government in F.I.C., we couldn't 
avoid becoming involved in war with the 
indigenous population.., The Annamites 
had been promised independence when Japan 
had won the war. They had no intention 
of reverting back to the 19U0 status quo.
Brigadier E.C.V. Myers
Head of Security Intelligence
Headquarters SEAC.
26 September, a tragic day for the OSS, ended happily for about 
20 people, thanks to the monsoon downpour:
"The rain contributed one final touch of 
comic opera this afternoon* The guards 
outside one of the gaols deserted their 
posts and belted for cover. About a score 
of Annamese prisoners made a dash for it, 
too, into the rain. No one pursued them.
It was not thought worth while," 1
In reporting that rioters were now showing "less keenness" as 
a result of 80 Brigade's response to the rioting, Gracey outlined his 
future course of action for Mountbatten. Gracey*s plan, as telegraphed 
to SACSEA, was composed of 5 parts:
- keep clear the northern approaches to Saigon, 
using Japanese troops with orders to use ruthless 
force if necessary;
- do the same within Saigon, using British/Indian 
troops and avoiding the use of French troops if 
possible;
- immediately reopen the markets and encourage an 
increase in trading in the city;
- reopen Saigon radio and urge the French to broadcast 
a liberal policy, which they had prepared;
- and clear the southern approaches to Saigon when 
troops became available.2
He also sent Mountbatten a list of "useless" French colonial officials
who should be immediately removed. Finally he asked for the rest of
his division and for good, well-commanded French troops.
On the 27th, with an increase in fighting likely, Numata requested 
a meeting with Maunsell; Brain sat in on this meeting between the 2 
respective Chiefs of Staff. The Cit£ Heyraud massacre was evidently 
much on Numata*s mind, for he made an emotional statement in which he 
said that "in 1*0 years of service he had acquired a reputation for 
absolute honesty if not wisdom!1 a*nd begged General Gracey to trust him 
to carry out faithfully the orders given him.
But, said Brain,
"On the other hand I have do doubt that Japanese 
policy here will continue to leave a legacy of 
friction and that there is a definite but 
unobtrusive output being given to the Annamites.
The lack of coordination between the departments 
of the Japanese headquarters and the ignorance 
of staff officers even of what is going on in 
their own departments, of which we have had 
startling demonstrations, is such that it is 
perfectly possible that these activities are
being organized without Numata's knowledge.
Every effort is being made to obtain concrete 
evidence but this political activity can only 
be put to a stop by the speedy disarming of 
the Japanese forces. At present the Japanese 
can only be relied on to cooperate in the 
maintenance of law and order as against the 
Annamites in places where they are under British 
observation." 1+
On 27 September SEAC warned the Foreign Office Political Warfare
Department, Calcutta, of impending trouble in Saigon. Further
involvement by Gracey was anticipated as "restoration of French police
[sic] almost certainly necessary and gradually French will take over
control [of] other public services, if necessary supported by force.
Absence of guidance from [the] Foreign Office [is] regretted greatly."^
A 12th Army report to SEAC Headquarters described the French police
as "trigger-happy", and "drastic action [is] called for since French
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population [is] near panic. Continental Palace Hotel besieged." French 
civilians, afraid for their lives, had fled the troubled areas of Saigon 
to seek refuge in the hotel, where men, women and children clogged the 
corridors as stray bullets whistled across the square outside. The 
Vietnamese staff had departed, and Dutch ex-POWs, who had volunteered 
to keep the hotel going, were serving hot soup and skew to the refugees.
The telegraphed report ended by saying that "As no light except few 
candles [the] scene with crashing rain outside was ghostly and rather 
dramatic,"
Under these conditions Gracey had ordered trucks loaded with
Indian, Gurkha and Japanese soldiers to patrol the city and to disperse
mobs, elininate snipers and dismantle road blocks where found. In the
northern sector, under Murray, the French were on the right (east),
Gurkhas in the middle and Japanese on the left. There were more problems
in the southern sector, where Purcell, of 3/1 GR, was in command and
where the vital power station was located.
Japanese were seen leading many of the mobs, and one incident
came to light in which a Frenchman was besieged in his shop by a
hundred armed Viet Minh. He managed to reach a nearby Japanese military
post, but the Japanese told him that "this was [the] Japanese Army from
whom he could expect no help," He did, however, make a miraculous
escape under a hail of bullets. It was impossible to walk a block at
night without being stopped at every corner, usually by an armed
French policeman," at which time one shouts 'Anglais* as loud and as
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quickly as possible."
Gracey had reported that his single brigade was getting worn 
out with skirmishing and guard duties; his troops, he said, had fought 
continuously for 3 years and were tired. He again appealed for the 
rest of his division, if only to make the Japanese obey him.
On 27 September a number of Viet Minh were killed by the Japanese 
while attempting a water crossing to the north of Saigon in the Dakao 
area. Just west of that area, the overworked Blascheck again took 
out his company, this time to relieve two platoons of 1/1 GR. The 
platoons had been sent to reinforce the French post on the bridge 
IJyriand des Vergnes, but came under heavy fire from well-concealed 
Viet Minh positions on the far bank. One of the Gurkhas was killed 
and one Gurkha officer, Jemadar Churamani, was hit and badly wounded.
It was not possible- to assault the Viet Minh frontally, for the attack 
would have had to be made over open ground. There were no reserve 
troops available, so the Gurkhas spent the night in the area, "disturbedg
only by constant and unfounded alarums from the French." At O630 on 
the 27th, Blascheck's company from 3/1 GR crossed the bridge on Rue 
Paul Blanchy, turned left and attacked the Viet Minh from the rear, 
which cleared the area between the Canal de Ceinture and R. Ehieu Lqc. 
Six Viet Minh were killed, 2k wounded, and nearby houses harbouring 
Viet Minh were burned. Blascheck*s company then withdrew through the 
French and 1/1 GR platoons and returned to barracks, followed by the 
1/1 Gurkhas an hour later. During the action a Gurkha soldier, Rifleman 
Tekbahadur Ghale, won the Military Medal for possibly saving the wounded 
Jemadar's life by carrying him to safety under heavy fire.
On the 27th, too, a company of 1/1 GR swept an area in northwest 
Saigon, and a strong force of 100 Viet Minh again attacked the power 
house, but were driven off after losing 2 killed and 5 wounded. Another 
party of 10 Viet Minh were caught crossing the Arroyo Chinois in a boat; 
the boat was sunk by 3/1 GR and no survivors were seen. The Cholon 
Ammonia Factory was also attacked, and the Viet Minh suffered 7 more 
casualties as 1 Indian soldier was killed and 1 wounded. The radio 
station in the north was also hit by the Viet Minh, but a detachment of 
3/1 GR repulsed the attack during which 2 Viet Minh were killed and U 
wounded.
The 3/1 Gurkha Rifles recorder captured the atmosphere of the 
days following the Viet Minh rising.
"Next day [27 September] two coya carried 
out a sweep of the Arroyo Chinois against 
fairly light opposition as most of the 
Annamite forces in the area were engaged 
attacking a coy of the Hyderabad Regiment.
The casualties during the day were 9 I.O.Rs 
wounded, Annamites 25 killed and 30 wounded.
During the whole of this period, bazaars, 
factories and godowns were burnt nightly.
French women, children and irregular troops 
were murdered and altogether the French 
Community lived indoors in terror for their 
lives. The Bn was roughly disposed to keep 
open B. de GALLIENI, the streets up to the 
ARROYO CHINOIS, and to protect vital points 
such as the Fire Station, leaving a small 
mobile force which was used exhaustively, 
dashing from the scene of one place of lawless­
ness to another." 9
"B" Company, 3/1 GR, crossed over to Khanh Hoi island and established 
itself in the abbatoir. Khanh Hdi had been Viet Minh territory.
"For the next several nights, "B" Coy was 
sniped every night as was the Power House.
The same day the Bn HQ platoon had a battle 
along the road to the Wireless Station 
clearing five road blocks and killing and 
capturing ANNAMITES as they progressed; 
they sustained no casualties. Practically 
every day, sometimes three times a day, our 
small mobile columns were called out to 
rescue captured French*, search houses, clear 
road blocks and even to cordon fires. Moving 
around the city was never easy owing to road 
blocks and sniping and the ever present 
danger of the crazy shooting French.
The Bn HQ platoon was next to receive attention 
and a strong attack was put in to try to 
dislodge them from the Wireless Station. This 
attack which was fanatical and supported by 
numerous grenades was beaten off causing the 
enemy 3 dead and 1* wounded...
Up to the end of the month, raids, searches etc. 
continued and we took many prisoners and captured 
arms, ammunition, and documents of considerable 
value." 10
A total of 55 guards were mounted over vital artesian wells by 
J+/17 Dogra, whose A and B Companies had flown in on the 26th in 23 
aircraft. "A" Company was based in North Sector, near the Cathedral, 
and two of its platoons went into action almost immediately.
The fighting was getting worse, and Indian civilians living in 
Saigon were now being attacked by the Viet Minh because of the actions
* who, according to Charles Blascheck, were frequently locked up in pagodas
of the Indian troops; six Indian civilians were killed in a short
period, and the 80 Brigade historian now noted that "The men have
accepted the necessity of fighting the Annamites. At first their
attitude was merely disinterested, but since casualties have been
incurred and they have seen and heard of atrocities committed by the
Annamites against the French women and children, feelings against
the Annamites has risen. They now consider the Annamites as 'Bushman'*"
Furthermore, "The Annamites have distributed propaganda in the form of
leaflets among the men. The general trend of these leaflets is to
compare the situation in FIC and the Annamite struggle for independence
with that in India. These leaflets have had NO effect on morale. Few
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VCO's or IORs have even bothered to read them...," Like all other
units, 80 Brigade had told its troops that they were not to get involved
in politics; "the sole job of All Ranks is the maintenance of law and
order." Troublemakers were to be manhandled and knocked out rather
than shot, but when casualties were incurred from machine guns and
grenades the picture began to change.
As Brain noted in his report of 27 September, the Japanese
participation was extremely important to the Viet Minh during this
period. When Indian troops were fired on from a house in the middle
of Saigon they attacked and found 6 Japanese with a radio set, with
which they had apparently been in contact with Viet Minh headquarters.
On 27 September Brain, as political adviser to Gracey, sent a
fairly comprehensive report to SEAC. Since his arrival, when he "was
12welcomed with anticipatory sighs of relief", he had "been consulted
at every point on matters of policy, and signals and reports to S.A.C.S.E.A.
have taken full account of my views." He spoke well of Numata, but 
*
General Mianaki gave the "impression of being dull-witted and rather 
bewildered with the situation in which he finds himself." Brain 
thought that Manaki "probably intends to carry out his instructions 
but is incapable of doing so expeditiously and efficiently." Wrote 
Brain:
"Unfortunately the road which is paved with 
such good intentions leads to a hell made up 
of known inefficiency and strongly suspected 
sabotage. Preliminary examinations of the 
organisation of the headquarters of the Southern 
Army have shown it to be disjointed, ill-
* Saigon garrison commander and Commander, 2nd Division.
coordinated and badly administered. At a 
conference at which six Japanese staff 
officers were present reference was made by 
us to the 'Planning Board' which was shown 
in the outline of their organisation..• It 
may sound incredible but is true that only 
one of the officers present knew of the 
existence of this department and he was only 
able to identify it after being given a list 
of the officers comprising it." 13
Brain was so struck with the Japanese organization, or lack of it, 
that he expanded on the subject:
"It will be no news to you that the Japanese 
tend to work in watertight compartments and 
that the right hand frequently does not know 
what the left hand is doing, but here the hand
does not appear to know what the fingers are
doing. In every case it was found that an 
officer knew little of his department beyond 
the officers immediately subordinate to him 
and a G.S.0.1. had to send for a G.2. in 
order to know the number of G.3's under his 
own command."
Having said that, Brian said that this disorganization, bad as it
was, did not account for all the problems with the Japanese. He wrote
that
"There is no doubt that there is some kind of 
Japanese organisation whose object it is to 
make things as difficult as possible for the 
restoration of law and order and for the 
peaceful turnover of the country to Allied 
control. There continues to be evidence of 
the handing over or sale of arras to the Annamite 
revolutionaries; complicity of Japanese civilians 
or soldiers in plain clothes in acts of armed 
violence; failure of Japanese troops to inter­
vene in cases of beating, killing, and abduction 
of French men and women and of attacks on Allied 
personnel, in areas where the Japanese have been 
given the responsibility for the maintenance of 
law and order; and so on. The system of water­
tight compartments would of course facilitate 
the working of such an independent organisation.
The Japanese have admitted that the Annamite 
revolutionaries may be receiving illicit 
assistance from Japanese troops who have 
deserted and have not yet been rounded up, but 
one cannot help feeling that such an explanation 
could give excellent cover for what was in fact 
a planned activity."
Terauchi appeared to have really been in ignorance of the 
situation regarding his forces. During the recent meeting with Gracey, 
Terauchi "took immediate action to have (Gracey*s orders) transmitted 
in translation to all officers down to platoon commanders (an exceptional 
action which he himself suggested), that in areas for which they were 
responsible Japanese forces were to take firm military action to deal 
with any armed Annamites encountered and to give assistance when called 
upon by Allied personnel."
While Terauchi's action had improved Japanese overt cooperation,
"It cannot be relied on of course to have any effect whatever on the 
undercover activities mentioned above and we can expect the surreptitious 
supply of arms and encouragement to the Annamites to go on wherever this 
can be done without observation by Allied forces." Only the presence of 
a greater number of Allied troops would stop this.
Brain also discussed the three courses open to the British regarding 
Japanese disarmament. The Japanese could be concentrated, leaving most 
of the country to the Vi'et Minh; the British could replace the Japanese 
as the latter are concentrated; the French could be left to deal with the 
Japanese. The first and third courses were impractical for the French 
would oppose one and the Viet Minh the other. As Brain noted, "The points 
that with the limited forces available to us we were able to take over 
ourselves were, secured without difficulty and without a shot being fired." 
Furthermore, the Japanese would not stand for course three, either. Their 
attitude to the French was one of "veiled contempt", for "they have had 
to deal with no serious resistance from the French, and they know of them 
only as a defeated nation; they have no knowledge of the exploits of 
the French in Europe." To make matters worse, the French population had 
low morale and tended to panic. There was no choice but the second, to 
replace the Japanese as they were disarmed, "however much we may wish to 
avoid the political implications of handing Indo-China back to French rule."
Brain drew particular attention to the state of the French population:
"As I have said their morale is low. They combine 
an almost hysterical fear of the Annamites (which 
to my mind denotes a guilty conscience) with an 
intense hatred and desire for revenge. These 
people will constitute one of the greatest obstacles 
to the institution by the French of a liberal 
policy and its acceptance by the Annamites. If 
at all possible I think that these people should 
be evacuated from Indo-China at the earliest 
possible moment." 1A-
Brain said that Cedile, the "Governor General designate of 
Cochin China", was a "well meaning and liberal man who appeared to be 
"unfitted" for his task:
"He commands neither the respect of the French 
population nor the trust of the Annamites. The 
former complain of his tenderheartedness towards 
the rebels. The latter see in him the 
representative of those who have exploited and 
ill-treated them and as the one responsible for 
the excesses of the French prisoners of war whom 
he re-armed. It was felt by all of us who saw 
him when the situation was at its worst two days 
ago that he was on the verge of a complete break­
down. What is wanted is a strong man with a 
reputation for fairness who will respresent the 
new France and who will not refuse to give the 
Annamites a hearing."
There appeared to Brain to be a hint of disagreement between Rivier, 
commander of French troops, and Cedile. Cedile had mentioned to Brain 
that although Rivier was in France during the war "he never saw a shot 
fired." Rivier was reputed to be a "good administrative officer but 
quite lacking in personality and leadership." Brigadier Myers confirmed 
this assessment in his own independent report, to be discussed later.
On 2? September, Gracey*s first heavy fighting reinforcements began 
to embark at Rangoon; these included "B" Squadron, of the 16 Indian 
Light Cavalry, who went aboard the S. S. "Moreton Bay". Also embarking 
on the Moreton Bay was most of Brigadier Jim Woodford's 32 Brigade, 
consisting of 3/8 Gurkha Rifles and 2/8 Punjab; (k/2 GR followed in the 
Circassia)• On the 28th the ship left her moorings in Rangoon to anchor 
at the mouth of the Rangoon River, from where on the 29th she began the 
journey to Saigon.
On 28 September the fighting flared up again as Gracey gave priority
1to the security of Tan Sdn Nhdt. Patrols from 1/1 GR continually swept 
the road to the airfield without incident, but a 3/1 GR company on 
reconnaissance in the north met an entrenched force of Viet Minh at the 
bridge at Ap -Bong Ni, east of Go Vap. The Viet Minh were heavily armed 
with rifles and machine guns, and the battle was joined.* The Gurkhas 
by now had suffered their first casualties, and this company was from 
one of the most battie-hardened battalions, having walked through Burma 
from Iraphal. When the smoke and din had subsided 7 Viet Minh corpses 
lay on the ground; they broke and scrambled away, suffering possibly 53 
more killed in the flight as the Gurkhas grimly pursued them. Three 
Gurkhas were wounded in the action which saw about 60 Viet Minh killed* 
The Gurkhas were beginning to make a name for themselves in Vietnam, and 
the memories of these days were to last for decades.
A Gurkha convoy from Lai Thi£u, a town on the river about 10
miles north of Saigon, did not fare so well. Again a platoon of 3/1
Gurkha Rifles was involved, and they suffered their worst casualties
of their whole stay in Indochina. Eighteeen Gurkhas, plus a detachment
of Japanese and a handful of Dutch soldiers, had accompanied a convoy
of 13 vehicles which had been dispatched to evacuate a Japanese ammunition
dump in Lai Thieu. The Gurkhas earned their pay on this day, for they
were ambushed six times on the return journey, when the trucks were filled
with ammunition and unmaneuverable. When the convoy finally reached the
British perimeter 5 trucks had been lost; 6 Gurkhas had been killed
(including 2 missing, believed killed), and 3 wounded. The loss of the
Gurkhas was deeply felt by the battalion: "This was a sad blow as we
15lost some first class NCOs in this ambush." The Japanese had opted out 
of the fight: "There is little doubt that the JAPANESE know all about
this ambush and they fired not a shot to defend the convoy." Of the 
Dutch, 1 officer had been killed and 3 soldiers wounded.
But the action was not confined to the Gurkhas, for k Dogra had been 
thrown into the fight as soon as they arrived. As the Dogra recorder 
wrote of the Viet Minh general uprising of the 25th:
"Almost the first shots were fired at the G.O. who 
had four rounds put into his car at five yards 
range before beating a hasty and unceremonious 
retreat... "A" Coy, under Subedar Dhian Singh, 
the first to arrive, was given two hours grace 
and was then sent off to stiffen up one of the 
sectors. They went into action on the 28th, 
when the two forward platoons contacted about 
200 well armed Annamites in a strong bunker 
position. Being finally held, Subedar Dhian 
Singh took under command two nearby French 
platoons and finally drove the Annamites out 
for a minimum cost of 35 (Viet Minh) killed.
"A" Coy had 3 O.Rs* wounded." 16
This action had taken place at Thanh N^an area, in the botanical 
gardens, and the Viet Minh, armed with rifles, machine guns and grenades, 
were driven into houses about six blocks north; these were turned into 
strong points and contact was broken off at 1230. Later in the day k of 
the 5 trucks lost in the ambushed convoy made their way into Saigon.
Mountbatten now summoned Gracey, Cedile and Brain to Singapore, 
where in a meeting attended by Mr. J.J. Lawson,** a former miner who was 
* Other Ranks (enlisted men).
** An officer in Burma wrote of Lawson: "The Secretary of State had just 
been here and was a nice little miner, but he just hadn't got a clue 
as to what was really going onl"
now the Secretary of State for War, the Indochina situation was discussed.
Again, Mountbatten's report of this conference (to the Chiefs of Staff)
was a bland recapitulation of the meeting with the three officers but,
as will be seen, Gracey directly confronted the Supreme Allied Commander
17on the withholding of the rest of the 20th Division.
At this meeting (SAC's 31st Miscellaneous Meeting, 28 September)
Mountbatten asked Gracey to explain his proclamation; Gracey replied
without hesitation that he had interpreted his instructions to mean that
he was confined to using British forces in key areas around Saigon, but
this did not absolve him from his responsibility for ensuring law and
order throughout French Indochina south of the 16th parallel, in the whole
of which area he was forced to rely on the Japanese for security duties.
Gracey said that merely to direct the Japanese to maintain order was not
sufficient. It was essential that the Vietnamese behind the disorders
should themselves know that he had instructed the Japanese to maintain
public security and that those who persisted in provoking disturbances
would be punished. A proclamation was thought to be the best way of
publicising his message to the people. Had he not taken this step a good
many French lives would have been lost. In his action he was strongly
backed by Slim who, as will be seen, was becoming less enchanted with
Mountbatten's style of command. Since Slim, Browning, Leclerc and
practically everyone else present approved of Gracey's action, Mountbatten
*
accepted the explanation.
Gracey further reported that the Japanese were involved in most of
the disorders and he was compiling a list of the names of the responsible
Japanese commanders for later trial. He was of the opinion that these
Japanese should be shot, and Mountbatten agreed. Mountbatten permitted
Gracey to continue his efforts to bring the French and Viet Minh together
for discussions, but stipulated that he "could only be the vehicle through
which such contact was established. He (Gracey) must not in any way enter
18
into discussions or negotiations with the Viet Minh."
Mountbatten then expounded his own view of the situation. He said 
that His Majesty's Government was determined not to repeat the Greek 
experience, and the British forces must not incur casualties by becoming 
involved in local affairs. Law and order should be a French problem (but
* A source close to Gracey said that when Gracey returned from Singapore 
he reported that Mountbatten had decided to relieve him of his command;
however, Slim had intervened by telling the SAC that "if he (Gracey) 
goes, I goI "
due to political delays there were insufficient French troops for this 
task). Cedile said that there were many French civilians throughout 
Indochina now dependent on the Japanese for their lives. Mountbatten 
then asked if they could all be brought into Saigon, but Gracey responded 
by saying that Saigon was already overcrowded, it would be difficult to 
find transportation and each move would entail a military operation.
Mountbatten told the Chiefs that he had "persuaded" Cedile to 
meet the Viet Minh and Gracey was trying to get them all together. That 
was not exactly how Gracey remembered it. He wrote that he had not 
needed Mountbatten to remind him to try to effect a reconciliation between 
the French and the Viet Minh:
"From 25th September onwards, efforts had been made 
by Colonel CEDILLE, after full agreement with the 
Allied commander, to get in touch with the members 
of the late Annamite government, and these were 
eventually successful. Again, there was no question 
of waiting for orders from S.E.A.C. to do this." 19
Mountbatten said that Gracey agreed with following Course B,
"but has pointed out that it will not be possible 
to limit his resources to the Brigade which is 
now in, since SAIGON covers such an enormous 
area that he considers that the full 20th Indian 
Division which is due to complete its build up 
in SAIGON by mid October, will be required." 20
That is not how Cedile remembered it. There were several generals
(including Slim) at the meeting, besides Mountbatten. Cedile said that
Gracey went to Singapore to ask for reinforcements:
"Well, whatever you may say that's what we went 
to ask for, especially air support, because we 
didn't have very much of that. I don't know why 
but they didn't give us much air support... I
remember when I asked for reinforcements and they
weren't forthcoming. I saw that Gracey was not 
very pleased, and Mountbatten said 'no reinforcements.'
And General Gracey said to him —  he used these 
very words —  he said, 'Saigon is much bigger 
and much more important than Liverpool, and how 
would you expect to defend a town the size of 
Liverpool with just a few battalions of Gurkhas 
and Dogras?' I always remember that incident 
when he compared Liverpool to Saigon." 21
Cedile appreciated Gracey*s courage, for "Gracey always said what 
he thought." Said Cedile:
"All I could do was to rely on General Gracey, 
because we did need help. We had to face the 
enemy and at that time I wrote myself —  I 
telegraphed in code —  to General Leclerc. I
asked Leclerc politely to try and get Mountbatten 
to send us some troops, some reinforcements, 
because we did need them badly. I know that Leclerc 
did it. In fact he did everything he could to 
insure these reinforcements for us, and some came —  
there weren't very many. I am certain that General 
Leclerc had intervened in supporting Gracey to 
get some troops for us while waiting for the French 
to arrive." 22
It was evident that Gracey had received solid support from all 
the senior officers present, with the possible exception of Mountbatten, 
who wrote:
"Slim has investigated this matter personally and 
is strongly of the opinion that not less than one 
Division is required merely to comply with course 
(B), that is, merely to safeguard the SAIGON area 
including dock area and airfield, which are 
essential for the safety of the maintenance of our 
own forces."
Mountbatten now professed fear that unless there was a strong 
British force in Saigon "I am of the opinion that it will become 
increasingly difficult to control the Japanese" (which is what Gracey 
had been saying for two weeks). The Japanese had already violated
Allied instructions by arming the Viet Minh. "On GRACEY making strong
representation to TERAUCHI, he has promised to do his best to prevent 
this, but I feel is himself embarrassed at our lack of force." Gracey 
had restated his position of holding the Japanese responsible for the 
safety of Allied nationals outside his key areas until the French were 
strong enough to take over; "Only then will these Japanese Forces be 
marched to the concentration area near SAIGON for disarmament by British 
Forces." Furthermore,
"GRACEY has explained that the reason why he extended 
his proclamation to cover zones outside SAIGON was 
to ensure that the Annamites know that he had ordered 
the Japanese forces to safeguard Allied Nationals.
Otherwise there was a great danger of a massacre,
which he and CEDILLE consider that this action has
now averted." 23
Mountbatten concluded by saying that Gracey’s entire division 
would be needed for both courses A and B:
"I have instructed SLIM not to hold up the move 
of the rest of 20th Indian Div. I must point 
out that the need to get the 9th French Colonial 
Infantry Div into INDO CHINA at the earliest 
moment has become more important than ever."
Cedile had a final comment on the issue of Gracey's badly-needed 
reinforcements:
"When we went to Singapore he (Browning) supported 
Gracey —  Slim, also. There was much discussion 
because Gracey had a lot of support among the 
generals on Lord Mountbatten's staff, and he was 
obviously friendly enough to write to.them, and 
so we got our reinforcements. We then achieved 
our mission.
No Frenchmen could say that he was not fully 
supported by the British." Zk
On 28 September, in London, the War Office responded to a request 
by Prime Minister Attlee for a note on Indochina by saying that the 
disarming and control of Japanese forces and the maintenance of law and 
order were of concern only as they affected the primary tasks of controlling 
the Japanese headquarters and repatriating APWI. "The British Commander 
of the Occupation Force for French Indo-China was given orders in this 
light..•
On 29 September, k Dogra's C and D companies arrived and were 
immediately assigned to guarding Tan Son Nhut airfield, RAF Headquarters 
and the radio station. The Dogra guards on the artesian wells were 
relieved by k22 Field Company. Tan Sosn Nhut was now continuously guarded 
by 2 platoons of ^ Dogra, about 180 RAF personnel and 250 Japanese troops.
On 29 September, too, Headquarters 20 Indian Division closed at Rangoon 
at 1000 hours and embarked aboard the Ranchi, which was part of the 
first sea convoy to Saigon (RSS 1); they joined 32 Brigade Group,
16 Cavalry, 114 Regiment (Royal Artillery) and ancillary units in the 
convoy of 10 vessels, which also carried POL, stores and 1200 vehicles.
In Saigon the Viet Minh attempted to burn a wooden bridge but were 
driven off by the Japanese. Reports from Lai Thi&u in the north caused 
concern, for the situation there was said to be worsening. Information 
was also received at Commission Headquarters that 30,000 Viet Minh troops 
were concentrating in the areas of Bien Hoa, Mytho and Vinh Long. A 
"generally reliable" source stated that these forces were to attack Saigon 
from the Botanical Gardens. The report was forwarded to' SEAC Headquarters 
where it caused more concern than in Saigon, for 1/1 Gurkha Rifles only 
noted the information and added that the "generally reliable source"
was "too reminiscent of the days of 'well informed circles' to be believed
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in the Bn." The rest of the battalion, -^50 men under Major R. Clark, 
embarked on the Rajula at Rangoon.
On 30 September the convoy finally left Rangoon, four days 
behind schedule. In Saigon, a detailed plan for the defense of the 
city was in preparation; it was otherwise an uneventful day, although 9 
Annamites were arrested in Cholon and some arms and ammunition were 
recovered. The RAF's 908 Wing in Saigon became Headquarters, Royal Air 
Force, French Indo China.
On 30 September, in London, the Joint Planning Staff (Chiefs of 
Staff Committee) prepared a report for the Chiefs titled "French Indo-
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China —  Measures for Responsibility for Internal Security by SACSEA."
As instructed, the JPS examined the correspondence between SACSEA, the 
Foreign Office and the War Office, together with the proposals from the
French (through SEAC) to abolish the boundary at the 16th parallel. After
tracing the recent history of Indochina since 9 March 19^5» the report 
stated:
"Unless a firm stand is taken, there may be 
continued riots, interference with communications 
and public services and activity by guerilla 
armed bands. There also may be a threat from 
native troops who served with the French until 
March (of which native troops 15i000 have 
retained their arms), and from the armed gendarmerie 
and civil guard recruits who are under the nominal
control of Viet Nam... On the arrival of British
forces in Saigon it was clear that the Viet Nam
Government had control in name only, that law 
and order had ceased to exist and that pillaging 
and looting was on the increase. The press was
also very strongly anti-French and becoming more
violent."
The JPS agreed that Mountbatten's Course B was the correct one to 
follow, and that Leclerc had been right to refuse to assume responsibility
until the arrival of the 9th DIC. They also agreed that it would be
unwise to revoke Gracey*s proclamation, since that would further incite 
revolutionary activity. The report continued:
"We are, therefore, perforce left in a situation 
in which we must remain legally responsible 
for law and order throughout South Indo-China 
until the French take over... For planning 
purposes we cannot count on any acceleration 
by these means and must therefore be prepared 
to accept that we may have to retain responsi­
bility in South Indo-China until the end of 
the year."
The Joint Planning Staff agreed with Gracey in recommending that 
the build-up of his division should continue "In the light of the 
situation which has developed." As for "Policy for Employment of British 
Forces", the JPS said that "we must clearly gain and retain complete 
control of the Saigon area since this is required by our military object." 
The rest of the country must be left to the French due to the small 
size of the British forces available. But "Saigon is the most important 
centre of population in the country and control of this area may be 
sufficient to allow small forces to establish law and order throughout 
the rest of the country."
The Joint Planning Staff then made a far-reaching recommendation 
which freed Gracey from a large measure of his restriction and authorized 
him to maneuver outside Saigon:
"We should, however, be prepared to assist these 
(small French) forces to the limit of our ability 
provided that, in the judgement of the local 
commander, this can be done without prejudicing 
the local security of Saigon."'
The JPS then recommended that "the following interim policy should 
be given to S.A.C.S.E.A.:
(a) His primary responsibility is control 
of the Saigon area.
(b) He is authorised to assist the French 
in the interior of the country as far 
as he can without prejudice to (a).
Their report concluded with the recommendation that the theatre boundary
remain unchanged until the French could assume responsibility for all
Indochina.
In Saigon itself, repeated attacks by the Viet Minh on the power 
station underscored the importance to Saigon of that installation; the 
city depended for its water on the artesian wells, and it could not be 
drawn from these without electric power to drive the pumps. But although 
the power house was successfully defended, its condition gave cause, for 
concern. The Vietnamese labourers had, before they departed, sabotaged 
the fuel elevator to the furnaces, the electric motors which drove the 
water injectors for the boilers, and more. A labour force of 200 Japanese 
soldiers was employed, working in shifts, carrying coal in sacks from barges 
in the canal to the furnaces.* The resourceful Electrical and Mechanical
* The fuel used was a mixture of coal and maize.
Engineer, an Australian, rewound some of the injector motors himself,
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and some Japanese marine engineers finished the job for him. But 
having control of the power station, such as it was, had its tactical 
advantages:
"There was always a curfew at night, and no 
street lights. If a unit got attacked at 
night, it could ask for the street lights 
in its area to be put on, which was a hasty 
surprise for the attackerB who were caught 
in the open." 29
Brigadier Myers was moving about under these precarious conditions 
conducting his own investigation into the explosive political situation 
and as he was leaving Saigon it was announced that General Gracey had 
managed to bring the French and the Viet Minh together for face to face 
discussions. Myers, an officer with an unusual depth of experience in 
clandestine operations, had no doubt as to what the major problem was.. 
Wrote Myers:
"My mission, given to me personally by Mountbatten, 
in Slim's presence, was a fact-finding one, basically 
to find out how we could achieve our military task in 
F.I.C., viz. accepting the surrender of the Japanese, 
without becoming involved in an internal war between 
the Annamites and the French, which was none of our 
business." 30
Myers then briefly described Scobie's experience in Athens, and 
continued:
"To sum up, I reported that if we continued to 
support the re-establishment of the French 
Government in FIG, we couldn't avoid becoming 
involved in war with the indigenous population.
The French were largely discredited. The 
Annamites had been promised independence when 
Japan had won the war. They had no intention 
of reverting back to the 19^0 status quo.
During my about 5 or 6 day stay in Saigon I 
spoke to several senior and educated Annamites.
Few had a good word for pre-World War II French 
colonial government in F.I.C. Virtually all 
pleaded with me to impress upon Mountbatten 
the necessity for an up-dated and‘liberal 
outlook by the French, if bloodshed was to be 
avoided and F.I.C. was not to be driven towards 
Communism."
On the evidence available to him Myers wrote that the Vietnamese
nationalists were generally not Communist, and he shared Gracey's view
31that the problem was in large measure due to French intransigence.
The French, said Myers, could not go on ignoring the changes wrought
by the Japanese occupation. The Vietnamese said that they did not wish
to involve the British, but in their view there was no way to avoid this.
The French insisted on "returning to square one," and the Communists
would take advantage of this. Regarding the Vietnamese, "The last thing
they wanted was to become Second-class' French colonial citizens once 
32again," and the Communists would know how to turn the nationalistic 
outburst to their.advantage after liberation* Wrote Myers:
"The French... couldn't understand what had 
hit them, any more than we did. Moreover, 
they blamed nearly all their troubles on 
the Communists and, initially, this only 
deepened the Annamite anti-French feelings 
and increased the troubles for the French —  
and ourselves." 33
Myers, like Brain, had no use for the colons generally and also 
thought that a new class of Frenchmen should come out from the raetropole.
Myers, who later went to Burma on a similar investigation into 
Aun Sang and his Burma National Army, interviewed Chinese and Frenchmen 
also, and personally shared Roosevelt's view of colonial France. But as 
the British Government was committed to the unequivocal return of French 
sovereignty to Indochina, and especially after having been ordered by 
Mountbatten to avoid entering into discussions with the Viet Minh, Gracey 
was left with no room in which to maneuver. And now that the Chiefs of 
Staff were about to free him from the confines of Saigon, war appeared 
unavoidable.
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CHAPTER XI
TRUCE
The result of the action we have been 
compelled to take has been that we have 
become unpopular with the Annamites and 
Indonesians because we are regarded as 
re-imposing on them French and Dutch 
rule which they had already shaken off, 
and with our Allies because our efforts 
to restore law and order, which to them 
means French and Dutch rule, are so 
restricted. The real and underlying 
danger is that the situation may develop 
so that it can be represented as a West 
versus East set-up. I need not point 
out how extremely dangerous this may be.
Slim, to Alanbrooke 
6 October 19U5*
As September 19^5 drew to a close the military situation was
visibly worsening, which obliged consideration to be given to the
possibility of employing the Spitfires in some role other than
reconnaissance and shows of force. Some of the road blocks were too
well fortified to be attacked by small patrols. Although the last 9
days of September had seen an increase in the RAF's airlift sortie
rate,* by 30 September a total of 3369 personnel had been flown into
Saigon, a large proportion of whom were not combat troops.
Air reconnaissance revealed an increasing number of road blocks
and movements of organized bodies. This led to the conclusion that
the Spitfires might have to be called in if British casualties were to
be avoided, though Gracey believed that the decision about their use
would have to be made by Mountbatten himself. He also sought authority
from Mountbatten to fly Terauchi's Assistant Chief of Staff to Hanoi
to consult the Viet Minh about the worsening political situation in 
* *  *
the South and to provide Gracey with information about conditions in 
the north. Gracey was most anxious to know more of the political 
situation in Hanoi (and in November he dispatched a permanent representative 
there)•
From 23 to 28 September inclusive, British casualties amounted to
6 killed, 26 wounded; the French had lost 8 killed, 3 wounded, while
French civilian casualties, at this time, were known to be 25 killed
and 100 missing.*** The Viet Minh losses were officially listed as
20*f killed and more than 200 wounded. Gracey told Mountbatten that in
Pakse, Laos, the Viet Minh had attacked the French, using Japanese
machine guns and mortars, while the Japanese, "sat by" and "smiled and 
1
did nothing."
As a result of information received from Saigon, Mountbatten cabled 
the British Military Attache in Washington that on 30 September Lieutenant 
Colonel Dewey's body had still not been recovered, and was unlikely to 
be recovered in the future. He regretted, as did Gracey, being unable 
to comply with the wishes of Dewey's father, but promised that the Allies
* 132 sorties had ferried 1853 personnel to Saigon.
** Mountbatten would not agree to this.
*** Civilian casualties were probably higher, as these figures 
included only the known casualty rate in Saigon.
would continue looking.*
The RAF element in the Control Commission was fully extended in
controlling Japanese air resources, the troop and supply airlift, and
a host of similar duties, and the shortage of aircraft throughout the
South East Asia area was acute. The Press, with its customary insensitivity,
now demanded that Mountbatten supply a plane for its own exclusive use,
merely to provide a special airlift of their dispatches and materials
to Rangoon on a regular basis. Air Commodore Cheshire, in recommending
that ACSEA (Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park) disapprove the request,
2
noted that the reporters "are unable or unwilling to understand” the 
severe operational shortages.
On 30 September a message from,the Control Commission requested 
SACSEA to instruct Special Duty operations in Calcutta to cease leaflet 
drops over Indochina, because its own requests, sent directly to Calcutta, 
had elicited no response. The leaflets, which probably originated in 
French headquarters, were reported by the Control Commission to be 
unhelpful. SEAC Headquarters was also asked to send a senior officer 
to Saigon to control the important radio station there and to supervise 
its handover, by stages, to the French. The Control Commission was 
fortunate to number among its members Hugh Astor, whose family owned the 
renowned (London) Times** and who was himself experienced in journalistic 
work, but he was still only a junior lieutenant colonel, and "It requires
men with more executive power than Astor, who is excellent within (the)
3proper scope of his task.”
On 30 September Gracey asked Mountbatten directly:
"Am I now empowered to use Spitfire aircraft 
to attack hostile targets? Am already employing 
Spitfire TAC/recce.sorties. I wish to employ 
in attacking role against hostile concentrations, 
road blocks,etc. Grateful earliest reply as I 
am still not clear." k
On 1 October Mountbatten responded to Gracey*s query:
"As from daylight 3rd October you are empowered 
to use Spitfire aircraft to attack hostile 
targets if for over-riding operational reasons 
you require to clear road blocks or bunkers 
to ensure the safe movement of your troops for 
any vital task. In particular you may use 
Spitfires to keep open your lines of communi­
cation between your airfield and your key area 
in Saigon." 5
* Many leads were followed up and graves were exhumed both in Saigon 
and in the surrounding countryside, but to no avail. According to 
Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Gopsill, officers down to the level 
of company commanders were personally alerted in this regard.
** A local paper was published in Saigon for British forces; it was 
the Times of Saigon.
But Mountbatten told Gracey to refrain from using the fighters 
on road blocks which did not interfere with his operations, or on 
"concentrations of Annamites from which large casualties might result," 
Furthermore, in the manner of operations on the Northwest Frontier of 
India, leaflets must be dropped on the intended target at least 2 hours 
prior to any Spitfire attack; Gracey then was directed "to report at 
once each case of using aircraft offensively together with reasons which 
made this imperative and telegraph the text of the leaflet that was 
dropped beforehand." But this was not northwest India, and the 2 
hour restriction was rescinded a few days later.
Mountbatten explained that these restrictions were necessary in 
order "to counter the anti-British propaganda which is certain to be 
put out after each attack by the Vietnam controlled Radio Station in 
Hanoi which General Wedemeyer, in spite of my repeated requests, appears 
unable to control."
The Supreme Allied Commander had now received the instructions from 
the Chiefs of Staff concerning the relaxation of restrictions on Gracey, 
and added:
"In order to reduce the likelihood of disorder 
you may make a public announcement on the lines 
that whilst you have no wish to intervene in 
the internal affairs of INDO-CHINA, any activities 
or agitation cannot be tolerated which may be 
detrimental to the internal security and orderly 
administration of your tasks of controlling 
Japanese surrender and relief and evacuation 
of RAPWI." 6
It was no more than Gracey had said two weeks earlier.
On 1 October a composite force called "Dinforce" was assigned 
to clear a portion of Gia Binh. Dinforce was composed of 3 infantry
companies and a small tactical headquarters, the infantry being provided
n
by 1/1 GR, 3/1 GR and V 1 ?  Dogra. No opposition was met during the 
sweep, but French police accompanying Dinforce made 2^ arrests, which 
included a Viet Minh "Red Cross Team". Another 3/1 GR infantry company 
(Blascheck,s company again) operating independently east of Gia Dinh, 
along Route 22, came under sniper fire. The 3/1 Gurkhas counterattacked 
and 28 Viet Minh were killed. The Viet Minh renewed the attack within 
a short time and again they suffered heavy casualties. The 3/1 GR 
casualties amounted to one Gurkha soldier slightly wounded and "Major 
Blascheck very slightly wounded." The 1/1 GR newsletter described the 
action:
"Blascheck's coy was providing 'stops' on the 
open flank of the operation and was attacked 
just before the withdrawal was due to start; 
it was however able to pull out after inflicting
heavy casualties on the Vitamins. Charles was
helping to evacuate one of his wounded in a
civilian car he had found when he was hit in
the middle of the chest - but the bullet only 
penetrated a few millimeters. His men, who 
had previously believed that bullets couldn't g 
hit him, now realized that they bounced off him."
On 1 October Lieutenant Colonel Lecomte, of the French Mission,
asked the Special Duty senior officers to arm the French guerillas in
Indochina with surrendered Japanese weapons. Lecomte argued that
these guerilla groups were as yet the only signs of French sovereignty,
and in any case the arms were needed to protect themselves and the local
population against the (Viet Minh) revolutionaries who were being
9armed by the Japanese.
Despite objections from Browning and Dening, Mountbatten agreed to 
the French request to arm their guerillas south of the sixteenth parallel 
provided "we are not told that they are going to cross the intercommand 
boundary." Browning and Kimmins thought that this was a risky move 
since these groups were not operating under British control and were in 
the vicinity of the intercommand boundary, where they would probably 
oppose the Viet Minh who were being backed by the Americans.
By 1 October, ^22 Indian Field Company had relieved the infantry
of guarding 11 tube wells in Saigon and Cholon. On 2 October, 2 grenades 
were thrown at the Arras tube well at 0100 hours; the sentry returned
fire by Sten gun, but no casualties were observed. Although the truce,
(described soon) was in effect by 1800 hours, at 2030 another sentry 
came under fire, and a sapper had been missing from the Nancy tube well 
in Saigon since 0900 hours.
The situation on 1 October was described in the Saigon Control 
Commission's "Political Report", which concluded:
"This phase (the second phase, 23 September to 
1 October), was one of rioting and bloodshed; 
the actions of the mob were typical of those 
of all savages; murder, outrages, interference 
and molestation and murder with outrage of 
French women, atrocities on women and children, 
were all present. It was obvious that without 
intervention by the British there could be 
no hope of any ending this phase without the 
use of maximum force and its inevitable blood-
bath. The VIET MINH leaders were therefore 
contacted and on the 1st October, 19^5i 't^ e 
first meeting between ANNAMITE leaders and 
General GRACEY took place.11 10
The report covering the third phase (1 October to 8 October) began
as follows:
The object of this meeting was twofold:-
(a) To make the Annamites understand the 
senselessness of further bloodshed and 
to stress the immediate necessity of a 
truce.
(b) To arrange further meetings but, then, 
between the French representatives and 
the Annamite leaders, with a British 
representative present. 11
At 1630 the first meeting between the British and Viet Minh was
opened by Harry Brain, Gracey*s political adviser* Brain stated that he
was present in two capacities, representing both the British Foreign Office
and General Gracey, who had been sent to Saigon by the Supreme Allied
12
Commander to disarm and remove the Japanese. As Foreign Office 
representative, Brain stated that it was "not the intention of His 
Majesty's Government that British Forces should be used for any political 
purposes whatsoever." The fact that British troops were presently 
fighting the Vietnamese did not mean that their object was the reinstatement 
of the French Administration by force. Said Brain:
"Politically H.M.Government are neutral but 
they together with other members of the 
United Nations have decided that they will 
not recognize any change of sovereignty of 
any territory which has taken place by force 
during the war."
At the same time, however, one of the aims of the UN was the "full 
and steady development of Colonial peoples all over the world and an 
increasing measure of self-government to them."
As General Gracey*s representative Brain said:
"I am here to tell you that the present 
situation (in) this area caused him the 
greatest distress and concern. Here we 
have people at each others throats who 
have been the common victims of Japanese 
aggression while the real culprit - the 
Japanese themselves - stand by and smile•
Brain then addressed the spirit of Gracey1s proclamation:
"For the proper disposal of the Japanese 
General Gracey must and will have law and 
order. But quite apart from the Japanese
he is also grieved that such a spirit of 
animosity and distrust which he feels is 
mainly due to misunderstanding should 
persist between the French and Annamites 
here."
Brain then announced that he was the bearer of a letter from General 
Gracey, and at Gracey's request he would now read the letter. The letter, 
in full, was as follows:
"I feel confident that the present state 
of disorder in this area involving as it 
does the death of Annamites, Frenchmen,
British and Americans and the disruption 
of the peaceful life of the community is 
as much deplored by the leaders of the 
Annamite Nationalist movement as it is by 
myself. (I) Would impress on you that the 
present wave of lawlessness with its 
shootings and burnings of property causing 
distress to thousands of your fellow 
countrymen and casualties to many of those 
who came here with friendly feelings towards 
you is doing incalculable harm to your 
cause and losing you the sympathy of 
civilised people.
I believe that if it were possible for you 
to meet the representatives of the New France, 
the France which fought in and played a 
glorious part in the final overthrow of 
her oppressors and whose policy towards you 
is not a policy of vengeance and aggression, 
many of your difficulties, fears and doubts 
could be set at rest and an atmosphere created 
in which normal life could go on and prosperity 
be re-established. Therefore with the full 
approval of the new French authorities (I) ask 
you to agree to meet the French leaders at a 
place and time to be fixed at this meeting 
and under my personal guarantee of your 
protection by British guards in order that 
all difficulties may be thrashed out." 13
Brain concluded by saying that General Gracey was in the building,
and it was his desire to see and talk to those present about the
situation if they were willing to hear what he had to say. But Brain
emphasized the true purpose of the meeting:
"But I would like to make it quite clear that 
the main purpose of arranging this meeting 
is ultimately to bring you and the leader of 
the New French Adm(inistration) together so 
that you can hear each others'views at first 
hand. We expect you to do your utmost as we 
shall do ours as mediators to bring about an 
agreement with the French in a spirit of 
reasonableness and to avoid useless recrimin­
ation and accusation.
If you are ready to see General Gracey I will 
now inform him."
Gracey then entered the room and (in view of Mountbatten's order 
to avoid political discussions with the Viet Minh) began by saying,
"This is no discussion of policy." He said that the local situation was 
entirely a matter for the French and Vietnamese, and "my task here is 
to get the Japanese forces of all kinds disarmed and shipped as quickly 
as possible out of the country." But apart from the needless suffering 
of the civil population, "the disarming and extradition of the Japanese 
forces is being delayed by the necessity of employing British and 
Japanese forces to stop attacks on Allied Nationals and to keep the 
life of (the) Saigon-Cholon area going." Gracey said his whole division, 
"with tanks, guns and the finest infantry in the world" would arrive 
shortly, and "the sooner the Annamites return to normal peaceful conditions 
and behave themselves the sooner can my task be completed of disarming 
the Japanese and getting them away out of French Indo-China." Continued 
Gracey:
"But there is no intention of British forces 
■ leaving the Saigon-Cholon area for some time 
and they will be here as guarantors that 
impartiality is shown in dealing with crime 
and disorders." 1^
But, said Gracey, in order to carry out his main tasks it was essential
that certain steps be taken by the Viet Minh:
"Are you in a position of authority to ensure 
these steps are taken and your orders carried 
out? Have you come here with ability to control 
both the moderates and extremists among your 
parties? Are you in a position of sufficient 
authority to ensure that orders to your armed 
bands are obeyed?
Here are the steps you should take immediately 
as regards law and order and to ensure that I 
can carry out my task.
(a) Return all Allied Nationals in Annamite 
hands at once. Return Colonel Dewey's body 
at once for Christian burial.
(b) Stop molesting Allied Nationals everywhere 
and allow no future molestation.
(c) Order all armed bands to cease activities 
at once.
(d) Order all villagers and townspeople to 
return to their homes at once.
(e) Remove all road blocks and allow all 
traffic to pass freely.
(f) Remove all blocks on waterways.
(g) Return all stolen parts of machinery 
including railway engines.
(h) Give full information as regards the 
sabotage of the water supply. "
The Viet Minh then replied to Gracey's statement. They said that 
they had welcomed the British troops as they thought that they had come 
to liberate the Vietnamese from both the Japanese and the French. Most 
of the French were Vichyist and their past behaviour had "infuriated" the 
Vietnamese. The only way that "confidence could be regained" was by 
restoring the Viet Minh to power. The Viet Minh would be prepared to 
meet the French "provided that the British acted as arbitrators and 
would protect their nationals against French aggression."
Gracey responded by saying that it was his duty to restore law 
and order and to arrange a meeting between the French and Vietnamese. 
Neither he nor his officers or men would "meddle or interfere" in local 
politics. The Viet Minh would "lose the sympathy of the whole world" if 
they refused to meet the French for face to face talks, and it was 
"essential that law and order is completely restored as a first essential. 
Gracey said that he would not permit the Japanese to take part in present 
or future discussions, and reminded the Viet Minh leaders that he "well 
knew that their forces had been aided and armed by the Japanese and that 
they still had a number of Japanese deserters and others assisting them." . 
Gracey ended by assuring the Viet Minh that he would nominate a 
representative to attend their meeting with the French, "and that in my 
capacity as Commander Allied Forces I would deal severely with sill acts 
of provocation irrespective of the nationality of the offender." *
Gracey, on leaving, assured the Viet Minh once more that they would 
not again get an opportunity to discuss the situation. Staff talks 
continued after Gracey's departure from the room, and the following 
agreements were reached. The Viet Minh agreed to a cease fire to take 
effect from 1800 hours on 2 October. Posters to that effect would be 
put up in Saigon and Cholon after 1200 hours on 2 October, and the Allies 
would guarantee the safety of the billposters. Finally,- a meeting was 
scheduled for 1100 hours on 3 October between the Viet Minh and the 
French, and Brain would represent Gracey at the discussions.
The French senior representatives, Cedile and Repiton (Preneuf, 
Leclerc's Chief of Staff), were then informed of the results. But,
* This statement must be emphasized again in view of the amount of 
hostile material published about Gracey. In his capacity as Allied 
Land Forces Commander he was charged with the maintenance of public 
order in his area of control.
wrote Gracey, "From their attitude [i] cannot be optimistic." He 
told Mountbatten that "I cannot stress too highly the importance 
of Leclerc's arrival here earliest possible, both for law and order 
as well as politically. Whether these Annamite representatives sore 
really able to control their unruly bands only time can tell." Brain 
was assigned to specifically check and see if Gracey *s demands were 
being carried out.
On 2 October another sizeable contingent of British fighting 
reinforcements, including I+/2 Gurkha Rifles and 2967 Field Squadron,
RAF Regiment, embarked on the Circassia, to set sail two days later.
By now the first sea convoy had entered the Straits of Malacca, to 
rendezvous near Singapore in order to arrive together in Saigon. Boat 
drills were rigorously practiced due to the danger of stray mines.*
On 2 October, also, Mountbatten wrote to the Chiefs of Staff, 
acknowledging the new instructions contained in COSSEA 366 [which 
authorized Gracey to move out of Saigon]. He reported that Leclerc 
was "horrified" at the delayed departure of the 9th DIC, and had 
"expressed his protest in the most emphatic terms." Leclerc had 
declared that he would now not be able to take over in Indochina 
until the end of the year. The Chiefs' offer of cargo ships to help 
in moving the Madagascar Brigade would not alleviate the situation 
since Mountbatten could not find the personnel ships. Furthermore, 
"Leclerc considers this brigade which only contains a proportion of 
white troops quite unsuitable in the- present conditions of F.I.C." 
Belays in transferring the 9th DIC to Saigon would increase the danger 
of further involvement by British/Indian troops. Mountbatten pointed 
out that "the lift available within SEAC is already below that required 
for planned movements so that in the event of serious disturbances in 
F.I.C. and the failure of the French forces to arrive the greatest 
difficulty would be experienced in sending additional British support 
to F.I.C."
Mountbatten then emphasized the major role played by the Japanese 
in Indochina:
"The only way in which I can avoid involving 
British/Indian forces is to continue using 
the Japanese for maintaining law and order 
and this means that I cannot begin to disarm 
them for another 3 months. By that time
* In fact, the Richelieu struck a mine en route to Saigon and, as the 
British were withdrawing three months later, the troopship Highland 
Brigade struck a mine en route to Makassar.
prisoners of war and internees will all 
have been removed and since it will be 
obvious that we could physically have 
disarmed the Japanese long before the end 
of December we shall have less and less 
good excuse for retaining British/Indian 
forces there. In fact we shall find it 
hard to counter the accusations that our 
forces are remaining in the country solely 
in order to hold the VIET MINH Independence 
Movement in check." 16
Mountbatten went on to say that he had received a message from 
the Viceroy of India (Wavell), which stated that "Indian opinion is 
most sensitive about (the) use of Indian troops to suppress disturbances 
in other Eastern countries." Protests had already been made against 
the use of Indian troops in French Indochina and Java.
Mountbatten concluded by re-emphasizing the need to move the 9th 
DIC rapidly to Saigon, and added:
"Meanwhile my task is not being made easier by 
persistent attacks against (the) British being 
broadcast by Hanoi radio which is presumably 
under China Theatre's control. I have protested 
about these broadcasts but so far without result."
The propaganda to which Mountbatten objected said that it was 
"the British who are now directing the massacre of our countrymen.
This is no longer a conflict but war which has been started by (the)
British Delegation."
In Saigon, the spread of the news of the impending truce was
accompanied by a brief decrease in violent incidents. At T^n Scih Nhift,
273 Squadron had done no flying for several days due to a shortage of
aviation fuel, and on the 2nd they opened their mess bar with a "terrific
party." The truce gave 1/1 Gurkhas "time to make proper arrangements
for the celebration of our first post-war Dushera...* the festival
was observed lavishly and General Gracey himself attended the Kalratri 
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nautch." Despite the truce, sporadic sniping was heard in late 
evening.
Christopher Buckley continued to provide his penetrating insights
into the situation in Saigon:
"The initiative now rests with the Annamese 
leaders. Who are these men who speak or
* A Hindu festival involving the beheading of a goat by a kukri, drinking 
and nautch dancing. The company's weapons are neatly stacked in a square 
heavy and automatic weapons usually in the centre, and the goat's 
carcass is dragged around the square of weapons, encircling them in blood
claim to speak for the 20,000,000 and more 
Annamese population of Indo-China? They 
are a motley collection, united only by a 
somewhat genuine desire for national self- 
government and a common distaste for French 
rule." 18
Buckley, who sought to report the happenings accurately rather 
than sustain some political ideology or other, went to the heart of 
the problem:
"The question that presents itself is: To what 
extent can this little group of semi-westernised 
intellectuals hope to allay or control the 
turmoil that they have raised? It is one thing 
to get your gunmen on to the streets in execution 
of vague promises of liberty for all. It is 
another to get them in hand again, particularly 
in the more remote parts of the country. The 
rising that" began a week ago was carefully 
planned, it was not a spontaneous outburst.
It received a good deal of stimulus and some 
material aid from the Japanese forces in the 
country. Its adherents have been buoyed up 
by propaganda claims. The developments of 
this week will decide whether this affair is 
to be more or less speedily liquidated or to 
drag on in futile costly guerilla fighting 
for months to come. In case of the latter 
it is now clear that the British commitment 
does not extend to supplying troops for the
suppression of the Annamese irregulars. Our
mission here is a localised one. It will 
remain so."
Gracey*s meeting with the Viet Minh leaders produced the desired
effect, and at 'I'lOO hours on 3 October the French and Viet Minh met for
discussions. Gracey opened the meeting with a short introductory address
and then departed, leaving Brain to remain as his observer at the talks.
The meeting lasted for two hours, and at first the atmosphere was stiff
and formal. However, as the talks progressed the air was gradually
cleared and the conversation became more cordial. Gracey*s report stated
that "Tea and biscuits and cigarettes helped and at one point both sides
were laughing together. At (the) end of (the) meeting both sides shook 
19hands warmly." It was emphasized that the return of all hostages and of 
Colonel Dewey's body, together with an exchange of prisoners, was a pre­
requisite to satisfactory discussions. The Viet Minh "strongly deplored 
(the) taking of hostages by extreme element not under their orders and 
undertook to do their utmost in (the) next two days to find and return 
those who still live and also Colonel Dewey's body."
Gracey felt that the "irreproachable attitude" of Cedile and 
Eepiton were in large measure responsible for the apparent success 
of the talks. [But as will be seen the weakness of the Viet Minh 
and their lack of control were responsible for a breakdown before 
long]. The next Franco-ViSt Minh meeting was set for 1100 hours on 
6 October, when both sides were.to produce written statements. But 
after the meeting the leading Viet Minh negotiator, Dr. Thach, asked 
Brain for a private interview on the samd day; after this private talk 
Brain told Gracey that he was not optimistic of the future, mainly 
because the wild men with the guns were in a dominant position over 
the Viet Minh political negotiators.
Brain's meeting with Dr. Thach lasted 2 hours; they spoke in 
French and there were no other persons present. Thach repeated 
his statement that the Allies had been welcomed "as liberators to free 
the Annamites of the French yoke." Brain replied that if this was so 
the Viet Minh were "greatly mistaken1.' Dr. Thach must remember that the 
French were Allies of G^eat Britain and had fought beside Britain; 
they were also Britain's closest neighbours in Europe. Said Brain, 
who emphasized that he was giving his personal views and not speaking 
as a representative of His Majesty's Government, "As liberating 
forces our task was to free Southern Indochina from the Japanese 
who had usurped power from the French and not to interfere in the 
internal politics of the country."
Dr. Thach responded that the Viet Minh Government had thought that 
the British would support them as the "de facto government with democratic 
principles which had shown itself capable of administration and which 
represented the aspiration of 99 per cent of the Annamites." Brain 
replied that in British, and perhaps American eyes, the facts appeared 
very differently. "In the first place they had been enabled to establish 
themselves in power solely as a result of the Japanese aggression against 
their country."* Japan and Britain were enemies and "we could not 
recognize a change of sovereignty which had taken place through the 
action of our enemies at the expense of our allies. Furthermore 
Annam was bound to France by treaties signed by the Emperor. The 
Emperor had abdicated but the treaties he had signed were signed in
* Thus turning on the Communists their own favourite description of 
their opponents [puppets], a term which Gracey continually used in 
describing the Vi§t Minh in Saigon at this time.
the name of Annam." Only negotiations with France could bring 
about "alterations and abrogations" of existing treaties. The Viet 
Minh would lose sympathy, and perhaps the fight, should they attempt 
to secure their goals by force.
As far as Thach*s claim that the Viet Minh was "a democratica
and effective administrative," Brain said:
"I pointed out that it had not been the 
result of a popular election and that 
its inability to control its followers 
was demonstrated to the world by the 
abduction of women and young children, 
the commission of outrages, and the 
murder of Col. Dewey, followed by an 
attack on a house flying the American 
flag."
Dr. Thach was "greatly depressed" by the thrust of Brain's 
argument, "but he recognized the force of it from the practical 
point of view." He then asked Brain what he would do if their 
positions were reversed. Brain replied that he would persuade the 
party to drop its demand for immediate and unconditional independence, 
which would result in deadlock, but "try to secure some promise of 
eventual self government, if possible with a fixed date." Thach
said that had the Viet Minh been negotiating with the British and not0
the French, they would probably have been promised immediate 
independence. Brain disagreed, saying that in British areas it was 
necessary to include a transition period under British tutelage prior 
to the granting of independence. He pointed to Burma as an example, 
and in Burma the independent government had fought against the Japanese, 
but they had recognized the need for a transition period "before they 
could hope to be able to cope with the difficulties that face a state 
in m o d e m  times." It would be better for Vietnam to look to the 
French temporarily, "whose language they spoke and with whom, as he 
[Thach] admitted, they had close cultural ties,"
Thach "admitted sadly the wisdom of this advice," but said that 
the Party would immediately reject a transition period lasting more 
than a few months." If he [Thach] and his colleagues accepted such 
a proposal they would be the first to be killed by their supporters."
Brain wrote that "The interview took place in an atmosphere 
of frankness and friendliness," and he told Thach that his sincere 
advice was given if in the long run the Viet Minh "really had the 
interests of the Annamite people at heart."
During this brief period of reduced military activity Jarvis's 
1/1 Gurkhas were able to concentrate on their ceremonial drills:
"We had a really good holiday, our only outside 
assignment being a search of the harbour area 
in which B.Coy took part under command of the 
3rd Bn. We continued to provide the guards 
on the Military Mission, of course. Through­
out the period of Vitamin activity, whatever 
our other commitments, we always put on a 
daily Ceremonial Changing of the GOC's Guards.
The Guard fell in and was inspected in the 
Cathedral Square and marched to the GOC's 
house (led by a piper 3 days a week) where 
it mounted. The effect on the population, 
especially the beleagured French, was probably 
reassuring and encouraging. There was usually 
a large crowd of spectators (in fact, we had to 
change the time on Sundays when the attention 
of the congregation was apt to be distracted) 
and the command "for inspection - draw kukris" 
was always received with delight." 20
On 3 October personnel of the RAF Regiment relieved U Dogra of
the defense of Tan Soh Nhiit airfield. Two days earlier the first
Royal Navy vessels had docked at Saigon; these were three mine
sweepers which had escorted a frigate and 2 LCIs, the first RN ships
to visit Saigon in nearly 1+ years. The Richelieu now lay at anchor
off Cap St* Jacques, where she and a cruiser were bringing more French
troops to Indochina. There was some excitement in the 1/1 Gurkha
Rifles Mess when at 2100 hours the lights failed and a "half-naked
Annamite" was caught "crawling along the floor trying to get a flame
for his candle. His intentions were almost certainly peaceful (he
proved to be a servant of RAFWI's) but he spent the rest of the night
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in the Quarter Guard."
On 3 October Lieutenant Colonel Purcell, commanding 3/GR, was 
replaced as South Sector commander by Lieutenant Colonel Trotter of 
1/19 Hyderabads. The 3/1 Gurkhas were now preparing to challenge 
the Viet Minh for control of Khanh H6'i island. Although the truce 
was in force, C Company of 1+/17 Dogra was fired on at night by 3 
Viet Minh, 2 of whom were captured.
While this was going on, there was trouble in Dalat, where on 
3 October the Vi£t Minh occupied the public buildings. [The Japanese 
reacted on 6 October, and a bloody battle accompanied the ouster of 
the Viet Minh: the Japanese lost 11 killed, 17 wounded and 2 missing, 
while Vi£t Minh casualties were 80 killed and 160 wounded].
October 1+ was fairly quiet in Saigon. A number of demonstrations 
took place and some shots were fired as British troops looked on.
The Circassia had now begun her journey from Burma to Saigon, carrying 
more fighting reinforcements for Gracey in the form of U/2 Gurkha 
Rifles, 2967 Field Squadron, RAF Regiment, and important ancillary 
units like Field Service and Workshop companies.
On k October, 1000 Vietnamese formed up and marched past a 3/1 
Gurkha Rifles company position; when they were abreast of the 3/1 GR 
Quarter Guard they presented arms to the onlooking Gurkhas. "Fairy" 
Gopsill, who remembered the incident well, thought that they may have 
been Caodaists. When the massed Vietnamese approached his positions 
Gopsill turned to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Purcell, 
and asked, "What the hell do I do about this?" Purcell replied, "Well, 
there is nothing you can do," but no incidents occurred during the 
march. Fighting broke out later that evening, however, and Mike 
Kelleher and his A Company, 3/1 GR, were surrounded by Viet Minh.
Gopsill's Company was ordered by Purcell to relieve Kelleher, and late 
at night set off in vehicles. They soon came across a road block and 
had to dismount, Gopsill ordering the drivers to follow in the vehicles 
as the blocks were cleared. The first three road blocks were not 
covered, although Gopsill knew that they soon would be.
Suddenly, a "shower of grenades and Bren guns opened up". Gopsill 
shouted "Grenade1" and dived to his right, "right into an open 
Annamite lavatory—  a bloody great pit which was full of it?" Continued 
Gopsill:
"I scrambled out, you can imagine in what 
condition, and we then fought our way through 
the road block, killed quite a number of the 
enemy, and my Senior Gurkha Officer —  a 
marvelous chap —  said in so many words:
'Sahib, for Christ's sake please get to the 
backj * I said that we must push on and he 
said: 'No, we're not worried about your 
bravery. You stinkj' I never realized it 
so I gave my rifle to a soldier, dived into 
the canal and swam to Mike. No further 
worry."
On 5 October Leclerc finally arrived in Saigon where he was 
met at his Dakota by Gracey and other senior officers including 
Brigadier Taunton. A platoon from D Company, U/17 Dogra, and a 
platoon of Frenchmen formed a guard of honour for Leclerc. Shortly 
after, a light commando of the 5th RIC was brought to Saigon in a
French cruiser, which had left the Richelieu anchored off Cap St. Jacques.
A French proclamation was issued to coincide with Leclerc’s arrival, 
and leaflets bearing the message were scattered all over Saigon by air­
plane. Leclerc stated that he was preceding Admiral D'Argenlieu and 
carried the greetings of General de Gaulle and the French people. France, 
like Indochina, had known the sufferings of war, and the sudden collapse 
of Japan had not given France time to fight in this theatre, but by taking 
part in crushing Germany she had taken part in Indochina's liberation.
Japan had taken advantage of the delay in the return of the Allies to 
start disturbances and engage in propaganda. As soon as Leclerc assumed 
command he would put a stop to this work of the enemy. The French 
Government had decided on a plan to bring prosperity to Indochina, and 
"Together we will feed those of you who are hungry, clothe your wives 
and children, build on your ruins, work for the well-being and the 
prosperity of your families whose great traditions are the best guarantees 
of peace and prosperity; this can only be achieved if order reigns...
Until further notice the Army of Great Britain, our Ally, holds military 
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authority."
The Political Warfare division at Headquarters SEAC advised the 
Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department that "the following
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line in regard to output to French Indo China" was being taken by SEAC. 
Radio broadcasts to French Indo China will be transmitted as far as 
possible by the French and given a "specifically French identification." 
British comment on news from French Indochina would be restricted to 
emphasizing the reasons for the presence of British troops, namely the 
controlling of Japanese Headquarters in Saigon (which controlled Japanese 
troops in the whole theatre), the disarming and disposal of Japanese troops 
in French Indochina, the repatriation of Allied POWs and internees, and 
the maintenance of the peace in order that the first three tasks may be 
carried out. In a fundamental reversal of policy the PW Division now wrote 
that "we will stress (d) in particular (the maintenance of law and order 
in order to carry out the other tasks), and play down the non-intervention 
line."
The French would be given assistance in their propaganda efforts 
and would be encouraged to emphasize de Gaulle’s promise of eventual 
self-government for Indochina. The British would scrutinize the scripts 
since most of the French broadcasting was to be done by SEAC transmitters.
Certainly a great deal of work was required of the propaganda 
and political warfare staffs, for a few days earlier Mountbatten had 
sent MacArthur a list of Japanese violations* of the Rangoon agreement: 
messages had been going out in codes not handed over by Numata in Rangoon —  
Terauchi had been communicating with Tokyo on the subject of disarmament - 
and repatriation —  the Japanese had not contacted the Australians —  
Terauchi had earlier refused to invest Numata in Rangoon with executive 
powers and had declared the independence of Indonesia several days after 
the original surrender offer by Japan —  he was discharging Koreans and 
Formosans from the Japanese armed forces, and the condition of Allied POWs 
in Sumatra and Java were still shocking —  Terauchi had attempted to renege 
on his promise to send Numata to Rangoon in early September and had in 
fact failed to send a representative to Bangkok on 5 September —  he had 
attempted to continue broadcasting and was operating aerial flights 
without giving adequate notice to the Allies —  Terauchi was also disposing 
of property to locals, withdrawing transport from key areas, failing to 
prohibit the destruction of property and installations and was losing 
control of Japanese-armed local forces by failing to maintain their 
discipline. The priority of repatriation of Japanese was now French 
Indochina first, then Siam and the Netherlands East Indies.
On 5 September, Dening wrote a long letter to Sterndale-Bennett
in the Foreign Office. He was worried about satisfactorily settling
the state of war between Siam and Britain, since the Siamese felt that
"they can count on the Americans to back them against us and the French."
Dening thought that "At the bottom of it all is apparently Seni, who,
having been treated for three and a half years in Washington as the
brave representative of the Resistance Movement, is suffering from
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totally unwarranted exaltation." A Siamese delegation led by a member of 
the royal family was in Kandy, and were being difficult, but after 6 days 
they appeared to be starting to "wilt" under neglect. Wrote Dening, "I 
have asked people to refrain from entertaining them, and Force 1^6 not 
to advance them any further funds without reference to me. Presently I 
will cut off their motor car too if I consider it advisable."
Turning to Indochina, Dening said that Gracey had protested against 
the return of Brain to Kandy; but Meiklereid was to be Gracey*s adviser 
and "I must have Brain back." The "basic evil" in Indochina was the 
Vichy French, who were despised by everyone including the Gaullists, who
* As of 20 September.
unfortunately were "too few and far between, and not so remarkable at 
that." Said Dening:
"I do not gain the impression that the 
independence movement of Indo-China is an 
insoluble problem. But there is little 
doubt that the Japanese ane still fostering 
it covertly, and the badness —  I can find 
no other word —  of the Chinese and the 
Americans north of 16° is likely to make 
life difficult for some time to come."
Dening wrote that the draft of the manifesto which Leclerc proposed to
issue was irreproachable, and he concluded by writing:
"These independence movements in Asia must 
be treated with sympathy and understanding.
Otherwise they will become really serious.
As I have indicated, they are half-baked 
and treated in the proper way they should 
not be very terrifying. But treated the 
wrong way they may well,in the end, spell 
the end of Europe in Asia. I think we should 
be leaders in handling the situation in the 
right way. After all, it is our forces who 
are liberating these areas and it is the 
British taxpayer who is paying. Let us, 
therefore, stand no nonsense from the Dutch 
or the French. In the end, they may well have 
cause to be grateful to us —  though gratitude 
is not a very marked feature of international 
relations."
Throughout the history of this period the figure of "Bill" Slim 
grows ever larger, his brilliant military mind, combined with a keen 
understanding of human nature and rare political insight, being mainly 
responsible for British success in the East. Slim, in response to a 
request by the CIGS,* Lord Alanbrooke, wrote him a letter in which he 
summarized the situation in Southeast Asia. Slim reported that "We have 
got one (problem) now in French Indo-China, and in the Netherlands East
Indies. I call it one problem because in essence the situation that faces
23us in each is in broad essentials the same." Slim had a firm idea of 
the immediate problems facing his land forces, 'and this accounted in 
some measure for the vital support he gave to his commanders on the spot 
like Douglas Gracey who, according to General Kiramins** (SACSEA Assistant 
Chief of Staff), were "pitchforked" into their respective turbulent areas. 
Slim’s letter presents an excellent, comprehensive overview of the political 
situations, both in FIC and the NEI, and is reproduced in its entirety 
as follows:
* Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
** Personal Interview 26 January 1978.
The main factors are:
(i) A large colony which was captured by the 
Japanese after a very poor effort at defense 
by the responsible European power, with 
resulting collapse of European prestige, 
especially French and Dutch. In F.I.C. a 
Colonial administration of a very poor type 
which cooperated with the Japanese.
(ii) A pre-war national independence movement 
which, carefully fostered by the Japanese,
has increased in militant strength immeasurably 
in the war years and which now in, both F.I.C. 
and N.E.I. can with reason claim to be the 
only de facto government.
(iii) Considerable well-armed and partially trained 
nationalist forces at the disposal of Nationalist 
Governments.
(iv) A lack of realisation on the part of most French 
and Dutch officials and of all French and Dutch 
resident civil population of the changed world 
attitude towards Colonial nationalism and an 
ignorance of the great local changes in F.I.C. 
and N.E.I.
(v) Large undefeated Japanese forces throughout
the territories not yet disarmed or concentrated.
The forces are well disciplined and so far have 
generally obeyed our orders.
(vi) Thousands of French and Dutch released prisoners 
and civilians who are in some danger of massacre 
and whose only protection is in many places the 
Japanese forces.
(vii) In F.I.C. a Chinese occupation North of 16° 
which is, with American encouragement, violently 
hostile to France.
(viii) No French or Dutch forces of any real value 
or strength as yet available and the prospect
of any arriving, especially in N.E.I., very slow.
(ix) The great areas involved, the immense distances 
reinforcements etc., must travel, and the shortage 
of shipping.
The Dutch prisoners were remaining in FIC because the Dutch 
government was as yet unable to accept them in the Netherlands East 
Indies, but the majority of French POWs were domiciled in Indochina 
Slim stated that it had not been possible to disarm the Japanese 
because they were needed "for the protection of Europeans, to keep 
open communications and to maintain a modicum of order outside the 
small areas we occupy. Our forces are small." Referring to Gracey 
difficult situation in Saigon, Slim wrote:
"In F.I.C. British forces have been compelled, in
order to prevent the massacre of French civilians,
to maintain essential services and to secure 
themselves, to use force against armed Annamites.
Several hundreds have been killed, more wounded 
and British, Indian, Dutch, French and Americans 
have been killed and wounded. There is now an 
uneasy truce which will not, I think, last long."
According to Slim it was unfortunate that "the only troops with 
which we can make any attempt to maintain order outside the very small 
areas* we can occupy ourselves, are the Japanese. Thus even in Saigon - 
Cholon, the greater part of the internal security duties are carried 
out by the Japanese." Slim pointed out the disadvantages of this 
policy, which were the following: in the first place the Allies could 
not disarm the Japanese, either now or in the immediate future, even 
if they were willing [as Slim thought they were] to disarm themselves —  
the Japanese- did not want to go on keeping public order —  the actual 
control they could exercise was, in any event, limited to a few vital 
points and communications —  there was, in their areas of responsibility, 
"little security for life or property and, of course, no law. We earn 
the opprobrium of the local inhabitants and to some extent of our Allies 
for employing the Japanese at all."
Slim then drew attention to a problem which appeared to be 
generally overlooked, and which was "real and more likely the longer 
the present situation continues." This worrisome point was that 
"through some provocative action by irresponsible French or Dutch 
elements there may be a large scale.native rising against Europeans."
If that were to happen the small British garrison would be hard pressed 
"even to maintain themselves," and would not be able to prevent 
the massacre of French or Dutch civilians; there would also be great 
difficulty in finding reinforcements or shipping to help the garrison 
should this nightmare occur.
Slim then told Alanbrooke that SEAC had been receiving directions 
from various sources which "seems to me to have been somewhat involved 
and at times contradictory." The British were originally to have 
disarmed the Japanese and repatriated Allied POWs and-internees without 
in any way "getting involved." At the same time the British were to 
work "in the closest possible accord with Dutch and French authorities", 
who were to be responsible for "general internal security." Said Slim:
"These tasks were to be achieved by using the 
British forces to hold only key areas and 
Allied forces to control the areas outside.
The difficulty of this is that up to the 
present [6 October] the British forces have 
not been large enough to hold even the key 
areas and there have been practically no*
Allied forces to hold outside them. The 
Japanese forces have therefore had to be 
used to supplement the British even in 
key areas and wholely outside. If French 
or Butch are used to extend these areas I 
think there is very little doubt that, unless 
the political situation improves immensely, 
there will be clashes. When these clashes 
occur, even if British troops do not have to 
go to the assistance of their Allies, as has 
already happened, the Butch or French forces 
will be operating under the command of the 
local British Force Commander, under my 
higher command, and the SAC's Supreme Command.
As long as we retain this command we cannot 
divorce ourselves from the responsibility 
for their actions."
Concerning Internal Security in Java, Slim thought it likely 
that the British would soon be charged with that problem in the 
Netherlands East Indies. He made it quite clear to Alanbrooke
"that this means either that we co-operate with 
the only existing government, the Indonesia Republic, 
or we overthrow it and replace it.* In fact we 
cannot take over security of anything except the 
smallest areas or put back the Dutch outside those 
areas without armed conflict with the Nationalist 
movement. The same applies in Indo-China until 
the arrival of effective and considerable French 
forces, at least the 9 D.I.C.
The result of the action we have been compelled to 
take has been that we have become unpopular with 
Annamites and Indonesians because we are regarded 
as re-imposing on them French and Dutch rule which** 
they had already shaken off, and with our Allies 
because our efforts to restore law and order, which 
to them means French and Dutch rule, are so restricted.
The real and underlying danger is that the situation 
may develop so that it can be represented as‘a West 
versus East set-up. I need not point out how extremely 
dangerous this may be."
To Slim, the only answer to these problems lay in an early handover 
to the French and Dutch governments. But this could not occur until
* Italics added.
** written by mistake as "with" in the original letter.
"reasonable" French and Dutch forces had arrived "unless we are 
prepared to contemplate large scale massacres." At the moment, "it 
appears that for a variety of reasons their [adequate French and 
Dutch forces] arrival is being more and more delayed. I consider 
this most dangerous."
If the British were to keep the situation under control between 
the present time and the arrival of adequate French and Dutch forces, 
"every means should be used to impress on the, I fear, somewhat 
unrealistic Governments of France and Holland, the need for conciliation 
and for the honest offer of a reasonable measure of Self-Government."
This to Slim was as important as the early arrival of (in the case of 
FIG) French forces, and Slim was also of the opinion that "the more 
diehard officers and [colonial] officials could be transferred to some 
other sphere of activity."
Slim's recommendations were that British forces remain confined 
to key areas while securing, with Japanese forces, the safety of European 
civilians outside these areas,* and that (depending on the speed of 
arrival of French and Dutch forces), FIC and NEI be removed from SEAC 
and made the responsibility of their own governments. The removal of 
Japanese forces from FIC and NEI should have priority over Malaya and 
Burma. Slim concluded by.saying, "Forgive me for writing at such 
length, but I am sure you agree that the present rather confused situation 
is fraught with great danger."
The Control Commission reported from Saigon that their work had been
somewhat curtailed due to the necessity of having to move under escort
since the "outbreaks of rioting, sabotage, looting, and murder which
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occurred on 2 Sept i*5*M For this reason "it has been difficult to 
obtain authoritative reports on the situation within the remainder of 
FIC south of 16° parallel." The scrutiny of documents submitted by 
Japanese Headquarters had continued, but "the accuracy of these 
documents is increasingly open to doubt." It had been impossible to 
examine Japanese Headquarters "and at the same time expect it to carry 
cut the orders issued regarding the maintenance of law and order." But 
with a "change in the internal situation an advance is now being made 
and the examination of the headquarters will be completed within the 
next week."
The Kempei Tai, although listed as war criminals, were remaining 
free for the present. Gracey wrote that:
* This was Gracey*s view exactly.
"until overall disarmament can take place I 
do not wish to upset the present working- 
of the Kempei Tai, except in one instance 
given below. The Military Police section 
is affording considerable assistance to me 
as Commander Allied Land Forces in the 
maintenance of law and order, and to intern 
them now would impede the execution of my 
tasks; I have, therefore, decided that 
immediately guard disarmament and concentration 
of Japanese forces takes place I will then 
close down on all Kempei Tai and war criminals.
Until then all Japanese civilians among whom 
is included the civilian element of the Kempei 
Tai have been ordered to wear a particular 
armband; failure to do this will involve arrest.
I am expecting that this will enable me to 
put one or two of the really wanted men inside 
straight away on a purely disciplinary matter: 
i.e. without the possibility of disorganisation 
throughout the whole Kempei Tai organisation."
The Mission had through force of circumstances become involved 
in tasks not originally assigned to it; this was due to the late 
arrival of the Headquarters, 20th Indian Division, and included the 
necessary political liaison between the French and the Viet Minh, 
the initiation of proclamations in cooperation with the French 
government, law and order outside areas actually occupied by 20 
Indian Division troops, and the control of all Intelligence 
organisations and coordination of all reports for all areas outside 
the Saigon-Cholon area. The heavy workload was caused by a number of 
factors beyond the control of the Mission. Perhaps the major 
contributory factor to the problem was MacArthur1 s ban on the Allies 
setting foot in Japanese held territory before the formal surrender 
in Tokyo on 2 September; the real damage was done during that two 
week hiatus following the cessation of hostilities, in which time 
the Communists had complete freedom of action. But Gracey was, 
even now, looking ahead to the possibility of reducing the Mission 
staff in certain areas; by 1 November the Director of Survey, certain 
Intelligence personnel and a few other smaller agencies should have 
completed their work. From November to December the RAF, RN and 
Economic Advisory Staffs should also be reduced. From 1 December 
onwards Gracey thought that "the need for a Mission as such will be 
so reduced that a change in organisation will be necessary." Head­
quarters 20 Indian Division, suitably augmented, would be adequate 
to fulfill remaining tasks.
On 6 October, 20 Indian Division Instruction Number 2 was 
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issued. On arrival, 32 Brigade was ordered to "clear their area 
of armed Annamites and to maintain law and order within their area"; 
key points within the Brigade's area were the airfield [with approaches] 
at Tan Sdh Nhtft and the road and rail bridge at Ap Dong Nhi, —  80 Brigade 
were to clear roads and maintain order in Saigon and Cholon. Within 
the 80 Brigade area, two companies of the RIASC were to be stationed 
on the New Race Course and responsible for its protection, while 
11il Field Regiment (RA) were to be based in the Artillery Barracks 
[when vacated by the Dutch]. The 11ivfch Field Regiment were also 
to be responsbile for the POW and Internee camps, while the IEMDE 
Headquarters were to make a strong point of their present location 
in Cholon. On arrival, 100 Brigade was to move north to the Thu Dau Mot 
-Bi&n Hoa - Lai Thi#u area to disarm the Japanese and guard the Various 
arms dumps located therein. French forces were ordered to relieve the 
Japanese on the east bank of the Saigon River and clear the area within
the loop of the river to An Khanh Xa, in addition to certain areas
north of the Arroyo de 1*Avalanche and in Saigon itself. The Japanese 
were, for the present, ordered to maintain "strong fully armed"
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battalions in Lai Thieu and Thu -Bute, and to keep the roads open and 
clear from 32 Brigade*s northern boundary to Thu Dau M6t and Bien Hoa.
The armored cars of 16 Cavalry were to patrol the whole area, to include 
100 Brigade's area in the north, but no British troops were to proceed 
outside this area without Gracey*s permission, and they would not fight 
unless attacked. The object of the patrols was "to show the flag, to 
keep the roads open and to carry out recces." Until the arrival of 100
Brigade, the Commander of 1/1 GR (Colonel Jarvis) was to start
controlling the Japanese troops in their concentration areas.
The intelligence summary accompanying 20 Division Instruction 2
reiterated the reasons for the weakness of the Viet Minh; it stated:
The Viet Minh is in fact an impossible grouping 
of rival elements separated by insoluble 
antagonism. Their disagreements on theory are 
further aggravated by the personal ambitions 
and the spirit of rivalry amongst the leaders.
They vie with each other in violent speeches 
for fear of being left behind in the race for 
supremacy.
This was a fairly accurate appraisal of the situation in Saigon, 
and the report continued:
But above all every Viet Minh revolutionary 
is tainted with the hereditary vices so often 
denounced —  venality and corruption. We have 
had the example of the 2nd Div where three 
times in as many weeks the leader absconded 
with all the funds.
While the Vi£t Minh hands were not considered to be formidable opponents,
the risk of ambushes and snipings were nevertheless great.
Since disturbing reports were being received from Dalat (where a
large bank was located), the Japanese were ordered to reinforce their
garrison there; General Manaki was told that "The present Japanese force
of *t00 is not considered sufficient with which to carry out your task
of maintaining law and order and disarming the Annaraites." Manaki,
commanding the Saigon garrison, was ordered to send an additional 600
\
troops to -Dalat. They were to be well armed with light and heavy machine 
guns, mortars and grenade dischargers. The Japanese were not to begin
A
disarming the Viet Minh until strong enough to do so, at which time the 
Japanese commander was to regain control of the power station, water 
works, and another power station 12.miles from Dalat. Manaki was 
authorised to send troops from Saigon and replace them with troops from 
Phnom Penh.
On 6 October a further meeting took place between the French
A  *
and the Viet Minh. The French were represented by Colonels Cedile, 
Repiton Preneuf, and Major Paul Mus; the Viet team was composed of 
Phan Van Bach, Dr. Phan Ngoc Thach and Hoang Quoc Viet. Harry Brain was 
present at the conference as Gracey's observer.
Cedile opened with "a few words about the arrival of General 
Leclerc, describing his background and character and his good intentions 
towards the native peoples of Indochina, and making it clear at the same
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time that he was determined to ensure law and order."
Dr. Thach responded with a fairly lengthy statement, prepared by 
himself and M.Bach in which he traced the course of events in South 
Vietnam before and after the British arrival and the resumption of French
A
administration. The Viet Minh declined responsibility for the ensuing 
disturbances which, they claimed, "expressed the anger of the people."
Dr. Thach turned the Allied charges around and declared that "large 
numbers of Annamite men, women and children had been the victims of 
atrocities by the other side and that since Sept 23rd the houses of 
Viet Nam citizens had been systematically pillaged and women molested 
by Frenchmen and Indians." The Viet Minh were ready to help in the 
search for kidnapped French civilians "and restore them to the French
against a similar number of Annaraites." The Viet Minh further denied 
all knowledge of hostages taken by Annamites "and declared with regret 
that attempts to discover Col. Dewey's body had failed." Dr. Thach 
concluded his statement by making four demands, which, if complied with, 
"would guarantee a cessation of the disorders* and safety for all French 
people." These demands were the restoration.of the Viet Minh Government 
and return of essential services to Viet Minh control, the rearming of
A.
Viet Minh police and the return of police stations to them, disarmament
of French forces, and the liberation of all Annamites, including Hoang
Don Van (a member of the Viet Minh government).
*
Cedile was, not unnaturally, unhappy with this statement and asked 
if the Viet Minh "had nothing furtherto say about the hostages", but 
the latter replied that their "careful enquiries had failed to produce 
any evidence of any .abductions whatever. They suggested that the persons 
in question had been killed in the fighting." Cedile pointed out that 
Annamites had been seen leading the hostages away, and their corpses 
had not been found. "Did they (the Viet Minh) seriously expect people to 
believe that over 100 French people including women and children, could 
be led through the streets without a single person having seen or heard 
of them?"
Dr. Thach reiterated that no evidence of hostages had been discovered
at which point Mr. Brain intervened to suggest that the Viet Minh should
make a fresh effort, for "the negative answer they had just given would
prove to the world that their claims to be an efficient administration
were not worth much." Dr. Thach then said that further efforts would be*
made. Brain returned to Thach's original statement by demanding full 
details of all charges against British Indian forces, "Without full 
documentation such charges were meaningless and would be ignored."
Repiton-Preneuf then raised the key issue by saying that the French 
delegation present were not empowered to negotiate the question of 
sovereignty, so the Viet Minh were leaving little scope for discussion.
"It was a legal question which was a matter for the French Government."
But the French had nevertheless made "very liberal and practical offers; 
to install Annamites in positions of authority in the civil administration 
police, etc. These were concrete steps which could be dealt with 
immediately. Had the Annamite leaders nothing to propose of that nature?"
* A curious and apparently contradictory undertaking in view of the fact 
that the Vi^t Minh had just disclaimed responsibility for the disorders
Dr* Thach then raised the other key issue: the Viet Minh would* *
not consider anything except "the restoration of sovereignty to the 
Viet Nara Government." Here was the insoluble problem: the Viet Minh 
wanted full sovereignty and the French delegates could not negotiate it.
Repiton-Preneuf was not put off by the inflexibility of the Viet 
Minh and continued to urge some sort of compromise. Thach responded 
that the arrival of French troops (the 5th SIC aboard French warships) 
had come as a surprise and warned "that if they disembarked it would be 
considered a hostile act for the results of which the Viet Nam Government 
refused to accept any responsibility."
Cedile interjected by pointing out that "these forces had left ports 
for Indochina before any question of conversations had arisen. Their 
movements had not been kept secret, and their purpose was not to fight 
the Annamites but to maintain law and order in Indochina and assist 
in disarming the Japanese." M.Bach, like the French, then said that 
his delegation could not negotiate political questions, which would 
have to be referred to the Central Viet Nam Government in Hanoi.
Cedile seized this statement to illustrate the French position, 
saying that "their purpose in talking to Viet Nam leaders was to settle 
the local problem." The French at this point suggested a further meeting, 
but the Viet Minh representatives hesitated, saying that "they were already 
meeting with disapproval imposing restraints on the people in return for 
getting no visible concessions, so they were not sure they could 
guarantee the maintenance of the truce. (In fact they were proved right, 
for they were unable to control some of their elements and the truce was 
eventually broken). The French-Viet Minh meeting was finally scheduled 
for 1100 hours on 8 October.
Gracey reported the results of this meeting to Mountbatten and
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Slim, ' saying that the "fact that conversations have not yet broken 
down had gained us further time." Substantial British reinforcements 
were expected on the following day, and Gracey.ended by saying:
"Attitude of both REPITON and CEDILLE again 
irreproachable in spite of unhelpful attitude . 
of VIET MINH leaders v/ho appeared to be 
riding to orders from the extremists and 
therefore even less ready to help and more 
stubborn.
Only new feature (of) today's discussion 
was additional stress laid by VIET MINH leaders 
on responsibility of BRITISH for present 
situation by assisting French to take over."
On 6 October Leclerc received his orders appointing him acting
Commander-in-chief, French Forces in the Far East, directly
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responsible to Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander. However,
the British force commander [Gracey] would continue to be in command
of all forces, including French forces, until the departure of
British forces and the assumption of control by the French.
To this already complex situation was added, on 7 October, yet
another difficulty, and its source was General Auchinleck [Commander
in Chief, India]. Auchinleck was understandably concerned with
developments in Southeast Asia for he was under intense pressure
from Indian politicians over the use of Indian troops for reoccupation
duties. He therefore opposed the speed up of the 9"fch DIC, arguing
that this would "result in retention in India for an extra six weeks
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at least of anything up to 18,000 British troops due for PYTHON."
Belay would also occur in returning Indian troops from the Mediterranean 
and in the arrival of British drafts from the TJK. Auchinleck stated 
flatly that "I am not prepared to accept this delay in PYTHON 
programme", particularly as the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Lawson, 
had just promised British troops that he would do all he could to get 
them home. Furthermore, "Indian troops used (must?) for political 
reasons be withdrawn from FIC."
At O83O on 7 October, Brigadier E.C.J. "Jim" Woodford*s 32 
Brigade, together with supporting units, arrived off Cap St. Jacques.
At 1^00 hours the Moreton Bay threaded her way up the twisting Saigon 
River to Saigon, where she berthed at 1830 hours, near the Ranchi 
[which carried the Headquarters, 20 Indian Bivision, the Provost 
Company and others]. While some of the units waited until the morning 
of the 8th to disembark, the Provost Company and 9/^b Punjab 
immediately left the ship and marched to their respective lines [the
Op
9/1h Punjab going to the Annamite Barracks],
At 1000 hours on 8 October Ma.in Headquarters 20 Indian Division 
opened in Saigon; rear Headquarters 20 Division remained in Rangoon, 
while the tactical headquarters in Saigon was closed down. Headquarters 
20 Division simultaneously assumed the additional function of 
Headquarters Allied Land Forces French Indo China [officially abbreviated 
ALFFIC].
* Return of British troops to the UK.
On 8 October also, Lieutenant Colonel Rivier [Commander of 
French forces in Saigon] received ALFFIC Operational Instruction 
Number 1,* which directed him to "take over the protection of the 
Northern Sector of Saigon from exclusive the Saigon river to inclusive 
the railway bridge immediately north of the Rue Verdun." French 
forces were prohibited from crossing the Arroyode l 1 Avalanche, although 
charged with protecting the bridges across it, and the only exception 
to Rivier*s restriction was that he might cross the Arroyo only if 
necessary for the "immediate protection" of the bridges. The Japanese 
were to remain responsible for protecting the road to Tan Son Nhut 
between the airfield and the Arroyo de l 1Avalanche, and Japanese 
troops relieved by the French were ordered to move into Gia Dinh.
The French takeover was ordered to be complete by 1200 hours on 
9 October, and Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis ** was to relinquish command 
of Northern Sector to the French effective 1000 hours on 10 October. 
Neither Gracey nor Leclerc wasted any time in implementing the resumption 
of control by the French. Colonel Jarvis would,however, retain 
command of British troops within the sector and of Japanese troops
protecting the Tan Son Nhiit road and in Gia -Dinh.
3l *
The 20th Indian Division’s History said of these early days 
of October:
"The VIET MINH continually broke the truce by 
carrying out parades and marches in SAIGON 
and CHOLON, often within sight of our troops 
who nevertheless refrained- from taking any 
action, and the usual grenade throwing and 
sniping incidents were still occurring. Attempts 
were also made to suborn Indian troops with 
propaganda leaflets, playing up the similarity 
of India's and VIETNAM'S struggle for independence.
SAIGON was being gradually reduced to a state of 
seige, the VIET MINH blocking all roads and 
entrances, and preventing the conveyance of food 
into the city."
The political report of the Saigon Control Commission, covering 
the period from 1 to 8 October, described the apparent impasse:
* Signed by Brigadier J.A.E.Hirst, who ran the Division for Gracey 
throughout the entire British occupation; Gracey was largely 
occupied by Control Commission matters.
** The copy of "ALFFIC Op Instr No.1" in the PRO is incorrect as 
it lists Lieutenant Colonel Murray's name here; Gracey's 
personal copy had Murray's name lined out and Jarvis's written 
in, and Jarvis was indeed commander of Northern Sector [for 21; hours].
•'The demands of the Annamites are simple 
hut inflexible, they appear to leave no 
room for discussion or compromise. They 
comprise the transfer of sovereignty to 
the VIET NAM government, the disarmament 
of French forces, the re-armament of 
Annamite forces and the release of all 
Annamite prisoners.
Even if it were conceivable that such 
conditions should be accepted by the French 
they could not be permitted by General 
GRACEY. He must continue to be responsible 
for law and order in the places where his 
troops are, and the inability of the Annamite 
leaders to restrain their people from looting, 
abduction and outrage does not give him 
confidence in their ability to maintain law 
and order.*
The attitude of the French is that they are 
not empowered to make decisions affecting 
French sovereignty, but they are willing to 
bring Annamites at once into close collaboration 
in the administration of the SAIGON area. They 
guarantee that their policy towards the Annamites 
will be extremely liberal and that there will be 
no reprisals.
The Annamite leaders, however, remain adamant 
in their demand for immediate and unconditional 
independence. In these circumstances there is 
clearly a danger that the conversations will 
break down." 3£
The report then discussed the role of the British troops in Saigon
"In that event it must be remembered that the 
British attitude, throughout, has been one of 
self-defence. British troops have only fought 
when they have been attacked. They have 
refrained from using anything but light arms 
to defend themselves. Naval guns, aircraft, 
artillery and tanks have remained idle. The 
truce is, in fact, a more or less complete 
cessation of actual attacks by Annamites and 
will be broken only when they themselves 
recommence attacks.** In the meantime they - 
continue to urge their people, by leafi.ets 
and posters, to continue strikes, maintain 
the encirclement of SAIGON and consider all 
who work for the French as traitors.
* In Gracey1s writings, this was a major factor in his decision 
to evict the Viet Minh by the coup of 23 September.
** This was exactly how the truce was broken.
It is necessary to realise these facts in 
order that the responsibility for any fresh 
outbreak of disorder may be placed firmly 
where it belongs. Such a fresh outbreak 
will be suppressed by force and this time 
there will be no guarantee that the heavy 
armament which we have refrained from using 
before will not be used, if necessary to 
the full.
Since the above was written a third meeting 
has taken place between the French and Annamites.
This meeting produced nothing new."
The report reiterated that the Viet Minh could not produce Dewey's 
body or any of the dozens of kidnapped French civilians, and both 
sides agreed that "there was no useful purpose to be served in 
continuing the conversations, but it was decided to refer the question 
to a meeting, if possible, between French representatives and the 
Viet Nam Central Government at Hanoi." The document concluded, 
resignedly:
"It is still fervently hoped —  but it is a 
forlorn hope —  that sense will prevail.
Then, in a peaceful atmosphere, the Japanese 
will be disarmed and the Annamites will be 
able to bring their case to a French government 
which will, we trust, examine it with a sympathy 
and fairness worthy of the cause for which they 
and we have fought for five years."
On 9 October Gracey sent Lieutenant Colonel Murray [who had 
been commanding 1+/10 GR in Burma] to Phnom Penh. Murray assumed 
the acting rank of Brigadier, and, as Commander Allied Land Forces 
in Cambodia, represented Gracey. Murray was directed to take command 
of all Japanese forces in the area, and was specifically charged 
with maintaining law and order in the Phnom Penh area, safeguarding 
all Allied nationals, ensuring the stability of the Cambodian 
Government in accordance with Leclerc's directive, and disarming all 
Annamites (including the Viet Minh police).'
Accompanying Murray to Cambodia were one platoon of 1/1 GR (to 
act as his personal escort) and a signals detachment; two French 
companies were to follow during the next two days. Murray would 
command the Japanese through Lieutenant General Sakuma, commander 
of 95 Division. Murray established his headquarters at the Hotel 
Resident Superieur, and on 10 October held a meeting with Lieutenant 
General Hatori, commander of the 5th Air Division, and Major Bara of 
the Kempei Tei [who on 13 October was sent to Saigon under arrest].
Also on 9 October, a meeting was arranged between the British
and the Viet Minh. Gracey was planning to move into Gia -Dinh and Go
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Vap and so informed the Viet Minh at this time. The meeting, which
appears to have been fairly short, was opened by Gracey's representative, 
Brigadier Hirst, who addressed the Viet Minh as follows:
"I will reiterate the objects for which British 
Forces have come to this country, viz:-
(1) To disarm the Japanese forces in this country.
(2) To get the Japanese forces sent back from 
this country to Japan as soon as possible.
(3) To maintain law and order in this country 
whilst we are completing these tasks.
All this is set out in Proclamation No.1 issued 
by General Gracey.
The British troops are impartial, and after 6 
years of war, fought to relieve you of Japanese 
domination, are anxious only to complete their 
tasks and then return to their own country.
The British have no interest in the politics 
of this country as between you and the French.
Proclamation No.1 by General Gracey sets out 
the conditions which are essential to enable 
the British to complete their tasks
(1) In order to maintain law and order, and 
so that people may go peacefully about 
their work, you are not to carry arms.
(2) You are not to hinder or impede the 
free movement of Allied Troops, so that 
we can get on with disarming the Japanese.
(3) You are to allow the population to resume 
their normal work, so that the essential 
services may operate, and are not to 
interfere with the normal trade of the 
country. "
Having wasted no time in setting down the British conditions, Hirst 
continued:
"As you know, a truce between the Allied Forces 
and your forces has been in operation during 
the political discussions between the French 
and your government. These have now proved 
unsuccessful and the question has been referred 
to Higher Authority.
I wish to know your attitude now as regards 
this truce.
(1) Are you prepared to comply with the 
requirements of Proclamation No.1?
(2) Are you prepared to cea,se carrying arms?
(3) Are you prepared to stop shooting Allied 
soldiers?
(i+) Are you prepared to allow Allied Forces 
to move where and when they like without 
interference?
(5) Are you prepared to allow the public services 
and the normal trade to restart?
If you are prepared to do this now, I desire only 
to make peace and arrange details of terms. If 
you are not prepared to give these guarantees,
I wish to make it quite plain that I shall from 
now on use such force as I consider necessary to 
implement the terms of the proclamation."
Hirst went on to state in stark terms the consequences of forcibly 
opposing the Allied troops in the performance of their duties:
"I have sufficient force at my disposal and 
I shall make use of all the weapons which I 
have —  armed cars, guns, mortars, aircraft, 
and so on. I am determined to carry out the 
terms of this proclamation, and those people 
of whatever nationality who oppose my forces, 
must take the consequences.
. The British Forces here are the finest 
trained troops in the world today —  what chance 
have your half-trained levies against them?
You are fools if you think your troops can 
oppose them successfully. The only result 
will be a lot of needless and useless bloodshed —  
the outcome of the struggle will not be in 
doubt.
I appeal to you, therefore, to be sensible 
about this. It is my last offer and your 
last chance of settling this matter.
I am prepared to give you 214. hours (until 
midnight on 10/11 Oct) in which to pass your 
orders to your commanders and leaders to carry 
out the proclamation —  to lay down their arms 
and not to oppose the movement of my troops.
From that hour onwards I shall start to move 
my troops as I desire. If your troops offer 
no oposition, I only require a peaceful laying 
down of your arms.
If your troops resist, they will be dealt 
with by all the weapons at my disposal.
This is my last word, I now await your answer."
Hirst then reassured the Viet Minh representatives that only 
British troops would be employed in disarming the Japanese. The 
Viet Minh expressed satisfaction at this information and said that 
"it would have a big effect on their followers." They went even
further by saying that "not only would they give the British all 
assistance possible but would even arrange civic receptions for our 
troops." Hirst again warned them that they had until midnight,
10/11 October, to transmit their orders to their military leaders, 
after which he would move his troops at his pleasure — "and he 
expected them to be received peacefully." The Viet Minh were then^ 
told that British troops would initially occupy Gia-Binh and G& Vap, 
the northern suburbs of Saigon [to the east of Tan So’n Nhtft].
Maunsell reported the results of this meeting in a message to
12th Army, adding that during the conference "News [was] then received
that action against airfield by Annamites was in progress. Annamite
leader considerably taken aback. They expressed their regret and
17left at once to issue necessary orders to stop action." He, Hirst 
and Brain met with Repiton Preneuf following the hasty Viet Minh 
departure, and the Frenchman agreed that no French troops should be 
used in the operation planned for 11 October north of the Arroyo 
de l fAvalanche [this operation affected only the key area]. Two 
French companies were, however, still scheduled to fly to Cambodia 
within 1*8 hours.
While Hirst was warning the Viet Minh representatives to stop 
their disruptive activities, Gracey, Leclerc and Cedile were in 
Rangoon for another meeting with Mountbatten. Leclerc had apparently 
held a secret meeting with the Viet Minh, and he now reported the 
results of the meeting to Mountbatten. The Viet Minh representatives 
had given Leclerc exactly the same information as they had given Cedile 
during the more publicized meetings, namely that they had lost control 
of their followers and could not produce any hostages or Dewey*s body. 
Leclerc then added the puzzling news that a radio message from Hanoi
A
to the Viet Minh in Saigon had been intercepted, ordering the Viet 
Minh to prolong negotiations with the French as long as possible.
"He [Leclerc] was at a loss to understand what reasons could have 
prompted such an order, in view of the fact that the prolongation 
of negotiations was more in the interests of the French than of the 
Annamites." Gracey affirmed that he had been told the same thing 
by the Viet Minh, and that he had asked to see the man who controlled 
the guns. Gracey also told Mountbatten that he had issued a solemn 
warning to the Viet Minh not to impede the British task of disarming 
the Japanese.
Douglas Gracey was one of a select few divisional commanders
described as "powerful" by General Kimmins* (who attended this meeting),
and he now spoke plainly to Mountbatten. Gracey said that "he had
prepared plans, which he intended putting into action on 11th October,
to move his troops into certain areas commanding Saigon and Cholon and
between Saigon and the airfield. He considered this essential in order
to ensure his communications against the action of the Annamites, and he
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would use force if necessary." Gracey then made it quite clear that 
"He was not prepared to accept indefinite casualties to his soldiers 
from sniping in the vicinity o-f Saigon."
Mountbatten said that "although it was essential to continue 
further negotiations with the Annamite leaders they were unlikely to 
produce concrete results if the leaders had no control over their 
irregulars." But he again emphasized that the British were in a 
"preventative" role, and stipulated that his Political Warfare and 
Public Relations departments be informed prior to any action taking 
place. Gracey responded by saying that he fully understood these 
limitations, and in fact had already prepared a statement on the 
current political situation.
Cedile told Mountbatten that the Viet Minh had now added "a
*
fourth condition to any agreement with the French —  namely, the 
re-establishment of Viet Minh control in the civil administration 
of Saigon, in fact a return to the situation which had prevailed 
during the later period of Japanese occupation."
General Gracey then outlined the present position:
"... Saigon was run by French police, with the 
assistance of British-Indian troops in certain 
of the main utility services, and of Japanese 
troops in the provision of labour. The 
Annamite citizens did not take their usual 
part in the administration of the city, because 
of their complete intimidation by the Viet Minh."
Gracey said that "the establishment of Allied control in the 
area immediately around Saigon" would solve many of the present 
problems and would induce the Annamites to return to their normal, 
labours.
* personal interview 26 January 1978.
Gracey and Cedile differed in their assessments of Saigonfs 
food problem. Cedile reported that Saigon had only a four day 
supply of food left, and although there was an abundance of food 
a few miles from the city, the Annamites would not bring their 
produce into Saigon without armed protection. Gracey did not think 
that the problem —  as serious as it was —  was quite so bad. He 
had set up a committee [under the Commander of the Royal Army Service 
Corps] which "had the position in hand and under review." While 
British troops, for political reasons, would not be used to clear and 
protect the food markets in the environs of Saigon, and French 
troops would not be available for this purpose for several days yet,
Gracey had ordered the Japanese "to give all possible assistance in this 
matter."
A potentially serious problem was posed by the French navy which 
appeared to be conducting its own operations independently of any 
Allied command. The matter was raised by Mountbatten, who had only 
just learned of it. Admiral D*Argenlieu had announced that the French 
ships in Eastern waters, including the Richelieu and Tnomnhant, were 
about to come under his operational control, so that Mountbatten had 
been obliged to inform him by telegraph that "this would not be in 
agreement with the arrangements made between H.M. Government and the 
French Government. Lieutenant General Leclerc agreed that this was 
indeed the case, and suggested that there must be some mistake."
Leclerc further added the disturbing information that
"there had been some mi sunder standing concerning 
the size and the command of landing parties from 
the French warships at Saigon; for instance 
*Richelieu' had refused to land 2^0 men at his 
request. Colonel Cedille mentioned examples 
of cases when unauthorised landing parties had 
carried out individual operations to the embarrassment 
of other Allied forces at Saigon." 1*0
Mountbatten made it clear that the French Navy was to respond 
to the wishes of Gracey and Leclerc, and directed Admiral Power to 
so inform the French naval units. In the mea.nwh.ile. Admiral Graziani. 
[French Naval Commander designate, Saigon] was invited to Ceylon "so 
that his position should be cleared up."
Mountbatten then asked Gracey to obtain all Japanese papers of 
significance, including orders of battle, for his dispatches. Gracey 
replied that the Japanese Headquarters was so disorganized and inefficient 
that "he doubted whether they would have sufficient knowledge of the
strength and movements of their formations to produce many useful 
papers on the subject." Gracey suggested that Mountbatten might 
have better luck in going directly to Japanese army and divisional 
headquarters for this information, and the SAC so directed his staff. 
The meeting ended after Mountbatten repeated his order that none 
of his commanders were to grant interviews to the press. This 
reflected instructions from the Chiefs of Staff "following gross 
misquotations in the press of an interview given by Lieutenant 
General Christison."
In Saigon, although the shooting had abated somewhat, the 
propaganda war was still raging. The Viet Minh, possibly with 
one eye on the Americans, invoked the spirit of Lafayette in exhorting 
the French soldiers to lay down their arms. In a "Message sent by 
our combatants to French soldiers", the Viet Minh concluded by saying, 
"French soldiers, workers and peasants of France, arise, La Fayette 
is watching you, let the blood of your ancestors speak and take up
I 4
again the glorious trail which they once laid down for you."4
On 10 October Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis "took over command of
Ji2
Northern Sector Saigon for the last 21* hrs of its life," It was
disbanded the following day because of the arrival on 10 October of
more 20 Division reinforcements. These two weeks were a period of
1*3 r.intense shipping activity in Saigon. Between 8 and 11 October 
substantial British/Indian reinforcements arrived, but on 10 October 
occurred the incident which marked the turning point in the history 
of the British occupation, for the extremist elements of the Viet 
Minh broke the truce by attacking a British engineer reconnaissance 
party near Tan S8n Nhut, and the British force commenced hostilities 
in earnest. Gracey had been deadly serious when he warned the Viet 
Minh of the possible consequences of their hostile actions, and they 
were now to discover that he was a man of his word.
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On 8 October the Ranchi. Ra.iula and Mbreton Bay had departed, 
to make room for the Samrich. Sam.iov and Beureoch. which carried 
motor transport, stores and 3860 badly needed tons of POL. On 
10 October the Circassia. Hamalyce and Samgaudia docked in Saigon 
with the advance party from 100 Brigade, I+/2 Gurkha Rifles, 2967 
Field Squadron [RAF Regiment], 20 Division C3EME and other 
supporting units, and motor transport (including 16th Cavalry 
vehicles). These reinforcements were in addition to the 7150 
troops and 507 vehicles which had arrived by sea between 6 and 9 
October.
The Gurkhas from 1+/2 GR did not disembark from the Circassia 
until 11 October.
CHAPTER XII
WAR
It is an unpleasant type of war, the 
enemy wear no uniform and one seldom 
sees them carrying arms, but there is 
always the odd sniper and the apparently 
harmless bystander who throws a grenade 
and ducks for cover. It looks as though 
the French have a tricky time ahead of 
them.
9/11+ Punjab writer.
The 10 October entry in the War Diary of 20 Indian Division
contains the following cryptic entry: "Annamites broke trace by
ambash Engineer Recce Party, killing RE Adjutant [,] 1 VCO and 2
IORs of his escort and wonnding remainder. ALPFIC Op Instr No. 3 
1
issued." Mountbatten, in his official report to the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff, stated that during his meeting with Gracey and Leclerc 
news was received that the Viet Minh had broken the truce. Wrote 
Mountbatten:
"... as it seemed clear that the Viet Minh spokesmen 
were incapable of ensuring that agreements into 
which they had entered would be honoured, I ordered 
that strong action should be taken by the British/
Indian forces to secure further key-points,* and to 
widen and consolidate the perimeter of these areas.
At the same time I insisted that further attempts 
to negotiate must continue." 2
The unofficial 9/1U and 2/8 Punjab Newsletters gave a more
detailed account of the incident which sparked off an enlargement
of the British military role, and "As far as the Bn was concerned
the shooting season for Annamites had opened". The engineers had
been escorted by 2/8 Punjab infantrymen and had ridden in trucks
driven by 9/1U drivers. The 2/8 Punjab chronicle is as follows:
A sec(tion)** from B Coy under Sub(edar) Ladhu Ram 
accompanied an engineer officer on a recce. They 
were returning when they were held up by a large 
crowd of armed Annamites. The Sub gave the order 
for the sec to take up positions and the sec 
promptly leaped out of their truck and took up 
posn in a drain alongside the road. After a while 
when things had quietened down the R.E. officer 
gave the order for the men to get back into the 
trucks and carry on back to Saigon. They were no 
sooner in the trucks however when the Annamites 
opened up on them and in the first fusillade the 
offr and the VCO were both killed.
Nk (Naik) Tunda Ram took over comd and got his 
sec back into the ditch from where they continued 
to hold out from 1700 hrs until they were relieved 
the next morning. During the night Nk Tunda Ram 
was killed as were two more of his men. Out of. 
the remainder of the sec not one man remained 
unwounded and when they were relieved the next 
morning they were found to have only 10 rds of
* Gracey later questioned Mountbatten*s frequent use of the
pronoun "I", noting that most of the actions supposedly ordered 
by Mountbatten had already been carried out by himself (Gracey).
** About 8 Punjabis.
S.A.A.* left between them. There were 3$ 
dead Annamites around their position, k
The 9/M\. Punjab Newsletter added further details of the
Viet Minh ambush, which occurred near the golf course as the
engineers were inspecting water lines:
It was during these days of truce at the 
beginning of October that a Sapper Officer 
went out along one of the roads leading 
north from Saigon on some form of reconnaissance.
He had an escort of a section from 2/8 Punjab 
and, as they had no transport, one of our 1*> 
cwt trucks driven by Naik Punnu Khan was detailed 
to take them; the Sapper travelled in a car.
The reconnaissance completed they turned for 
home and, when some three miles from the town, 
they were fired on by some Annamites the Sapper 
Officer was wounded and his car wrecked. He 
transferred to the front seat of the truck and 
they went on. Shortly afterwards they ran into 
another ambush, the Sapper was again wounded, 
some of the escort killed and the truck damaged. 
While dismounting from the truck the Sapper was 
hit and killed and Punnu Khan got a bullet in 
the elbow. It was now just getting dusk, they 
were some way from home and some six men, several 
of them wounded, were surrounded by a party of 
Annamites numbering anything up to a hundred.
Things did not look too good but events were to 
show that a handful of Punjabis, even when wounded, 
are worth an army of Annamites. Punnu Khan and 
the Gujar section Commander of the 2/8th lost no 
time in getting a small defensive position going 
with their single Bren gun as the main weapon 
for defence. Throughout the night they beat off 
a succession of attacks with heavy casualties 
to the enemy, the Gujar N.C.O. was killed and more 
men were wounded but they hung on. At dawn Punnu 
Khan, who knew a few words of English, called out 
to the Annamites and said that unless they fall 
in on the road he would knock hell out of them 
as he had a hundred men just coming up. To 
some extent this bluff was successful and Punnu 
Khan, taking the remainder to hang on at all 
costs, slipped out through the enemy to get 
help from the 3/8 G.R. a mile or so up the road.
He was fired on as he went but got through and 
came back with a Coy of Gurkhas. The rest 
of his party although fired on were safe and the 
Annamites, seeing a whole Coy after them, with­
drew. The estimate of Annamite casualties is hard
* 10 rounds of small arms ammunition.
to make but it is possible that Punnu and 
his handful had accounted for anything up 
to forty. For this very gallant action 
Naik Punnu Khan and a sepoy of the 2/8 
Punjab both received the M.M. Punnu 
himself was invalided back to India. As 
far as the Bn was concerned the shooting 
season for Annamites had opened. 5
The "20th Indian Division's History" reported that the attacking
Viet Minh force, which had been held off for 2W hours by less than a
6dozen wounded Punjabis and Gujars, had numbered 500. It was 
reminiscent of the Zulu attack on Rorke's Drift in an earlier colourful 
era of empire building. tThe 20th Division History also reported a 
simultaneous attack on the 5/8 Gurkhas at Tan Sdn Nhdt airfield . The 
beleagured section was finally rescued by a combined Gurkha-Japanese 
force (1 platoon each).* The 20th Division historian wrote of the 
incident:
Events of the 10th October... established beyond 
any doubt that the Viet Minh political leaders 
were in fact unable to control their armed forces...
The futility of negotiating with the Viet Minh 
had been demonstrated and our troops were ordered 
to take offensive action against Viet Minh forces 
where necessary. 7
The ambush of the engineer reconnaissance party and the attack 
on the Gurkhas at Tan Sdn Nhtffc (which was repulsed by Gurkha mortars 
at a cost of 6 Viet Minh known killed) were not the only incidents of 
the day; 3/1 GR reported a fire at 2500 hrs behind the soda factory 
on Khanh H6i island, bridges were attacked and Gurkhas fired on, 
incendiary grenades were thrown at warehouses, and road blocks sprang 
up on main streets in their area. These reports suggest that the 
ambush of the engineer party was not an isolated incident but part of 
a deliberate series of actions designed to invite retaliation.
Also, on 10 October, 908 Wing, RAF Station Saigon, became Air 
Headquarters, RAF FIG. The RAF at Tan Son Nhut received a warning
A
from 20 Division that another Viet Minh attack was expected and RAF 
troops, few in number at this time, immediately undertook preparations 
to defend the vital airfield. A local Japanese armoury was found and 
Japanese and French weapons, in addition to the RAF's own guns, were
distributed. Japanese machine guns were mounted on the balcony of the
control tower, with fields of fire down the runways and taxiways.
* The 3/8 G.R.War Diary erroneously lists the ambush as occurring 
on 11th October. The attack began at 1500 hours and at 0600 on
11 October Punnu Khan reached the 3/8 Headquarters.
The Headquarters and Flying Control building was converted to a 
minifortress, and all the Spitfires and C-^7s were taxied up to the 
building. The aircrews were ordered to sleep in their cockpits and 
while awake to watch the tower for flare signals.
Newly arrived RAF Regiment troops, who had flown in at 2k hours 
notice, were immediately deployed to the north to augment the small 
Japanese and Indian detachments there; some were placed in the Headquarters 
building with a platoon of Dogras.
That evening a violent tropical storm burst over Saigon and 
continued to 2300 hours. Whether the heavy rains or defensive preparations 
deterred the Viet Minh is unknown, but no attack occurred and the defensive 
arrangements were continued on the following day. (The assault, a 
ferocious one, did occur two days later).
On 11 October Gracey reported the details of the 10 October attack 
to Mountbatten in the following message:
1. In neighbourhood (of) airfield and
Cholon Annamite armed bands last night 
broke truce. They attacked my troops 
and also burnt out cigarette factory.
RE recce party proceeding to examine g
water well was ambushed near golf course.
Gracey then listed the casualties: 1 British officer, one subedar
and 2 Indian soldiers killed, and 7 wounded. He pointed out that this
"definite aggression" was in spite of recent assurances given by Viet
Minh leaders, and he was "now proceeding to take necessary strong action
against armed resistance. (I) have consulted Leclerc and we are in complete 
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agreement." Wrote Gracey:
"Our agreed policy as follows.
A. Strong action against armed men 
or bands who in any way resist 
disarmament or commit hostile acts 
or sabotage or in any way infringe 
proclamation order. B. Disarmament 
and seach for Annamite arms as advance 
to key areas near Saigon and Cholon - 
progresses. C. No necessary 
provocative use of force during 
disarmament.’' D. Strict orders to 
prevent looting by own troops.
E. To cause as little disturbances 
as possible to all law abiding persons.
* This phrase, written in the compressed style perculiar to telegrams, 
meant that force would be used only when operationally essential —  
not provocatively.
Gracey then stated that he was now proceeding with his plan to
occupy progessively the key areas of Bi^n Hoa, Laithi^u and Thu Dau Mot.
Responsibility for casualties must now rest with the Viet Minh, and
Gracey thought that it should be made known that he had personally warned
the Viet Minh leaders on 8 October, and Hirst, on 9 October, had told them
of the consequences of their breaking the truce. Said Gracey, ”1 further
stressed that this would entail the use of all weapons of war at our 
11disposal.” Gracey asked Slim for authority to form military tribunals 
to try Vi(3t Minh murderers of his troops; failing that he wanted to 
classify them as war criminals. Slim would not concur in either action, 
since the formation of a British Military Administration would be 
necessary for the institution of military tribunals, and this was 
politically out of the question. It was one of the rare instances in 
which Slim did not back Gracey.
While Mountbatten agreed with Slim's line of argument in not 
conceding Gracey's request to establish martial law, he said that he 
had a great deal of sympathy with what the British/Indian troops were 
going through in Saigon and he appreciated the difficulties of the 
situation:
”If Gracey considers it of any help, he may 
tell them I have reported to H.M.Government 
that the troops in South East Asia Command 
are accomplishing with willingness, courage 
and efficiency all that British policy has 
demanded of them, and are behaving with 
exemplary forebearance in extremely difficult 
circumstances.”
Mountbatten thought that it would help if the troops knew that
the people at home were being told of their problems. But, continued
the Supreme Allied Commander:
”Our position is difficult enough already, 
without establishing martial law for our 
own purposes within somebody else’s country.
The only solution I can see is that the
French courts should have their personnel 
increased if necessary by flying in 
reinforcements from France, and that they 
should adopt a speedier procedure to bring 
these cases to trial, so that those proved 
guilty may have the sentence carried out 
sufficiently quickly to act as a deterrent 
to others.” 12
In SEACOS 510, 11 October 19^51 Mountbatten informed the Chiefs 
of Staff that he had authorised Gracey to issue the following announcement 
at his discretion:
"The SAC directs me that he has been instructed 
to tolerate no activity which might be in­
convenient to the orderly administration of the 
tasks with which he has entrusted me. These 
tasks are to control Japanese surrender
and subsequent disarmament of Japanese forces 
in Indochina and £thq] relief and evacuation 
of Allied PQWs and internees.
While these objectj|.vql s are being accomplished 
the inhabitants, whatever their race or creed, 
must be enabled to carry on their lawful 
activities without interference and without 
fear of violence and this right will be guaranteed 
by armed forces under his order.
The terms of this notice are in accordance with 
the policy of His Majestys Government."13
Brigadier Woodford’s 32 Brigade was charged with conducting the 
investment of Gia ©inh, the first move of the expanding British involve­
ment in Vietnam. On 10 October, "ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.3” 
had been issued to Woodford, which directed him to secure
(a) Gia Dinh from inclusive the bridge
over the river Can Bong to Thanh My Tay —  
cross roads Binh Hoa Xa —  road junction 
1000 yds west of Gia Dinh.
(b) The road/rail bridge at Ap Dong Nhi - 
Go Vap - road running South and South 
East to Saigon.
(c) The Thanh My Tay area up to the Canal 
De Thanh Du.
(d) The remainder of your area as laid down in 
20 Ind Div Instruction No.2 dated 6 Oct ^5*
Woodford was told to "use such force as is necessary to overcome 
any opposition" and to "apprehend and disarm any armed Annamites you 
encounter," but "You will NOT carry out a detailed search for arms 
unless opposition is encountered, in which case you will search for and 
seize all arms found in the area of opposition." D Day was set for 
0800 hours on 11 October.
The intelligence provided to Woodford was somewhat sketchy. It 
was difficult to estimate the numbers of Viet Minh in the Gia Dinh area, 
but intelligence personnel were reasonably sure that Gia Dinh and Go Vap
A  S'*were Viet Minh assembly points. Although a figure of 3000 armed Viet
Minh was put forward, Woodford was told that it was unlikely that
he would encounter many of them. Since at the 9 October conference
the Viet Minh had stated their intention to accept the British entry
into Gia Dinh and their violent opposition to the French, the latter
were omitted from the operation.
Three Japanese units were to come under WoodfordTs command for the
Gia Dinh operation (Yoshida, Sato and Yamagishi butais). One troop *
each from 16 Cavalry and 114 Field Regiment (Royal Artillery), plus 
air support within the established guidelines, were available to 
Woodford. Personnel from 604 Field Security were to follow his forces 
into Gia Dinh where they would conduct their specialized intelligence 
and interrogation activities, and arrested Annamites would be placed 
in the temporary custody of 20 Division Provost Company for transfer 
to the French.
At 0630 on 11 October the operation began; 9/1^ Punjab, under 
Lieutenant Colonel J.B.Hobbs, moved to a bridge on the southern extremity 
of Gia-Dinh, north of Dakao. At 0800 one squadron of 16 Cavalry came 
under command of S/'lk Punjab. At 0930 Gia Binh was occupied without 
incident and posts established at a bridge and road junction, both at 
the eastern edge of the town. By noon Battalion headquarters were 
established in Gia Dinh and Japanese forces relieved of security duties.
By 1315 an armoured car troop, with a company of infantry, had made a 
reconnaissance of a major road running through Gia Dinh from southeasta /\ v ^
to northwest, stopping at a major intersection between Binh Hoa and Go Vap, 
where they reported the presence of half a dozen armed Viet Minh. It 
was at this point that the first serious incident occurred, an incident 
which again proved (if further proof was necessary by this time) that 
the Viet Minh extremists were out of control, since Viet Minh negotiators 
had earlier agreed peacefully to accept the British occupation of Gia -Dinh. 
The 9/14 Punjab Regiment War Diary summarized the action:
"No.9 PlCatoonJ dismounted to cover those 
who were called on to surrender. Annamites 
moved towards our tps with hands raised when 
fire was opened by about 30 Annamites at short 
range from west of X c^rosfjjj rds.
Immediately the surrendering Annamites took 
cover in fox holes already prepared. As a 
result of this No. 14597 Havj^ ildar} Ahmed 
Khan was killed.
Considerable prophylactic fire put down 
by our tps as a result of which Ij.
Annamites were killed and many were 
wounded. Three of the original surrender­
ing Annamites were extracted from fox 
holes with their arms and were handed 
over to F.S.S.* » 15
The 9/1 k Punjab Newsletter, in describing the incident as
"not much of an engagement", recorded the death of Havildar Khan
in a manner common to the entire division: "... he was a most
gallant NCO who had been all through the Burma campaign and it is
sad that he should meet his death through treachery after peace 
16
was declared." / /
V A *  \  A
The reconnaissance to the edge of Go Tap was made because Go Vap
was the battalion*s objective on the following day. The 16th Cavalry
War Diary added the final details to the ambush at the road block
when writing that the company commander ordered a section of infantry
to bring in the surrendering Viet Minh. But as the Punjabis advanced
a heavy volume of fire suddenly erupted from the scrub immediately
behind the trenches and the Havildar commanding the section was killed
with a shot through the throat. The rest of the section immediately
took cover while the armoured car troop opened up on the Viet Minh
with 37mm and Besa machine guns. Pour Viet Minh were killed
immediately, and 5 prisoners taken. The rest of the Viet Minh were
pinned down by Besa bursts, at which time the troops withdrew. The
withdrawal itself was a tricky operation involving the maneuvering
and turning of armoured cars and vehicles in the narrow road. So
v J
ended the first day of the occupation of Gia Dinh and Go Vap which 
was to be resumed on the following day.
After a relatively quiet night at 9/U+ Battalion Headquarters, 
the Go Vap operation continued on 12 October, when at 0600 two French 
liaison officers reported to the battalion; one squadron of armoured 
cars from 16 Cavalry rumbled up at 09U5» and at 1000 the occupation
\ A  ^
of Go Vap resumed when nearly five infantry companies,, supported by 
the armoured cars, searched about 200 houses on either side of the 
main road into tne town. N0 contact was made with the Viet Minh, 
although a few harmless shots were fired by snipers at a cross roads. 
At noon the sweep was widened and sporadic action occurred, which 
resulted in some Vietnamese being killed and 1 Indian soldier wounded;
* Field Security Section
the house from which his assailants fired was destroyed "by armoured
car 37mm fire. At 1230 the Punjabis captured a Viet Minh officer 
17in uniform, who was handed over to the Field Security Section 
detachment accompanying the battalion, A final Viet Minh attempt
k a'
at defending Go Vap was broken up by armoured car fire and the 
occupation of the town was complete; the second objective was to
\ a '
patrol the road and tram lines northwest of Go Vap and join up
with 3/8 OR; and in the course of these operations 20 French
civilians, captives of the Viet Minh, were released and two road
blocks removed. A detachment of armoured cars then drove west
to contact 3/8 Gurkhas. With the successful conclusion of the
operations, the 16 Cavalry armoured cars returned to their base near
Tdn Sdn Nhut. The Punjabis withdrew to their lines after leaving
two pickets at key areas, and handed over the responsibility for Go Vap 
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to k/2 GR. The latter noted, during these operations, "... we came 
to the conclusion now and never altered that opinion that the Annamite 
will never stay to make a proper fight of it," although two days later 
(on 1i+ October), the k/2 recorder wrote that the battalion "were 
unlucky enough to lose two men and two vehicles" in establishing two 
bridgeheads "against slight opposition."
Viet Minh activity was noticeably increasing. The Spitfire 
pilots returning from their daily reconnaissance flights reported 
about 1f?0 Viet Minh, in military formation, between Gia-Dinh and 
Hoc M$n, and it was reported that 500 Annamites were assembled in
HQ
Thu Dau Mot. More disturbing was the report of 6 field guns in 
Viet Minh hands, and the road from Cholon to Due Hoa was completely 
trenched across. Trees were felled across a number of other roadB, 
and in Thu Bite the Viet Minh had held mass meetings and requisitioned 
all cars to transport their troops for an attack on Allied forces.
Saigon's North Sector* was formally abolished on 11 October, 
when Jim Woodford's 32 Brigade assumed responsibility for that area 
of Saigon. Cyril Jarvis and his 1st Gurkhas then prepared to rejoin 
the arriving 100 Brigade for their movement north out of Saigon as 
the British planned on expanding their key areas.
The French 5th RIC and Marines played a part in the 9/1k Punjab
operation of 11 October, as they secured the Thanh My Tay area to
20
the Saigon river. They were supported by "C" Troop, 111+ Regiment (RA),
* Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis during the last day 
of its existence.
who the following day laid down 28 rounds of high explosive ordnance 
in clearing out machine gun nests.
On 11 October Hirst ordered the Japanese to reinforce the garrison
in Phnom Penh by II4.O men, who were to be armed with 20 light machine
guns and personal weapons. They were to be drawn from 3 Japanese
battalion's attached to Woodford's 32 Brigade (Yoshida, Sato and
Yamagishi Butais). The Japanese were now beginning to cooperate
to the extent that the same orders drew attention to a Japanese
soldier who, as driver for the RE Commander, was commended for "his
devotion to duty on 10 October 19U5 when a British Officer and a
small force of British Troops were subjected to an unprovoked attack
by a large band of Annamites... You will ensure that Lance-Corporal
21
Niko Inouye's superior officers are acquainted with this fact."
At about this time a letter addressed to "The General Commander
of English Army at Gia-Binh" (presumably Brigadier Woodford) was
” 22
received at 9/M± Punjab Headquarters and passed on to Woodford and 
General Gracey in Saigon. The letterhead bore the title, "Eastern 
Defending Committee; Head Offices Bi§n Hoa," and was datelined 
"Eastern Zone, 11th Octobers 19U5.” It was as follows, with various 
British comments in the margins:
Sir,
I have the honour to call your attention 
on the following points:
1°) We, Vietnamese people, have no aim to 
attack, nor to disturb English Army 
in its mission to disarm Japanese Army.
We are always ready to give some help 
to English Army in the above mentioned 
mission. [A pencilled British comment 
by this paragraph stated, "Not borne 
out by what has happened"].
2°) Our only purpose is to forbid French 
people or soldiers to get out of the 
region of Saigon and Cholon. So we 
beg you not to mixe [sic] in your 
army any French soldiers, who, after 
your returning back to your bases, 
would occupy by force our towns and 
villages, as they did some days ago 
in Saigon.
I hope that you will guarantee to US 
on this notable point.
30) Will you kindly give me the fixed 
time and zone into which your army 
will go and disarm the Japanese army, 
so that I can notify MY MEN, in order 
to prevent any trouble that should be 
caused by misunderstanding.
U°) As for me, I am totally responsible 
on everything happening between your 
Army and Mine.*
Awaiting your prompt decision,
1 am; Sir,
Respectfully Yours
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF VIETNAMESE ARMY 
IN THE EASTERN ZONE.
[Signed]
\ ^
Hoang-Cao-Nha
In this vein, a reply was sent back to the Commander in Chief,
Vietnamese Army in the Eastern Zone, Eastern Defending Committee,
Bien Hoa, by Lieutenant Colonel Ritchie, 20 Division's Chief of Staff,
who said that General Gracey was willing to receive a Viet Minh
representative "to hear any statement or explanation or suggestion
on the subject of law and order which you may wish to express; the
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representative will be sent as your personal representative." J 
Continued Ritchie:
2. You will remember both now and in the 
future that General D.D.Gracey speaks 
as the Commander of the Allied Land 
Forces in FRENCH INDO CHINA South of
16 Parallel; I would draw your attention 
to the word "Allied"; the Allied Nations 
include the French nation.
3. You will reply suggesting the place, date 
and time for the meeting; also the 
composition of your party, the route by 
which it will enter the Allied lines
and the means by which it will be 
recognised. The party will be given 
safe conduct through the Allied lines.
It is not known whether the Viet Minh responded to Gracey1s
t
invitation to parley; it is likely that they lost interest when they
obviously were unable to split the British and French forces over
reoccupation policy.
Incidents were now simultaneously flaring up throughout the
British area of responsibility. Writing, in part, of the period from
k October to 30 October, the 3/1 Gurkha Rifles historian said:
"Every day up till the 12th we had one or 
more occurrences. It became almost a daily 
task clearing the numerous roadblocks on 
the RA GAN GIOC. Despite all our hard work,
* British comments by the last paragraph said, "He should come in an 
speak to the General" —  "Yes, and call off the blockade."
plundering on a much reduced scale and 
arson continued. The ANNAMITES were now 
using incendiary grenades, fired from 
discharger cups, and petrol bombs thrown 
at close range. Two important factories 
went up in flames. Nightly we continued 
to bump slight opposition with patrols 
and sniping continued fairly frequently.
The 11th was a bad night and considerable 
damage was done by incendiary grenades 
fired from the NORTH bank of the ARROYO 
CHINOIS where the Japs were on guard]
A wood and oil dump was set ablaze and 
the men fighting the fire were heavily 
engaged with l.m.gs & rifle fire which 
was not very accurate fortunately. 2 k
As the 3/1 writer had previously noted of Khanh H6*i Island,
"The area is a vast one for a battalion to protect, especially as it 
is populated by the real 'bad hats' in [the] Saigon area." It was 
becoming more important now as a great deal of the surrendered Japanese 
Army munitions and small arms were being moved from outlying areas 
to Khanh H6i for storage.
In a remarkably blunt report, the SEAC Assistant Director of
Intelligence summed up the problems in South Indochina. He prefaced
his report with the statement that the document expressed his personal
opinion, and should be treated as such. He commented that General
Gracey was not permitted any contact with the Viet Minh, and the small
number of French with him were not enough to take over administrative
control. It was also hard to explain to the Vietnamese how large
numbers of Vichy French were back in positions held during the war.
Wrote the senior officer, "Throughout the handling of the situation,
the French appear to lack every vestige of imagination." For
example, a pamphlet to be airdropped had the old themeof "Liberte,
Egalit£, Fratemite," and called upon the Annamites to lay down their
arms, saying that the French would be
more considerate and more generous than 
they had ever been before. Such a pamphlet,, 
under the existing conditions, would have 
but provoked the Annamites to further rage.
It promised the Annamites nothing new. Up
to date the French seem incapable of 
appreciating the frame of mind of the 
Annamites and to adjust their actions 
accordingly.
It is not an exaggeration to say that until 
the arrival of Colonel Repiton Preneuf,
General Leclerc's acting Chief of Staff, there 
was not a single Frenchman with both imagination, 
ability and powers of leadership who had 
returned in a position of authority to F.I.C."
He went on to say that there was conclusive evidence that 
Japanese intelligence organisations were behind the Viet Minh and 
the revolt "to the hilt." As far back as April Annamite
officers were established in the same building as Minoda's* head­
quarters, and high Kerapei Tei officers were often seen with Caodists 
and other groups. The Brazzaville declaration was not enough, and 
the Japanese had publicised it to the Vietnamese as noncommittal and 
worthless. Like most of the British participants, including Gracey, 
he had no doubt as to the root cause of the troubles:
"Provided the French are prepared to deal 
with the Annamites as human beings and not 
as chattels for exploitation as in the past, 
there is every reason to believe that the 
leading Annamites will not only listen to 
them, but will help them...."
On the 12th, the night fighting in Saigon was intense, with
delayed action mines continually exploding, large fires ringing the
city, and the crackle of small arms fire and banging of artillery
could be heard throughout the night. On 12 and 13 October Gracey
was encouraged by the arrival of two strong battalions, the 9/12
Frontier Force Rifles (FFR) and the- 9th Jats (the Machine Gun Battalion),
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who arrived by air from Hwawbi, Burma. As the Jats were deplaning
A /
at Tan Son Nhut on the 13th, the busy 3/1 Gurkhas again reported heavy
f &
activity in Khanh Hoi Island:
"... on 13th Oct we carried out Op "CHINA", 
which was a complete 'sweep' of the island.
Under comd for this operation was one coy ,
1/1 G.R., 1 Coy DOGRA and NAVAL units,
Prisoners were taken, 13 in all and a certain 
number of arms and ammunition recovered, but 
there was no trace of the l.m.gs. The island 
was very deserted during this search and the 
whole atmosphere spoke of a breach in security."
The Gurkhas spent the night on Khanh H6i, during which time 
several attacks on their positions were beaten back. The first attack 
came on a platoon on the west end, just after midnight, and was 
supported by two light machine guns; one Gurkha was wounded and sniping 
continued until first light. At 00lj5 the docks were charged, banzai
* The Japanese military governor of F.I.C.
fashion, but again the attackers were repulsed. Several attempts 
were then made to set fire to buildings on the river front, and it 
took a grenade attack by the Gurkhas to silence snipers in the area.
An attempt by Vietnamese to cross over to Saigon from the east bank 
was abandoned when the Royal Navy illuminated the area with searchlights.
The 13th was an exceptionally busy day for 16 Cavalry. A 
squadron came under 3/8 GR command as the Gurkhas prepared to establish 
themselves in new positions. They were under sporadic sniper fire 
throughout, and the leading troop of armored cars and infantry dealt 
with resistance as it occurred. By 1100 hours the battalion tactical 
headquarters was established at a crossroads about two^miles north 
of Tan Sdh Nhut, on the main road northwest from C£o Vap. Brigadier 
Woodford then drove up to report that the k/2 Gurkhas on a crossroads 
two miles due north of the 3/8 tactical headquarters were under 
"considerable enemy fire" and unable to advance to their objective 
(a bridge a few hundred yards away to the north). The operation was 
carried out, but the move "was sniped and shot at the whole way."
On moving to a new objective a couple of miles to the southwest the 
16 Cavalry troop was opposed by light machine gun and rifle fire from 
Viet Minh concealed in the thick undergrowth; the ambush party was 
dispersed by return fire from the armored cars. Another k/2 objective, 
again a bridge, was well defended by Viet Minh troops with two, and 
possibly three machine guns and the k/2 GR commander wanted to send 
for another company of his infantry. But with daylight fading the 
16 Cavalry commander suggested moving in with the squadron headquarters 
detachment, plus two platoons of infantry, and after i+5 minutes the 
bridge was seized. When the remaining two Gurkha platoons arrived the 
squadron returned to harbor.
In the Cholon area, there was great excitement in the ranks of 
U/17 Dogra, for not only did General Gracey visit the unit but a 
section attached to 3/1 GR captured a man believed to be the Kempei Tei 
chief, "the local Japanese Himmler"! The excitement (shared at 20 
Division Headquarters) was dampened when the man turned out to be a 
Vietnamese.
To the north, in the early morning darkness of the 13th, a Viet
1
Minh force had approached Tan Sdn Nhiit from the southwest and fired on 
16 Cavalry positions 600 yds from the airfield; in a heavy exchange of 
fire bullets struck the 273 Squadron crew quarters, 1307 (RAFR) Wing
Headquarters and the 6th Air Formation Signals Officers Mess. The 
Viet Minh forces fanned out and assaulted Tan Son Nhut from three 
directions. The situation looked desperate for about twenty minutes, 
during which time the Viet Minh stormed Tan Sdh Nhut in a major 
effort to destroy the aircraft and transmitters there. The attackers 
were slowly driven back by the 16th Cavalry and Japanese infantry.
They did, however, reach the doors of the radio station and got to 
within 300 yards of the control tower before being stopped; the fight 
for the field then turned into a grim struggle as the loss of the 
airfield would have cut Saigon off from the rest of the world. The 
RAF Regiment defense force, positioned east and southeast of the field, 
did not participate in this fire fight, but took part, with the Japanese, 
in the sweep which followed, which drove the Viet Minh back a distance 
of two miles.
At 1030 the participating units were briefed, and Wing Commander
Allen (commanding 1307 Wing) wanted a show of strength while searching
for arms; about 500 men were involved. The operation, mounted to the
southwest (from which direction the attack occurred), began at 1100 hours,
with Allen directing the action from a nearby crossroads. On the left
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flank were positioned 2963 Squadron, with 2967 Squadron in the centre 
and Major Matsuzato's Japanese infantry company on the right. In the 
centre, 2967 Squadron was fired on from a house almost immediately, but 
heavy Bren and rifle fire drove the Viet Minh out; in their hasty exit 
they left a shotgun and some equipment behind. Further Viet Minh fire 
came from a cemetery in front, but again the Viet Minh fled to heavy 
undergrowth. After a third ambush two suspects were flushed out and 
captured.
The RAF Regiment flights soon lost contact with each other in the 
heavy growth and proceeded independently. One flight came across a 
temple containing a haversack with clips of Japanese and French ammunition, 
plus Sten magazines. A Bren gun group, chasing some Viet Minh, also 
discovered a temple containing Viet Minh arm bands.
The last RAFR troops returned to base at 1U30> but the Japanese 
stayed out until 1600.2^
Back in Saigon, the 9th FFR had a few pleasant days following their 
arrival, but as their historian wrote:
"This was the proverbial lull before the 
storm; every day some unit has an 'incident' 
with the rebel Annamites, but we had escaped 
so far. Grenades were thrown at some of our 
transport and the Jawans replied with 
avengeance. Unfortunately one man was killed 
and several wounded by grenades a few days 
later and then the gloves were off. Wire 
cages were put round some of the trucks and 
strong escorts became the order of the day.
Patrols out into the country provided 
excellent training for everyone and the 
odd clash with the Annamites took us back 
to our first days on the Chindwin. Two 
Annamite flags —  put up in the Bazar at 
night —  were captured by Jock Lawrie and 
the defence platoon. Periodical raids 
on houses of suspects revealed grenades 
and rifles." 30
Mountbatten, who a few weeks earlier had considered withholding 
Gracey's full division from him, was now gravely concerned over the 
rapidly. deteriorating situation in Saigon and concluded his report 
to London by emphasizing the need to speed the arrival of French 
reinforcement s:
"Both SLIM and I would be failing in our 
duty if we did not draw your attention to 
the serious consequences to British/Indian 
forces of any postponement in the original 
date of [the] arrival of 9 D.I.C. In fact 
we both consider it more urgent than ever 
for 9 D.I.C. to be accelerated." 31
On 13 October Brigadier Hirst sent a stiff letter to Lieutenant
General Manaki, Commander of the Japanese 2nd Division (responsible
for the Saigon area). Hirst related that during the British operations
in Go Vap they had discovered some 30 Japanese soldiers in various
houses in the town. While saying that "Their attitude to the British
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soldiers was correct", he implied a collaboration between those 
Japanese troops and the Viet Minh and demanded "to know what they were 
doing there and to which unit they belong." Continued Hirst:
"What orders had been given to them and by ■ 
whom? If they were there for the maintenance 
of law and order, it did not appear that they 
had been taking any active steps to deal with 
Armed Annamites in the neighbourhood.
During the French operations at THANH MY TAY 
I am practically certain that opposition was 
encountered from formed bodies of Japanese.
These parties were dressed in proper uniform, 
which appeared to he Japanese, and were operating 
in conjunction with the Annamites, and were 
equipped and armed like proper soldiers.
I know for certain that there were certain 
Japanese troops taking part with the Annamites.
Who are these troops?
What action do you propose to take to eliminate 
them? They are traitors to your Army and your 
Emperor."
Hirst then turned to the letter received by Lieutenant Colonel 
Hobbs, 9/1U Punjab, from the Viet Minh Army in the Eastern Zone:
"General GRACEY wishes General MANAKI to 
explain why such an office should be allowed
to exist in BIEN HOA, when this village is
supposed to have been cleared.
General GRACEY has grave doubts as to General 
MANAKI*s sincerity when such things as this 
come to light."
It is not known what response Manaki [described by Brigadier 
Taunton of 80 Brigade as "dull-witted"] made, but Hirst's charges 
added weight to the argument that the Japanese were actively assisting 
the Viet Minh.
A number of other incidents had occurred on the morning of 13
October. Before dawn about 15 to 20 Viet Minh attacked the 16 Cavalry*
perimeter with rifles and grenades but were driven off and loSt two 
men killed and two captured. The 3/1 Gurkhas captured 6 looters in 
the docks, and one of their patrols came under fire from a block 
on Rue Lanessan and had to clear it with 3-inch mortar fire. The 
French were continuing their mopping-up operations in the Thanh My* Tay 
area, where pockets of Viet Minh were holding out. The French had 
lost 6 killed, but Viet Minh casualties were "believed heavy" [indeed, 
casualties were always proportionately higher when the French engaged 
the Vietnamese, reflecting the bitterness on both sides]. The French 
captured two Japanese Air Force officers during this operation, and 
summarily executed them both.
The 9/1k Punjab's Number 3 Company searched a number of buildings 
between Battalion Headquarters southwest to Gia Dinh and by sheer 
luck discovered a local Viet Minh headquarters and post containing 
4 wounded Vietnamese. The four suspects, together with a number of 
seized documents, were handed over to the Field Security Service
* The 16 Cavalry historian exclaimed that "Our cookhouse was shot up.'"
detachment. Heavy fighting was also reported near the power house 
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in Saigon.
At Commission headquarters, Mr. Meiklereid [Brain*s successor 
as Foreign Office adviser to Gracey], now wrote his first summary 
of the situation in Saigon. In a letter to Dening, Meiklereid wrote 
that the population as a whole were in
"a very nervous state, and though they have 
actually suffered little from privation their 
morale is low and they are unlikely to be very 
effective in carrying on either the adminis­
tration or their normal activities without a 
complete change of atmosphere." 3U
Meiklereid pointed out that the local French population had had 
little knowledge of events in the world, apart from the Japanese 
occupation. Leclerc * s arrival had
"given them considerable temporary moral 
support, and the line he took at his first 
meeting with the French population demanding 
a united front is likely to prevent a VICHY/ 
de GAULLIST split. The applause for General 
de GAULLE appears to have been unanimous, 
despite the presence of a number of strong 
^x* Petainists."
He reported the breakdown in negotiations between the French
and the Viet Minh ("As was to be expected"), but implied that the
fault lay with the Viet Minh for demanding immediate and full autonomy.*
He also reiterated the very clear warnings personally given to Viet
Minh leaders by both Gracey and Hirst, but the Viet Minh had inferred
that "we were acting as a screen for the building up of the French
Forces." With the 10 October ambush of the British section near
Tan Sdh Nhdt "General GRACEY was left with no other course but to
implement his threat." Meiklereid continued:
"The French are obviously delighted at the 
turn of events as General LECLERCfs attitude 
on his return from RANGOON showed that he 
by no means agreed with Colonel REPITON on 
the non-participation of the French troops.
He considers that it would have a very 
bad effect on French morale and prestige."
At this time Meiklereid independently echoed Slinks fear that
"There is little doubt that we shall now be 
accused of backing French Imperialism, but 
I frankly consider that no other course was 
possible if the Allied troops were to carry 
out their task, and enable us to hand over
to the French as soon as possible and let 
them tackle their own problem —  it is no 
small one!
As for the immediate future, Meiklereid said that:
"It is, as yet, too early to estimate the 
strength of the Annamite opposition, but 
it may be not inconsiderable —  at least 
at first, as they must realise that it 
is now or never for them. Once the French 
have taken over, they can be expected to 
be ruthless in putting down the *revoltl.
It is evident that the leaders of the 
COCHIN CHINA VIET MINH COMMITTEE have little 
or no hold on their followers, and the 
situation is likely to develop into a 
form of guerilla warfare with arms supplied 
by the Japanese."
Meiklereid then interrupted his assessment of the political 
situation to report a curious meeting with Leclerc, who had called 
on him the previous day:
"He [Leclerc] began by expressing the 
opinion that unless BRITAIN and FRANCE 
avoided the mistake made after the last 
war, i.e., non-cooperation, a further 
war would inevitably result. He added 
that our interests were obviously common 
ones in the EAST and if we allowed the 
French to be thrown out of Indo China it 
would have considerable repercussions 
on our own Colonial possessions in the 
FAR EAST. So far the conversation had 
followed the lines of our previous 
interview in KANDY.
The General then referred to his reputation 
of frankness and stated that he had been 
informed that I was particularly anti- 
French and had been specially selected 
for this post on that account. In view 
of the attitude I have always adopted, 
both previously in Indo China and later 
in French West Africa, I was somewhat 
amused at this accusation, which I 
strongly refuted.*
I am afraid, however, that I failed to 
convince the General as he went on to 
state that the attitude so far adopted 
by General GRACEY had been admirable 
and he sincerely hoped that it would 
not be affected by political intrigues —  
obviously myself!
I can only imagine that some of my 'friends1 
who fear what I may have to say about them 
have tried to get in first."
* Meiklereid's wife was French.
Meiklereid returned to the political situation by reporting
the opinion of a Frenchman who had been interned by the Japanese
in Singapore and restricted by the Vichy authorities, a man "whose
views I found both sound and reliable during my previous sojourn
in French Indo China." The Frenchman
"stated that in his opinion the present 
situation was due mainly to:-
a) the delay in the arrival of the 
Allied Forces* and the opportunity 
thus given to the Japanese to arm 
the Annamites.
b) the failure to apprehend the VIET 
MINH leaders in Saigon.
c) the excesses of the French in the 
coup d'etat of September 23rd.
As regards (c) apart from the inevitable 
result in loss of life the unfortunate, 
but perhaps understandable, excesses on 
the part of the French only recently 
liberated, combined with their slovenly 
appearance due to their lack of proper 
uniform had created the worst possible 
impression on the Annamites."
Meiklereid went on to state that the Frenchman opined that for
the future the Annamite leaders must be arrested and the Japanese
deserters in the Vi#t Minh ranks be "rounded up" as soon as possible.
"This having been completed the status 
quo should be reinstated for a period 
of some months before the declaration 
made by General de Gaulle regarding 
the status of Indo China is implemented.
Apart from the question of prestige 
the lapse of time would enable the 
moderate Annamites who have been intimidated 
by the extremists to come to the fore.
As regards General de Gaulle's declaration 
regarding the future status of Indo China 
he considered it would have been very well 
received by the French in Indo China at 
the time it was made had they been aware 
of it as up to that time the native 
population had if anything helped them 
against the Japanese. Unfortunately owing 
to the lack of wireless facilities it 
received little publicity at the time and
* Caused largely by MacArthur's ban on Allied landings in Japanese- 
held territory until he had received the Japanese surrender in Tokyo.
when it did become generally known feeling 
had already begun to run high while the 
assumption of power by the Annamites and 
their general attitude was not conducive 
to its acceptance."
This was an astute assessment. Like de Gaulle, the Frenchman 
recognized the inevitability of Vietnamese independence, but felt 
that it should come as a result of a French gesture rather than by 
threats of force. While Meiklereid recognized the bias in the 
argument, he considered that "it probably fairly accurately represents 
the outlook of the saner members of the French civil population*"
General Gracey agreed with Meiklereid*s text,
"except to say that the Annamites are doing 
everything in their power to separate 
British and French forces, and thus to pave 
the way for a public declaration that British 
impartiality is a myth, and that the British 
never had any other intention than backing 
French imperialism. The intransigent 
attitude of the Annamite leaders has in fact 
forced us to full military cooperation with 
the French, which, in General Gracey*s opinion, 
is all to the good, as the situation before 
the Annamites broke the truce was dangerous 
in the extreme as regards cooperation and 
a continuance of cordial relations with the 
French."
Shortly after he wrote this report, Meiklereid received a 
copy of the Vi§t Minh reply to Hirst's questions of 9 October; "It 
completely bears out General Gracey®s point that their main object 
is to 'separate British-French forces'."
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Gracey *s opinion was expressed in a message to Mount batten in 
which he described his recent correspondence with the "self-styled 
C in C VIETNAM army of [the] Eastern Zone." In reporting Meiklereid*s 
receipt of a letter on 13 October from the Committee for the South, 
and the continuing rigidity of the Viet Minh position, Gracey wrote:
"I consider that VIET MINH Central Policy 
if such a thing exists is to attempt by 
every means of conciliation with British 
to split British and French. I have no 
doubt that they will accuse British 
through radio and all other means of coming 
to F.I.C. with statement that they had no 
interest in politics but in fact providing 
shield for reinstatement of French. In 
fact it has now become inevitable for the 
proper execution of my tasks that I should
act hand in hand with LECLERC policy as 
to key areas only. By doing so I inevitably 
provide very considerable assistance to 
political aims of French in this area." 35
The increasing military activity at this time was described 
by the "20th Division*s History", which recorded:
"On the 13th 32 Bde fanned out and advanced 
NORTH of GOVAP to the line of the River CHO 
and secured all bridges intact. A coy of 
3/8 GR fought a pitched battle on the 
approaches to one of these bridges through­
out the night 13/14 October. These bridges 
held by 3/8 GR and 4/2 GR came in for a great 
deal of VIET MINH attention during the follow­
ing weeks, and sniping and grenade throwing 
was a regular feature...
The night of 13/14 October was marked by 
large scale VIET MINH attacks in the 
SAIGON/CHOLON area. Determined efforts were 
made to dislodge the 3/1 GR guarding the 
entrances to the docks. The attacks were 
made in characteristic Jap fashion with 
much screaming and shouting. 36 A Jap BN HQ 
on the outskirts of CHOLON was attacked 
and surrounded during the night, and re­
inforcements were dispatched at dawn to 
assist them in driving off the attackers.
All these attacks were repulsed with heavy 
losses, and as a result the SAIGON/CHOLON 
area remained comparatively quiet up till 
22nd October." 37
Having been beaten back in frontal assaults the Viet Minh now
intensified their attempts to strangle Saigon, and RAF reconnaissance
"indicated that the VIET MINH were determined 
to cut off the city from the outside world, 
and that extensive demolitions and roadblocks 
were visible on all roads leading out of the 
city.
Large concentrations of Annamites seen in 
the area N.E. of SAIGON (THU DAU MOT - 
THU DUC- BIEN HOA area) confirmed reports 
of a large VIET MINH build up in this area."
The situation continued to grow more ugly day by day, and any 
hop® of reaching a peaceful settlement had vanished by this time.*
The French were determined to regain their position (and prestige) by 
force of arms, the Viet Minh had despaired of gaining immediate
* On 1 October Gracey had written that unless some form of autonomy was 
promised the Vietnamese by the French the fighting was inevitable.
independence, the British were intent on securing their key areas, 
and the Japanese, who had surrendered two months earlier, must have 
wondered what it would take to he allowed to lay down their arms 
again and go home.
The Viet Minh attack on the Japanese Headquarters in Phu Lam, 
described briefly in the 20th Division History, was a particularly 
bloody battle. During the night-long fight the Japanese killed 
about 100 attackers while taking 200 prisoners and several weapons. 
Japanese casualties amounted to one dead and two wounded. The Vi&t 
Minh had transported 15 truckloads of Vietnamese from Mytho to 
participate in the assault, and the number of attackers was estimated 
to be between 500 and 1000 men. The Viet Minh troops were led by 
an unidentified young man of 24 years of age, a Vietnamese of French 
citizenship who had been an enlisted man [other rank] in the 11th RIG.
The meagre firepower of the attacking force included 70 muskets 
and 3 submachine guns, and subsequent interrogation revealed that the 
attack had been launched in an effort to secure weapons.
Among the Allies the suspicion grew that the Japanese were inflating 
their reports, and this action was described in part by the Intelligence 
Summary of 22 October:
"... an attack was put in against a Jap HQ 
at PHU LAM. Interrogation reports suggest 
that the Jap claim to have killed 100 out 
of 1000 was greatly exaggerated, but they 
certainly rounded up 329 men, women and 
children as PW." 38
Despite this sarcastic summary, the important part played by 
the Japanese troops at this stage cannot be emphasized too strongly.
They were doing the lion's share of the dirty work in clearing road 
blocks, patrolling,and investigating and rounding up wanted Vietnamese.* 
After a slow start the Japanese were now taking a more active role 
in anti-Viet Minh operations, but their distaste for this activity 
remained undiminished. They were in a totally unenviable position.
* And stolen cows. On 14 October the Japanese were ordered to round 
up 70 stolen cows, believed to be 5 kilometers from Phti Lam, and 
return them to the Race Course. This incident of "cow-napping" 
would be humorous except for the fact that the Vi£t Minh seige of 
Saigon was having an effect and the beef was badly needed.
On 1*f October, 32 Brigade continued to run into strong opposition 
as they consolidated their positions and gradually moved the Viet Minh 
out of their suburban stronghold in the north. Primary objectives of 
Woodford's Gurkhas and Punjabis were the river bridges north of Saigon. 
The Gurkhas had to charge one bridge and use armored cars to secure 
another. More than five Japanese were seen with Viet Minh forces in 
the course of stiff fighting which left 2k Vie't Minh and one Gurkha dead. 
Despite this, the north bank was still in Viet Minh hands and early in 
the battle the Gurkhas of k/2 GR were forced to abandon a truck and a 
jeep which were captured by the Vieit Minh. Major Cobb and Captain Spark 
were fired on at close range, and when Brigadier Woodford came up to 
take a look the Vi;et Minh, no respectors of rank, fired on him too.
1 Gurkha later died of his wounds and 10 Viet Minh were, killed; others 
probably died in the jungle or fell into the river.
Northwest of Tan Sdn Nhift the 3/8 Gurkhas cleared Viet Minh from 
a bridge with a bayonet charge, and k/2 GR ran into "strong opposition" 
in clearing two bridges to the east of 3/8 GR.
In 80 Brigade's area, Taunton’s troops were subjected to sniping, 
arson, and road blocks, and two mortar bombs damaged a cable in the 
power station. In three days over 125 Viet Minh had been killed, if 
Japanese casualty estimates were correct, while two Indians and one 
Japanese were killed. Nearly 350 suspected Viet Minh were arrested.
Most of Indochina was now tense with unrest as the two sides in 
the Saigon area rested from the fighting of the previous day. Pro-French 
individuals were being arrested and shot in southern Laos, while the 
coastal areas north and east of Saigon were nests of Viet Minh activity.
A low grade intelligence report was now received in Saigon that 1000 
Japanese troops from Cambodia had joined a force of 10,000 Viet Minh
soldiers in Tay Ninh, the Cao -Dai capital northwest of Saigon.
Back in London, the Joint Planning Staff, as instructed, gave their 
opinion of Slim's letter to Alanbrooke on the worsening situation 
inherited by the British in the French and Dutch possessions of Indochina 
and the Netherlands East Indies. In the manner of headquarters staffs 
everywhere, their response of the 1^th reflected their long distance
from the scene of these immensely difficult problems. As to Slim's
recommendation that the removal of the Japanese from Indochina and the 
NEI should have priority over their evacuation from Burma and Malaya,
the best the JPS could do was to say that "With regard to priorities
for evacuation of the Japanese, this is a matter for the Supreme Allied
39Commander, South East Asia, in consultation with General MacArthur."
On the following day Mountbatten was informed by the Chiefs of Staff 
that action was being taken to accelerate the transfer of the 9th DIC to 
Saigon. He immediately wrote to Gracey, asking him to "Please inform 
Leclerc and tell him how glad I am that our repeated attacks have borne
An
fruit at last."
A message from Gracey to Slim clarified the immediate background
to the violence. The "Suggestions, assurances and statements made by
Hirst to the Annamite leaders on October 9 were all bounden only repeat
only in the event of the continuation of the truce. In view truce is
broken and remains broken... all Hirst's statements of 9 October are
therefore inoperative."
General Leclerc flew to Phnom Penh on the 15th and arrested the
Cambodian Prime Minister. It was said that Lieutenant Colonel Huard,
commanding the 5th RIC (in Phnom Penh as acting High Commissioner for
Cambodia) was supposed to have done this, but did not feel confident
enough to do so. Gracey's representative in Phnom Penh, acting Brigadier
Murray, had recommended the arrest because of the Prime Minister's pro-
Japanese conduct. Leclerc made the arrest by a simple nod of the head —
not a word was said, and both he and the arrested minister flew back to
Saigon in the afternoon.
To avoid the unpleasantness the King of Cambodia had embarked on
a pilgrimage before Leclerc arrived and returned the day after the Prime
Minister's arrest. After the return of Leclerc and his captive to Saigon
Huard rounded up the remaining known extremists in Phnom Penh and the
situation returned to normal. As reported by ALFFIC Headquarters to
ALFSEA, "Altogether a very satisfactory coup d'etat by the French with
-^1
strong flavour of Ruritania."
Gracey's personal account of affairs in Cambodia was given in
his rebuttal to the version produced by Mountbatten's staff. In his
response on 3 October 19^ -6 to the SEAC Recorder, Gracey wrote:
"As regards Cambodia, the situation was that 
shortly after the Japanese removed the Vichy 
government in March 19^5, an anti-French 
prime minister, who had been sentenced to 
death for treason, was put into power by the 
Japanese, and gradually the loyalist element 
in CAMBODIA was ousted from power, against
the King's wishes. He, however, was powerless 
to interfere with Japanese machinations.
The establishment of the Annamite regime in 
COCHIN-CHINA, ANNAM and TONKING had its 
repurcussions in CAMBODIA —  not only did 
Annamite D/iet MinhU influence increase, 
but also the loyalty of the forces of law 
and order was gradually being undermined.
Shortly before the arrival of the Allied 
Mission in SAIGON, R.A.P.W.I. teams, and 
small detachments of French and British 
special intelligence Forces arrived in 
CAMBODIA, and reported the fact that to 
ensure the compliance with the terms of 
the surrender by the Japanese troops in 
CAMBODIA, a British commander and staff were 
required in PHNOM-PENH, the capital, and if 
law and order were to be kept, some French 
or British troops, or both, were most desir­
able ...
Shortly after Colonel MURRAY arrived, he 
reported that in his opinion, the speedy 
arrest of the Prime Minister was essential 
if CAMBODIA was not to be embroiled in 
serious civil disturbances, or worse. It 
was essential to the Allied forces that 
there should be no trouble in CAMBODIA, as 
it was providing the fresh food supplies 
for SAIGON and CHOLON, which were not 
obtainable in COCHIN-CHINA owing to the 
Annamite food blockade.
Opportunely, General LeCLERC arrived at this 
time, and at the request of the Allied 
commander, himself flew to PHNOM-PENH, arrested 
the Prime Minister, and flew back with him 
the same day to SAIGON. This very carefully 
arranged and neatly executed coup d'etat caused 
the trouble to subside immediately. Loyal and 
well tried ministers were appointed by the King, 
whose complicity in the coup d'etat was never 
in question, as the day was chosen during a 
week when he was away on a pilgrimage.
Confidence was restored, the Japanese officers 
in CAMBODIA, completely surprised, started 
to cooperate at once —  later, they openly 
expressed admiration at the speed, secrecy 
and thoroughness with which we had spiked 
their gunsi ... There was very little trouble
in CAMBODIA thanks to the above strong action."
But there was no flavour of Ruritania in the Saigon area as there
now occurred a number of small, sharp fights between the British/Indian
troops and the Viet Minh, with 3/8 GR, k/2. GR, 3/^k Punjab and k Dogra
(plus some Japanese units) all reporting actions. One armored car^ 
became bogged down in Hand Thotnh Tay village, north of T£n Sdn Nhuft 
and northwest of Go Vap, and was guarded all night by a platoon from 
Yoshida Butai until it could be extricated in the morning. The 3/8 
Gurkhas killed twelve Viet Minh while conducting sweeps and seizing 
a bridge, and armored cars supporting them killed six more; 25 Viet Minh 
prisoners were taken.
In the United States, the British Military Attache wrote to 
Mountbatten from Washington, stating that the father of the assassinated 
Lieutenant Colonel Dewey had offered to increase the reward for the 
return of his son's body from the current 5000 piasters. However, he 
agreed to withdraw the offer when he realized the potentially dangerous 
consequences of the act, for it offered an incentive for the murder of
if 3
officers in the future.
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Gracey's Headquarters now issued ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.5, 
which divided the Saigon/Cholon area and suburbs into four sectors, known 
as 32 Brigade, French, 80 Brigade and Royal Artillery Sectors. In the 
80 Brigade sector, 4/17 Dogra was experiencing the frustrations associated 
with guerilla warfare; their unit war diary stated that many sweeps were 
fruitless as weapons "are obviously hidden with great care, probably under 
floors and other such places, and unless the search is 100% thorough it 
is useless. With the troops available only very small areas can be 
tackled."
During the 16 October daily conference between Hirst and the Japanese 
the latter handed over a report on the Phu Lam operations during the night 
of 13/14 October. They also requested written confirmation of Gracey's 
orders (transmitted by Hirst to General Manaki) to arrest certain 
Vietnamese leaders. The conference minutes noted that
"The Japanese referred to more complaints of 
illegal action, e.g. looting, removal of 
vehicles etc by French nationals against the 
property of Japanese civilians. The Japanese 
also stated that, in view of the above, it 
was becoming increasingly difficult to restrain 
junior officers, NCOs and men from taking 
retaliatory action, e.g. by deserting from 
the Japanese forces and joining the Annamites 
to fight the French. The Japanese added, 
however, that stern measures were being taken 
to prevent this." 45
An entry in the 9/14 Punjab Newsletter is indicative of the 
steadily rising tempo of the hostilities during this period:
"... we have been busy searching and patrolling, 
bringing in arms and suspects and generally 
ensuring the safety of our portion of the 
SAIGON perimeter. We have had casualties,
Sepoy TOR MOHD of D Coy killed and some ten 
men wounded, though not seriously, but the 
rebels have suffered far more heavily than 
we. Among our wounded is MAJOR APPS who was 
sniped at close range in GOVAP. He had a 
miraculous escape as a bullet drilled his 
right cheek bone, passed behind his nose 
and came out through the left cheek bone 
without doing any material damage. He has 
been in hospital for a fortnight but should 
be out in a couple of days with his beauty 
unimpaired. His fourth wound in this war.
It is an unpleasant type of war, the enemy 
wear no uniform and one seldom sees them 
carrying arms, but there is always the odd 
sniper and the apparently harmless bystander
who throws a grenade and ducks for cover.
It looks as though the French have a tricky 
time ahead of them." 46
On the night of 15/16 October the Viet Minh assaulted a 3/3 Gurkha
position at a bridge in which 400 desperate attackers, some armed with
bows and arrows, were beaten back. The Viet Minh used a form of tear 
gas in the attack, and analysis of the arrowheads revealed sublethal 
traces of strychnine. One Gurkha was killed, and in this and other 
attacks 16 more Viet Minh were shot dead.
As a result of this raid the Japanese were asked if there were any 
stocks of poison gas in Indochina. The Japanese replied that there were 
none in the south but the possibility existed that there might be some 
in Tonkin. However, the Chinese had invested the north, and the Viet Minh 
were well armed and organized there, so there would be little chance of 
investigating the report or securing the gas, if any. Additionally, 
reports continued to flow into Saigon of organized Viet Minh reinforcements 
from the north. Giap himself has stated:
"After the triumph of the tAugusjQ revolution, 
liberation troops emerged in every locality 
and in the first days of the revolution, when 
the French colonialists coming at the heels 
of the British troops started war in South 
Vietnam, many units of the Vietnam Liberation
Army got ready to go south. These were not 
merely platoons of some dozens as before but 
thousands of young patriots from every 
locality who, responding to the appeal of 
the revolution, resolutely went south to 
fight the aggressors. Throughout the country, 
every day witnessed moving, encouraging scenes 
of these youths piling into long trains which 
took them to the southern part of their father­
land to fight together with their compatriots 
for national independence.” 47
The main enemy were the reactionary French colonialists, "formerly
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the most zealous lackeys of the Japanese.”
The 3/8 Gurkha Rifles War Diary records the escalating violence 
as its companies and platoons were constantly engaged by the Viet Minh.'
On 16 October their day began at 0800 when a Gurkha section on patrol 
killed a Viet Minh attempting to assassinate the section leader. In 
the evening D Company were attacked by a large force of Vietnamese, and 
one Gurkha was killed; the Viet Minh left 16 dead when they were beaten 
back.
The completion of the buildup of 20 Indian Division occurred on the
17th, for Gracey's third brigade (100 Brigade, commanded by the larger
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than life figure of Brigadier C.H.B. Rodham*) arrived in Saigon. As 
they disembarked a further series of sharp fights occurred throughout 
the area. Ten armed Vietnamese were arrested during the course of a search 
of G^ > Vap, and a line party was shot at and grenaded not far away. In 
80 Brigade's area 3/1 Gurkhas, acting .on a report that eleven Japanese 
anti-tank guns were in the sector, conducted a search and uncovered four 
dismantled guns. A boatload of ten armed Vietnamese was sunk while
attempting to cross a canal, and only two men were seen to escape.
Allied intelligence indicated that the main Viet Minh strength 
0 I \
lay in the Thu Dub - Bien Hoa - Thu Dau Mot area north and northeast 
of Saigon; it was here that General Gracey decided to position the newly 
arrived 100 Brigade.
Although major Viet Minh assaults on and within Saigon had abated, 
widespread guerilla activity by small groups continued to harass the
Allies and take its toll, and reports persisted of Viet Minh forces moving
south from Tonkin.
* "Roddy” Rodham, who died in Pakistan in 19731 is remembered with awe 
and affection by his colleagues. A huge man, he could not fit in the 
small front seat of a Jeep and was chauffeured while sitting in a 
specially constructed rear seat; a larger windshield was also installed 
in his jeep. (Major Peter Prentice, Personal Interview, 19 August 1977)
The Japanese were ordered by Brigadier Hirst to provide eight 
Japanese interpreters for the use of 100 Brigade, as Anglo-Japanese 
military cooperation was increasing dramatically* They were also 
ordered to produce their key to the vault of the bank at Dalat; the
other key was said to be in Viet Minh hands* More will be said of\
the transfer of millions of piasters from the Japanese to the Vi&t 
Minh, but at this moment the sole key in Japanese hands was deemed 
so important that a special aircraft was made available to bring it 
to Saigon.
As a result of recent French actions the British now discussed 
the question of the unauthorized burning by French troops of a village 
south of Rue Verdun.* General Leclerc said that he would make sure 
that Colonel Rivier’s forces would not repeat the act.
Gracey*s policy of making sure that his troops were highly 
visible to the population was paying dividends, and on the 18th 
16 Cavalry and 1/19 Hybad troops did a flag march through Choi on,
It was "A great success. Considerable cheering by the Chinese 
population.M ^
However, at the same time to the north the Viet Minh fired on
k/2 GR troops on the road between Go Vap and Battalion Headquarters;
using machine guns and rifles, they ambushed the Gurkhas from the
same place where grenades had been hurled by unseen attackers the
previous day. At this time "B" Company, in their words, ’•plastered'1
the area with two-inch mortar and small arms fire and burnt surrounding
^1houses; "Much blood found but no bodies," and 11+ suspects were 
arrested.
In 80 Brigade’s area a 1+/17 Bogra writer said:
"Shooting match between French and Annamites 
in Rue de Nancy reported to us by an excited 
French soldier during the morning. Fighting 
patrol sent out to investigate found the 
incident finished. It is very difficult to 
assess the value or accuracy of these French 
reports.” 5>2
Another boat load of armed Viet Minh was now sunk attempting 
to cross the Arroyo Chinois near the western tip of Khanh Hoi, and RAF 
pilots reported that nearly all roads out of Saigon were blocked, either 
by trenching, felled trees or earth works (as in the case of the 
Gia Hinh - Thu Dau Mot road). A "low grade" intelligence report said 
that Vietnamese were seen placing "native poison" in water wells between 
Thu Dau Mot and Laithi&u.a
ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.6 was issued to Air Commodore 
Cheshire. He was told that during the next three days, before
Japanese reinforcements could arrive, there was "considerable danger"
A
that the Viet Minh might attack the small Japanese garrison and the 
French civilian population in Datlat. Two Japanese battalions, each 
short one company, were en route to Dalat, but for three days [18,19,20 
October] the RAF was ordered to carry out strong shows of force over 
the Dalat area. The Spitfire squadron commander was given the authority 
to use his discretion in deciding to use the leaflets available to
him and to commence offensive action against armed Viet Minh bands
seen attacking "the French civilian concentration areas, Japanese 
forces or vulnerable points in Dalat such as boosting stations, 
water supply installations, railway station, etc. If he decides upon 
any offensive action he will use minimum force to achieve his object."
There was "great excitement" at 273 Squadron when it was announced 
that they were to do an "actual strike" at -Dalat, and the strike team 
was formed by drawing names out of a hat, after which the selected 
pilots were briefed. "Then there was great disappointment, the show
hi
was cancelled." Finally, two Spitfires, carrying 90 gallon fuel 
drop tanks, took off for Dalat at 1330 on the 17th:
"... they had a good look round the town
and did a few dummy attacks on a
concentration of Annamites . They both 
[S/Ldr Sylvester and F/Lt Lilbum] 
said when they got back, that the country 
that they flew over was very bad. They 
dropped special leaflets on the Annamites 
which as afterwards confirmed, did a lot 
to clear up a sticky situation."
The Japanese reported that a liaison officer (recently returned 
from a visit to Dalat) reported that "the situation there would be 
completely in hand if 300 reinforcements were received." The Japanese 
also stated that "negotiations for the key of the bank vault, now in 
Annamite hands, were in progress. The key in Japanese hands would be 
returned as soon as possible." They were also sending an officer of 
regimental commander’s rank to Nha Trang to assume command of the 
1100 Japanese troops in that area (600 of whom were railway operating 
troops).
On the night of 18/19 October five grenades were thrown into the 
3/M\. Punjab perimeter, but no casualties were incurred, and desultory
sniping continued throughout the night. Mortar fire dispersed 
concentrations of Viet Minh, and a few rounds of artillery from 
112+ Regiment fs guns kept the Viet Minh north of Tan Sdn Nhut dispersed 
at night. A mortar concentration was laid down on the western edge 
of Go Vap, after which ten Viet Minh were captured and a great deal 
of blood discovered. In the southern part of Cholon an armored car 
became stuck when the road subsided due to sabotage. On the 19th 
a platoon from U/10 GR (Murray *s battalion) flew to Phnom Penh to 
relieve the original platoon from 1/1 GR.
Gracey now asked Browning for permission to send a permanent 
British representative to the Chinese headquarters in Hanoi. This 
was brought on by the exasperating discussions at Tourane [Banang] 
following the seizure there of eight Japanese aircraft* under British 
control. As Gracey said in his telegram,
"During discussions at TOTJRANE to facilitate 
release [of] our aircraft it became evident 
Chinese consider exact position 16 degrees 
parallel as considerably South of position 
as demarcated by this Commission." 55
The negotiations were complicated by the fact that the Chinese 
were annoyed that Terauchi still retained command of Japanese troops 
in Tourane, and Gracey foresaw similar problems at other areas along 
the common border. His means of communicating with Hanoi were limited 
indeed: he could only go through SACSEA and General Carton de Wiart 
in Chungking.
The Chinese themselves thought that Gracey should send a 
representative to Hanoi. Chinese military officials in Tourane 
representing the local commander, General Tsung, suggested that a 
British Liaison Mission in Hanoi
"would considerably assist parochial discussions 
on the following points:- (A) Exact position 
16 degrees parallel (B) Arrangements for release, 
control, administration of movement by air, land 
or sea North and South of 16 degrees parallel." $ 6
Because of the Chinese attitude towards the French, Gracey felt 
it would be better at this time to omit any French representation on the 
proposed Liaison Mission. In addition to normal liaison duties, Gracey 
thought that the mission would provide him with valuable intelligence 
of the political situation in the north. Meiklereid suggested that
* carrying food.
the dispatch of a British mission to Hanoi would result in an immediate 
request by the Chinese for a similar mission in Saigon* As it was, 
a British mission did go to Hanoi in November; it was headed by a 
remarkable officer, of whom more will be subsequently said.
The 3/8 Gurkhas were busy on the 19th. A patrol from B Company 
searched a grid square about miles north of Tan Soh NhUt; the 
area searched was roughly a square mile, and they rounded up 2 $ 
suspects found sleeping in the jungle.* Southwest of Tan Son Nhut 
C Company, guarding the main crossroads leading from Cholon northwest, 
captured a Vietnamese "‘snooping* around our position.'* A mile to 
the west a C Company patrol engaged six Viet Minh, killing two. The 
house sheltering the six was destroyed by fire after it was discovered 
to be harboring a Viet Minh telephone exchange.
On the following day a 3/8 position on a bridge five miles 
northwest of Tail ScJn Nhut was attacked, and a Gurkha was slightly 
wounded by a premature explosion from his own three inch mortar. One 
of the attackers was killed.
The hapless General Manaki now received another stern letter 
from Brigadier Hirst, who stated that he had received a report that 
a large Viet Minh force had arrived in the Thu Dau Mot area. Continued 
Hirst:
"Furthermore, I have been informed that your 
forces at THU DAU MOT have received these 
Annamites in a most improper manner and 
have even shown them friendliness.
I view this report with grave concern 
and demand that you immediately despatch 
an officer of suitable rank to THU DAU MOT 
to investigate the situation and that you 
furnish me with a full report in writing 
on the conduct of your forces in that 
area as soon as possible." 57
It was evident that the only way the British would deny the
y ^
Thu Dau Mot - Thu Bute - Bien Hoa assembly areas to the Viet Minh would 
be by occupying them, and this they would soon do.
The publication of Operation "Moussac" on 20 October marked the 
first time that the legendary figure of Jacques Massu enters the 
history of Indochina. The newly arrived Lieutenant Colonel Massu,
the Roi des Nases. Commander of Groupement Massu [Regiment de Marche
1* *  ^8 
de la 2° DBj, was to be in charge of the operation. It was the first
* An informer later reported them to have been involved in attacks 
on British forces the day before.
** Deuxieme Division Blind^e, or Second Armored Division.
French thrust out of Saigon and the first step in the French effort 
to reconquer Indochina.
The operation was planned for 2\\ October, and would be a French - 
British - Japanese affair, for the Royal Navy, RAF, a British Army 
Liaison officer and the Japanese Army were involved in supporting 
the French. Details of the operation, as published on 20 October, 
were as follows. The Royal Navy would transport 270 French troops 
by water to its objective at Mytho, while the French would provide 
a ferry near Vinh Long, where the RN would also provide a tug. The 
RAF would attempt to provide photo reconnaissance of the operational 
area and would reconnoiter the roads and ferries. On 21 October the 
French were to take over 3*1 trucks from the British at Tab Sdn Nhutt, 
and three ambulances on the following day. The French would thus 
have three days in which to bring the vehicles to peak mechanical 
condition. Brigadier Taunton was assigned to provide a Major from 
80 Brigade to act as liaison to transmit orders to the Japanese, for 
the latter would not accept orders from the French.
The French were authorized air support* "in case of grave 
emergency", and the British Royal Engineer report on the Saigon-Mytho 
road was delivered to Leclerc; the Japanese were also asked to report 
on the bridges in the area and, if possible, to guard them. There 
were three known road blocks en route, and the Japanese were ordered 
to seize them on 21 October.
Rodham now issued "100 Brigade Operational Instruction No.52".**
This order outlined the details of the British move into Thu Du^ s,
Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa, and will be discussed in the next chapter.
Reports from "low grade" French sources stated that three trains carry- 
ing three to four thousand Vi&t Minh from Tonkin had arrived in Thu 
'-Dub during the last few days. Allied intelligence estimated Viet Minh 
forces as follows: 2000 Vietnamese and 200 Japanese in Nha Be (just
downstream from Saigon) under Nguyen Van Khanh; 2500 Vietnamese and 
150 Japanese at Thu Thua (southeast of Saigon) under Nguyen Van Ba;
2000 Vietnamese and 150 Japanese at Cangioc (south of Saigon); 2000 
Vietnamese and 100 Japanese in Cha Ba Horn (southwest of Saigon);
500 Japanese (with 2 artillery pieces) dressed as Vietnamese, in a
* Massu said that he never asked for, nor received, air support 
[personal interview, Paris, 1977]*
** Dated 20 October.
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plantation just north of Thu Bub; 3000 Koreans in Thu Bub (via 
Tay Ninh), with 3 guns. These forces were in addition to the Vi&t 
Minh cadres operating in the Saigon/Cholon area.
In a separate operation two RAF Regiment men went to Balat 
as escorts for two officers who received the bank's keys from the 
manager. The Japanese had said that the trip was hazardous and that 
they would bring the keys to Saigon, but the manager refused to hand 
oyer the keys to them.
The Japanese were brought into the picture when "Order No.1"
was issued by Brigadier Rodham to General Manaki. Manaki was
informed that 100 Brigade would be occupying Thu Bub, Bien Hoa and
Thu Dau Mot on 23* 2k and 25 October respectively. Wrote Rodham,
"Having occupied these areas I will then assume responsibility for
cjg
the maintenance of law and order in the area. Manaki was ordered 
to facilitate the move of 100 Brigade by taking a number of actions, 
as follows: (1) The Japanese were to continue disarming all 
Vietnamese (including police) and search for weapons in the Thu Due - 
Thu Dau Mot - Bien Hoa area; (2) keep the Route Goloniale open be W e e n  
those towns [dug-in Viet Minh at road blocks would be dealt with by 
Rodham's tanks and armored cars]; (3) the Japanese were to "thoroughly 
clear" a three mile radius of those three towns. Steps were taken 
to minimize the possibility of the Vi£t Minh fomenting trouble between 
British and Japanese troops by firing on Rodham's troops as they 
approached the Japanese. Japanese troops in Thu Diic, Bien Hoa and Thu 
Dau Mdt would then come under the command of Major Mullaly (h/10 GR), 
Lieutenant Colonel Pickard (1U/13 M l )  and Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis 
(1/1 GR) respectively.
The Viet Minh were now generally switching to a guerilla role, 
abandoning for the most part direct assaults on Gracey's forces. 
However, the sniping and grenading of the Allied troops continued.
Word now arrived that on 10 October a Japanese patrol from Fhanrang
v ^
to Dalat was attacked by the Viet Minh and only one man survived to 
reach safety. The Japanese further reported that the-Viet Minh were 
training soldiers in the Xuan Locaria, about 55 kilometers east of 
Bien Hoa. The Japanese were also investigating a report that an 
entire Japanese unit had defected to the Viet Minh in Thu Dau Mot.
During their daily conference with Brigadier Hirst, during which 
they received their orders, the Japanese stated that regimental
commanders summoned from Bi§n Hoa to Saigon (for discussion on the
impending Allied operation) were delayed due to a clash with the
Viet Minh, They had also somehow managed to retrieve the Vi^t Minh*s
key to the -Balat Bank and had returned it to the French manager.
The Japanese, in view of their increasing military involvement against
the Viet Minh, now asked permission, ’’in cases of immediate necessity,
[to] despatch forces up to coy strength to remove road blocks etc,,
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without first requesting permission from the local Allied Comds."
They were informed that
"in the case of small obstacles easily 
removed by a few men, prior sanction 
need not be requested, but that, in the 
case of large blocks, the Japanese Comd 
would always refer the matter to the 
Allied sector Comd before initiating 
action."
On 22 October 9/1U Punjab lost a soldier killed at a crossroads
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east of Go Vap, just south of the main road and rail bridge over the 
river; another soldier was wounded. The 3/8 Gurkhas, acting on an 
informer*s tip, arrested 31 Vietnamese near the village of Tan Soh 
Iflhi, about four miles southwest of Tah Sbh Nhi^t airfield. Artillery 
fire was called in to silence sniping and medium machine gun fire
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on a U/2 GH position on a bridge two miles north of Go Vap. The 
population was also now treated to the hitherto unlikely spectacle 
of Japanese infantry units, carrying out the occupations of Cho? Ballom 
[sic] and Bin Bien [sic]*, being supported in their minor clashes 
with the Viet Minh by 16 Cavalry armored cars.
A grade "A" report from French sources identified the overall 
Viet Minh commander of the Bien Hoa district as Hoang Minh Chau, 
recently arrived from Hanoi. It was also reported to Allied intelligence 
that "1000 Tonkinese troops" had arrived in the Xuan Loc area on 15> 
October, armed with rifles and one light machine gun per eight men.
They were said to be commanded by a dozen Japanese officers including 
Lieutenant Sakamoto, the ex-Kempei Tai chief at Cap St.Jacques. More 
ominous was the report that the Japanese had handed oyer 200 tons of 
ammunition to the Viet Minh from dumps in Bien Hoa, Mytho, Binh Long, 
and Tanan.^
Although the fighting was receiving the most attention, there were 
other pressing problems to consider. On 22 October, the Control 
Commission*s chief Civil Affairs Officer, Lieutenant Colonel T.M. 
Kirkwood, wrote to the senior SEAC CA officer, Brigadier Gibbons.
* The accompanying map coordinates place these areas about 20 miles 
southwest of Saigon.
Kirkwood commented on the inadequacy of a War Establishment strength 
of two CA officers, and despite the fact that the War Office and the 
SEAC Headquarters attitude was that "we should let the French do it 
all", it was not that simple. Because of unrest "The writ of the 
French Administration in Saigon and throughout Indo-China does not 
go very far." In almost all matters concerning the Japanese and 
Vietnamese the French were dependent on the British. There were 
complex problems of finance, property, justice, trade, civilian 
supplies and shipping which must be worked "after the fighting troops 
of 20 Division are withdrawn."
Kirkwood compared the situation to the Balkans in 19M+ at the 
time of the British intervention and Syria in 19k3/kht when Beirut 
and Damascus saw considerable rioting. In late September a basic 
Civil Food.Control Organization was hastily set up to avoid famine, 
and Kirkwood wrote that if Headquarters (Gibbons) had any doubts as 
to the gravity of the situation he was invited to visit Saigon to 
discuss it on the spot. The situation was being aggravated by the 
fact that the Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese appeared to be ignoring 
French orders.
3h Kandy, Mount batten dined with the French naval commander,
Admiral Graziani, on the 22nd; Graziani carried a letter from D'Argenlieu 
to Mount batten. Mount batten stated that D*Argenlieu should have been 
equally as delighted "that the continued pressure which I have applied 
to the Chiefs of Staff has succeeded in advancing the date of the 
arrival of the 9th DIC from the end of December to November." He 
quashed rumours that he was displeased with D ,Argenlieu*s impending 
arrival in Kandy and added:
"My own hope is that General Gracey and 
his Division will be able to prove of 
real service to you within the limitations 
which, as you know, ray Government have 
placed upon their activities."* 62
A team of Japanese communications officers now visited the 20 
Division Signals branch, for 100 Brigade lines were now being maintained 
by the Japanese. By 1f> October the temperamental radio link with 
Phnom Penh was working satisfactorily and a link had also been 
established with 7 Division in Bangkok.
* Someone on the Control Commission staff had placed two large 
exclamation points, in blue pencil, aside the last statement. 
[Actually, the Chiefs of Staff had overruled Mountbatten in freeing 
Gracey from the unrealistic limitations imposed upon him by SACSEA],
"ALFFIC Intelligence Summary No.1", dated 23 October, traced 
the recent political history of the Saigon area. It noted that the Viet 
Minh had agreed to the truce on 2 October "Following engagements in 
which Allied Troops and Japanese inflicted severe casualties on the 
Annamite insurgents, in particular in N W  SAIGON, and a successful 
sweep through GIA LINH which demonstrated our ability to move troops 
out of SAIGON when we wished... On 10, 11 and 12 October Japanese 
soldiers had been seen on the Viet Minh side during 32 Brigade*s 
operations in Gia Birth and Go Vap. Regarding the Thu -Due - Bien Hoa - 
Thu Dau Mot area:
"In the absence of reports other than 
Japanese and from local sources% no 
very clear picture of events in this 
area has- been obtained. The Japanese 
view is that only small Annamite forces 
have been located in these places (except 
that they complain of continual attempts 
to rob their ammunition depots in the 
BIEN HOA area). The local source view 
is that large forces are collecting in 
the area between THTT DHC and DIAN on 
the railway, with the intention of 
opposing our further advance. Tac/R* 
reports have on several occasions noted 
demonstrations of approx 1000 in THU 
DATJ MOT."
The Control Commission intelligence officers had worked out their 
unique method of evaluating reports:
"The principle adopted in considering 
these low grade reports is (a) where 
Japanese and local sources disagree, 
to disregard the Japs and accept 
that a proportion of the figure 
suggested by the local source (usually 
10%) is actually in the area as stated;
(b) where Japanese and local source 
reports agree, to accept a rather
higher percentage figure for the area.11
The intelligence staff also pointed out that the main support
/V
for the Viet Minh came from the Tonkinese coolies on the plantations,
"so that any trained bodies of these already in the area may be the
occasion" for reports of trainloads of Tonkinese arriving from the 
north. These rumours "would, of course, greatly encourage the wavering 
Annamites of Cochin-China, who have never been as active as those from 
the NORTH."
* RAF tactical reconnaissance.
The fortifications in Baria and Cap St. Jacques were still held 
by the Japanese, whose attempt to barter 107 rifles for food appeared 
to have been thwarted by Manaki*s order to maintain surrender 
discipline. Nha Trcftig was another key trouble spot, but again orders 
from Saigon had improved the Japanese attitude as a handful of French 
marines landed to cover the off-loading of food for the beleagured 
civilian population. The Japanese reported that public opinion in the 
^ytho-Cantho> area was "excitable", but the Japanese were acting 
vigorously in this region, guarding important bridges and removing 
road blocks. Viet Minh strength in this area appeared to be 
"surprisingly low."
In conclusion, the Intelligence Summary stated that the concensus 
of reports was that' the main Viet Minh strength was in the Thu Btfc - 
Bien Hoa - Thu Dau Mot area. It remained to be confirmed that the Viet 
Minh here were being reinforced from Hanoi:
"It appears likely however that better 
disciplined troops will be met here than 
elsewhere, and an attempt at defence 
(as opposed to the normal guerilla tactics) 
may be encountered. The value of Viet 
Minh forces in other areas may be considered 
to be that of large bands of brigands."
Since Gracey intended to concentrate the bulk of the surrendered
Japanese forces in the region between Thu W c  - Bien Hoa - Thu Dau Mot,
he would first have to occupy these towns and clear the area of Viet
Minh. That task fell to Rodham's newly-arrived 100 Brigade.
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administration of the SAIGON area* They
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reprisals. The FRENCH delegates at 
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in order to prevent the negotiations 
from breaking down.
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for what they are worth —  are in a strong position to meet them."
Before his departure from Saigon on 9 October, Pyman promised 
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[Pyman Papers, Liddell Hart Center for Military Studies, King's 
College, University of London].
3 Gracey Papers, 2/8 Punjab Newsletter.
1+ Ibid.
5 Gracey Papers, 9/11+ Punjab Newsletter.
6 Gracey Papers, 20th Indian Division's History.
7 Ibid.
8 GB, PRO, WO 172/1787, Sqn 189 COS 50 (Saigon Control Commission 
to SACSEA), 11 October 191+5*
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 GB, PRO, WO 172/1787, War Diary Headquarters SEAC, 11 October 191+5*
12 GB, PRO, WO 203/1+1+51+, SAC 25800 (SACSEA to ALFSEA, info Gracey),
19 October 191+5*
13 GB, PRO, CAB 105/162; also WO 203/1+71+1+, SEACOS 510, 11 October 191+5*
11+ Gracey Papers, ALFFIC Op.Instr.No.2, 10 October 191+5*
15 GB, PRO, WO 172/771+9, War Diary 9/11+ Punjab, 11 October 191+5*
16 Gracey Papers, 9/11+ Punjab Newsletter.
17 GB, PRO, WO 172/771+7, War Diary 9/11+ Punjab; the captured 
Viet Minh official was reputed to be the secretary to the 
local commander-in-chief.
18 Gracey Papers, 1+/2 GR Newsletter.
19 GB, PRO, WO 172/7008, INTSUM No.23 to 1500 hours, 11 October 191+5*
20 Gracey Papers, ALFFIC Op Inst No.l+, 11 October 191+5*
21 GB, PRO, WO 172/7008, 8th Orders by Brigadier Hirst, 11 October 19U5*
22 Although Lieutenant Colonel Hobbs, commanding 9/11+ Punjab, passed 
the letter on up through channels to Gracey [who replied on 11+ 
October], Hobbs sent an immediate reply to the Vietnamese 
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the questions you raise are being dealt with by 
the Commander of the Allied Forces in INDO CHINA, 
from whom you will receive details of the conditions 
he requires you to accept.
I am not authorized to give any answer on questions 
of policy, but you must clearly understand that 
any person found carrying arms will be arrested 
and disarmed. Any person resisting the movement 
of British troops will be shot.
As by now you are probably aware some of your 
men fired on my troops at 1-30 hours today on 
the outskirts of GOVAP. This action which was 
entirely unprovoked resulted in the death of 
one of my men. I am glad to say that your force 
was dispersed with casualties.
In the fourth paragraph of your letter you 
say that you are responsible for the actions 
of your men. I can assure you that any further 
hostile action on your part will be met with 
the full force at my disposal, which I may tell 
you is most formidable.
I will hold you entirely responsible for any 
incident which may occur in the future.
[Gracey Papersi.
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On the 12th, also, advance elements of 681+ Squadron arrived.
The enormity of the tasks laid out for the squadron is 
evident when considering the vast areas involved and the 
poor flying weather prevalent at the time of year. The 
photo reconnaissance Mosquitos were to map large areas in
Malaya, Sumatra, Java and Borneo besides having 
to cover all of the British section of French 
Indochina. Some of the Mosquitos even flew to 
Hanoi and back to map that city and key areas 
in the Red River delta.
The first Mosquito left Rangoon for Saigon on 
12 October; it was flown by Squadron Leader 
W.M.Murray, a New Zealander, who temporarily 
took command of the squadron. The ground 
personnel embarking from Calcutta [the squadron 
had been based at Alipore] on 25 September had 
an inauspicious start, as they had been directed 
to the wrong ship and had to disembark at Rangoon 
and try it again. This first leg of the trip 
to Rangoon, must have been truly unpleasant 
as the squadron renamed the vessel the "Altmark" 
after the notorious prison ship of the German 
pocket battleship "Graf Spee".
The ground crews finally reached Saigon on 
11 October, where they were in place to receive 
Murray on the 12th and the first flight of 
six Mosquitos on the 15th. By the end of 
October the squadron was in place, with 
detachments at China Bay (four aircraft) and 
the Cocos Islands (seven aircraft). A few 
photo reconnaissance Spitfires from 681 
Squadron Detachment later augmented 68U 
Squadron at Tan Son Nhut.
25 GB, PRO, WO 203/5562, "FIC, Political and Internal Situation," 
12 October 19U5*
26 The 9th Battalion's Magazine described their arrival:
The Battalion arrived in Saigon without incident 
and soon settled down in what we thought was a 
"Land flowing with milk and honey." —  alas, a 
grim reminder met our eyes next morning —  four 
graves outside our staging camp.
•The Battalion was split up next day, companies 
moving out to guard bridges, factories and other 
vital points. Battalion Headquarters was moved 
to the Fort [de Cai Mai, to relieve the Dogras] —
'just like the Frontier, don't you know', and 
very soon the Union Jack flew over Cholon for 
the first time. The Battalion band — only 
formed a few days before and consisting of two 
dhols, two sumais and a couple of buglers, led 
the Battalion through the streets.
Major General D.D.Gracey, CB, CBE, MC, soon 
came out to see us and presented medal ribbons 
to many of the officers, VCOs, and men.
27 Gracey Papers, 3/1 GR Newsletter.
The adventures of 2963 Squadron, RAF Regiment which would 
have stretched credulity to breaking point had they been 
enacted in a stage farce may be worth mentioning. In 
October 19W+ (a month after it was formed) it departed 
Calcutta for a train and ferry journey to Burma. The 
units 6 officers and 137 men arrived in Chittagong on 
27 October, and entrained for Dohazari. Their train 
immediately collided with a goods train and the engine 
was derailed. After a delay they arrived in Dohazari 
to discover that they were supposed to have remained 
in Chittagong, to which they returned the following 
day. On 30 October their brand new 3-ton truck was 
in a head-on collision while the unit was en route 
in heavy rain to a temporary camp in Ramu, and on 
5 November returned to Chittagong, only to discover 
that no lodging was available, so they pushed on to 
Double Moorings.
At Double Moorings they found that no water was 
available due to contamination, but the Army came 
to their rescue with water. They finally found their 
water bowser, but it was unserviceable and the Army 
again rescued them. By now most of the officers had 
been in and out of hospitals for various ailments, 
mostly due to bad water.
On 10 November they left Double Moorings for Comilla, 
and the water bowser plus two ^ t o n  trucks broke 
down en route and were left on the road. On 11 
November they arrived in Comilla but missed the turn 
to the airfield and wound up unexpectedly in another 
camp. By now they had had enough and defied orders 
to move on again, staying the night at the camp.
Two more men went into hospital. On 13 November 
they departed Agartala (reached the day before) for 
the Syhlet transit camp (having prudently sent the 
troublesome bowser on ahead), only to find that no 
room was available at their destination —  no one 
had warned the camp of their arrival and the men 
had to sleep in and under their trucks (except 
Corporal Jones, who fell off his motorcycle on a 
"rough road").
On 15 November the unit left for Shillong, and 
the log triumphantly stated that "all vehicles 
negotiate difficult bends and gradients", that 
is, all except the 3-ton Ford which crashed into 
a wall and broke its front axle and was 'left at 
the roadside. Arriving at Shillong that day, 
two more men went into the hospital, followed 
by three more on the 16th. On 18 November the 
2963rd move on to Nowgong, but two trucks (or 
lorries) would not start and were left behind.
The men again slept in their vehicles and the 
bowser broke down once more. On 19 November 
they arrived in Dimapur to find tents available 
fcut no water) and one more truck gave up. The
next day, en route to Imphal, two more vehicles broke 
down, and it was a much-depleted unit which was welcomed 
by the 221 Group Commander [at this time 30 men, a 
quarter of the strength, were scattered in various 
hospitals along the way]. By now, even the break-down 
vehicle had broken down. Then just as things were 
looking up in Imphal, the entire unit received 
cholera shots.
However, comedy turned to tragedy when the unit 
arrived in Saigon, as on 2 October the commander,
Squadron Leader Ward, was shot in the back and 
seriously wounded while riding in a Jeep near Tan 
Son Nhut.
GB, FRO, Air 29/1118, Log of 1307 Wing, RAF, 13 October 19U5*
Major Matsuzato's report was as follows:
Report No.1 concerning the wiping out of Tan 
Son Nhu village.
To Wing Commander Allen October 13th.
1. Our troop returned at 16 hours safe and 
sound without any casualties, completing 
its duty.
2. The situation and the cause of fighting 
as follows
(a) Most of the armed Annamites have
already gone away only a small number 
were left. These were no resistance 
at all and no damage as well, (b) After 
thorough searching we took the following 
arms as war prizes.
1. l+ rifle bullets
2. 1 hand grenade (without safety plug,
so putting it into the well, made it 
unserviceable)
3. About 30 bamboo spears and arrows 
(breaking into pieces, making them 
useless).
Signed. Major Matsuzato
Commanding Officer.
The "war prizes" were handed in to Wing Headquarters.
The RAF log of the events of the past few days is as follows:
It was a situation of some irony when Wing 
Commander Allen met the Jap Major Commanding 
and discussed the disposition of the Jap Forces...
A peculiar feature is also that the Japanese, 
whom we were fighting less than two months 
previously, are now aiding their victors against 
another enemy. Wing Commander Allen, O.C. 1307 
Wing who has campaigned against the Japs from 
Onbank to Rangoon, now finds some of these very 
men under his command, and what is more proving 
very reliable in their defense duties at the 
airfield. An ironic situation from the point
of view of the Japs assisting us is that they 
risk being killed by their own weapons in the 
hands of the Annamites or even in the hands 
of Japanese fighting with the rebels; also, of 
course, the fighting in which they are involved 
has its root cause in the action the Japs took 
when they put the Annamites in power in March 
of this year.
At the end of October the RAF historian wrote, "There seems 
no immediate hope of a settlement in the dispute here, and with 
the dangers of infiltration ever present the need is for 
constant vigilance."
[GB, FRO, Air 29/1118, Log of 1307 Wing, RAF, October 19U5]*
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36 The 3/1 GR Newsletter account complemented the official War 
Diary, and is as follows:
On the 1l+th, a pi of *Br Coy was fairly heavily 
attacked by ANNAMITES with l.m.g.s, grenades and rifles.
Despite the tenacity of this attack we only had one 
man wounded. In the dark it was impossible to assess 
the casualties to the enemy but they must have been 
considerable. During this attack *Df Coy main position 
was also attacked, as was *Af Coy in 'A' Area marked 
on the map. In this latter attack the quarter guard 
was hit by an incendiary grenade but three well 
aimed 3" nitr bombs broke up the attack which followed.
'C* Coy on the docks also received attention this 
same night when a party of -0 [the first digit is 
illegible] ANNAMITES, supported by l.m.gs and rifles 
from the houses charged the main entrance. This 
attack, typical Jap fashion, with all the screaming 
etc. was met with a hail of l.m.gs, fire and grenades 
at close range, it dispersed. M9AIs were fired into 
the l.m.g. positions in the houses and in an hour 
all was quiet. We only traced four ANNAMITES casualties, 
but they must have had at least fifteen in this 
action alone; 22 gun shot and other wound casualties 
were found in the ANNAMITE Hospital CH0L0N subsequently 
and many fresh graves were found on the island.
There is no doubt that the 1l+th was a well planned 
and co-ordinated attack in all sectors. It was a 
miserable failure and probably decided the ANNAMITES 
against any further [-] force. Incidents occurred 
daily for the rest of the month. An attempt was 
made to cross the River SAIGON from the EAST and
many attempts were made to cross the Canal de 
Derivation from the SOUTH, all attempts were 
defeated, boats were sunk and few survivors 
got away. Seachlights played their part on the 
River SAIGON. Perhaps the most amusing incident 
at this time was when a young Rfn [Rifleman] 
called 'Halt', three times, to a swimming 
ANNAMITE before shooting him; he didn't know 
that ANNAMITES cannot 'tread water* !
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1+1 Gracey Papers.
1+2 By now the casualties were as follows:
Vietnamese killed by British —  307
Vietnamese killed by Japanese —  255 (including 80 in Dalat),
plus 180 wounded.
British casualties —  1 British Officer and 7 Indian/Gurkha
other ranks killed, 29 wounded, 2 missing.
French casualties —  2i+ killed, 7 wounded, 2 missing.
Japanese casualties —  12 killed, 9 wounded, 2 missing
(their figures).
1+3 The OSS were still involved in their malicious anti-French (and 
now, Anti-British), pro-Communist activities, and at this time 
the full story on the murder of the French officer Klotz, in Laos, 
became known. An OSS officer (who shall be named Major "B" and 
whose name is available in the archives) and party had parachuted 
into French Indochina from Kunming in late September and crossed 
into Northeastern Thailand, where they carried out anti-British 
and anti-French activities. Astonishingly even for the OSS,
Major "B" announced that he was going to use the Nakon Phanom 
airstrip for his own purposes (although he had not bothered to 
ask the Thai authorities). This was ironic in that it was 
usually Wedemeyer's China Command who complained that Allied 
agents operated in their area without express permission, and 
Siam fell within SEAC. ‘Hie US general at SEAC, Timberman, sent 
a stiff note to China Command and "B" and party were promptly 
ejected from whence they came, but not before they had managed 
to cause some mischief. According to Force 136, "B" later 
reported that Klotz's Viet Minh murderers had arrived on scene 
at OSS request and later "escaped", Mackenzie, head of Force 136, 
wrote to Dening about this despicable action and was not 
surprised at the Viet Minh escape, which happened."as we foresaw".
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CHAPTER XIII
EXPANSION
I am absolutely convinced that the 
healing of our sick and weary world 
is going to be more complicated by 
the fact that a free, third rate and 
irresponsible Press are at large in 
the world today. They have consistently 
misquoted our statements and in fact 
done everything to embarrass the 
situation rather than help it. If you 
can only d o . something to persuade the 
people at home that £0% of our problems 
now have been due (and will be in the 
future) to the world Press, you will 
have done a most important thing.
Lieutenant General Browning to 
Major General Penney 
25 October 19U5*
With the arrival of 100 Brigade, Gracey could now implement his 
plan to secure and pacify the Thu W c  - Thu D&u Mot - Bien Hoa triangle, 
in which the bulk of the Japanese were to be concentrated prior to 
their transfer to Cap St.Jacques for embarkation to Japan. As early 
as 19 October, 1/1 GR were alerted for their move to Thu M u  Mot. 
Although the 100 Brigade Operation Instruction No.52 (which dealt 
with the moves to the north) was dated 20 October, the ALFFIC Operation 
No. 7, the parent instruction, was dated 21 October, rather than the 
reverse. Certainly, Gracey wasted no time in pushing his third brigade
A- ^
out, for among other things Bien Hoa was developing into a major 
Viet Minh centre.
ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.7, signed by Brigadier Hirst, 
informed Rodham of his tasks and the makeup of the additional forces 
which were to come under his command. Rodham was ordered to "(a) 
Establish forces at Bien Hoa and Thu Dau Mot;* (b) Control the area 
and keep open the L of C** to SAIGON NORTH and EAST of 32 Brigade's
-j
present boundary, (c) Concentrate and disarm the Japanese forces."
Brigadier Rodham issued "Op Order No.2" on 21st October 19bS»
Woodford's 32 Brigade was to establish bridgeheads and secure cross
roads leading out of Saigon, and the Japanese had been ordered to disarm
the Viet Minh throughout the area. Also, "The day before the arrival
of the Bde at THU DUC - BIEN HOA and THU DAU MOT, the Japanese have
been ordered thoroughly to comb the area within three miles radius
2
of each place for armed Annamites and hidden arms."
/<-
In order to preclude the possibility of the Viet Minh firing
on Rodham's troops from behind Japanese positions, and thereby
forcing a British - Japanese fight, the Japanese were told to keep
clear of the roads during the brigade's actual movement. A recognition
signal was also devised for the use of Japanese troops guarding vital
arms dumps, bridges and vital points.
The operation itself was to be carried out in three phases.
Phase I was the securing of Thu Dub, Phase II of Bieh Hoa, and Phase III
of Thu Dau M&t. Spitfire reconnaissance had reported all "Route
Coloniale" roads in good condition, but the road north of Saigon (to 
9 / \
Thu Due) was blocked at intervals with trees and trestles.
* Thu Dub was omitted, but inserted in 100 Brigade's "Op InstcNo.52".
** Line of Communication.
The following additional troops were to come under Rodham*s 
command from 0800 hours on the day before D day*: 16 Cavalry less 
one armoured car squadron, 31 Battery from 23 Mountain Regiment,
9 Jat Machine Gun Battalion less two companies, 61+ Indian Workshop 
Company, one section of 20 Division Recovery Company, and 1+81 Field 
Company.** Supporting units were 1+2 Field Ambulance, 9 IMSU, and 
1+5 Indian Composite Platoon.*^
The whole force was divided into four groups, Groups A,B,C and D.*** 
Besides the additional troops mentioned, Rodham had his own infantry 
battalions: 1/1 and 1+/10 GR, and 11+/13 FFR. On 23 October the whole 
force (minus Group D, the smallest group, which was to move later)
would depart, and Group C would remain at Th& Life. On D+1 Groups A
and B were to move to Bi<hi Hoa under Lieutenant Colonel J.N. Chaudhuri, 
the Indian commander of 16 Cavalry; Group A (minus 16 Cavalry and the 
1+/10 GR company) were to remain in Eie^n Hoa. On D+2 , 16 Cavalry and 
the 1+/10 GR company were to join Group B for the move to Thu Dau Mot, 
still under Chaudhuri*s overall command, and Group B would remain at 
Thu Dau Mot under Cyril Jarvis. On D+3 16 Cavalry and the 1+/10 GR 
company were to return to Saigon. It was a well-planned and well- 
executed operation, as the force moved counterclockwise in a triangle, 
dropping off groups along the way.
* D Day was 23 October 19U5*
** A slight discrepancy concerning one support unit exists between
“ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.7” and "100 Ind.Inf.Bde Op Order 
No.2"; Gracey*s own copy of the ALFFIC Operation Instruction also 
differs slightly from the copy in the Public Record Office.
*** Group A Group B Group C Group D
(Mechanized) (Mechanized) (Marching) 61+ Indian
ComdsLtCol Chaudhuri, Comd: LtCol Bde Hq,Sig Sec, Workshop Coy
16 Cav. Jarvis, 1/1 GR LAD. Units* heavy
16 Cav(-1 Sqdn) 1/1 GR (-1 Coy) 1 Coy 2/8 Punjab baggage.
1 Coy I+/10 GR 1 Coy $ Jats Hq. 9 Jat
+11+/13 M  31 Mtn Bty(-1 Sec) 1+2 Ind Fd Amb *
+1 Coy 9 Jat Let 1+2 Ind Fd Amb 9 MSU *
+Det 1+2 Ind Fd Amb Det 1+81 Ind Fd Coy 1+81 Ind Fd Coy*
+Det 1+81 Ind Fd (All units remain 1 Wireless Sec,
Coy. Thu Dau Mot) 61+ Ind Wksp Coy
, m . . 1 Sec 20 Recovery Coy
+ To remain at 1*/10 GB (- 1 Coy)
Bien Hoa
1+5 Ind Comp PI 
* (less dets)
(All units remain 
Thu Due)
At 0730 hours on 23 October, the operation began as the first 
battalion, the 1+/10 Gurkha Rifles, moved out, marching out of Saigon 
carrying full pack and equipment. Five-hours later the battalion 
entered Thu Bui, weary but unhindered. At 1300 an Officers* 
conference was held, and an immediate reconnaissance was made of the 
battalion*s perimeter. The men were more than satisfied with their 
quarters arrangements "as we are billeted in the big Convent here at 
THU DUC and there is plenty of room both inside for sleeping and 
outside for recreation."^ According to 1/1 GR, the first day*s 
operation had gone very well, with "no hindrance except for the Military 
Police in SAIGON who were alleged to be directing traffic,"
On 23 October, as 1+/10 GR was tramping up to Thu Due, 9/12 FFR 
"was ordered to hand over in Saigon to French troops and move to 
Cap St. Jacques at the mouth of the Saigon river, a welcome change 
to a pleasanter milieu. The men were able to enjoy some welcome 
sea bathing." The relief was genuine, for the 9/12 FFR historian 
had earlier written that "Life in French Indo-China, as in other 
Japanese-occupied territories surrendered after the Second World War, 
was by no means ordered and peaceful. The aftermath of war had left 
unrest and the ugly head of communism was raised, causing trouble, 
sabotage and outbreaks of violence."
The regimental history continued:
"The Battalion*s role in the Cap St.Jacques- 
Baria area was to take custody of Japanese 
surrendered troops who were being concentrated 
there. Sixty thousand were due to arrive 
shortly, and these included some sixty generals 
and admirals besides Field-Marshal Terauchi, the 
Japanese Supreme Commander in South-East Asia.
He was an old and sick ma n and was removed 
for treatment to Singapore, where he died soon 
afterwards." 6
In 32 Brigade *s sector Viet Minh snipers wounded a 1+/2 Gurkha, 
who later died, and the Gurkhas searched houses to the west of
A*battalion headquarters to Go Vap; four suspects were arrested, three
with Japanese ammunition and equipment and one in a green uniform
who carried papers showing him to be a "Tonkinese soldier from Hanoi."
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The force moved out of Thu Bub early on 2l+ October, arriving 
in Bien Hoa at 081+5* There was no sign of the 1+-8000 Tonkinese Viet 
Minh troops reported in a previous low grade estimate, but "reliable 
reports state that all armed Annamites, approx 2000, evacuated the
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town on 22.10.U5* The unit commanders were met by Colonel Miyake, 
the senior Japanese officer in the area, and the town was immediately 
"searched and found to be clear". The 1U/13 FFR and ancillary units 
set up camp in the jail area, and at 1100 hours the Union Jack was 
"hoisted with ceremony" over the main gate entrance to the Bien Hoa 
jail. In the afternoon a French major arrived as Liaison Officer to 
Lieutenant Colonel Pickard, commanding 11+/13 FFR. At 1600 hours 
Chaudhuri, Pickard and Miyake met to discuss Japanese troop dispositions 
prior to the move to Thu Dau Mot on the following day. For 1/1 GR, 
the afternoon was spent relaxing and bathing in the river, although 
their staging area was formerly the Vi&t Minh headquarters, and 
quantities of Viet Minh documents were discovered there.
On 25 October, as the remaining group prepared to depart for Thu 
Dku Mot, the 11+/13 TTR took up a new headquarters at the old French 
Administration Building. Jarvis*s group reached Thu D&u Mot at 1100 
hours on 25 October, "aft'dr a peaceful journey along a road lined with
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Japanese troops." On the day before, in Thu Due, U/10. GR had seized 
all weapons at the local Bow and Arrow Factory and were already searching 
selected areas. The Viet Minh had previously told the Mother Superior 
of the local convent that they would attack when she rang the church 
bell. The Gurkhas set up an ambush and rang the bell, but the Viet 
Minh never showed up. The following day, however, an interpreter 
assigned to 100 Brigade Headquarters was threatened by armed Viet Minh, 
but a search by the Gurkhas produced no results.
As the last group entered Thu Deb. Mot, six Spitfires took off 
from Tan Sdh Nhait
"to do a show of force over BIEN HOA 
and THU M U  MOT. This was a general 
beat up of the place to keep the 
Annamites quiet while the Army went 
in. Bad visibility prevented a really 
good show." 9
The "20th Indian Division1s History" described the actions of 
the past few days:
"The THU DUC - THU DAU MOT - BIEN HOA 
area N.E. of SAIGON had been selected 
as the main concentration area for 
Japanese forces in SOUTH F.I.C, but 
before the disarming and concentrating 
of the Japanese could commence it was 
necessary to secure this area.
100 Bde were earmarked for this task and 
on the morning of 23 October the Bde 
organised as a mobile column moved out of 
SAIGON with 1+/10 GR in the van and secured 
the town of THU DUC without opposition.
On the following day the 1U/13 FFR went 
on to occupy BIEN HOA and secured intact 
the vital bridges over the DONGNAI River 
SOUTH of the town. On the 25th the 1/1 
GR occupied THU DAU MOT. Both the latter 
operations also encountered no opposition.
The absence of opposition in this operation 
came as a complete surprise, as the area 
had been the concentration area and training 
ground of a large proportion of the VIET 
MINH forces in COCHIN CHINA. TONKINESE 
troops of the VIET MINH Army had been arriving 
by train in this area from the NORTH.* Reports 
differed-widely as to their numbers but they 
were stated to be well armed and disciplined 
and were intended to provide a hard core for 
the VIET MINH forces in COCHIN CHINA.
Reports received indicated that the VIET 
MINH had moved out of the three towns less 
than 2k hours before the arrival of our 
troops. Although 100 Bde occupied their 
area without a fight, they were engaged for 
the duration of their stay in constant 
operations against the VIET MINH guerilla 
elements which were left behind when the 
main body withdrew. The dense nature of the 
country rendered the task of combing out 
these guerilla parties: extremely difficult 
and to sweep the whole area thoroughly 
would have required many more troops than 
could be spared at this time." 10
While the major operation of 23-25 October was the investment 
of the Thu Bub - Bi&i Hoa - Thu D&u Mot area, the other two brigades
remained busy as the daily incidents of sniping and arson continued.
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On 23 October, as the U/10 Gurkhas marched into Thu Bde in Phase I, 
a 3/8 GR patrol was fired on from a crossroads, and one Gurkha was 
killed. Half an hour later, at 1230, Major J.B. Clements brought up
A.
B Company to attack the Viet Minh ambush party but the latter had 
moved. However, the company was fired on from a position a few 
hundred yards from the ambush site and the Gurkhas moved in with 
3—inch mortars bracketing the new sniper location. At 1315 the 
village in which the Viet Minh attackers had hidden was set on fire
t ,
* Verifying the accounts of Giap and Trdcshg Chinh.
and an ammunition dump was destroyed. Two Gurkhas were wounded, and 
at 1330 the company returned to base, having engaged the Viet Minh 
in a thirty minute fire fight. Viet Minh casualties amounted to 
thirty killed and six wounded, and this figure was considered to be 
a low estimate. A Japanese grenade dump was found and destroyed, and 
one Japanese was seen with the Viet Minh.^
On the night of 23/2I+ October the same company was "jittered" 
[harassed] by a "large number" of Viet Minh at a bridge near the 
scene of the recent action. A B Company position on a bridge fired 
on the Viet Minh jitter party and casualties were believed to have 
been inflicted, as blood was found near the position. On the following 
evening, at the same position where the earlier sharp fire fight had 
occurred, B Company again stood to all night long with a large number 
of Viet Minh circling the position while shouting and beating drums.
The French now reported that the Viet Minh had attacked forces 
at Nha Trang, and the battleship Richelieu had been sent to back up the 
cruiser Triomuhant there; both had permission to use their guns if 
necessary. A small group of Vietnamese were said to be marching east 
out of Bien Hoa, and the Japanese report of 500 Viet Minh arrivals from 
Tonkin was accepted as fairly accurate. The Japanese estimated that 
200 more Vi&t Minh were now northwest of Xuan Loc and 300 in Trang BOin; 
they also stated that a small party of Japanese had been paralyzed after 
drinking water from a poisoned well at Hoc M8n.
ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.8 , issued on 21+ October,
acknowledged that "Hostile activities of the Annamites have, to a
large extent, receded from our expanding perimeter within and on the
edge of which they have now confined themselves to minor guerilla 
12
tactics." The 20th Division was now to "commence systematic 
patrolling beyong the present perimeter... the object of these patrols 
is to show the flag, reconnoitre and open up the roads, rid the area 
of malcontents and reassure the peaceful inhabitants, so that they 
will recommence their normal trading." The patrols were not to fight 
unless attacked and would clear undefended road blocks; they were also 
forbidden to search for arms unless a special operation was "laid on 
as the result of information from informers or the observations of 
patrols." Night ambushes were permissable "after due reconnaissance 
by day."
The Japanese again protested the French attitude towards them.
The minutes of the 2i+ October conference held by Hirst state that
"The Japanese complained of the lack of 
appreciation by certain elements of the 
local French population, and, more especially, 
the local press, of the work performed by
the Japanese forces working side by side with
the Allied forces in the suppression of 
disorder." 13
The Japanese also reported heavy fighting east of Xuah Loc, and
they were now out of contact with their troops east of Bidn Hoa, as
the lines had been cut. They also said that Japanese-Vietnamese
relations had deteriorated at Baria, near Cap St. Jacques, because
500 tons of salt had been shipped from there to Phnom Penh. In
retaliation, the Viet Minh were said to have "raided a Japanese arms
depot and stolen some 800 cannon shells."
A 20 Division memo of 21+ October stated that "A dump of 600
Tear Gas bombs was located at GOVAP. These are now believed to be in 
1 )
Annamite hands." The memo further confirmed that the poison on the
Viet Minh arrows was probably strychnine, but in sublethal quantities.
On 25 October, as far as can be ascertained, came the only
evidence of direct Russian involvement in South Vietnam. The Japanese
reported that in their sweep and disarmament of the Viet Minh which
immediately preceded the arrival of the 1st Gurkhas in Thu Dau Mot,
their forces had found a Russian among the Viet Minh. The minutes of
the 25 October British-Japanese conference said of the Russian:
"Being a subject of an Allied nation, he 
had been placed in protective custody.
He was, however, reported to be the leader 
of the local VIET MXNH party and is said 
to have come from CHINA originally."
The Japanese were ordered to hand the Russian over to 100 Brigade.
The 1/1 GR War Diary reported the incident as follows:
"At 1600 hrs a RUSSIAN claiming to be a 
French subject and a rubber planter was 
brought in by the Japanese: an exotic 
red bearded figure by Kipling out of 
Conrad, he freely admitted having worked 
for the VIET NAM for two days before his 
detention. The papers he carried showed 
him to be a scientist of some learning.
He was sent to Bde for detailed interro­
gation." 15
The diarist also reported that the former governor*s house 
had been used as a Viet Minh headquarters and the jail as a bow 
and arrow and pike factory. The 1st Gurkhas said of the Japanese,
"Their intelligence information was to prove invariably accurate: 
it was always clearly illustrated by quite excellent maps."*
The 1/1 GR barracks in Thu Dstu Mot was the foamier Vietnamese 
militia barracks built by the French. It was better than any barracks 
the British troops had in India, recalled Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis, 
the 1/1 GR commander. Lieutenant Colonel R.Clark, who succeeded 
Jarvis as 1/1 GR C.O., remembered it as a "Beau Geste" sort of 
barracks, left spotlessly clean by the Japanese who had just moved 
out. As the 1/1 GR Newsletter later wrote, there was a drawback:
"The barracks at THU DAU MOT were probably 
the best that the Bn has ever occupied.
They consisted of two large barrack blocks 
with a fine parade ground, and separate 
quarters for officers. The only drawback 
was that it meant, literally, death to go 
outside unescorted. We lost one follower 
and two IORs of the Field Ambulance who 
did so." 16
In Thu Dau Mdrt the Japanese remained largely responsible for the
maintenance of public order, as the Gurkhas "provided a mobile column
to take action against irreconcilables who sniped and ambushed us and
the Jap sentries, impartially, and made raids on warehouses and 
17installations."
Lieutenant Colonel Clark described the Thu D&u Mdt operations, 
including the remarkable fact that the town was initially deserted 
of Vietnamese inhabitants:
"The En Gp consisted of our own Bn plus 
one Tp 23 Mountain Regt (artillery), one 
Tp 16 Cavalry (Armoured Cars) and one Sec 
Indian Engineers.
To this was added a group of five or six 
’Colons* who were supposed to be with us 
as interpreters but they hardly mixed with 
us at all and eventually moved off to take . 
over the old French Governor’s Residency.**
* This was probably because Lieutenant Colonel Cyril Jarvis, commanding 
the 1/1 Gurkhas, developed a closer relationship with the local 
Japanese commander, Major Takahashi, than perhaps the other battalion 
commanders. Many years later, Jarvis returned TakahashiJs sword to 
him, to discover that Takahashi had died! However, Jarvis received 
a photograph from the family, which showed Takahashi*s widow holding 
the sword and surrounded by the immediate family.
** Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis had earlier written: "A French officer was 
attached to us in Thu Dau M&t, and went down very badly, because of 
his attitude to the Gurkhas, which was far too ’colonial1."
The Vietnamese population of Thu Dau Mot 
was very noticeable by their complete 
absence and it was not until after Christmas 
before we found them in a jungle clearing 
some three miles out of the town where they 
had constructed a new village of bamboo and 
grass huts. In fact this seemed fairly 
typical as we failed in all efforts to 
contact the local people. They simply 
took to the jungle when troops appeared.
There were one or two contacts with the 
Viet Minh but this was mainly casual 
sniping, in particular at a detached 
company base about 3 miles south of Thu 
Dau Mot. This necessitated a Bn sweep 
when we cleared a number of houses on the 
perimeter of the village." 18
Lieutenant Colonel Clark provided an insight into previous 
Japanese-Vi&t Minh cooperation in the area:
"On the score of Jap support for the Viet 
Minh it may be of interest that when the 
'Colons' took over the old French Residency 
in Thu Dau Mot they discovered that the 
evening before our arrival in the town the 
Japanese commander had given a banquet for 
the Viet Minh! They found the full list 
of guests and the menu. Unfortunately there 
was no list of Japanese officers against 
whom we could take action but I did warn 
the Jap commander of the area that I would 
have a Military Police investigation if I 
had any further cause to suspect collaboration.
The interpreter used the term 'Kempei Teif 
and you should have seen the Admiral's face.
He was obviously really scared that our BMP* 
would use Kempei Tei methods!" 19
Fires now blazed all over Saigon and Cholon as Viet Minh arsonists 
attempted, among other things, to b u m  down the Power Station.
Japanese firefighters came under heavy sniping, and i|/2 GR killed 
three snipers north of Tan Sdn Nhut.
The French under Massu had startling success in their first
operation, the recapture of Mytho. One of Massu1 s officers had
reconnoitered the area in a Japanese Zero, and although his mechanized
column had rough going due to the numerous road cuts and blown bridges
?0(destroyed by a Vietnamese graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique), * 
the commando group under the unique naval parachutist Ponchardier,
* Royal Military Police.
supported by the sloops Gazelle and Annamite. seized the town in 
a lightening waterborne assault.
Reports that sizable bodies of well-armed Viet Minh were 
slipping back into Go Vap seemed confirmed when the Viet Minh mounted 
a strong attack on 9/lb Punjab at 2230 hours on the night of the 25th. 
This attack on a 9/lb post just east of the golf course near Tan Sdn 
Nhut was supported by five light machine guns and a Japanese grenade 
discharger. Major Apps brought up a platoon to reinforce the post 
and the ensuing fight lasted for four hours. When the Viet Minh 
withdrew the 9/lb troops burnt the houses which covered the Viet Minh 
approach and counted twenty dead Viet Minh; 9/lb casualties were seven 
"slightly wounded". A "drastic search and patrolling of [the] area 
[was] carried out", and two suspects were arrested and handed over to 
the Field Security Section. On the previous day 9/1b patrols had 
rescued a French family and discovered two houses containing signals 
equipment and small arms ammunition. The houses in the vicinity were 
fired as the 9/lb Punjabis were reacting vigorously to Viet Minh attacks.
On 25 October an Indian sapper guarding the Concasseurs tube 
(artesian) well in Cholon was shot dead by a burst of Sten gun fire from 
a nearby house. Naik Ajmer Singh, of the 92nd Indian Field Company 
(Indian Engineers), had been guarding one of five wells operated by 
the Bombay Sappers and Miners Company. In describing the incident, and 
tragi-comic aftermath, Major J.H.Clark, R.E., wrote as follows:
"It had become a matter of custom when fired 
on or ambushed to take the only retaliatory 
measure that was found to have any effect.
This was to b u m  to the ground the hut or 
house from which the shots came, and any 
others roundabout. It seems harsh on the 
innocents among the guilty, but in actual 
fact there were very few innocents. They 
all supported the terrorists, and were never 
anything but hostile to us." 21
The wells were continually being sniped-at night. It was irritating 
for the sappers, because they had strict orders never to fire unless 
they had a target, and of course they never did." The Naik's death 
triggered a reaction:
"The O.C. of the company got angry, and 
obtained permission from Brigade to destroy 
all the houses near the wells. The same 
morning the Sikh platoon burnt down eight 
houses near that well. They had considerable
difficulty in doing so, because they 
were made of very tough teak and there 
was absolutely no wind to fan the flames.
Even when saturated in petrol they did not 
b u m  very effectively. The O.C. then 
indicated to the Subahdar where he could 
start on another lot in the afternoon 
near another well, at the c o m e r  of a huge 
Chinese-Annamite slum, but separated from 
it by roads on all sides which would act 
as firebreaks. At 1500 hours that afternoon 
an urgent telephone call brought the O.C. 
to the scene. It was obvious what had 
happened two miles away. A black pall of 
smoke hung over the rooftops. The 
difference between the morning's and the 
afternoon's burning was that these huts 
were made of dry thatch and that a strong 
wind had sprung up.
The Subahdar had only fired one hut, and 
now the whole hutted slum was an inferno 
half a mile long by a quarter of a mile wide.
The inhabitants were panic stricken, and 
crowded the roads and blocked them with 
their goods and chattels pulled out of their 
houses. The first hut had burnt out in a 
matter of seconds, but the wind had blown 
the flaming thatch on to [a] nearby hut, 
which had gone up in flames also, and 
distributed burning thatch as much as a 
hundred yards further away on to other 
houses. And so it grew and spread literally 
like wild-fire. It was an appalling situation; 
with the high wind spreading the fire further 
afield every moment, the whole of Cholon was 
threatened, because there was no firebreak 
wide enough to stop the fire, and no time to 
make one.* The only bright spot was that the 
mobs of shrieking humanity were too panic- 
stricken to start any shooting. The. feelings 
of the O.C. may well be imagined. It was certain 
that the whole of Cholon was going to b u m  
down, that tens of thousands of people would 
be homeless, if not killed or injured, and 
he was responsible. Futile attempts were 
made to stop the fire with all the water- 
tank trucks, pumping sets, men and buckets 
that could be obtained, whilst the unhappy O.C. 
turned over in his mind what he was going to 
say at his court martial.
However, quite suddenly the wind dropped and 
actually blew gently from the opposite direction, 
and some light rain fell. The fire went no
*News of this fire most probably caused Mountbatten to criticise 
Gracey's policy in a letter to be discussed later in this chapter.
further. The houses burnt themselves slowly 
down to the ground, and as the smoke cleared 
the full extent of the devastation could be 
seen. Several thousand homeless Annamites 
and Chinese drifted out to clear ground outside 
Cholon, and started to encamp there in the open.
The Sikh Naik had certainly been given a worthy 
funeral pyre. An anxious O.C. sat down and wrote 
his report, and had a worrying time waiting to 
hear the outcome of it. But his luck was in; 
for the Chinese had been making trouble for some 
time, and when their complaint about the fire went 
to the authorities, accusing the allied forces 
of committing all sorts of other offences against 
them, they received a reply to the effect that 
they were doing nothing but obstructing the 
allies from carrying out their tasks. They 
cheated the troops, ran evil places of entertain­
ment, spread disease, sheltered terrorists, and 
profited from both sides whatever happened. If 
they didn't cooperate in future, there would be 
another Fire of Cholon. The incident was closed, 
and there was practically no more trouble from 
sniping in that area for some time, although it 
all started again later when the French were 
taking over." 22
Shortly thereafter a 3/8 GR company on a sweep seven kilometers 
northwest of Tan Scfa Nhtfb airfield encountered some opposition, after 
which 59 Tonkinese were brought in. At night, another 3/8 company was 
again "jittered" by 80 to 100 Viet Minh armed with a few rifles.
The Viet Minh fired from such a distance that their shooting was 
ineffective, and the Gurkhas replied with mortar fire, at which time 
screams were heard and the firing ceased. The Viet Minh kept up the 
shouting and banging of drums throughout the night.
By the 26th the balance of 20 Indian Division (3000 men) had 
arrived, completing the buildup of Gracey's own forces to a final 
strength of 22,190 men. French forces at this time totalled U575» 
which included 2150 personnel of the Combat Command, 2nd Armored 
Division (Groupement Massu). By the end of November French strength 
was to reach 26,375» the greater number being due to the expected 
arrival of the 9th D.I.C,^
Towards the end of October, in Bien Hoa, a British-Japanese 
meeting was held "to ensure compliance with AI.F BIEN HOA ORDER N0.1 
dated 25th Oct US*1' The latter was issued by Lieutenant Colonel 
Rickard, commanding 1U/*13 FFR, and laid down the general tasks 
assigned to the Japanese; these included the passing of information 
on the Viet Minh to Rickard and the establishment of a curfew. On the
27th Captain A.I. Akram, 1U/13 FPR, conferred with Major Kosaka,
Chief of Staff of the 29th Infantry Regiment.
"Major Kosaka was informed that at 11*30 hrs 
on 26 Oct 1*5 a VIETMINH car had escaped 
from X DONG 3^75 and a JAP picquet on the 
road near X DONG had made no attempt to 
stop and search the car and its occupants.
It was pointed out that this indifference 
on the part of the Japanese picquet was 
a case of disobedience of orders issued 
by the S.A.C.S.E.A., and Major KOSAKA was 
warned that severe disciplinary action 
would be taken in future against JAP 
soldiers concerned in all such cases." 2i*
This incident, small and unimportant in itself, is illustrative 
of the Japanese tendency towards complicity in areas away from Saigon.
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Although ordered to arrest Viet Minh on sight, the Japanese in places 
such as Bi4n Hoa allowed the Viet Minh openly to inarch out of town 
by the score. There were also dozens, if not hundreds, of local 
arms dumps which were never reported to the Allies, for the 20th 
Division troops were constantly discovering small ammunition storage 
areas in the course of their sweeps.
Kosaka had been preceded by Mr. Tran Lam, a representative of 
the large Chinese community in Bren Hoa. Colonel Pickard and Captain 
Akram discussed the state of sanitation in Bifen Hoa with Mr. Lam.
Pickard "stressed the importance of immediate measures for improving it. 
It was a mundane topic for discussion, but representative of the sort 
of problem faced by the various local British commanders. The sewage 
system consisted of bullock carts collecting refuse from all parts of 
to.wn, and since the drivers were Vietnamese who had left (although a 
Chinese was in charge) the system had come to a halt. Pickard pointed 
out that "There was a large number of diseased paupers and loafers 
at large in the town, who not only lived day and night in the market 
place and adjacent streets but were constantly dropping their excreta
a. ^
in the streets without any check whatsoever." Since ALP Bien Hoa 
was near the bazaar, the local air was becoming quite unbearable at 
Pickard's headquarters. The Chinese community was persuaded to start 
up the sewage system again.
In other incidents, the Japanese carried out a surprise raid on a 
reported local Viet Minh headquarters a few miles southwest of Cholon, 
killing ten Viet Minh and capturing five. The Sato Butai was ordered 
to Bi^n H^a to become part of Gateforce for the impending drive to 
Xuan L&c. During the Prench operations around Mytho, the sloop
Ann ami te reported stopping two barges in midstream. The barges 
were believed to have been manned by Japanese, and were loaded with 
Japanese mines (some of which were ready for laying). The occupants 
abandoned their barges, which were later sunk by gunfire. A JL4./17 
Dogra operation to clear the. southwest c o m e r  of Saigon brought in 
9h suspects, including a probable Japanese deserter, and some weapons.
A further snap raid brought in nine more suspects and two rifles, two 
shotguns and some grenades.
In Thu D£u  Mot the 1st Gurkhas reported that "The Japanese
brought in an assorted collection of captured ANNAMITE weapons:
swords, poisoned arrows, catapults, long bows, cross bows, stabbing
knives, throwing knives, spears, shot guns, rifles and grenades.
During Hie night ANNAMITES cross the river and planted two flags near 
25
the quay side." On the 28th the first ration convoy, escorted by 
a 1*/10 GR company, arrived in Thu Dau Mot, and "Subversive pamphlets 
in ENGLISH, CHINESE, JAPANESE and ANNAMITE were found in the town: 
their distributor was captured by the JAPANESE." As the convoy was 
en route north, i*/2 GR fought a pitched battle over a bridge about 
2J- miles north of Tan S8n Nhiit; the Viet Minh withdrew, and the l*/2 
report stated that "The patrol reported seeing Jap troops but it is 
thought that these may have been Tonkinese troops whose equipment is 
similar."
Earlier in the day, 20 Division had informed 100 Brigade that
A ^
Sato Butai was to arrive in Bien Hoa on the following day. This 
Japanese battalion, 500 strong, was to come under command of 100 
Brigade in order to carry out the following tasks. Rodham was ordered 
to seize the Xuan Loc area and break up any Viet Minh force found there, 
establish a strong base at Xuan Loc and patrol "vigorously" towards 
Baria, east on the Nha Trang road and north towards -Balat, and to 
operate offensively at all times while maintaining control of
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communications in the Xuan Loc area. Rodham was to nominate a British 
officer to command the force and to assign armored car and artillery 
support from his resources as he saw fit. The British officer and 
supporting units were to be withdrawn after having established a block 
and issuing orders for further Japanese operations in the Xuan Loc 
area.
Major L.D.Gates of the 11j./13 Frontier Force Rifles was selected 
by Rodham to command the force, which was to be called Gateforce.
Gates was issued "100 Ind Inf Bde Op Instr No.55"> dated 27 October 19U5-
^ t V*j
He was informed that ViQt Minh headquarters, together with 2000
troops, had been reported to have fled to the Xuin Loc area, and
while his brigade had met no resistance so far, Rodham stated that
"I appreciate that a strong show of force 
moving immediately into the area of their 
Hq. will disperse any cone[entration] they 
may have made or are planning to make.
I further appreciate that NO opposition 
other than occasional sniping will be met 
if the advancing force is strong. Small 
rd blocks will be encountered but I consider 
that they will NOT be held against a show 
of force." 27
Gate*s infantry would consist of Sato Butai, supported by a 
squadron of 16 Cavalry armored cars, a company of 1U/13 FFR infantry 
and a 1*2 Indian Field Ambulance detachment.
Gates was ordered to establish his patrol base at Xuan Loc
on 29 October, patrol aggressively from 30 October to 1 November,
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then return to Bien Hoa on 2 November with the whole force. He would 
have two Japanese interpreters with him, and while the British/Indian 
units were to take a seven day food supply, the Japanese were responsible 
for their own maintenance. The armored cars were to carry sufficient 
fuel for 900 miles, and the whole order was drafted by Rodham himself, 
who cautioned Gates not to use half measures if met with opposition.
Gates received his personal instructions in an order titled 
"In Confirmation Verbal Orders. Gate Force Op Order No.1". The 
background information was essentially the same as that provided
by 100 Brigade Instruction No.55* with a slightly more detailed
breakdown of the forces available to him. In addition to the units 
mentioned, Gates would have a platoon of 9 Jat machine gunners, a 
section of 3 inch mortars from 1U/13 FFR and a Royal Engineer detachment.
The operation itself was to be carried out in four phases. These 
were, from Phase I* to Phase IV respectively, the establishment of a
* For Phase I the order of march was as follows:
Mobile Troons Mein Body
C Sqn 16 Cav less 1 1 Platoon C Coy Ut/13 FFR
troop Tac Hq.
2 Coys Sato Butai 1 Platoon 9 Jap, MMG
Be* 1 Sec 3" Mortars, 1U/13 FFR
C Coy 1U/13 FFR less 1 plat.
Sato Butai less 2 Coys & 1 plat.
Bet 1*2 Fd. Amb.
B Ech.
Bet LAB 16 Cav.
Rear Guard
1 platoon Sato Buta 
1 troop 16 Cav.
patrol base in Xuan Loc on 29 October, patrolling the Balat road 
on 30 October, patrolling the Baria road on 1 November, and the
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return to Bien Hoa on 2 November.
The patrol base itself would be formed by one troop of 16 
Cavalry armored cars, one platoon of C Company (1!+/13 FFR), one 
section of 9 Jat medium machine guns, one company of Sato Butai,
1*2 Field Ambulance detachment and the engineers. For Phases II and 
III the order of march was 16 Cavalry, 1U/13 FFR, Tactical Headquarters 
plus ambulance jeeps, 9 Jat, Mortars, Sato Butai, recovery vehicle 
and 16 Cavalry.
Gates was ordered to use "maximum force" against enemy opposition, 
and all armed Vietnamese were to be disarmed. Further, "Any opposition 
from a village will be answered by complete destruction of the village." 
These were draconian instructions, indeed, but the message to the 
Viet Minh and the population was brutally direct: there would be no 
safe haven for Viet Minh engaged in warfare, and villages should not 
shelter Viet Minh units.
By 2100 (9 P.M.) on 28 October Sato Butai had still not arrived 
in Bien Hoa, and the Gateforce starting time was moved back to 0900 
on 29 October, By 0800 hours on the 29th it transpired that Sato
Butai had been issued incorrect orders by the Japanese staff and had
turned up in Trang Bcfai, about 15 miles east of Bi§n Hoa. So at
0925 Gateforce departed Bi&n Hoa and picked up Sato Butai on the way.
Shortly after, Gracey and Hirst arrived in Bien Hoa from Saigon to 
look over the area and discuss the battalion1s operational role with 
Pickard.
While Gracey was in Bien Hoa, rumblings of discontent became 
audible at the highest levels of command in South East Asia. At the 
request of General Slim, Major General Harold Pyman, ALFSEA Chief 
of Staff, wrote an extremely blunt letter to General Miles Dempsey, 
the Commander of 1i*th Army. The reason for the letter, and for its 
timing, was Dempsey's visit to Delhi to confer with the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Alanbrooke. So- long as the 
war was being fought, Slim and the senior Army commanders had concealed 
their very considerable discontent and loyally supported the Supreme 
Allied Commander, presenting a facade of unruffled harmony to the 
world. But with the massive postwar problems to be confronted,
compounded by a home government more intent on securing votes
than supporting the senior commanders in the troubled areas, officers
like Slim could contain themselves no longer. Wrote Pyman:
"As you know, the situation here is continuously 
complicated by the dynamic energy of SAC.* He 
loves to dabble in matters which are not his 
concern and, when called to order, justifies 
his interference on the ground of the political 
aspect. He insists upon centralising all 
political matters entirely at his own HQ.
Partly because of his tremendous charm of manner, 
it is extremely difficult to establish a cast 
iron case where he has really been naughty.
It would be wrong to say that the machinery 
of command is really efficient. These inter­
ferences are taking place constantly and have 
always been a source of worry to the C-in-C 
[Slim].
As I once said to you before, SAC tries more 
and more to run these HQ*s as a Combined 
Operations Headquarters. He seems to find it 
particularly tempting to deal with military 
matters, but that I think is largely because
the RAP have now practically nothing to do, and
he knows better than to upset the Royal Navy.**
The Joint Planning Committee "in particular has been a source of
irritation to the C-in-C." The Joint Planners had a dual allegiance
to SAC and the Commanders in Chief, but the latter were prevented from
doing their own staff planning. It was "contrary to the normal method
of planning", and Browning had been approached several times, but
neither he nor Slim could change Mountbatten1s ideas. Continued
Pyman:
"This system has become particularly obnoxious 
of late because the Joint Planning Committee 
have tended to deal more and more with executive 
plan's, and less with more distant projects." 28
Slim*s disenchantment extended to Mountbatten1 s reorganization of
SEAC in Singapore.*** So if Gracey was less than happy with Mountbatten
he was not alone.
With Gracey on the way back to Saigon, Gateforce arrived in Trang
Bdm by 1300 hours, and local patrols discovered no Vi^t Minh activity.
However, Gates reported that the day before a body of 300 Viet Minh
had left Trang Beta, armed with 1k0 rifles, 30 light machine guns, pistol
* Supreme Allied Commander (Mountbatten).
** Mountbatten was a Captain (Colonel equivalent), and acting 
Vice-Admiral while SACSEA.
*** None of this is intended to detract from Mountbatten1s historic 
and valuable contributions to winning the war as SACSEA. His 
place in history is assured, and the author remains one of his 
great admirers. This merely shows that he was mortal.
and spears. In view of this information, which turned out to be 
accurate, Gates encamped west of Xusin Loc, as darkness approached, 
and at 2000 hours (8 P.M.) radioed Bien H^a for a company to come out 
and establish a base in Trang Bdm. In the meanwhile, Sato Butai had 
moved ahead to reconnoiter and attempt to make contact with the 
Viet Minh.
At 0600 hours on 30 October, A Company left BiSn Hoa for Trang Bdm 
while a section of artillery from 23 Mountain Regiment remained on alert 
to move out and support Gateforce if needed. At 1330 hours Gates 
radioed Pickard, informing him that Gateforce had been fired on by the
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Viet Minh at first light, and his force had attacked at 0700 hours.
The Viet Minh withdrew to the northeast, pursued by a company of Sato 
Butai. There were' no British casualties, and the Japanese suffered 
three wounded. Unconfirmed Viet Minh casualties in this initial
skirmish were 3 wounded, and 27 prisoners were released from Viet Minh
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captivity.* Gateforce finally entered Xuan Loc and the armored cars
immediately began patrolling the town.
The "20th Indian Division*s History" provided more details of the 
day's operations:
"On the morning of 30 October the column 
arrived at XUAN LOC and found the town 
held by a large force of VIET MINH troops 
who had withdrawn from the BIEN HOA area 
shortly before it was occupied by our troops.
With the support of the sqdn of 16 Cavalry 
a full scale attack was launched and deter­
mined opposition encountered. The town was 
cleared after heavy casualties had been 
inflicted on the VIET MINH. 27 French 
hostages were released and over 60 prisoners 
taken, amongst whom were some TONKINESE 
recently arrived from the NORTH." 30
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The initial casualty estimates radioed to Bien Hoa were drastically 
revised when the battle was over, for a major encounter had taken 
place, with the Japanese bearing the brunt of the combat. Somewhere 
between 100 (100 Brigade report) and 130 (16 Cavalry report Viet Minh 
had been killed, most by Sato Butai in two engagements, the rest by 
the British force in one attack and in support of Sato Butai. The 
II4/I3 FFR now had a man killed. Several road blocks were removed, and 
a quantity of arms recovered as many of the Vi&t Minh discarded their 
arms on retreating.
* These were French and mixed French-Vietnamese who were to have been 
executed by the Viet Minh.
Unarmed Vi&t Minh searched the battle area at night for wounded,
but were driven off by Japanese looking for arms. A Vierfc Minh prisoner
stated that the "Xuan Loc force was [the] largest in F.I.C."-^
While the Bien Hoa area remained a major trouble spot for 100
Brigade, the Vi£t Minh were busy everywhere. In the Thu Dau Mot
area roads and bridges were constantly being damaged and the Viet Minh
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were seen openly digging trenches on the opposite bank of the river.
Back in Saigon's northern suburbs, 3/8 GR continued their series 
of engagements with determined guerillas in their sector. A D Company 
patrol proceeding along a road about two miles soutwest of Tan Sc?n Nhtft 
was attacked by small arms fire and grenades. One Gurkha was killed 
and another wounded, and the patrol retaliated in the now-classic 
method of destroying the attackers' cover —  part of the village was 
burnt, and VitH Minh casualties were unknown. An A Company patrol 
found and destroyed three local Viet Minh headquarters four to seven 
miles west northwest of Tan Sdh Nhut, meeting continual slight opposition. 
Viet Minh casualites were again unknown, but blood was discovered in 
the area where they had been.
At the end of the month the Japanese were authorized to draw 
down their garrisons in Qui Nheta, Tuy Hoa and Thach Ban, and to 
bring those troops plus the European populations to Nha Trang. Hirst 
then provided the Japanese with a piece of intelligence reminiscent 
of numbers of alleged sightings later to be made by Americans during the 
Sixties in South Vietnam:
"An European, medium height, well built, 
sunburnt, generally carrying a machine 
carbine, has been seen on horseback among 
the Annamites holding the two block houses 
between the beach at TIWAN and the BARIA 
road (approx 6802), His name is believed 
to be TELLIER, formerly interpreter with 
the Japanese.
You will arrest this man at the first 
opportunity and bring him to this HQ for 
interrogation." 33
In Thu Dau Mot, the airfield was inspected and found to be 
serviceable, and soon after some Dakotas and Spitfires landed 
uneventfully there. Although frontal assaults had now largely 
ceased in the Saigon area, the Vi£t Minh were stepping up their 
activities elsewhere. Phnom Penh reported that the frontier post of 
Le Rolland had been captured and the post at Snoul attacked. Japanese
guards on two bridges southwest of Cholon were also overwhelmed,
and the Viet Minh had attempted to operate the shore batteries at
/
Rach Cat against the French, but had been unable to do so. They
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did, however, make off with some sea mines from the Rach Cat fort.
Earlier^ at the 29 October British-Japanese conference, Brigadier 
Hirst angrily castigated the Japanese over the serious loss of a large 
quantity of ammunition from the Phu Tho Rubber Plantation. The loss 
amounted to several truck loads of ammunition, and Hirst charged 
that this "can only be due to gross neglect of duty on the part of
the commanding officer and the troops responsible for its protection,
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if not to actual cooperation with the Annamites."^ Hirst demanded 
a full investigation, and was dissatisfied with what he considered 
was an inadequate punishment awarded to the officers commanding the 
guard. The Japanese were also asked to explain why the Allifes had not 
previously been informed of the existence of a dump of this Size.
They could only answer lamely that it was an Air Force depot Snd as 
such not under Colonel Suzuki, Chief of Ordnance at Headquarters 
Southern Army. However, when asked which officer was ultimately 
responsible to General Manaki for all ordnance in Indochina, the 
Japanese admitted it was Suzuki. The specter of Japanese-Viet Minh 
collusion was very great in this and a number of other notable instances. 
At the same meeting the Japanese were ordered to discontinue the 
use of the term "Butai" preceded by the commander's name when referring 
to battalions. Henceforth they were to "use the proper designation 
of the Bn e.g. 1 Bn 16 Regt." [However, the British units working 
with the Japanese continued to use the Butai designation as a matter 
of course].
The Japanese also made known their anxiety about their small 
garrison at Phan Thiet, for the Viet Minh were being driven to that 
area. They were informed that Gateforce would soon be patrolling 
the road to Phan Thi&t and the Royal Navy would supply landing craft 
should reinforcements be necessary.
There was no respite in the Saigon k e y  area as a 9/12 FFR patrol 
was fired on southwest of Cholon: there were no casualties and four 
Viet Minh were captured and handed over to the Surety. In the 
evening a French armored column passed through Cholon, firing medium 
machine guns indiscriminately to both sides. Two local civilians 
were killed and several wounded. The 9th FFR War Diary stated that 
"In future Bn will escort all French convoy[s] through the Bn area."*
* A Gurkha officer interviewed stated that he and a colleague had to 
throw themselves flat on the street to save their lives while walking 
on Rue Catinat (Tu D o ) when the French did the same thing there at 
about this time.
Casualty figures were now released by Allied Headquarters, 
as follows (as of 29 October):
Killed
British/Indian 18
French 17
Japanese 19
Dutch 1
American 1
An estimated 391 Vi&t Minh had been killed by British forces ("not 
for publication")* and lfJ+1 arrested. There were as yet no reliable 
figures for Vietnamese killed by French and Japanese forces, but 
certainly the total number of killed was far higher, especially in 
view of Gateforce*s actions in the Xuan Loc area shortly thereafter.
On the 31st, an emergency message from Gateforce advised Pickard 
that a potentially serious situation was in the making, for part of 
Gateforce was still in Trang Bdta and the Viet Minh were now attempting 
to destroy a key bridge between Trang Bcfm and Xuan Loc, having set 
fire to it. One company of 11+/13 FFR, plus engineers and guns from 
23 Mountain Regiment, prepared to depart to reinforce Gateforce, and 
a U/10 GR company arrived in Bien Hoa from Thu Dub to replace the 
1U/13 company. However, Gates radioed back that the bridge could 
be repaired with his own resources and the relief column remained
in Bien Hoa. However, one platoon plus a detachment of Lj.81 Field Company
departed to assist in repairing and strengthening damaged bridges 
along Gateforce*s route.
At this time Gates, no longer in danger of being cut off from 
Trang Bdm and Bi£n Hoa, launched a three-pronged attack on Viet Minh 
forces in a plantation area near Xuan Loc. A sharp, bloody fight 
ensued until the Viet Minh retreated, leaving 62 bodies on the field;
28 Viet Minh were captured. Thus in two days the heart had been shot
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out of the Viet Minh main force unit in that area, as they had suffered 
between 162 and 192 killed and dozens wounded and captured. To make 
things worse, the Japanese had surprised yet another Viet Minh party, 
numbering about 50j during a physical training session and shot down 
almost the whole group; only a few escaped.
Even as Gateforce was in action, Mountbatten, perhaps fearful of 
adverse publicity, wrote a letter to Gracey which stung Gracey into 
a detailed reply. Mountbatten's letter was as follows, opening with
Wounded Missing 
51 3
3U 2
13 2
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"My dear Douglas":
"Isn't it great news that the 9th D.I.C. 
will be out by the end of December?
I propose to come and visit you about the 
end of this month in order to arrange the 
final turnover from British to French 
Command, and possibly to take part in the 
official hand-over ceremony.
I should like your advice as to whether 
you think it would be a good thing for me to 
accept Terauchi's sword on the occasion of 
my visit, in which case I propose that this 
should be done at your Headquarters in the 
presence, only, of senior allied officers 
and not more than two photographers. I 
do not wish to drag an invalid man of sixty- 
seven through a humiliating ceremony, and 
leave it to you to arrange matters so that 
this may be avoided.
On the other hand it must be remembered that 
until Terauchi has handed over his sword the 
surrender cannot be regarded as complete.
If he has two swords it is proposed that I 
take one for the King and the other for 
myself. As you know no Japanese officers 
whatsoever are being allowed to return to 
Japan with their swords from any overseas 
commission.
The fact that I intend to give one of the 
swords to the King must be kept completely 
secret."
The niceties over, Mountbatten (who did not take Gracey*s advice 
about Terauchi's surrender) now criticized Gracey for his conduct 
of operations in Vietnam:
"About the pamphlets you have been dropping 
from the air, I must say that it would be 
most indiscreet for a British Commander 
to put on record that Hanks, ships, aircraft 
and guns' are massed against virtually 
unarmed people, and that 'useless misery' 
might ensue. Any leaflet, worded in such a 
way, must be signed by the French Authorities 
for we must not further embarrass H.M.
Government or the French Government by making 
it appear that we are strongly threatening 
the Independence Movement." 35
The letter was signed "Dickie Mountbatten", but had a hand­
written postscript:
"I was most distressed to see you had been 
burning down houses, in congested areas too.1 
Cannot you give such unsavoury jobs (if they 
really are military necessities) to the French 
in future"
Graceyfs response, in full, was as follows:
"Very many thanks for your letter dated 
31st October, 19U5* I too was very glad 
to hear that the arrival of the 9th D.I.C. 
had been advanced. Ve shall, of course, be 
delighted to see you whenever you can come 
to SAIGON.
With regard to Terauchi's sword': I have 
just heard from TOKYO that two swords are 
on their way here; I would suggest that 
the ceremony for the surrender of the sword to 
you by TERAUCHI should take place at 
SINGAPORE and not at SAIGON. I am convinced 
that this is the right answer for the following 
reasons:-
(a) As you know, TERAUCHI's sword can 
almost be called the outward and 
visible sign of authority he holds 
from the Emperor; whilst he is in 
SAIGON it is essential for the proper 
execution of his orders by his own 
forces that nothing is done to under­
mine this authority. At SINGAPORE he 
will be in his own small H.Q, in a 
country in which Japanese forces have 
already been disarmed; in SAIGON he is 
in a country where only partial dis­
armament has been possible, and where 
Japanese forces are still operationally 
employed in the maintenance of law and 
order.
(b) I consider that the act of surrender, 
which as you say completes the over­
all act of surrender, is more properly 
executed within the British Empire than 
on French soil; it would, therefore, 
appear more logical that this particular 
ceremony should take place at SINGAPORE, 
the site of the S.E.A.C. official surrender 
ceremony, than at SAIGON; a place of no 
significance to the average person.
I will, of course, keep the fact that you 
intend to give one of the swords to the 
King a complete secret.
I was pleased to see that CARTON DE WIART 
had had a considerable success with the 
Generalissimo on behalf of the French; 
from the little connection we or the
French authorities here have had with 
representatives of the Chinese authorities 
in north French Indo-China, it would appear 
that the greatest difficulty is not between 
ourselves (or the French) and the Chinese, 
but between the Chinese and the other 
Chinese, or in this case, the Chinese in 
HANOI (or HUE) and the other Chinese in 
CHUNKING! There appears to be a singular 
lack of unanimity on the question of who 
ultimately commands who and why!
Finally I would like to give some explanation 
about the two 'operational* points upon 
which you take me to task; the first was 
the wording of one of the leaflets,36 
and the second was the destruction of some 
houses, burnt down in CHOLON. In all 
fairness to you and to my Division I feel 
that an explanation is necessary.
Although on numerous occasions both in 
SAIGON and elsewhere it has been stated 
that H.M.G. have no political interest 
in F.I.C., the Annamites have felt, and in 
fact have vociferously so expressed them­
selves, that 20 Ind. Div. is being used 
as cover to allow French troops to be 
brought into the country; and, therefore, 
that in fact we are anything but impartial. 
Further to this, they have always loudly 
proclaimed that wherever they found French 
troops or police, they would resist and 
employ every form of active opposition that 
they or their armed forces could produce: 
in spite of their attitude during our 
temporary truce, it was soon evident that 
they were, going to find it impossible to 
differentiate between our troops and those 
of the French, both of whom have been 
engaged in the maintenance of law and order 
and essential services in next door areas; 
since the truce was broken it has been 
proved that the Annamites have no intention 
of trying to differentiate between my troops 
and those of the French. It'is self-evident, 
therefore, that the Annamites are actively 
hostile to British forces; and if hostile 
and actively so, it follows that in the 
execution of my own military tasks, such as 
the clearance of key areas for the ultimate 
disarmament of the Japanese forces, I am 
forced to take offensive action; not only 
in order to carry out my tasks but also 
to prevent my own troops from sustaining 
needless casualties at the hands of Annamite 
insurgents and rebels: also to maintain a 
proper standard of British prestige in the
eyes of the French and Chinese, two 
very susceptible communities, with 
active uncensored press.
The extent of the active opposition 
which has been encountered so far is 
best indicated by a casualty statement 
for the period from 20th September to 
[ ]* th November
(a) CASUALTIES TO BRITISH TROOPS.
OFFICERS VC Os IORs TOTAL
Killed 1 2 it 19
Wounded 1 2 65 68
Missing believed
killed - — k k
91
(b) CASUALTIES TO JAPANESE TROOPS.
OFFICERS NCOs JORs TOTAL
Killed 7 11 36 5U
Wounded 8 20 51 79
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The large majority of the casualties enumerated 
above have been caused by unprovoked attacks 
on my troops, NOT in affrays started by them.
I am at all times obviously responsible for 
the security and safety of my own forces.
In spite of the issue of warnings verbally 
and in writing to disturbers and likely 
disturbers of the peace, the Independence 
Movement has by its attitude strongly 
threatened my forces in the expectation 
of their duty, infinitely more than I have 
threatened them.
The particular passage from the pamphlet 
that you quote was dropped with the full 
knowledge and agreement of the French 
authorities, at a time (approximately 1st 
October) when we knew that few Annamites 
were really active extremists: we knew 
that there were many on the edge ef the 
political movement who disliked the 
thought of months of guerilla warfare, 
loss of money, loss of home, and in fact 
all the misery of war; we knew also that 
the extremist elements were doing their 
utmost to collect all such into their 
ranks. The pamphlet was, therefore, written 
and dropped from aircraft in order to persuade 
the vacillating elements of the population
This date is blank in Gracey*s letter, but may have been 8th or 9th, 
as the letter was dated the 9th; it could be that the original was 
too weak to reproduce properly in Gracey*s copy.
why peace could he the only sensible 
policy to adopt. In that pamphlet, I 
did not say that tanks, ships, aircraft 
and guns were massed against virtually 
unarmed people; I said that the Annamite 
extremists and irresponsible elements 
who were trying to continue the useless 
fight against the might of tanks etc. 
were misleading the remainder of their 
people; nor is it really accurate to 
refer to the Annamites as really unarmed; 
they were and are well equipped with rifles, 
L.M.G.s, medium machine guns (in small 
quantities), grenades and grenade dischargers.
I had this particular pamphlet dropped in 
order to save further bloodshed and as a 
warning not as a threat.
I had been given a task to do in the 
preservation of law and order within 
key areas; I had told the Annamite leaders 
and they agreed that I was bound to do it; 
they were inclined to belittle to their own 
followers the effects of disobeying my orders;
I, therefore, had to warn them of the inevitable 
results of pitting themselves against me and 
of putting me in such a position that in order 
to carry out my tasks they forced me to take 
action against their own people.
There was one problem I had to consider 
before insisting on the French authorities 
signing the pamphlet; at the time of issue 
of the pamphlet to which you refer, the French 
authorities had no means of implementing any 
warnings they might issue other than by the 
use of British troops; surely such signature 
would have put H.M.G. in an invidious position, 
as we should have laid ourselves open to the 
charge of openly promising to aid and abet 
French domination?
In order to safeguard the movement of my 
troops on their lawful occasions, and to 
reduce their casualties from sniping and 
grenade throwing to a minimum, it has been 
essential for me to clear certain areas, 
which have shown themselves continually to 
harbour armed extremists. Searching such 
houses has been done on numerous occasions 
end has on only very few occasions produced 
anything; such searches have always been 
followed by fresh sniping, fresh grenade 
throwing and further casualties. On the 
other hand, burning such houses or as they 
really are, basha huts, has inevitably
produced a series of resounding detonations 
giving ample proof of the presence of 
ammunition. Within key areas I do not think 
I would be wise to pass responsibility for 
such acts to the French; in these areas 
inhabitants well know that I am responsible 
for law and order; the very presence of my 
troops proves that conclusively. The actual 
effect of obtaining French assistance would 
result in the complete destruction of not 
20 but 2,000 houses, and probably without 
warning to the occupants! In the area 
for which I am responsible I do not honestly 
feel I can risk such a travesty of justice:
You may doubt the veracity of this statement, 
but I can assure you that French measures 
in such cases know no such thing as minimum 
force.
I have written at great length, for which 
I apologise: I have only done so because
I felt from your letter that something must 
have been lacking from my reports as I had 
obviously feiled to explain the background 
against which I had had to issue such pamphlets 
and demolish houses.1’ 37
October closed with a number of sharp engagements throughout 
the three brigade areas. In 32 Brigade’s area, 3/8 Gurkha Rifles 
was again in action against a company-sized body of Viet Minh. Two 
•groups of Gurkhas, two platoons each, set out to reconnoitre two 
suspected Viet Minh positions just west of Tan So\i Nhi village, about 
two miles west southwest of Tan Sdn Nhut. One group went down a 
road, the other along a canal bank. They met, and had not encountered 
any Viet Minh; but on returning separately to base they came under 
constant sniper fire. D Company engaged- the snipers with 3" mortars 
and small arms fire and casualties were believed to have been inflicted 
on the Viet Minh. Half an hour later, at 1100, the company was again 
engaged by a determined enemy, and now the Gurkhas could see their 
mortar bombs falling in the midst of the Viet Minh group, in which 
”2 Japanese were seen to be talcing an active part." Exact Viet Minh 
casualties were not known, but two bodies were seen, one in the ricefield 
and one near the road.
In Cholon, in 80 Brigade’s area, the Vi&t Minh floated burning 
rafts downstream in an attempt to set key bridges on fire, but without 
success. Four Indian soldiers were also wounded in Cholon during a 
machine gun and grenade attack on their post. Because of the prevailing 
insecurity there, Cholon was now placed out of bounds for off-duty troops.
Down in Khanh H&i, the 3/1 Gurkhas had arrested numerous looters 
in the docks and warehouse areas, and on Rue de Nancy, in I4/17 
Dogra1s area, an IEME driver was shot and wounded. In fact, the 
military action now assumed a fairly constant pattern, with few 
all-out battles but continual small-Bcale patrol engagements, yet 
the casualty rate continued to rise. Indicative of the high level 
of activity was a 20 Division order to cease all practice firing 
in order to conserve dwindling ammunition stocks.
Paddy field and jungle bore silent witness to this opening act 
of the bigger drama of years to come, as small groups of men fought 
one another in the half-light. But for Gateforce there were, in this 
the first of-the postwar counter-insurgency wars, few spectacular 
battles. It was more a matter of men falling silently and unrecorded 
into the thick undergrowth or beneath the languid brown surface of 
the swamps and canals. November appeared to offer little prospect 
of any change.
Footnotes: Chanter XIII
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3 Rodham's orders, contained in Instruction No. 52, have been 
cited by virtually every anti-British writer on the period to 
illustrate the brutality of the British counter-insurgency 
operations. 'The order invariably quoted verbatim is: "Always 
use the maximum force available to ensure wiping out any hostiles 
we may meet. If one uses too much no harm is done." There is, 
however, more to it than that, for Rodham continued, "If one 
uses too small a force and it has to be extricated we will suffer 
casualties and encourage the enemy." Taken out of context the 
quoted orders appear brutal, but their purpose in Instruction No.
52 was solely to emphasize strongly that "the full precautions
of war must be taken throughout the ops.'" As Rodham vent on to 
say, the reason was simple —  the brigad0 1>ras at war and they 
•were taking casualties. They ha.d no defined front, and we’re 
vulnerable from the flanks and the rear, just as on the North 
Vest Frontier in India, where some in the division had served.
In the oft-cited phrase, the operative word is "hostiles".
U GB, PRO, W0 172/7793, War Diary U/10 Gurkha Rifles, 23 October 19’-!5•
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The 1/1 GR Newsletter discussed these events:
100 Bde was the last Bde of 20 Div to 
arrive in Indo-China. It came on 17 Oct 
and on 19 we received the warning order 
for our future operations. Ve were to 
leave the fleshpots to 80 and 32 Bdes and 
move out to show the flag in the country 
to the North of Saigon, and proceed with 
the disarming of the Japs who were concen­
trated in that region. 100 Bde group, 
commanded by Brig Rodham, consisted of 16 Cav, 
a Mountain Regt IA, MG Bn 9 Jats, lj.2 Fd Amb 
and a dett of Engineers, with the original 
Inf Bns of the Bde, 1U/13 FF Rifles, U/10 
GR and ourselves. Ve left the following in 
Saigon to continue to carry out duties as 
General Gracey's bodyguard: C. Coy, the 
General's old coy. commanded by John Rennie, 
who seemed best fitted to withstand the 
rigours of social life, the "Bn HQ defense pi": 
and the A.T. PI (still unhorsed).
These rigours were real enough, as one of the 
youngest of the bodyguard troops, who . 
deserted his post under unusual circumstances, 
can testify. He was a sentry one night on 
one of the main gates of General Gracey's 
house; when he was approached by an amorous 
French woman who threw her arms around his 
neck and kissed him. Fearful of what might 
happen next, he forgot his duty and fled for 
safety to the guard room.
Ve all moved in MT and reached THU DUC on 
23rd. Here Bde HQ remained with the U/10 GR.
On the 2ij.th we arrived at BIEN HOA, where we 
shed the 1^/l3th, and went to THU DAU MOT 
on the 25th. Ve were escorted by the 16 Cav: 
while we settled into the barracks, they did 
a 'chukka* round the town in the course of 
which, much to his indignation, the 2 i/c was 
hit in the back of the neck by a hostile 
grenade: it failed to explode.
Cyril Jarvis, who commanded ^he 1st Gurkhas at fh° time, related 
the humorous incident to the author in 1977* The 16 Cavalry 
second in command was a British officer who was disgruntled 
anyway because he had not been selected for promotion. His
chagrin was increased when it was discovered that the grenade 
which bounced off his neck and sputtered on the ground looked 
like it was wrapped in an old sock. This was the final insult: 
"It wasn't even a proper grenade!"
GB, PRO, Air 27/1583, Log of 273 Squadron, 25 October 19U5*
Gracey Papers, "20th Indian Division's History", n.d.
11 GB, FRO, VO 172/7786, War Diary 3/8 Gurkha Rifles, 23 October 19U5-
12 Gracey Papers, "ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.8”, 21* October 191*5-
13 OR, PRO, WO 172/7008, Minutes of 2l+ October 19l*5» Conference 
(Nineteenth Orders).
1U Gracey Papers, Memo, 2i* October 19U5*
15 GB, PRO, WO 172/7769, War Diary 1/1 GR, 25 October 191*5-
Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis remembered the incident well. Since 
he knew some rudimentary Russian he attempted to get the prisoner 
to talk, to no avail. The Russian was wearing a regular Viet 
Minh uniform, with gold stars on the lapels of his jacket. He 
was handed over to the S(5ret£ and never heard of again. [Cyril 
Jarvis, personal interview, 13 May 1977]*
Jean C£dile also remembered the Russian, but said that he had 
no direct knowledge of his fate:
I had no knowledge of military operations.
My job was to prepare the events of 23 
September, and as I said to General Gracey, 
to reequip the FWs, but anything else [military]
I knew nothing about. My work with the British 
consisted mainly of arranging the affair of the 
23rd of September.
[Jean C«£dile, personal interview, 26 October 1977]*
16 Gracey Papers, 1/1 GR Newsletter.
17 Ibid.
18 Lieutenant Colonel R.V.Clark, former Commander 1/1 GR, letter 
to author, n.d. [1977]•
19 Ibid.
20 Jacques Massu, Sent Ana Avec Leclerc (Paris: Plon,197i*) p.2li5*
The Vietnamese, Nguyen Ngoc Bich, was later betrayed to the 
French by the Viet Minh.
21 J.H.Clark, "Sappers and Miners in Saigon", The Royal Engineers 
Journal, Vol. LXIV, No.3 (Chatham, Kent: 1950), PP 28I4.-285.
All of this, however, was but more fuel for those writers 
who saw in these events only the Allied sins, and on 25 
October Browning had written a prophetic letter to Penney:
I am absolutely convinced that the healing 
of rtur sick and weary world is going to be 
more complicated by the fact that a fr^e, third 
rate and irresponsible Press are at large in 
the world today. They have consistently mis­
quoted our statements and in fact done everythine* 
to embarrass the situation rather than help it.
If you can only do something to persuade the 
people at home that 50?^  of our problems now have 
been due (and will be in the future) to the 
world Press, you will have done a most important 
thing.
[ Papers of Major General. V.R.C.Penney, Letter from Lieutenant 
General Browning, 25 October 19U5* Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, University of London King's College],
22 Ibid. This may have been what R.Harris Smith was referring
to in his book, OSS, when he wrote that "the British had deliberately 
burned down great sections of the native quarter of Saigon."
He probably meant Cholon, since nothing comparable happened in 
Saigon. [University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p.31+6].
With that curious selectivity which permeated the writings on 
this area in the Sixties and early Seventies, Smith fails to 
mention the Viet Minh fire campaign of September (to increase 
its effectiveness they had carefully managed to remove Saigon*s 
fire trucks beforehand), and the fact that arson and incendiarism 
constituted a major part of their strategy. A great deal of South 
Vietnam*s produce —  warehouses, houses, rubber dumps, etc. —  
were daily put to the torch by the Viet Minh as a matter of policy.
23 Meanwhile, in London, a political report was received at
the Foreign Office on 26 October; it was the report sent earlier
by Dening to Mountbatten, in which Brain traced the recent history 
in the south. In the report, now about 1wo weeks old, Brain recapped 
the reason for-the 23 September coup, noting that pure hooligans 
and bandits had been flourishing "under the banner of the fight 
for independence." Wrote Brain:
Because these activities went on under the 
authority of the so-called VIET NAM government 
the latter could not be dealt with as an 
administration capable of maintaining order.
It was for this reason that Gen GRACEY arranged 
for the civil administration to be taken over 
by the French using rearmed French prisoners 
of war. This was done on 22 and 23 Sept in the 
form of a coup d*£tat.
It has not been possible to date to find any evidence that Brain 
or Dening ever disapproved of the coup, and Brain was even-handed 
in his report which stated that
the French administration was not a great 
deal better than that which it superceded 
for there began a repetition by way of 
reprisal against the Annamites of just those 
acts of which they had been accused, illegal 
arrests, beatings and unnecessary ill-treatment 
of prisoners, and an overbearing and insulting 
attitude to the Annamite population. This 
naturally confirmed up to the hilt the worst 
fears of the Annamites that they were back 
to the old days of violent suppression by the 
French and goes far to explain the wave of 
terrorism which then broke cut.
Brain again pinpointed a major cause of the problems in the south:
Before and after the French take-over an 
important and very dangerous factor in the 
situation was the hysterical attitude of 
the French population. The wildest rumours 
circulated - and were believed - that hordes 
of Annamites were gathering to attack the 
city, that hundreds of civilians were being
massacred - even that it was the Ghurkhas 
who had set fire to the market place. The 
excesses committed by the French were partly 
the outcome of this mixture of panic and the 
desire for revenge, and one of the things 
which has emerged very clearly is the necessity 
of removing the French civilians and prisoners 
of war as soon as possible, if normal life is 
to continue and French and Annamites are to 
live in harmony.
Brain*s scathing report went straight to the heart of the
matter:
All the French people I have met have assured 
me that the great majority of the Annamites 
want nothing more than to live in peace and 
carry on their work under French rule, and that 
the VIET. MINH are a set of pirates and bandits 
who owe their power purely to the fact that 
they were armed and backed by the Japanese.
I think that this is a dangerous belief. It 
is a comforting one and represents what they 
would like to believe. But they are shutting 
their eyes to the fact that Annamite independence 
movements have existed for some 80 years and 
have- broken out in violent forms more than 
once, only to be driven underground by the 
use of the harshest measures of suppression.
They are also ignoring the fact that many of 
the arms now being used against them and us are 
French arms seized by the Annamites themselves. 
There is not the slightest doubt that the Japanese 
backed the Annamites, but the flames were there 
before the fuel was added. The fact that 
resistance did not immediately collapse when the 
first heavy casualties began to be inflicted by 
our forces is alone sufficient proof of this.
The unamimous opinion we have been given in the 
past by the French that the Annamite movement 
was of little account and that 'deux coups de 
fusil* would see the end of resistance has proved 
so utterly wrong that it is difficult to place 
any reliance on the views of the French regarding 
the political importance of the demand for 
independence. They do not realise that in the 
eyes of the natives the French are no longer the 
superior beings that their domination and their 
foree of arms made them appear in the past. The 
Annamites have seen the French dictated to, 
humiliated, and finally disarmed and kicked out 
of authority by an Oriental race, and, perhaps 
equally important, they have tasted power and 
known for a short time the pride of being a 
de facto government.
Brain emphasized that the Viet Minh leaders he had met 
"were no mere puppets of the Japanese, hut educated and 
intelligent men with a strong determination to be free from, 
as they put it, the French yoke." He went on to say that he
Also gained the impression that they were not 
entirely in control of the forces which threatened 
us, and this impression was confirmed by a private 
interview which I had on October with Dr.
PHAM NGOC THACH, who is the member of the local 
administration responsible for foreign affairs 
and at the same time a representative of the 
central VIET-NAM government in Hanoi."
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28 Papers of Major General Harold Pyman, 29 October 191+5*
[Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, University of
London King's College],
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30 October 191+5.
30 Gracey Papers, "20th Indian Division's History", n.d,
31 GB, FRO, WO 172/7135, War Diary 100 Indian Infantry Brigade,
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32 The 1/1 GR War Diary for 30 and 31 October is as follows:
30 Oct. Three trenches were found dug along the
track leading through the village to the 
NORTH of the FRENCH BARRACKS. As the track 
is never used by traffic it is difficult to 
see why such energy was expended. (ANNAMITE 
tactics rarely descended to such depths but * 
they were to keep on doing pretty silly 
things and their continuous avoidance of all 
principles of war or even common sense made 
the work of the Battalion less uncomfortable.)
The ditches were filled in by the local 
inhabitants, CHINESE; their senility and 
feebleness had prevented them making any 
attempts to stop their road being spoiled.
In the afternoon the FRENCH I.AH0 Col. TURCK, 
attached to the Battalion in a capacity which 
no one was ever quite able to fathom, was 
fired on in the Market place and also had a 
grenade thrown at him while on some useless 
errand. The culprits were not found.
31 Oct. B and D Coys, Pioneer Platoon, Mortar Platoon
and Lj. Secs. MMGs (9 JAT) searched the area
bounded by 175767 - 1697^7 - 162714-7 - 
156771 - 169770, found grenades and spears 
in houses and captured seven ANNAMITES.
0200 hrs 7 0 - 8 0  patients plus seven 
ANNAMITE sisters disappeared (presumably 
of their own free will) from the hosptial 
in THUDAUMOT in pony carts. Japanese 
sentries were near: Col LE TURCK*S opinion 
that they had been forcibly abducted by 
the VIET NAM was obviously without 
rational foundation unless they were all ' 
deaf and dumb. The search for the elusive 
sisters started by Col Le TTJRCK was to 
last for days (they were finally found near 
BENCAT by the Japanese and packed off to 
SAIGON).
[GB, PRO, WO 172/7769].
GB, PRO, WO 172/7708, Twenty-Pifth Orders, 30 October U9U5>.
Ibid.. Twenty-fourth Orders, 29 October 19^ +5*
Gracey Papers, Letter from Mountbatten to Gracey, 31 October 19U5*
The leaflet in question is reproduced below [Gracey Papers]:
ANNAMITES ANNAMITES ANNMITES.
READ THIS READ THIS READ THIS.
You kow that your representatives are at present conferring 
with the representatives of the new Prance.
You know too that a truce has been ordered by the Commander 
of the Allied Forces,
This Cease Pire has been accepted by your representatives.
Do not be mislead by the extremist and irresponsible elements 
who are trying to continue this useless fight against the terrible 
might of tanks, aircraft, guns, ships, soldiers, sailors and airmen. 
After six years of War the United Nations of the World wish for 
peace. They have no sympathy for those who attempt to attain their 
ends at the expense of Bloodshed.
Return to your Peacetime duties.
Refrain from murdering, pillaging, thieving and other acts which 
are illegal.
The New =>nd Free France wishes to recogn-' se your pM.nt of view.
Do ynu want a life of destruction, of misery, off famine and 
unhappiness for yourselves and for your families? Do yon want to 
suffer the terrible destruction of modern arms against your houses 
and your villages?
Return to your Peacetime duties.
Let wisdom prevail. Stop this senseless bloodshed. Pay no heed 
to those fools who encourage you to continue this pointless fight.
Return to your Peacetime duties.
Let those who do not listen to this warning and wise advice 
be warned that they will certainly bring misery and misfortune 
to their families and their friends.
RETURN TO YOUR PEACETIME DUTIES.*
Gracey Papers, Letter from Gracey to Mountbatten, 9 November 19U5-
CHAPTER XIV
CONSOLIDATION
We used rocket launchers to blow the 
doors down, and before I could say 
*knife* the Gurkhas were across and 
in with the Kukris and butchered every­
one in it.
Lieutenant Colonel E. Gopsill, DSO,OBE,MC. 
3/1 Gurkha Rifles
Personal Interview 12 December 1977.
November saw Gracey*s forces fully committed to the immediate 
problem of pacifying the areas in which the Japanese were to be 
concentrated and disarmed. As the British achieved success in the 
battle against the Viet Minh, and as substantial French forces began 
to arrive in Indochina, the emphasis gradually shifted to the 
formidable task of preparing the Japanese Armed Forces for repatriation 
to Japan. The arrival of Mountbatten at the end of the month, when he 
formally received Terauchi*s personal surrender, signalled the fact 
that the major British objective had now become the concentration of 
the Japanese. However, several more weeks were to elapse before British 
(and Japanese) units ceased fighting.
Although the counter-insurgency role was new to Gracey*s troops, 
and although his individual battalions were greatly stretched in 
regard to the area for which they were responsible, the 20 Division 
units had notable success in the campaign against Viet Minh forces.
There were a number of reasons for this. First, and probably most 
important, the Division was well led —  there were competent commanders 
from Gracey down through brigade, battalion and company levels. BeloV 
that, the records of individual actions show that platoons and sections 
were also generally well led* The Division was also experienced in 
combat, having been committed to battle against the Japanese from the 
Imphal-Kohima days to the end of the war. The British were helped by 
the mutual antagonisms in the Viet Minh organization, and the Tonkinese 
troops who came south to stiffen the local Viet Minh cadres were, to 
an extent, themselves strangers.
It should also be mentioned that some of Gracey*s professional 
soldiers did have experience in the task of pacification by their 
service on the North West Frontier in India. Brigadier Rodham in 
particular (on whose markedly broad shoulders fell the responsibility 
for clearing the main concentration areas) was experienced in operations 
against some of His Majesty*s rebellious subjects, having earlier 
participated in the Mahsud campaign and operations in the North West 
Frontier in addition to the war in Burma.
There were a number of recognizable features in the general 
pacification strategy. Disarming and concentrating the Japanese was 
part of Gracey*s goal. By securing the important key area he hoped 
to encourage the local population to return to their customary pursuits 
and restore the normal tempo of life and commerce to Saigon and the 
surrounding countryside.
British strategy at this stage appears to have been conceived 
largely by Rodham, for it was his brigade which remained to clear 
the Viet Minh on the departure of 32 and 80 Brigade (which earlier 
had borne the brunt of the immediate street fighting in Saigon 
before Rodham's brigade arrived in Vietnam). By skilful employment 
of his limited resources, Rodham's tactics combined the use of 
mobile columns assigned to specific objectives, surprise sweeps, 
static posts and road-clearing operations which kept open his vital 
lines of communication and made his troops highly visible to the 
local population —  Rodham put a great deal of emphasis on his soldiers 
keeping a "high profile" in their areas of responsibility. British 
responsibilities were further defined by the creation of Inner and 
Outer Zones, of which more will be said.
As November opened, one of Rodham's special columns (Gateforce) was
/ /
proceeding down the Hiatt Thiet road to Gia Ray in its task of dispersing 
the Viet Minh main force and driving them further away from the key 
areas. Gia Ray* was found to be deserted, and the entire area of 
Gateforce*s operations was now believed to be cleared of Vi£t Minh 
main units —  these were now retreating east before the British/Japanese 
advance. Despite reports of large boulders being poised on overhanging 
cliffs, Gateforce returned uneventfully to base in Bien Hc}a a day later, 
leaving Sato Butai in Xuah L&c as a garrison to keep the Viet Minh 
as far from the key areas as possible.
The more routine, less spectacular and more frequent sweeps 
had varying success. Sometimes they were mounted in response to hard 
intelligence, but more often they were designed to keep the Viet Minh 
off balance, and occasionally the British were lucky and damaged the 
Viet Minh by catching high ranking members by surprise or by discovering 
arms caches. Although the emphasis was on the Gateforce operations 
in the east, Jarvis's 1st Gurkhas kept up the pressure in Thu D&u M&t 
when two companies searched houses from early morning until noon. As 
sometimes happened, this sweep bumped into a Viet Minh force. Earlier,
28 suspects had been detained and six houses were found to contain 
shotguns, rifles, grenades, javelins and ammunition. The six houses 
were destroyed, and during the operation the Vi&t Minh opened fire 
from the far bank of the river. Return rifle and machine gun fire 
from the Gurkhas failed to silence the snipers and artillery and
* Gateforce had surprised a Viet Minh demolition squad in the act
of blowing up a bridge near Gia Ray, with gelignite and fuzes in place.
mortar concentrations finally destroyed the houses sheltering the 
snipers, killing thirteen Yl&b Minh.
Perhaps encouraged by the success of Gateforce in smashing the 
strong Viet Minh concentration in the Xuan Loc area, Rodham, from
O f  ’
his Thu Dub headquarters, issued "100 Brigade Operation Instruction 
56'*. In the background information Rodham stated that 20 Division's 
influence was now being extended beyond the Saigon perimeter, and 32 
Brigade sweeps had been pushing up the Saigon River's west bank, 
encountering small armed bands and snipers en route. The evidence now 
showed that the Viet Minh had withdrawn to concentration areas around 
Ben Cat (northwest of Thu D^u Mot). Further evidence indicated that 
Viet Minh were moving down from Loc Ninh to Ben Cat. • There was a
A. f '
Japanese garrison of 300 artillerymen in Ben Cat. Rodham thought
Ar 1
that a British advance to Ben Cat would meet opposition and road 
blocks, but after a show of force during the "first brush this 
opposition will melt away and become confined to snipers and saboteurs. 
There are certainly a number of diehards in the area."
The order to form another special mobile column was addressed
to R.W.Clark, who was then a Major and second in command of 1/1 GR, and
a number of additional units were to come under his command at 1200
hours on 5 November. His force was to be known as "Clarkol",* and
his general tasks were as follows:
(a) To break up any ANNAMITE FORCE found in the BEN CAT 
area.
(b) To est[ablish] a firm base in BEN CAT area.
(c) To operate strong offensive patrols on general
axis rds radiating from BEN CAT.
(d) To kill or capture all armed ANNAMITES.
(e) To assist and give necessary protection to
SAIGON CONTROL COMMISSION FINANCIAL ADVISER 
in the inspection of JAPANESE Printing Press 
at LAIKHE 0700 [map coordinates] with a view 
to its removal, and in the collection of bank 
notes from the Press.
(f) To report by wireless the feasibility of removal
of the Printing Press to SAIGON. 1
* 1 sqn 16 Cav armored cars, less 1 troop
1 Coy 1/1 GR 
1 Sec 3" mortars, 1/1 GR 
1 Sec MMGs, 9 Jat 
Det 1+2 Ind Fd Amb 
Det U81 Ind Fd Coy 
Yamagichi Butai (1+00/500 troops).
Clark was further assigned specific tasks, such as which roads 
in particular to patrol, and all "Recces in force" were to be back 
in the firm base by 1530 hours each day. Rodham cautioned, "During 
whole op you must watch your L of C from THU DAU MOT to BEN CAT 
paying particular attention to br[idge]s." This was no doubt a 
result of Gateforce fs experience in being temporarily cut off from 
Trang Bom. Jarvis was ordered to "hold in readiness on wheels" a 
relief force consisting of a company of Gurkhas and a battery (less 
one section) of 23 Mountain Regiment.
An amendment was later issued to Clark's orders; the change had 
been necessary because "The operation of CLARKOL is now part of a 
bigger operation to encircle and destroy all [armed] ANNAMITES within 
the BENCAT area." On the night of 7/8 November Massu's French force 
was to advance to and occupy Tay Ninh, with French armor arriving on 
the 8th in order to establish a firm base there. On the following 
day French patrols were to move east from Tay Ninh in the hope of 
driving the ViSt Minh towards Ben Cat, while Japanese forces were to
" A. ^
move south from Loc Ninh and establish a block at Choh Thanh. In 
view of the enlarged plan the composition of Clarkol was now altered, 
with more firepower being added to it. One troop of British artillery 
from 111+ Regiment was to be brought into Thu d£u  Mot and attached to 
Clarkol, and the machine gun complement was increased from one section 
to one platoon of 9 Jat, The tasking remained unchanged.
Clarkol fs departure from Thu Dau Mot on 8 November coincided with 
the French drive east from Tiiy Ninh. Clark's force was to sweep the
A  1  ^ A  ^  ^
Ben Cat area in the north, and by 1015 he was established in Ben Cat; 
a smaller mobile column was detached from Clarkol and drove to Long 
Thanh, but met no opposition. The operation was described in part by 
a 1/1 Gurkha writer:
"Mob[ile] col[umn]s searched THU DAU MOT 
town and its environs thoroughly and then 
went further afield to visit the whole area.
There were frequent brushes with Vitamins 
and we suffered some casualties. The most 
notable effort was that of "Clark Col" which 
was commanded by Bobby Clark... This force 
combed the country 1+0 miles North of THU DAU 
MOT, visited BEN CAT, AP BUNG CAU, and 
CHAUK LOO and returned with 106 prisoners, 
having left the YAMAGISHI* BUTAI to garrison 
BEN CAT.
* The spelling of this name in various documents appears to be 
divided between Yamagichi and Yamagishi. "Yamagichi"is used 
throughout this text.
BUNG was [the] scene of several actions 
by the mobcol; in one of these the Pioneer 
pi comd. Jemadar Bakhatbahadur scored a 
most successful snap shot on the forehead 
of an Annamite sniper who was stalking 
Bn. Hq. from the rear. "2
Lieutenant Colonel Clark later wrote of the Clarkol operations:
"It was about this time that I was ordered 
out with Clarkforce to investigate the 
extent of Viet Minh activity towards 
the Cambodian border.•. My modus operandi 
was for the 1/1 GR Coy to ride on the armoured 
cars and, as soon as we hit trouble, to put 
in the Japs. This avoided casualties to our 
own men and, since the Japs supported the 
Viet Minh, the latter seldom continued the 
operation.
The first evening we arrived at a large 
village and billeted for the night. The 
village was completely deserted and all 
evening patrols reported 'No contact' for 
2 miles.
After a quiet night the usual dawn patrols 
went out and presented a very different 
picture on return.
Of the six roads radiating from the 
village all roads were blocked by felled 
rubber trees for a distance of miles 
except the one up which we had come and 
which we would have to use to return 
to Thu Dau Mot. No sight was to be seen 
of any Vietnamese.
There obviously must have been a large 
number of Viet Minh active during the 
night but, since no contact could be 
made and it would have taken a day to 
clear the road blocks there was little 
more we could do. After fairly wide 
patrolling without contact the force 
returned to Thu Dau Mot without achieving 
anything other than to show the Viet Minh 
strength.
I remain convinced that Takahashi's* Bn had 
throughout been giving active support to 
the Viet Minh but we couldn't prove any­
thing and all orders to him were carried 
out with scrupulous correctness. He even 
shot a senior NCO through the thigh with 
his pistol, in my presence, because I 
complained that some task had not been 
completed." 3
/'l A
Major Takahashi commanded the Japanese battalion in Thu Dau Mot.
Clark further commented on the initial French operations in
the 1/1 GR area —  a common description by British officers:
"The first French operational forces now 
began to arrive but we saw little of them 
as they only passed through our area to 
operate further North and towards the 
Cambodian border.
They really were a band of pretty unruly 
cut-throats and it was subsequently no 
surprise to me that they were not accepted 
in the country by the Vietnamese.
Their method of 'pacifying* a village, without 
any provocation or indication that the place 
■ might be hostile, was to drive through in 
American 3 ton trucks .300 machine-guns on the 
cab, all • guns firing on alternate sides of 
the street at first floor level *in case 
someone might be about to snipe at the 
column. * They seldom hit anyone but if that 
is the way friends arrive it is little 
wonder the Vietnamese threw them out." k
Despite British suspicions concerning Japanese-Viet Minh 
collusion, Yamagichi Butai clashed with Viet Minh troops in the 
Ben Cat area on the 9th, and suffered five wounded. On the following 
day Clarkol fought a six hour battle with Viet Minh units armed with 
rifles and light machine guns. Five Viet Minh were killed, six 
wounded and twenty captured. Two days later Clarkol split into two
a ( /
smaller columns; one swept northwest from Ben Cat, the second
reconnoitered the road east to beyond Thanh Tay. The two mobile
s J  /
columns returned to Ben Cat after a few hours, at which time Clarkol
returned to base at Thu Dau Mot. Several more aimed Viet Minh had
been captured, and Clark's troops just missed rescuing a number of
prisoners said to be held by the Viet Minh. A further report had led
them to a house where again they just missed their quarry, but this
time the number "52" was chalked on a wall, perhaps indicating the number
of prisoners held; notices were also found which cautioned the Viet
Minh against talking to the prisoners. Clarkol returned to Thu M u  Mob
A ' /
without Yamagichi Butai, which remained to garrison Ben Cat.
In Thu Dau Mot itself, suspicions of Japanese-Viet Minh collusion* 
were strengthened when Viet Minh arsonists walked past Japanese guarding 
1000 tons of rubber and set fire to the dump; incendiarism had become
* In a few days Brigadier Hirst was to ask the Japanese for an
explanation of incidents which had occurred between 25 September and 
7 October. During this time the Cholon post office and telephone 
and telegraph exchanges were destroyed while guarded by Japanese 
troops.
part of Viet Minh strategy and Gracey*s troops were hard pressed
to cope with fires throughout the key areas* Another instance of
questionable Japanese sincerity occurred in Thu -Sue, not far from
Rodham*s own headquarters, when a Japanese captain and twenty men
were detailed to arrest the secretary of the local Vievt Minh
organization. The raid was in response to Japanese information, and
in a somewhat suspicious report the captain stated that "they
succeeded in seizing his [the Viet Minh*s Secretaxy*s] wife and
servants, but saw the Secretary himself —  escaping across the field
£
at the back of the house*" It appeared that over a dozen Japanese 
soldiers were unable to run down (or wound) a single Vietnamese of 
questionable athletic ability.
Three days prior to Major Clark*s reconnaissance in force, Rodham 
had sent a smaller mobile group into Lai Thieu. This column was 
named Sawcol, after Major Sawhny of 16 Cavalry. Sawcol departed
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Thu -Rue with the objective of showing the flag in what were reported
to be strong Vievt Minh concentration areas in and around Lai Thieu.
Sawcol was composed of a 16 Cavalry squadron less one troop, one
company of 1+/10 Gurkha infantry and one artillery section from the
mountain battery detachment.
The column departed at 0800 and went straight to the Bata Shoe
factory to check reported damage there. The factory was found to be
deserted, but had been making boots for the Vi&t Minh. A local rubber
dump was also deserted, and the Japanese (who were supposed to be
guarding key areas of the town) were conspicuous by their absence.
The local Japanese commander. Colonel Hamagachi, was summoned
by Sawhny and told that he [Hamagachi] was personally responsible for
the area and no further Viet Minh activities (including the erection
of road blocks) were to be permitted. The 16 Cavalry report stated:
"The present negative attitude by the Japanese 
Commander would NOT be tolerated, and that a 
far greater activity on the part of Jap troops
to suppress Viet Minh activities would be
expected of him. This shook Col. Hamagachi' 
and had a very salutary effect on him." 6
The shoe factory had been "thoroughly looted" by the Viet Minh,
but a French boy (one of Sawcol*s objectives) was located and the
? !
column returned to their Thu Luc base on the following afternoon.
But while these specially designed and tasked mobile columns 
were relatively successful in achieving their limited objectives, in 
terms of men and material they were expensive to mount, for the
remaining British troops could do little more than conduct minimal
sweeping operations and respond to emergencies. As a result, for a
A
few days at a time the Viet Minh were able to take advantage of the 
lessening of British pressure. These were the times when incendiarism 
and road and bridge sabotage increased, and 16 Cavalry reports 
described armored car crossings of numerous rickety bridges with "a 
certain amount of anxiety and amusement" —  supporting structures had 
usually been removed or other damage done to the bridges.
Rodham *s third battalion also conducted limited armed reconnaissance 
as 11+/13 FFR plus 16 Cavalry armored cars and Jat machine guns swept the 
road and river from Bien Hoa to Binh Long and Ben Cat, where Viet Minh 
concentrations were reported.
But although the emphasis was on military operations against
/L
the Viet Minh, the first modest step towards disarming the Japanese 
was taken on 2 November, when the first of the many localised surrender 
ceremonies took place. On this occasion the Saigon-Cholon Kempei Tei 
section handed over their sidearms and swords, saluted the Union Jack 
and were interned. All the Japanese consular officials were now in 
"honourable confinement", including the group flown in from Phnom Penh 
on the same day.
Following the Saigon Kempei Tei surrender General Numata, in a 
paper titled "Reorganisation of Japanese Forces in FIC", was ordered 
to provide an Army Headquarters in Saigon which would command all 
Japanese Army and Air Force units in South Indochina. The Army 
commander was to be Lieutenant General Nishioyada, as Field Marshal 
Terauchi, declining steadily, now spent a great deal of time convalescing 
at Cap St. Jacques. The Japanese 2nd Division, on being replaced in 
Saigon by the 5th Air Division, was to be relieved of all wider 
commitments and move to Lai Thi6u to come under Brigadier Rodham to 
use as he deemed necessary. The Japanese Army Headquarters, Saigon, 
was to assume control of Japanese forces in South Indochina upon the 
departure to Singapore of Field Marshal Terauchi and Headquarters 
Japanese Southern Army.
At the daily staff meeting the Japanese were now informed that 
they could reduce the size of their operational forces under Brigadier 
Taunton of 80 Brigade. At the moment, 2000 troops from the Japanese 
2nd Division were operating under Taunton; these were to be reduced 
to 1000 men, to be organized as follows: 600 for guard duties, 200 
for fighting reserve and 200 for administrative duties. The 1000
Japanese now released were to prepare to move "in due course" to the 
Japanese concentration area between Bi&i Hoa and Thu M u  Mot. As 
units of the 2nd Division were released they would, in principle, be 
replaced by units of the 5th Air Division* who would eventually take 
over all the static guard posts in the. Saigon-Cholon area. Second 
Division troops near the Cambodian border had still not received 
"clear orders regarding offensive action to be taken against all 
armed Annamites," and the Japanese were ordered to rectify this 
situation immediately. Hirst also drew attention to the fact that 
the Japanese in outlying areas appeared to be selling arms and 
ammunition to the Viet Minh, and Major Takahashi in Thu Dau Mot had 
announced that there were over 3500 Japanese troops in the Thu Dau Mot 
area who did not fall under his control; these included naval troops, 
hosptial corpsmen, weather forecasters, marine troops and so forth.
On the following day, 100 Brigade "Jap Surrender Instr No.1"
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was issued to provide guidance on forthcoming Japanese surrenders.
Under "Phases of Ops Leading up to Disarmament", Bodham wrote that
"Broadly speaking our operations are divided
into three phases:
PHASE I (a) Thorough combing out of area for 
elimination of hostiles and 
collection of rebels arms.
(b) The recce and marking down of all 
JAP arms, arm, explosive and store 
dumps preparatory to their evacuation 
to SAIGON or destruction.
(c) The clearance of roadblocks so that 
these dumps can be collected by M.T.
PHASE II The collection or destruction of all
JAP arms, amn, explosive and store dump.
PHASE III The disarmament of the JAPS."
However, Rodham recognized that "We have not yet completed PHASE I 
and this may yet take us a considerable time. Owing to extreme shortage 
of tpt the Div. Comd [Gracey] wishes us to start on PHASE II in respect 
of dumps near firm bases." Ordnance collected from the Japanese was 
to be backloaded on empty ration transports. Rodham saw no point in 
backloading ammunition and grenades and asked permission to throw 
the former into the nearest river and blow up the latter. These 
instructions, however, referred to arms in dumps, as the Japanese were 
not to be disarmed at present. As for the Japanese themselves, the 
decision had now been made that
* from Cambodia.
On disarmament of the Japanese, surrendered 
personnel as opposed to War Criminals and FW 
will he divided into two categories:
Category 'A' Those individuals and units
which have scrupulously carried 
out orders and co-operated 
properly since BRITISH troops 
came here.
Category fB* The rest —  non co-operators, 
the half-hearted indisciplined 
units, officers who have not 
carried out their orders to the 
best of their ability or have 
been half-hearted in carrying them 
out.
Category "B" individuals were to be returned last to Japan, and 
in the meanwhile given "all the menial and disagreeable jobs." This 
information, however, would not be passed to the Japanese until they 
were disarmed.
At this time Gracey was surprised by news of the unexpected 
appearance in Cholon of two Chinese officers from the 60th Division 
[which was in the area just north of the sixteenth parallel]. They 
had motored down and spent the night of the l+th in a Cholon hotel and 
sought an interview with Gracey on the following day. They carried a 
letter dated 25 October from the "Commanding Force of the 60th Army, 
Hue". Colonel Sy Wang, Major K.H. Hwan and a sergeant were sent to 
Saigon to get food for the Chinese Army and certain necessities for 
the Chinese cooperative store for officers and men. The letter was 
signed by Major General P.M. Wan, Chief of the 60th Army. Gracey 
pointed out to the Chinese that negotiations between Mountbatten and 
Chiang Kai-Shek (concerning the exchange of missions in Indochina) 
were reaching an advanced stage, and that the local British commander's 
task concerned the Japanese rather than civil commitments and supply.
He then sent them to D'Argenlieu with their request.*
Gracey did not need any problems with the Chinese in the north, 
as he was coping with problems caused by the Chinese in Cholon. Gracey 
had been forced to turn his attention to the propaganda war being waged 
against him,** time he could ill afford to lose as he was occupied 
with a number of other more pressing problems from the pacification 
operations to disarming the Japanese. In a telegram to the Department
A
* In Bien Hoa, the French reported seeing two Chinese colonels and a 
Chinese staff officer in the market.
** Which continues in some of the current histories on this period.
of Public Relations in India he focused on the "sudden wholesale 
allegations* by [an] element of [the] Chinese Community and Chinese 
Press in [the] Cholon district of Saigon against [the! conduct and 
discipline of British Indian troops recently used as an excuse to
g
strike, and non cooperation movement by Chinese." In Gracey1s view 
there was little doubt that the real cause was to be found in the 
fact that many of the Chinese leaders, who formerly had collaborated 
with the Japanese, were now working with the Vi&t Minh to hinder the
Allies. In fact, the President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce
had been arrested, and in his pocket was a letter of agreement of 
cooperation with the Viet Minh. Wrote Gracey, "His arrest and reason 
for it has had [a] salutory effect amongst those Chinese elements 
terrorising their qompatriots to acts against us." Virtually none of 
the "wholesale charges" stood up to investigation by a British/Chinese 
Bureau set up after a meeting between Chinese leaders and Gracey.
They did agree on such matters as curfews, methods of searches, and 
so on, and mutual cooperation increased.
As it happened, investigations did substantiate some of the
Chinese charges, but these acts had been committed not by Gracey's
troops but by Pondicherry Indians sponsored by French police. The 
Chinese were also pressing Gracey to lift his ban on British/Indian 
troops, dallying in Cholon —  they wanted the business back.
There was another potential problem which worried Gracey, and 
that was the possibility that Lecler.c would gain control of British 
forces. With talk of his division leaving Vietnam, Gracey wrote to 
General Slim, ALFSEA Commander. Gracey commented that the Commander 
in Chief had no doubt seen the recent critical .letter from the Supreme
Allied Commander to Gracey, a copy of which he attached to this letter,
and wrote:
2. I do hope that when the command of French 
forces passes to LECLERC I shall not be placed 
under his command for any purpose,-even within 
the limitations imposed on my activities by 
H.M.G. I get on extremely well with LECLERC.
but if I am put under his command at any time,
it will be more difficult than it is now to
resist his more extravagant demands, especially
as regards transport.
3. It is most necessary that I should continue 
to run the whole Japanese side of things as 
long as we are here. The Japanese will take 
anything from us, but will do nothing for the
* Of looting by Gurkhas [ all Indian troops were called Gurkhas].
French. However, we shall very shortly 
be able to disarm most of the Japanese, and 
I hope that LECLERC's operations, which his 
troops have carried out with great skill and 
speed (and with much unnecessary brutality) 
will soon allow us to concentrate all except 
the more northerly Japanese detachments,
k. The French troops are leaving a pretty 
good trail of destruction behind them, which 
will result in such resentment that it will 
become progressively more difficult for 
them to implement their new policy, and, I 
am convinced, will result in guerilla warfare, 
increased sabotage and arson as soon as we 
leave the country.
3. LECLERC may even find he wants to rearm 
some of the Japanese again —  and if this is 
necessary, the result, in my opinion, will be 
that such Japs will desert in large numbers 
with their arms.
6. LECLERC is bound to ask before he leaves 
to be presented with every and any form of 
equipment that 20 Div can spare. This request 
may well embrace weapons of all kinds, clothing, 
equipment, bridging and technical equipment, 
such as directors etc., precision instruments, 
canteen stores if available etc. etc. I should 
be grateful for an early rating on my policy 
in this matter.
Gracey added a P.S.:
TAILPIECE. Ref. para 3 above. The following 
has just been submitted by the Japanese: Quote 
We respectfully submit a request that all orders 
to our forces should be passed by a British and 
not a French Officer, as we find it increasingly 
difficult to carry out the orders resulting 
from their schemeless plans. Unquote: The last
is, alas, so true about the implementation of 
their plans. 9
While Gracey was exercised with the task of speeding up the 
concentration of the Japanese, and the likelihood that problems with 
the French would grow in relation to the size of their, forces, the 
major activity during this period was the continuing difficult, grindin 
pursuit of the Viet Minh, both in the urban centers and in the country­
side. Conditions were not yet to the point where the Japanese could 
be completely disarmed and concentrated.
In Saigon and Cholon, 1/19 Hybad, now renamed the 1st Kumaon 
(Russell's) Regiment, carried out a series of raids on suspected Viet 
Minh houses, and four suspects were handed over to the Surete. Two
women were arrested distributing Viet Minh propaganda to Indian 
troops, and in the Cholon bazaar a grenade killed a 9/12 FFR soldier 
and wounded another.
In 32 Brigade's Sector, b/2 GR searched a hospital and school in 
GcS Vap and were sniped by Viet Minh who escaped into heavy brush behind- 
the shops. The school was empty, but a large number of Vietnamese 
men and women wearing red cross armbands were in the hospital. Forty- 
one men were arrested, and an informer later stated that these men were 
responsible for much of the sniping in Go Vap. On the 3rd a great deal 
of firing was heard in k/2 GR’s area, believed to be Viet Minh reprisals 
on Chinese informers involved in the previous day's operations. The 
b/2 Gurkhas further validated Rodham's emphasis on protecting his lines 
of communication, at times to the exclusion of other necessary military 
operations, when they reported that a ration truck had been fired on by
Viet Minh who lay in ambush on both sides of the road about two miles
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north northeast of T$n Sdn Nhut. The Viet Minh had a light machine gun 
and threw seven or eight grenades, but caused no casualties. The 
Gurkhas immediately replied with 2 inch mortars and charged the ambushers 
who fled, leaving two dead while carrying away one wounded man. At' 
the same time a sniper fired four shots at a sentry at battalion head­
quarters, but. missed each time.
With garrisons positioned in outlying districts, the security 
of vehicle convoys now became a matter of urgency. Likely ambush sites 
(and there was no shortage of these) were reconnoitered and the under­
growth was cut back as far as possible from the roads. As Lieutenant 
Colonel Clark, 1/1 GR, wrote:
"The Viet Minh also took to harassing the
twice weekly ration convoy from Bien Hoa
despite the armoured car escort and Jap 
guards at VPs and so the Japs were ordered 
to clear the jungle for 50 yards either side 
of the whole route. This they did, without 
batting an eyelid, within 3 days! I later had 
to order them to clear a further 50 yards as 
the Viet Minh took to catapulting grenades 
at the convoy by springing bamboo 'ballistas1 • 
and the Japs did complain at this order 
saying that we had already removed all their 
tools.
My only reaction was to ask my Adjutant, Capt 
Bob McMaster, how many officers swords were 
in the surrendered weapons dump, intending to 
smash off the tip and reissue them as machetes.
The Japanese reaction was immediate and before 
McMaster could answer the interpreter agreed 
that they would do the job. They did so 
within a week.
As far as I can remember this was about 
the only protest the Japs ever made about 
orders given to them at our daily conference 
as, because of the small British presence, 
they were left pretty much to themselves...
Most of the Japanese force consisted of Navy 
personnel and they were fully employed on 
digging out aerial bombs from underground 
tunnels, most of which had collapsed." 10
In early November, during the Diwali Hindu festival, grenades 
were again thrown at a 3/12 FFR truck in the Cholon bazaar, wounding 
three soldiers, but "at least" ten ViSt Minh were believed killed by 
return grenade and Sten gun fire. Three more Sikhs were wounded while 
buying chickens from a village, and mortar fire was put down on the 
village. The 9/l2th War Diary states that there was now not a day 
passing without grenades, sniper fire or both being inflicted on the 
9/l2th in their Cholon area. The same held true for all battalions, 
and the casualty figures crept up correspondingly.
The "20th Division's History" continued:
"The position in SAIG0N/CH0L0N had by 
this time been stabilized and 80 Bde, 
with the assistance of Field Security 
and French Surete personnel were engaged 
in sweeping the built up areas and carrying 
out security checks on large sections of 
the population.
This was especially necessary in the 
CHOLON area which is densely populated and 
where VIET MINH incendiarists, grenade 
throwers and snipers were able to mingle 
with the native population. Our troops 
continued to suffer casualties in this area 
from grenades and sniping attacks...
The main feature of the first fortnight 
of November was a wave of grenade throwing 
incidents in the CHOION area. At this time 
the whole of 80 Bde (less the 3/1 GR on 
KANH £sic"3 HOI island) and 9/12 FFR were 
disposed in the CHOLON area.
In addition, there was a proportion of 
Div troops, including ISHE workshops and 
100 and 102 Div Tpt Companies. Like most 
EASTERN cities CHOLON consisted of numerous 
bye-ways and side alleys which afforded 
easy getaways for grenade throwers. Our 
casualties would have been heavier had it 
not been for the unreliability of the home 
made grenade." 11
Unfortunately, a more reliable grenade was thrown at a 1st 
Kumaon truck near a canal bridge in Cholon, killing a VCO and wounding 
four others who were returning from battalion headquarters. The area 
was cordoned off and-136 Vietnamese were held for questioning. In the 
north, a Japanese soldier was wounded when the Viet Minh attacked a 
Japanese post southeast of Thu Dau Mot.
Rodham now directed that a network of dozens of check posts be
established throughout 100 Brigade's area. The sentries at these
posts were to search all vehicles (other than British or Japanese) for
arms. The searching was to be done "politely and cheerfully and people
12
themselves will NOT be searched."
In Thu Dau Mot, the Japanese retaliated against the recent Viet 
Minh attack on their post by sweeping Thu Dau Mot, bringing in a total 
of 61 suspects. On the 6th they turned their attention to Bien Hoa, 
which they swept completely, but the town was apparently clear and a 
Chinese liaison officer reported that the community felt "comparatively 
safe from VIETMINH." On the previous day the Japanese, now more 
aggressive, had reported finding what appeared to them to be a Viet 
Minh military academy, and some of the suspects brought in were 
believed to be former students of the academy.
Three more Viet Minh were killed in 32 Brigade's area as a 
Japanese patrol linked up with b/2 GR, and 3/8 GR reported that an
1unserviceable Japanese aircraft had been set on fire at Tan Son Nhu*t, 
after which 32 Brigade asked the RAF. to institute "some indentification 
system" for the "large number of Annamite coolies" employed by them. 
The Japanese near the airfield arrested eight more suspects, one of 
whom was carrying 150 rounds of ammunition. The Gurkhas burned down 
two houses a mile north of Go Vap, and ammunition was heard to explode 
in the flames. In late afternoon the b/2 Gurkhas fired mortars into 
a suspected Viet Minh concentration area just north of Go Vap, and a 
Chinese informant reported that seventeen Viet Minh had been killed, 
and tw.enty-two wounded, by the mortar fire.
When Jean Cedile visited Rodham's 100 Brigade area, he was 
fortunate enough to escape a grenade thrown at him while en route to 
Thu Dau MSt. The "20th Division's History" noted the increased activity 
during early November:
"The situation in the SAIGON/CHOLON area had 
remained comparatively quiet during the last 
few days of October, but fighting flared up 
in CHOLON on the night of 31 October/1 November 
with an unsuccessful attack on one of our 
picquets on a bridge.
In the GIA DINH area on the night of 2/3 
November a strong attack was made on one 
of our posts. During this attack the 
VIET MINH again used tear gas bombs without 
success.
On the afternoon of 3 November a company 
of the k/17 DOGRA became heavily engaged 
with a large body of VIET MINH in a built 
up area NORTH of CHOLON. The defences 
here included well constructed bunker 
positions. The company was forced to 
remain out overnight and during the night 
jitter parties were active in the familiar 
Jap fashion.
The following morning the company was 
joined by 16 Cavalry armoured cars and 
another company of the V l 7th, and between 
them they accomplished the task of clearing 
the area." 13
Soon after Cedile's escape near Thu Dau Mot, the hapless 
French Lieutenant Colonel Turck had another grenade thrown at him in 
the town, but the 1st Gurkhas caught two of the attackers while the 
Japanese ran down another. In b/2 GR's area, a Gurkha company was
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fired on while conducting a sweep towards Bin Cat, just east of Gb Vap.
The Gurkhas counterattacked ferociously and killed twenty-two Viet Minh;
eight boats were also sunk trying to escape across the river and some
1^
arms and documents were seized in the village. A further 179 men and 
78 women were arrested as suspects and most of the village was burnt 
down. The Gurkhas did not incur any casualties, and it was being 
driven home with a vengeance that war, especially a guerilla war, was 
no game.
Rodham now issued "100 Ind Inf Bde Op Instr No. 58”1 which began 
by saying, "This Bde's area of responsibility has been extended." He 
reiterated his main tasks of establishing "complete law and order", 
clearing lines of communication and ridding the area of hostile elements 
so that the Japanese could be disarmed and their arms dumps emptied.
An additional area had now been allotted to 100 Brigade; this new 
area stretched all the way east to Xuan Loc, south to .the east bank
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of the river through Saigon, and northwest to Ben Cat* (north of 
Thu Dau Mot) and Tan Uy§n. The original Bien Hoa - Thu Dub - Thu Dau Mot 
area now became known as the "Inner Zone", and the further areas as 
the "Outer Zone." From now on all Japanese troops were to come under
y f
* There are two places named Ben Cat, one, a larger town north of Thu 
Dau Mot, the other a village near Go V^p.
the local Japanese Sub-Area Commander* 'Thus all Japanese troops
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in the Bien Hoa Outer Zone, regardless of unit affiliation, were 
to come under Colonel Miyake, while all British troops in the Bi&i 
Hoa Inner Zone were to be placed under Lieutenant Colonel Pickard,
1U/13 PPK Commander (who would also exercise overall command of Japanese 
troops in his Sub-Area through Colonel Miyake). Similarly, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jarvis in Thu D£u Mot would control Japanese troops in the
Inner and Outer Zones through Major Takahashi, and Major Mullaly of
0 /
U/10 GR would work through Colonel Sakai in Thu Bute. The necessary 
orders had already been issued by General Manaki.
The Japanese were generally responsible for security in the 
Outer Zone, as British troops were restricted to operations in the 
Inner Zone unless used for specific tasks (such as the Gateforce and 
Clarkol operations). But even the Japanese were not present in 
sufficient strength to guard all vital points in the Outer Zone, and 
20 Division Headquarters was asked for a list of the more important 
VPs, with emphasis placed on the Bien Hoa - Xuah Loc and Thu Dau Mot - 
Ben Cat roads.
Rodham thought that the Japanese could be used for the following
tasks:
(i) Eliminating small bands of rebels for which a 
combined force is NOT necessary.
(ii) Arresting any rebel leaders or armed ANNAMITES 
they can trace in their area.
(iii) Searching for arms in any village reported 
to contain VIET MINH Agents or rebels.
(iv) Furnishing Sub Area Comds with all information 
they can get hold of regarding rebel or VIET 
MINH activities in or near their areas.
(v) Give warning of the approach or infiltration 
of any rebels or VIET MINH agents towards the 
INNER ZONE. 15
For the present, Japanese naval units would not come under the 
Japanese Army, but the naval area commander, Captain Kakita, would 
move his headquarters to Thu Bute, to be near Rodham's 100 Brigade 
Headquarters. Kakita was to appoint local naval commanders to work 
for Jarvis and Pickard in Thu Dau Mot and Bi&n Hoa.
British troops increased the pressure on the Viet Minh during 
these first few days of November, and Brigadier Woodford, of 32 Brigade, 
now executed plans for a massive sweep in his sector, plans which 
involved all of his battalions. This was a big operation which
concentrated on about a square mile area bordered by the road running 
northwest from the golf course, west of Go Vap and northeast of Tan 
Sdn Nhiit. Two companies of 2/8 Punjab were detailed to search the 
area while k/2 GR and 3/8 GR blocked all exits from the area. All males 
between 18 and ^0 were detained, so that 2000 men were held for 
questioning by the Surete; another 120 were arrested by Gurkhas at 
the exit blocks.
One result of this intensive sweep by 32 Brigade was that their
area became quieter than it had been for weeks. However, women were
X Jdaily smuggling grenades hidden in loaves of rice bread to Go Vap, and 
"some buildings in Go Vap which have been burned down have had arms 
and ammunition so securely buried under the earthern floors that
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ANNAMITES have later returned and retrieved these arms from the ruins." 
Allied Intelligence officers were scoring some notable successes,
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an example of which was the arrest of Phan Phifob Tan, alias Sau, on the
night of 7/8 November by a 1^/13 FFR search party. Tan was reputed to be
the local Viet Minh Commissar of Police and a "known VIET MINH Chief."
Arrested with Tan in the Bien Hoa area were a Viet Minh agent and a
Frenchwoman thought to have been kidnapped; it was later discovered
that she was with the men voluntarily. The Japanese also brought in
two Viet Minh officials.
In Cholon, a suspicious priest reported an "alarming increase" in
new graves in a cemetery, and 80 Brigade units investigated the possibility
that arms and ammunition were being hidden in the graveyard.*
In Saigon, the Control Commission issued a summary of operations
for inclusion in SACSEA Report No.^f. In it Gracey reported that the
arrival of more French troops** had facilitated his task of expanding
the perimeter to Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa, and certain areas were now
being taken over by the French. Large concentrations of Viet Minh
troops were reported outside the occupied area and operations were
planned to "break up these concentrations and drive the remnants away
from the concentration area...*** Many smaller operations involving
close cooperation beti^ een British and Japanese forces have also been
17carried out with great success."
* Significant quantities of arms were indeed recovered from graves 
throughout the area.
** 1800 French troops had arrived during the preceding two days.
*** With mobile columns such as Gateforce, Sawcol and Clarkol.
The report continued;
"Experience has shown, however, that any 
important operation to be carried out by 
the Japanese should be under the direct 
command of a British Officer. The British 
Officer is then in a position to see that 
the operation is carried out quickly and 
efficiently - the Japanese usually being 
only too anxious to demonstrate their 
soldierly qualities in the presence of 
British troops. If left to themselves, 
however, the Japanese do not always 
conduct their operations with the degrees 
of thoroughness and despatch required."
French forces had now extended southwards into the Mekong delta,
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occupying Mytho, C&ntho\ Go Cong, Vinh Long, and other towns. They 
felt well enough established to assume complete control and the Japanese 
forces were being withdrawn accordingly. However, it was still necessary 
to attach a British liaison officer to ensure Franco-Japanese cooperation.
Gracey now had a fairly firm plan for the proposed drawdown of 
Japanese forces and their subsequent concentration. He was hoping that 
by 20 November the Japanese, "less a certain number employed in 
operational roles and the staffs and guards of some Japanese Stores 
and Depots", should have moved to their concentration areas*
Gracey had heard news of the proposed departure of his division
from Indochina*, and he forwarded to Leclerc a summary of the
instructions received from ALFSEA concerning the withdrawal of 20 
20
Division. Gracey asked Leclerc for an estimate as to when the French 
would be prepared to accept responsibility for the Japanese forces, and 
hoped that the majority of the Japanese in the concentration areas 
could be disarmed by late November. Gracey also advised Leclerc that 
it was unlikely that any Jeeps or wireless equipment could be given 
to the French, and some of the 3 ton and 30 cwt vehicles would have 
to be taken by 20 Division.
In Leclerc's reply to Gracey's letter of the 9th, he acknowledged 
the conference he had had with Gracey earlier in the day.** Leclerc
* Ever the solid commander, Gracey telegraphed Major General Pyman,
ALFSEA Chief of Staff, requesting all available information "including 
type of terrain, climate, etc., in areas to be occupied later by 
20 Div so that I can start organizing suitable Brigade Gps. Matter 
also affects order of priority of location of French tps in relief 
of mine in Saigon-Cholon." ^Gracey to Pyman, 7 November 19^3J •
** 12 November 19^5-
agreed that "It is of the greatest interest in view of the return 
to law and order that the Japanese should be embarked as a matter of
first priority as was promised by SACSEA telegram ^52 of 17 Aug.
21addressed SOAP.11 Leclerc further stated that in his view it was 
"indispensable” that after their disarmament the Japanese should be 
transferred from their present concentration area in 100 Brigade*s 
territory to some place where it would be "much more difficult to 
remain in contact with the civil population and desert, e.g., BARIA 
CAP ST JACQUES."
Leclerc wrote that he accepted the fact that the British were
responsible for disarming the Japanese. "We have always respected this
principle as even during the operations it is a British L.O.* who 
eventually transmits orders to the Japanese." For Leclerc and Massu, 
the sting from this procedure was difficult to conceal. Leclerc 
confirmed that it would not be possible for him to take over the task 
of disarming the Japanese until the 9th DIC and Corps support troops 
arrived, and until his over transportation situation improved.
Gracey agreed in part with Leclerc*s arguments, but disagreed
on the requirement for the corps troops to be in place before 20 Division
could depart; at the present shipping rate this could severely delay 
the departure of 20 Division. Although Leclerc wanted the British to 
disarm the Japanese garrisons in south Annam, Nha Trctng, -Dalat, Phan 
Rang and Phan Thiet, Gracey thought that the French could do this by 
January as the total Japanese strength in those garrisons was only 3500. 
Gracey did recommend that the vehicle and troop ships arrive together, 
as the "Time gap between the arrival of personnel and vehicle ships 
is most paralysing, to the speed of French operations." He also 
recommended that the repatriation of the Japanese begin immediately.
Back in London, Brigadier Calthorpe, War Office, asked Sterndale- 
Bennett if there were "any political considerations which might delay
the withdrawal of our forces from Indo-China.once the 9th Colonial
. . 22 Division has arrived." Wrote Calthorpe:
"You will appreciate that any additional 
commitments in the Far Fast will have a 
direct bearing on the plans we are making 
for the reinforcement of our forces in 
Netherlands East Indies and the extension 
of S.E.A.C.’s control in those areas which 
he has still to re-occupy."
* Liaison Officer.
This was a powerful argument against keeping Graceys forces 
any longer than absolutely necessary in Vietnam (if indeed any 
arguments were needed at all), and as there appeared to be no political 
objections, the original plan [_of removing 20 Division when the 9th 
DIC arrived]] was broadly adhered to.
In Kandy, a first draft of the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) Paper
215 was published on the 9th; it was titled "Turnover of Command in 
23FIC and NEE". The SEAC JPS laid down four conditions under which 
British forces could be withdrawn. First, Japanese troops must be 
disarmed and isolated from any possible Viet Minh contact, and French 
troops must be in sufficient strength to insure the isolation of the 
Japanese and the containment of the Vi£t Minh. Second, a civil 
administration should have been reestablished. Third, the French and 
Chinese in the north should be negotiating, and, finally, Terauchi's 
headquarters must have been moved to Malaya.
The JPS also stated that "in no circumstances should British Forces 
be placed under French command or operational control in INDO-CHINA." 
British forces remaining in Indochina after the resumption of French 
control should come directly under ALFSEA. As with bringing the 20th 
Division to Vietnam in the first place, there still existed a shortage 
of shipping. The shipping bringing the 9th DIC to Saigon could not 
be used to take the British out since it was committed to other tasks, 
and shipping to carry out Gracey1s brigades would not be available 
until December and January.
The Planning Staff concluded that their four conditions would be 
met by early January 19^ 6, so that the British troops could commence 
their withdrawal by mid-December. This proved to be an accurate 
assessment, but although the JPS thought that "We should, therefore, 
be clear of INDO-CHINA by mid-January, 19^ +6.", two battalions stayed 
on for a couple of extra months. In order to get the 9th DIC operational 
as soon as possible it was recommended that all of 20 Division's vehicles 
be turned over to the French,
The French were gradually becoming more prominent’ in south 
Indochina, and on the 10th Woodford and the newly arrived French 
commander in Gia Dinh held a conference in which they agreed on the 
relief of certain 9/1^ Punjab posts in Gia -Binh. At noon Woodford 
received a message from Division Headquarters, officially informing 
him that he and his brigade would be going to British Borneo in mid- 
December. Even as he was digesting this information the k/2 Gurkhas 
caught seventeen Viet Minh in the act of digging up containers of oil
which, according to an informer, was to be used to burn down the 
Catholic Church in Go V&p. Woodford's next visitor was General Valluy, 
Commander of 9 DIC, who wanted to see for himself the trouble spot 
in which his units were to operate. On the night before Valluy's 
visit to 32 Brigade's area the Viet Minh had succeeded in penetrating 
the Tan Sdn Nhu!t defenses and destroyed *tQO drums of fuel.
An Anglo-French parade was held on Armistice Day, and was reviewed 
by D'Argenlieu, Gracey, Leclerc and other local dignitaries. The route 
of march was, as usual, past the Cathedral, under which stood the 
reviewing officers, and down Rue Catinat (Tif-Do). After the parade 
Gracey presented decorations to men of the 1/19 Hybads for their valor 
during the Burma campaigns, most being honoured for actions during the 
battle of Myitson or in the desperate Japanese escape attempts across 
the Pegu Yomas.* After the presentations Gracey spoke to the troops 
(mainly Jats, Kumaonis and Ahirs) in Urdu, praising their performance 
in Burma. He said that he was glad to decorate them himself, and 
"He expressed his regret that instead of earning their well deserved 
rewards they were still engaged in a certain amount of fighting, in 
order to enable the city to function normally."
Despite the significance of Armistice Day there was no lessening 
of the level of military activity in the key areas. The h/2 Gurkhas, 
for example, fought with twelve Viet Minh who ran from a house and 
.fired on the Gurkhas during a sweep about three miles southwest of 
Lai Thieu. The Gurkhas killed two before entering the house and 
arresting ten suspects inside. In a unique incident the Viet Minh 
attacked a hospital in Cholon but were driven off by local Chinese, 
including the "inmates", who killed two of the attackers.
The Lai Thi&u area was becoming a trouble spot, for on the
following day an armored car column was ambushed on the southern edge
of Lai Thiesu. However, gunfire from the cars blasted the attackers
from their positions. This column had now been ambushed three times
? *during the fairly short convoy run to Thu Bufc, but for the price of 
a single 16 Cavalry trooper wounded in the thigh, the Viet Minh lost 
ten killed; six were taken prisoner and the last ambush party finally 
fled, abandoning their arms in the process. Later in the day Gracey 
called on the 16th Cavalry troops and gave them a talk on the "Situation 
in French Indo-China."
* For this see Louis Allen's Sittang, The Last Battle.
The situation in Cholon remained as difficult as ever, A grenade 
was thrown at a Jeep, and while one soldier was slightly wounded, 
several civilians were killed. Eleven more Indian soldiers in a truck 
were wounded by a grenade thrown from the upper storey of a house in
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Tan Phu, and a sweep was immediately mounted to flush out the terrorist 
grenade thrower. In the west, two French supply columns from Saigon 
to Massu's force in Tay Ninh were heavily attacked en route, and near 
Xuan Loc twenty Moi tribesmen led by a Viet Minh guerilla* attacked a* -* 9
Japanese post, killing one Japanese soldier and wounding another. Hoad 
blocks and trenches were still making travel on the roads from Saigon 
a difficult matter.
The increasing level of violence was reflected in the higher 
casualties now being suffered by Gracey's forces. MDfl Company, 1 V 1 3  
FFR, conducted what seemed to be a routine sweep of the village Tan Tu 
(about four miles north of Bien Hoa). When the soldiers mounted their 
vehicles to depart the village, three grenades were suddenly hurled 
into the bed of one of the trucks. Twelve of the 1A-/13 FFR troops were 
wounded by the explosions, three of whom died the following day. The 
rest of the column immediately jumped out of the trucks and again 
swept the village, killing six Vi&t Minh, capturing one and arresting 
four suspects.
The Viet Minh were now beginning to use a tactic which they would 
employ with success during their coming war with the French —  they 
ambushed a convoy in the Bien Hoa area, and when a relief force arrived 
they ambushed that as well. In this instance, however, six more Viet 
Minh were killed and a number captured while twelve Indian soldiers were 
wounded. There were reports now of large Viet Minh forces armed with 
tanks and guns in the Ban Me ThuSt area in the central highlands,
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and the Viet Minh leader Tran Van Giciu was said to be in Battambang, 
Cambodia, with a force armed with 800 rifles and 100 machine guns.
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In the usually troublesome Go Vap area the b/2. Gurkhas and the 
Viet Minh simultaneously distributed their respective propaganda 
leaflets, yet, amazingly, failed to encounter one another. The 3/1 
Gurkhas in Khanh Hoi did meet the Viet Minh when three Viet Minh 
approached a Gurkha platoon area near the docks. The Gurkhas shot dead 
two of them and one escaped after suffering a kukri wound. But casualties
* The significance of this lowland Viet Minh's influence on the Moi 
was not lost on Allied Intelligence.
were not confined to the soldiers of the opposing sides, for on the 
morning of the 13th a 1st Kuraaon patrol came across a shocking sight 
in Cholon —  a Vietnamese woman was found tied to a tree and stabbed 
to death. She was the wife of an Indian merchant, and a note in 
Vietnamese, attached to her body, warned all traitors that the Viet 
Minh had a similar fate in store for them.
Division Headquarters now received information that the bodies 
of lieutenant Colonel Dewey and a missing Gurkha soldier were buried 
in the cemetery for the poor in Thu Dau Mot. The 1/1 Gurkhas investigated 
the report, but without success. In Bi&n Hoa, 14/13 FFR had better luck 
when they seized the Viet Minh Secretary General for the surrounding 
six provinces.
These numerous, if unspectacular, small unit actions continued
slowly but inexorably to push the casualty rate up. In Bung, a few
miles southeast of Thu Dau Mot, a 1/1 GR mobile column was engaged
by an entrenched Viet Minh force, and mortar and artillery fire killed
at least seventeen Viet Minh soldiers. Three more Viet Minh were
/
killed by 3/8 Gurkhas about five miles northwest of Tan So*n Nhut 
following a petrol bomb and grenade attack on the Gurkhas.
Tan Sob. Nhift airfield was temporarily isolated from Control 
Commission Headquarters in Saigon when a Viet Minh squad cut the telephone
lines at 2145 hours on the 13th. The cut was skillfully made between
two guard posts just thirty yards apart and only two hundred yards 
from the Officers Mess on the main Saigon road.
An example of the types and amounts of Japanese arms and ammunition 
collected from their scattered depots was the convoy load arriving in 
Saigon at this time for storage and disposal —  this included 18,000 
grenades, 1158 rifles and 40 light machine guns. At the same time the 
4/2 GR War Diary reported collecting 50,000 mortar rounds, 111 rocket 
launchers and other arms and ordnance too numerous to iist (including 
rifles, machine guns, etc.) —  such was the large amount of Japanese 
arms stored in Cochinchina. The problem was that many of these dumps 
were not discovered by, or were inaccessible to, Gracey's forces, and 
much undoubtedly ended up in Viet Minh hands and was shipped north.
The recent history of political and military activities was
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summed up in "ALFFIC Intelligence Summary No.2". Part 1 dealt with 
events between 22 October and 14 November. It was stated by Gracey's 
Intelligence officers that the increasingly effective Viet Minh siege
of Saigon was in large measure broken by 100 Brigade's operations 
to the north and by the French drive to Mytho and Can The?. The Viet
Minh main force units had been driven eastwards after the Xuah Loc
/
battle and were now concentrated around Than Thiet. However, in all 
previously occupied areas groups of Viet Minh were active and their 
operations ranged from the throwing of grenades at passing vehicles 
to "well organized attacks on isolated posts and picquets." Gracey's 
battalions had kept the offensive and carried out numerous sweeps 
in their areas, "but the ability of these guerillas to hide themselves 
amongst the large native populations in these areas renders the task 
of combing them out extremely difficult."
Posts on the Cho River bridges north of Go Vap were constantly 
sniped by day and night. In early November the situation in Saigon 
deteriorated when strong attacks were made on posts in Gia Dinh and 
Go Vap. Viet Minh troops in bunker positions were engaged in Cholon, 
but vigorous action by 20th Division troops, including an increase in 
sweeps and security checks, gradually lessened the frequency of serious 
incidents.
In and around Nha Trang the Japanese had fought several engagements 
with the Viet Minh, who were finally cleared from the area around the 
town when French marines arrived on the cruiser Triomuhant. However, 
the report continued, "The whole EAST COAST is a VIET MINH playground 
in which VIET MINH bands have complete freedom of movement including 
the use of the railway which the small isolated Japanese garrisons 
are powerless to prevent." The most serious opposition was expected 
when operations were to begin in the -Dalat and Ban Me Thuot areas.
An ominous statement reported that it was now "worth noting that the 
hill tribes of this area, the MOIS, have become reconciled to ANNAMITE 
control." The Vietnamese, plainsmen, previously had little contact 
with the Mois, who were often under the influence of individual 
Frenchmen. But the Viet Minh had gained "considerable influence over 
the Mois, "in some cases organising parties of them within VIETMINH 
bands. This new familiarity permits the ANNAMITES to take refuge in 
jungle areas, where pursuit will be difficult."
While the Tay Ninh - Loc Ninh - Saigon triangle had largely 
been cleared by joint British-French action (Massu's drive on Tay Ninh
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and Clarkol to Ben Cat and north), the Viet Minh continued to pose a
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problem in the Mytho-Canthd and Plain des Jones areas. Although Viet
Minh main force units had retreated east and north, guerilla activity 
was expected to continue in the British key areas.
The interrogation of Nguyen Van Hai, former secretary to the 
senior Viet Minh commander in Cochinchina, revealed that the Viet
t *
Minh main force (totalling 5000) had retreated to Phan Thiet the day 
before the arrival of Gateforce in Xuan Loc. What the British and 
Japanese fought were Viet Minh suicide units totalling IM i men. The 
main force had retreated because the Xuan Loc area was considered 
unsuitable for defense. In the suicide units, 100 had been killed 
and many wounded, although in the initial skirmishing the Japanese 
troops had intentionally fired high and inflicted no casualties.*
The "sitrep to 1530 hrs 11+ Nov" reported that "a local stated 
that as all VIET MINH leaders [in] G0VAP area [were] now captured 
[the] VIET MINH are having three weeks rest to reorganise... night 
13/11+ Nov 3 fires started in GO VAP area... comment, evidently speedy 
reorganisation.M The Viet Minh had also just introduced a new tactic 
in the 32 Brigade area. The 3/8 Gurkhas had discovered the new 
Viet Minh technique by which the latter hoped to disable Allied motor 
transport (and troops). The Viet Minh had dug a large pit in the road 
and covered it with bamboo supports; earth was put down over the bamboo 
and the tarmac replaced. While it could be detected fairly easily 
in daylight it was almost impossible to spot at night. While there is 
no record of Allied vehicles tumbling into these traps they served as 
a deterrent to unrestricted night driving.
Daily intelligence summaries reported ten more Viet Minh killed, 
and twenty suspects arrested, by Japanese troops in operations north 
of two bridges a few miles north of Tan Son Nhut and Go Vap. The 
Japanese lost two dead, and several individual Viet Minh agents and 
soldiers with documents and weapons were arrested in the course of 
routine security checks in all areas. But not all Japanese units were 
able to maintain their wartime efficiency, and 221 members of the 2nd 
Japanese Division Hygiene Regiment were jailed pending investigation 
into recent cases of indiscipline and a search for suspected Kempei Tei 
in their ranks.
In mid-November Gracey sent Mountbatten a letter received from 
Terauchi, in which the Field Marshal passed on significant information 
about his forces he had just received from Tokyo. This information
* There was no explanation in the accompanying intelligence summary 
as to why the Japanese did this.
most probably came from MacArthur1s staff through Japanese channels:
1. All those [Japanese] guilty of desertion 
committed on or before 2 September 19 
were pardoned by the General Amnesty by 
virtue of the Imperial Ordinance 597 
granted on 17 October 19^5* Consequently 
no disciplinary action can be taken for 
deserters of this category.
2. It is the policy of the Japanese Command 
to punish the crime of joining in or 
cooperating with the Viet Minh party 
committed during desertion. 26
The internment of Japanese civilians now began. The total 
of 5500 were to be interned at a rate of 600 a week, and a week later 
555 Sub-Area was informed by Control Commission Headquarters that, 
except for prison guards, Formosans and Koreans in Japanese service 
were to be treated as civilians.
Within the last week or so the emphasis in the British area 
of South Vietnam had, it seemed, suddenly swung from fighting 
the Viet Minh to concentrating and disarming the Japanese. On 16 
November "100 Inf Bde Jap Surrender Instruction No.3" was issued, 
which began by saying that orders had been received that the concentration 
and disarmament of the Japanese must be speeded up. This was Phase III 
of the British operations in the area, and Rodham began pages one and 
two of the instruction by emphasizing, "WE HAVE GOT TO GET A MOVE ON".
Phase I had been "the elimination of hostiles from the area."
But from now on the Japanese would not be used for offensive operations
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except for Yamagichi and Sato Butais in Ben Cat and Xuan Loc respectively, 
who would remain armed for the present. Phase II was the collection 
of all Japanese arms, ammunition and stores. This was now almost 
complete. Due to the British-directed reorganization the new Japanese 
Army Headquarters was being formed in Saigon, and on 20 November 
Lieutenant General Manaki was scheduled to move to Laithieu, in the 
100 Brigade area. But 2nd Division and Army troops were immediately 
to commence moving to the concentration areas under 100 Brigade*s 
authority, and these moves were being carried out by the Japanese 
under their own arrangements. The final Japanese total in 100 Brigade*s 
area would be 35»000, comprising 12000 from 2nd Division, 17000 Army 
and 6000 Navy troops. By 26 November all medium and light machine guns, 
mortars, grenades and grenade dischargers were to be removed from the 
Japanese (with the exception of Yamagichi and Sato Butais). Twenty-five 
percent of Japanese guards were to be armed with rifles (50 rounds) or 
pistols (12 rounds), the rest with lathis and staves, like "chokidars"
(Indian watchmen). A reserve force would have a greater ammunition 
supply.
But the immediate task of relieving the Japanese of their money
was to be accomplished in two steps. First, the cash balances and
valuables held in unit accounts or by units were to be gathered,
followed by the collection of cash and valuables in possession of
officers and men.* A certain sum of money would then be handed back
to the Japanese for their maintenance. But so short were the Allies
of specialist support troops (such as paymasters) that the Japanese
were tasked to "depiaster" themselves through the agency of 'Withdrawals
Officers", one to 300 men or less.
The Japanese were to be warned that they must scrupulously obey
this order, for they would no longer be able to use piasters and would
be summarily punished for so doing after surrendering their money.
Furthermore, the amount withdrawn was to be credited in the soldiers
paybooks for payment in yen upon returning to Japan. The Japanese
Withdrawals Officer would be supervised by an Allied officer, to whom
the total of collected money would be handed after the parade. Gracey
reiterated that severe punishment was in store for any Japanese individual
or holder of a unit account who attempted to circumvent this order.
It was at French insistence that Gracey made arrangements for the
Japanese to surrender all currency negotiable in south Indochina. This
surrender of currency was to commence on Sunday, 25 November, and
continue as fresh drafts of Japanese troops moved into the concentration 
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areas.
This matter of currency, to be discussed later, was potentially
a problem of enormous importance, the full magnitude of which had only
now become apparent to the Allies (especially the French). Hundreds
of millions of piasters appeared to be held by the Japanese, which led
the French to fear the disaster of inflation and the danger that this
enormous amount of money might fall into Viet Minh hands.
Gracey also laid down some guidelines for the formal surrender
ceremonies, which were to be kept as simple as possible while still
bringing home to the Japanese the fact that they had lost the war.
Humiliating the Japanese was to be avoided, and "The essential point
is that every man realises that he personally surrenders and pays an
act of respect to the nation to which he surrenders, symbolised by 
28the Union Jack." Prior to the surrender parade the Japanese unit was
* From 22 November to 31 December this sum totalled 3»790»000 piasters 
for 68,500 Japanese troops.
to hand in all arms except sidearms. The parade itself was to he 
conducted by an Indian VCO (Viceroy*s Commissioned Officer), who was 
to be seated at a table in front of a flagstaff on which the Union 
Jack would be flying.* A number of Allied guards were to be posted 
around the parade ground, and the Japanese unit was to march in and 
form up facing the flag. Officers were to step out individually in 
front and salute the flag, bow to the VCO, salute the flag again and 
fall back to the unit. They were to retain their swords for the present. 
Warrant officers were to perform the same ritual, but would hand over 
their swords. At the command of the senior Japanese officer the troops 
were to bow to the flag, ground their arms and bow again to the flag, 
after which they marched off.
Of the dozens of surrender parades which took place throughout 
the British key areas, one notable ceremony occurred at Tan Sdn Nhu?t 
on 17 November when Matsuzato Butai formally surrendered and was disarmed 
to 2$% of its strength. This battalion had played a major part in 
defeating the desperate Viet Minh assault on Tan Sdn Nhrit a few weeks 
earlier, and to these Japanese troops the population of Saigon owed a 
debt of gratitude for keeping open their link to the rest of the world.
At 11*00 hours the Japanese battalion marched on to the field and lined 
up facing the RAP ensign, officers in front. Awaiting them were the 
troops of the RAF Regiment, dressed in green battledress with white 
webbing. On Matsuzato *s command the Japanese bowed to the ensign; 
Matsuzato then paid his compliments to Group Captain Sturgiss, and 
ordered his men to lay down their arms.
Wrote the RAF recorder:
"The sight of those long rows of rifles 
lying harmlessly on the ground with 
bayonets gleaming in the sun will be 
long remembered by those who witnessed 
the parade. The Japs formed up again 
outside the roped area of the parade 
ground and the [RAF] Regiment Flights 
moved off... They marched past the long 
line of Japanese, and in the precision 
of their inarching, their smart and 
soldierlike bearing, they were the 
epitome of the victorious troops."
The Chinese in the north appeared to be less than fully exercised 
with the task of concentrating and disarming the Japanese. The French 
reported that thirteen Chinese divisions were said to be in Tonkin,
* In some cases the table was covered by a Union Jack.
five of which were in transit to Formosa and Manchuria. At least
20,000 of these Chinese soldiers had left the army by permission of 
their commanders in order to settle as civilians in Tonkin. Except 
for the Red River delta, no attempt had been made to disarm the 
Japanese, increasing numbers of whom were deserting to the Viet Minh.
In Kandy, Mountbatten suggested to Browning that Terauchi should
be moved to Singapore the day after the handover of responsibility for
south Indochina to the French. Mountbatten was perturbed at reports
that Terauchi had hoarded a two-year supply of stores and some gold
bullion; the Supreme Commander had thought that Terauchi was eating
normal army rations. Although the Field Marshal was no longer in
effective control of Japanese forces he was, as Mountbatten acknowledged,
the chief cover for the British presence in Vietnam and thus could
not be moved prior to the British departure.* Mountbatten had also
decided to spare Terauchi a trial for war crimes, saying, "I doubt
the wisdom of trying a cripple of 67 unless it is known that he gave
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orders which render him guilty."
Browning agreed that Terauchi should remain in Saigon, but there 
were senior officers, including Major General Pyman, who were not yet 
absolutely sure that Terauchi would issue the necessary orders to 
surrendered Japanese in the event of trouble. In any case, it was 
decided that the Field Marshal should have a deputy Supreme Commander, 
and General Itagaki (who had substituted for Terauchi in the surrender 
ceremony in Singapore) was nominated for that position. Mountbatten 
concurred "despite General Itagaki*s militaristic outlook?! The Japanese 
themselves had just decided on the ship to bring Terauchi to Singapore. 
The vessel Taian Maru was being prepared for his journey, the destroyer 
Kana Kazi. first proposed, now being deemed unsuitable.
On the 19th a special meeting was held between the British and 
Japanese senior staffs in Saigon. The British participants were 
Brigadiers Hirst and Maunsell, and Air Commodore Cheshire; Japanese 
members present were Lieutenant General Numata, Commander Kusumi and 
Lieutenant Colonel Tomura (around whom, as Maunsell had earlier said, 
"everything revolved").
The Japanese were at the meeting to answer the charge of fomenting 
unrest in Java, where the fighting between British and Indonesian 
nationalist forces was particularly savage. Of the local situation, 
Numata said that he was disturbed at the idea that the Japanese were
* Since Terauchi was the chief cover he "should not blow the gaff by 
leaving long before we do." [SAC's personal minute, 16 November 1945].
to be concentrated at Cap St.Jacques (which British reconnaissance 
had shown to be the best place to concentrate the Japanese and sever 
the links between the Japanese and Viet Minh). Numata protested,
"It is a surprising fact that some of your 
forces are still harbouring the idea that 
the Japanese forces are assisting or 
cooperating with the Annamites, and I 
regret very much indeed that the present 
order to concentrate the Japanese Forces 
in Cap St. Jacques would seem to have 
been issued on this assumption. I certainly 
hope that you will review our hearty 
cooperation with the Allied Forces since 
their arrival here and wipe out such an idea 
entirely." 30
Numata then pointed out some of the problems associated with 
collecting all the Japanese at Cap St. Jacques —  the shortage of 
water, malignant malaria, shortage of building materials and food, 
lack of transportation facilities and so on. It was causing concern 
to. the Japanese, for the area was damp and swampy. If it was indeed 
necessary to gather the Japanese there, Numata requested that the 
number be limited to 20,000. These 20,000 Japanese would live in 
town, but if new barracks could be built the number could be raised to 
1*0,000. The greatest problem was water. The present supply system 
could provide a maximum capacity of 1000 tons per day, but large scale 
repairs to the system were necessary in order to achieve this capacity.
Hirst replied firmly that the British knew all about this and 
the area would not have been selected had it not been capable of taking 
all the Japanese. Maunsell then interjected to comment on the "hearty 
cooperation" of the Japanese, which, he said, was not substantiated 
by events of the weekend when British casualties had been inflicted 
by Japanese deserters working with the Annamites. They had been 
clearly recognizable by their uniforms and superior military training 
and marksmanship. Furthermore, recent interrogation of Kempei Tei 
personnel had generated grave doubts on Japanese assertions that no 
officers had deserted from Headquarters Japanese Southern Regions, 
and in fact a list of such officers was now being drawn up. Despite 
this, however good and efficient work by Japanese officers and men 
would be recorded.
Maunsell closed by saying that he would not allow Numata to 
continue this statement which was a waste of time and undesirable —  
Brigadier Hirst was in charge of arrangements and needed no advice from 
Numata, and Japanese headquarters would be told in the future not to
reproduce such statements.
In Kandy, the SEAC staff thought that it was now time to bring 
Japanese Headquarters Southern Regions to an end for, in their view, 
the work required by the Japanese headquarters in fulfilment of the 
surrender terms had been completed. Furthermore, Terauchi was no 
longer in effective control, for by this time power had been almost 
completely decentralized to subordinate commanders. Breaking up 
the Japanese headquarters, and the "Japanese war machine in South 
East Asia", would "bring home to the rank and file full realisation 
of their defeat." This assertion by the SEAC staff had a somewhat 
hollow ring, for they had waited until the survival of Gracey*s forces 
had been assured —  with Japanese help —  before "bringing home to 
the Japanese the full realisation of their defeat."
Now that their freedom to operate as formed units of the Imperial
Forces was drawing to a close, the Japanese were proving more effective,
possibly because they wished to win the respect of the British victors
before finally departing from Vietnam. If this was indeed part of
their motivation during the final weeks, then they achieved their
objective. Or perhaps it was that they knew that the seeds that they
had planted in Vietnam, as elsewhere, had already germinated and could
no longer be prevented from reaching full growth, 
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Thus, at Ben Cat, Yamagichi Butai began aggressive sweeping 
operations and dislodged the Viet Minh from the area, killing and 
capturing dozens. They now reported Ben Cat cleared of Viet Minh to 
a radius of five kilometers. Japanese patrols in Budop brought in 
thirty-three Viet Minh suspects and a number of weapons. There were, 
as in all armies, some problems with second echelon, (non-frontline) 
troops, and two patrols from a Japanese motor company claimed to have 
been "captured" by the Viet Minh four miles east of Saigon. The 
Japanese officer and eighteen men were released after handing over 
their weapons (a sword and eighteen rifles). This report was received 
with great skepticism at Control Commission Headquarters. On the other 
hand as these troops (described as "third rate" by the Japanese Command)
A*
were cooperating with the Viet Minh, an infantry patrol lost an officer 
killed and five men wounded in a fight with the Viet Minh about five
s.
miles east of Gia Binh.
Brigadier Rodham now issued "100 Ind Inf Bde Japanese Surrender 
Instruction No.5, Full Disarmament", which he again prefaced with 
"WE HAVE GOT TO GET A MOVE ON". Sub-Area Commanders were immediately 
to begin disarming the Japanese in their areas, with one vital exception.
Commanders responsible for the "ALL RED ROUTE" [100 Brigade*s Lines 
of Communication] were to maintain their Japanese guards for the 
present time. This route encompassed the road from Saigon to Thu Due, 
and the main routes connecting the key areas with Lai Thieu, Thu Dau 
Mot, Ben Cat, Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc. All Japanese guards on other 
roads were to be dispensed with forthwith, and the risk of having 
bridges blown would have to be accepted. Since some of these roads 
served Japanese supply dumps,* it appears that these were being 
abandoned in order to concentrate the Japanese as quickly as possible.
To counter the spate of daily grenade-throwing incidents the
"scorched earth policy" (of clearing the All Red Route for forty yards
on either side) was to be speeded up. As Rodham stated, the "JAPS
have any amount of labour with which to carry this out and it is a
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very suitable job for unarmed m e n . T h e r e  were exceptions to this 
policy, which did not apply where the road met houses or villages, 
rubber plantations, crops, or places where a single hedge bordered 
the road.
Ten percent of the Japanese were to retain their arms for 
self-defense, for "In all fairness, we cannot allow these tps to 
march long distances completely unarmed at the mercy of any ARHAMITE 
'Grenade-Thrower*." As for the surrender parades, local British 
commanders were told to practice their own ceremony the day before 
the event occurred, with the surrendering Japanese commander in 
attendance; both would then know exactly what to do on the following day. 
As the days passed and more parades were held, Japanese commanders of 
units to be disarmed were to witness the parade on the day prior to 
their own unit1 s formed surrender. They were not to watch it more 
than one day in advance in order "to prevent Japs ,brooding' over 
[the] fact of having to give up their arms and perhaps causing a 
number to desert and make a nuisance of themselves in the countryside.". 
The British/Indian guards were to be "Ceremonial Guards", and would 
not be in firing position; however, they would carry full ammunition 
and have their weapons loaded.
Even as plans were being made to disarm the Japanese their 
casualty rate was slowly rising. Japanese patrols clashed with the 
Viet Minh on three occasions in the always-disputed area about six 
miles east of Saigon (across the river), and lost one officer and three 
men killed; 7 Japanese were wounded. Another Japanese guard on a bridge
* not arms dumps.
was killed and two others wounded, and a Japanese patrol was said 
to have been surrendered when cut off by a downed bridge east of the 
Saigon River.
Over in Nha Trang, the French landed on the night of the 19th, 
under cover of the Richelieu’s guns. In 32 Brigade’s area the k/2 
Gurkhas raided a house about 800 yards south of the golf course near 
Tan S<?n Ntuft; the house was said to harbor the head of the local Viet 
Minh. He was not in, but a pistol and incriminating documents were 
seized and six suspects arrested. An ambush was then laid on the house 
and six more suspects were picked up. In 80 Brigade's area, h/Xj 
Dogra caught eleven Viet Minh in the act of digging up the road. In 
Tsua Tich the Japanese raided a suspected Viet Minh area and killed ten 
defenders; many more escaped by jumping into the river, and quantities 
of arms and ammunition were seized.
Back at SEAC Headquarters in Kandy, the Joint Planning Staff issued 
the third and most comprehensive draft of JPS 215 * ’’Turnover of Command 
in FIC". The French were now reported to have 9196 troops in Indochina*; 
by 10 December a total of 19*819 French troops would be in the south,
15,000 of them being the main body of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division. 
There still remained a few Allied Prisoners of War and Internees in the 
south who were awaiting repatriation, including 35 British, k-2. Dutch 
and 150 Swiss.
The Joint Planning Staff recognized that SEAC would have to maintain 
the French forces for some time to come. The Staff now suggested that 
Mountbatten should consider relinquishing responsibility for south 
Indochina upon the departure of the last British troops, for Min the 
event of a deterioration in the political situation, resulting in 
widespread disorder and bloodshed, world opinion would attribute the 
blame to SEAC and British/Indian forces might again have to be employed 
to restore the situation.” On the other hand, other areas in SEAC's 
sphere of responsibility needed Indochina's rice, and since SEAC 
must maintain the French for the foreseeable future, it may be desirable 
to keep some measure of control over them. Also, the Japanese, though 
disarmed, may yet cause the French some trouble. Finally, "The indefinite 
retention of even a reserve of operational control in FIC would materially 
assist the future problem of theatre defence strategy in the Far East.”
* 9 DIC, ^57; Combat Command 2 Armoured Division 2165; 5 SIC 1159;
Two Marine companies 35^, Administrative and Support Troops 1061.
It was suggested that after consultation with the French the question 
of the degree of control to be exercised in Indochina by Mountbatten 
should be referred to the British Chiefs of Staff.
Browning now informed Gracey that he could tell the Japanese 
that they were to be given first priority for repatriation from 
Southeast Asia to Japan. In SEAC's eyes this should cut down the number 
of Japanese desertions to the Viet Minh, and Terauchi was to broadcast 
this to the Japanese in Vietnam (but not to Japanese in other areas).
As for the future of the Control Commission, the SEAC staff had Gracey's 
letter on the subject under advisement. Gracey's proposals were that 
the Commission as now organized could be disbanded upon the transfer 
of Terauchi to Singapore. There would be no need for a special agency 
to control Terauchi's headquarters in Singapore, but since references 
were still to be made to Headquarters, Southern Regions, some portion 
of the Commission should remain in Saigon. The Headquarters itself 
could be controlled directly by the ALFFIC Commander, reinforced by 
the transfer to him of the remainder of the Control Commission staff.
While this was going on a Spitfire was hit in the propeller by 
small arms fire from the ground —  the first and only instance of a 
Spitfire being hit while airborne. Since the Spitfire pilots were operating 
under such strict rules of engagement regarding air support for French 
troops, the question inevitably arose of simply giving the aircraft to 
the French and letting them provide their own air support. In response 
to an enquiry from his staff Mountbatten approached the ACSEA, Sir 
Keith Park, on this possibility. Park would not hear of it. First, 
he advised the Supreme Commander that the ACSEA had no authority to 
hand over Spitfires to the French without Air Ministry approval.
Furthermore, even if the RAF did nothing more than service the aircraft 
for French pilots, the British would be vulnerable to adverse criticism. 
Finally, Park pencilled in a note on Mountbatten's query: "NO. Why 
should RAF personnel support Qthe[J French in settling an internal civil 
disturbance not within tasks of SEAC?"
In Vietnam, the continuing fighting and unrest made it impractical 
for Gracey to concentrate the Japanese as rapidly as he wished, for his
battalions were still preoccupied with the Viet Minh. At about this
time a Gurkha was attacked at his post about one and a half miles 
southwest of Tan S6n Nhdt by six Viet Minh who stabbed him with a spear.
He managed to fire a Sten gun burst at his assailants before collapsing.
His fellow 3/8 Gurkhas followed a trail of blood to a house and into a
paddy field. They destroyed the house, then rounded up all the males 
in the area and made them stand on one leg for forty-five minutes 
before they were released.
In the Bien Hoa area, B Company, 14/13 FFR, plus a section of 
mortars, Jat machine guns and 16 Cavalry armored cars swept an area 
northeast of the town. They met a road block and grenade attack, but 
suffered no casualties in killing two Viet Minh. A wounded prisoner 
reported the presence of 500 armed Viet Minh a few miles away. The 
column was sniped at on the return journey, and two more Vi&t Minh were 
killed. A little further on came another grenade ambush and 1 more 
Viet Minh was killed. More sniping resulted in four more dead Viet 
Minh (this group having been entrenched in foxholes). The 14/13 
troops finally returned to base after breaking through this spate of 
ambushes; they had killed nine Viet Minh at no cost to themselves. But 
this had been their lucky day. Incredibly enough, of the dozens of 
grenades hurled at them, none had exploded —  their pins had not been 
pulled.
The gods were also smiling on another 14/13 FFR driver this day.
He was driving a truck into a nearby village to get fresh vegetables 
when a Viet Minh guerilla threw a grenade at the truck. The grenade 
struck the driver in the side of the face and fell into the truck, but 
failed to explode. The Viet Minh grenadier and six others were captured 
by the truck’s escort.
Many of the grenades raining down on the 14/13 FFR soldiers were 
being hurled from positions near Japanese posts, and Colonel Miyake —  
who appears to have been a reluctant ally of the British —  was called 
to explain why the Viet Minh were operating with such impunity. From 
the Thu Dau Mot base, two companies of 1/1 Gurkhas, supported by
A*
machine guns, artillery and armored cars, combed the area around Ap Bung 
Cau (north of Thu Dau Mot). Strong resistance, including machine gun 
fire, was met in two villages which were seized and searched. The 
houses in which weapons were found were burnt down, and at the end of 
the 8-J operation a concentration of artillery was laid- down on an area
A
suspected of being a Viet Minh night concentration area. Not far away 
some 16 Cavalry troopers discovered fourteen badly wounded Viet Minh, 
believed to be casualties from earlier actions against Clarkol. The 
16 Cavalry report estimated that fifty casualties had been inflicted 
on the Vi&t Minh.
South of Saigon, villagers reported the presence of 300 armed 
Viet Minh and five Japanese deserters in a village about ten miles 
south of Cholon. This force was engaged by artillery, after which
they had reportedly split, one group heading for another village about
/
five miles southwest of Long Kien, which turned out to be the site of 
a stiff fight between 3/1 Gurkhas and strong, dug-in Viet Minh troops.
The Long Kien operation was laid on because of intelligence that 
the Viet Minh were holding a number of French hostages in that village. 
Thus on 18 November a force of two platoons under Major E.W. MacDonald 
left the 3/1 GR base at Khanh Hoi for Long Kien. MacDonald was supported
1
by a water-borne party of forty Gurkhas who approached Long Ki£n from 
the southeast.
MacDonald’s force had gone just a few hundred yards when they 
were engaged by a party of about thirty Viet Minh armed with rifles, 
and a thirty minute firefight occurred before the Vietnamese were 
dispersed. Only a mile further on the party encountered another Viet 
Minh position, a post defending a bridge over a river. The bridge 
was in a village, the north of which was ringed with well sited Japanese- 
style bunkers and occupied by about fifty Vi'et Minh armed with machine 
guns and rifles. This proved a formidable task for two Gurkha platoons
a'
and Long Kien was not, in the event, taken until four days later.
One of MacDonald's platoons attacked the defenses "in a good old 
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fashioned charge" and broke through, dispersing the defenders. That 
particular village, on the elbow bend of the Khanh Hoi - Long Kien road, 
was cleared, but a destroyed bridge and more entrenched Viet Minh along 
the road forced the platoon to turn back. The whole force retired 
northwards to the south bank of the Canal de Derivation, the battalion’s 
south perimeter, fired on all the way back by light machine guns and
A
rifles. Local reports stated that a force of 200 Viet Minh and twenty 
Japanese were in that area and the day’s actions resulted in the death 
of between twenty and thirty Vi'et Minh and the capture of four. One 
Gurkha was wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel Purcell, the battalion 
commander, had to bring out reinforcements with mortar's to see the 
force safely back to battalion lines —  Purcell had his hat shot off 
in the process.
While MacDonald had slow going along the road, the water-borne 
party under Major E. Gopsill travelled a circuitous route down a number 
of connecting streams and canals, swinging an arc to the east and south
t
and approaching Long Kien from the east southeast. As they approached
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Long Kien heavy firing from scattered Viet Minh positions forced 
the landing craft to a halt, then a short withdrawal, at which time 
(1500 hours) it was discovered, to their horror, that the tide had 
come in and the landing craft could not pass under the nearest bridges 
to withdraw to safety. The two platoons of Gurkhas and Japanese 
sailors were now stationary targets for the Viet Minh, who soon 
discovered their predicament. Whether by design or by accident, the 
Japanese Navy had neglected to tell the British about the tides.
Tactical reconnaissance flights had earlier reported downed
f
bridges and defended positions along the Long Kien road, and Gopsill 
himself had reconnoitered the approach to Long Kien, so the fierce 
opposition should have come as no surprise; thus the wisdom of assigning 
a total force of eighty Gurkhas in two groups to such a heavily 
defended area appears questionable.
Gopsill well remembered his hazardous predicament. In 1977) speaking
(
of the Long Kien operation, he recalled that the Viet Minh fire was so 
intense that he thought that a thousand Vi^t Minh may have opposed his 
two platoons.
He contacted Lieutenant Colonel Purcell, the 3/1 Commander, by 
radio and said, "It’s very difficult. I can push on if you like, but 
I think we ’ll be cut off."-^ "Percy" Purcell radioed back orders for 
Gopsillforce to hold in place and withdraw as soon as possible. Said 
Gopsill:
"Well, I couldn't come out because the river 
had risen and I couldn't get under the bridges.
We were stuck there. I said this to the men and 
they said, ’Never mind, Sahib, we'll be O.K.’
We were there for six hours. I got on the road 
bridge and dropped a plumb line to the approx­
imate height of the boat, and reckoned when it 
swung we could get out. Eventually it swung 
free and we came out.
I’ve never forgotten it. I said to my senior 
Gurkha officer, ’Load your chaps, I’ll wait 
here,' and he said, 'Oh, no, Sahib, you get 
out and you can lie in midstream and give me 
covering fire.' He was a wily old bugger —  
we were both laughing, and he got the M.C.* 
for that.
Well, I got to midstream and we commenced 
fire while he got into the boat and we went 
downstream together."
* Military Cross.
During the withdrawal the Viet Minh attacked the group with 
machine guns, grenades and an anti-tank gun. The retreat was in the 
nature of a blitz as "Gopsill Force" ran the gauntlet back to Saigon, 
firing its way through Viet Minh positions on both banks. By now 
both craft had been hit numerous times, and the anti-tank gun had 
blasted holes in both boats near the water line. Miraculously, no 
Gurkhas were killed in the operation, although two were wounded, 
along with a Japanese sailor. The boats had been so heavily shot up 
that Gopsill and his Gurkhas had to stuff the holes with their clothes 
to keep them afloat long enough to reach safety. As Gopsill said of 
the anti-tank gunfire:
"... they had £the gun] firing just below the 
waterline at us; we could see and hear it
hitting. God knows what would have happened
had they aimed above the waterline because we 
were crowded on the boats.
As we got out of the boats one sank, and the 
other sank during the night." 3^
The first phase of the Long Kien operation ended with the 3/"1
Gurkhas being heavily engaged but unable to reach their objective.
The next attempt was to be made on 22 November. As it was, thirty 
to forty-five Viet Minh had been killed and a number of others wounded
and put out of action for a cost of three wounded Gurkhas, one wounded
Japanese and a lot of sweat and excitement. Two Japanese had been seen 
with the Viet Minh, who appeared to be exceptionally well trained and
agressive here, and it was thought that the Japanese were responsible
for the more accurate sniping aimed especially at the British officers. 
The "20th Division History" reported that the Vietnamese defenders at
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Long Kien were members of the Binh Xuyen gang, reinforced with some
35Japanese deserters.
On the 22nd the Gurkhas made a second attempt to oust the strong
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Viet Minh force from the area of Long Kien and to seize the village
and rescue French hostages, if any were still left there. This time
the British collected a large enough force to do the job. Two full
companies, rather than the two platoons used earlier, were tasked to
lead the operation, and these were supported by a troop of guns from
the 11*fth Field Regiment, Royal Artillery. The two companies (A and C
Companies) were relieved of their commitments in Khanh Iioi on the
evening of the 21st by companies from the h/Xj Dogra and 9/12 FFR.
Gopsill's company led the operation. The first objective was 
an old French fort about a mile south of the Canal de Derivation; 
the fort was to be seized at 0500 hours. On the way, not long after 
leaving the Khanh Hoi base area, Gopsill's company was attacked by 
a Viet Minh ambush party armed with grenades. Two of the grenade 
throwers were captured and the Gurkhas continued their advance along 
the Long Kien road. Stiffer opposition was met soon after this first 
engagement, this time by dug-in Viet Minh defenders on the banks of 
a stream, or nullah. The defenders were driven off and the gunners 
laid a few rounds into the midst of a group of about thirty Viet Minh 
retreating through the paddy fields. The next objective was the fort 
and the village of Ben HS, which proved to be an important local Viet 
Minh headquarters and refuge for Japanese deserters. The assault on 
the "Beau Gest" fort and village was preceded by a short artillery 
bombardment, during which a Japanese deserter was killed. Another 
Japanese deserter was killed by a burst of Sten fire when the two sides 
closed. The clearing of the fort, involving one of the few true kukri 
charges (if not the only known one) of the campaign, is best described 
by the officer who led the assault. Lieutenant Colonel Gopsill stated 
that Viet Minh defenders in the fort opened fire as the Gurkha company 
approached. Said Gopsill, "We used rocket launchers to blow the doors 
down, and before I could say 'knife* the Gurkhas were across and in
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with the kukris and butchered everyone in it." The immediate area 
was cleared and local patrols carried out, after which the rest of the 
force (including Major Mike Kelleher's A Company) passed through on 
the way to Long Kien. A large quantity of arms and a variety of 
ammunition, plus Japanese and Viet Minh documents, were captured by 
Gopsill's force.
It was now just after noon, and the heat was described as "un-
37 ebelievable." Kelleher's force reached Long Ki§n at about 1^ +00 hours,
but this time there was little opposition and the only Viet Minh
visible were three wounded who were captured in the local hospital.
However, driving out the Viet Minh was only half the objective; the
r t
French hostages were searched for after Long Kien was occupied, but 
to no avail. Information from local sources indicated that tv/o of the 
French civilians had been executed during the previous night, but the 
three remaining hostages had escaped. Since it seemed that the Viet 
Minh now held no French hostages, and since it appeared that it would
f
serve no useful purpose to leave the company overnight in Long Kien,
especially with known strong Viet Minh forces in the vicinity, the 
decision was made to withdraw. The withdrawal was accomplished in 
"good N.W.F.P." style", with rearguards covering the exit by the 
main force. Two rearguard actions were fought as the company, returning 
to base, was engaged by fire from light machine guns and rifles. Quick 
use of artillery and mortars quickly silenced the Viet Minh pursuers—
The 5/1 GR force finally returned to Khanh Hoi about 1930 hours 
in the evening. No hostages were found, but somewhere around fifty 
Viet Minh had been killed and their forces dispersed and pushed out 
of the immediate area. It was estimated that about thirty Japanese 
were operating with the Viet Minh during the course of the operation 
and, as the Gurkhas later wrote, "the accurate sniping and encircling
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tactics indicated that they, were well to the fore." Leclerc was 
well satisfied with this operation, which enabled the French to occupy 
the area not long afterwards.
Two days earlier, British and French delegations had met to discuss 
the program for the relief of British and Japanese forces by the French.
On the British side were Brigadiers Hirst, Taunton and Hendriks 
(Commanding 555 Sub Area), and eight other officers including Lieutenant 
Colonel Hobbs of 9/1^ Punjab (who was acting Commander of 52 Brigade 
in Brigadier Woodford's absence); Brigadier Rodham of 100 Brigade was 
probably too preoccupied with clearing out Viet Minh and concentrating 
Japanese to attend, and he would be the last to be relieved upon the 
British departure. Representing the French were the recently-arrived 
Brigadier General Valluy (commanding the 9th DIC) and Lieutenant Colonel 
Repiton (Leclerc's Chief of Staff).
The two sides went down the list, one place at a time, discussing 
areas on the map. The French said that they could relieve the Japanese 
Naval detachment at Nha Be, on the river just south of Saigon, by the 
first week of December; they hoped to relieve Japanese Naval forces 
on the Saigon River's perenially troubled east bank by mid-December.
They further arranged to relieve British and Japanese forces in south 
and west Cholon by 28 November; this was Taunton's 80 Brigade area.
Tan Son Nhdt airfield, Go Vap and Gia Dinh, (all trouble spots and in 
Woodford's 32 Brigade area) could be transferred to French forces in 
mid-December. The transfer of the Japanese concentration areas (Bien Hoa
'<■ * IThu Dau Mot - Thu Due) was to be discussed at a later date, as would 
handovers by British detachments in east Cholon, Cap St.Jacques and Baria.
Mountbatten asked Gracey for his views on the SEAC staff's plans 
for closing down Japanese Southern Army headquarters. It was now 
* North West Frontier Province.
proposed that Terauchi should move to Singapore as soon as possible 
after 1 December, the actual date to be fixed in conjunction with 
Gracey's handover of command to the French. Terauchi was to travel 
to Malaya in a Japanese ship, which would not be at the expense of 
British movements. Among other groups, an Intelligence jjReconnaissancJ 
Checking Party was to be formed to verify Japanese information and 
study airfields, communications and port facilities in the south.* 
Mountbatten and Gracey were in general agreement on the main issues, 
even if they differed on the size of the residual mission and other 
relatively less important matters.
As the British were thinking about drawing down, the French were 
meeting increasing resistance wherever they operated. In Nha Trang, 
the Viet Minh fiercely resisted French efforts to move inland from the 
town. The six French and 95 Viet Minh dead were indicative of the 
savagery of the fighting whenever French and Vietnamese met in battle.
The Richelieu brought her guns to bear on the station west of Nha Trang,
where she shelled a trainload of Viet Minh arrivals from Tonkin. The
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Japanese commander in Nha Trang admitted that a "large number" of
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his troops had deserted to the Viet Minh, which may have accounted for 
the stiffening of Viet Minh defenses in the area. Elsewhere, the usual 
daily incidents of grenading and sniping continued, and Viet Minh 
casualties rose steadily.
D'Argenlieu held his first formal press conference as the 3/1
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Gurkhas were returning to Long Kien* In reply to written questions 
he stated that the Viet Minh leaders were not regarded as war criminals, 
but individuals accused of criminal activities who would be dealt 
with by the courts. The press were suitably impressed with the Admiral's 
sincerity as he said that talks with the Viet Minh could go on. By 
now the French government had received assurances of Anglo-American 
support of France's sovereignty over Indochina.
Meiklereid's dispatches described life in Saigon during this
if'l z
period. With the arrival of Admiral D'Argenlieu, Jean Cedile had
reverted to the status of Governor of Gochinchina. Criticism was
being voiced of French conduct of trials for captured Vi^t Minh*? and
* Members of this team were to be the last British casualties in Vietnam. 
** As Meiklereid remarked, judges were human and were sometimes "touched 
by the hysteria of the moment." As observers in Washington during the 
Watergate years may recall, this "hysteria of the moment" was not 
confined to judges in Saigon in 19^5*
certain correspondents, as was their wont, were exacerbating the 
issue for reasons of their own. Two reporters in particular (one 
a well-known American left wing figure) produced daily outpourings 
of vitriolic denunciation of what they termed "neocolonialism" and 
the "brutality" of the Anglo-French occupation.
The French community was growing nervous over rumours that the 
British would leave before the Japanese had been fully repatriated, 
but in general Saigon was quiet and the population was settling down 
once more to normal work. Japanese consular officials were being 
treated as ordinary civilian internees since they had earlier taken 
over administrative functions in the colony.
The Viet Minh were still described as uncontrollable armed 
bands and criminal elements, with pillaging occurring in their 
operational areas. Leclerc’s tactics and the behaviour of his troops 
had encouraged the French population to demand revenge and reprisals.
Meiklereid has described the arrival of yet another group of 
Chinese emissaries comprising Colonel Yeung She War and a secretary.
They carried a letter from Lieutenant General Su Wen of 1st Area Army 
Headquarters in Hanoi and purported to represent the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Bureau on a mission of "consolation", to tell the Chinese 
community, "so long cut off from their native land", what was happening 
in China. The two Chinese officials were received by Meiklereid in 
M.Clarac's* presence; Meiklereid referred them to the French, who 
remained suspicious of their motives.
Shortly thereafter a third Chinese mission arrived, this one 
headed by Mr. Chang-Yong, who carried a letter from "Full General 
Lu Han, Commander in Chief, 1st War Commission Chinese Army at Hanoi". 
Chang-Yong was described as Commissioner of Food to Indo-China and 
Representative of the Chinese Ministry of Food. He wanted to buy
30,000 tons of rice to ship to Haiphong. The French agreed to let 
the Chinese have 5000 tons in November and another 5000 tons in December, 
on one condition: the Chinese must leave Laos, for there they were 
undermining the King (on whom the French relied, in part, to reestablish 
their influence).
The British stayed clear of these peculiar French-Chinese problems. 
Although life was slowly returning to normal, the general strike imposed 
by the Viet Minh continued. Essential services, such as water and
* D'Argenlieu's Political Adviser.
electricity, were being operated by the armed forces (largely British 
and Japanese engineers). The French came in for some harsh words in 
this regard.*
The French population, as yet unaccustomed to queueing, were 
inclined to do their buying on the black market rather than take their 
turns at the food distribution points. The French administration was 
gradually reimposing its authority. The Police, CID, Public Health, 
Information, Finance, Economic Affairs, Justice, Political Affairs,
Post and Telegraph, Education and other major departments resumed 
their functions, in some cases in spite of a lack of staff and office 
space. There were still few Vietnamese civil servants, for many who 
had earlier left their posts had not yet returned.
Governor Cedile was reluctant to employ Vichy officials, but 
found himself forced to do so since most of the French in Indochina were 
tainted by collaboration with the Japanese. As rationale for this, 
Cedile stipulated that all appointments were provisional pending future 
enquiries.
The judicial service was now being reorganized, but restricted 
its activity to penal cases for the time being since the Viet Minh had 
removed all case histories, books, dossiers and archives, and what 
little remained was in disorder. A Court Martial Decree had been 
issued on 2 October which was specifically designed for all crimes and
offences against national defence, security and public order since
4?
9 March 19^5.
Correctional Tribunes dealt with common law offences, petty thefts, 
assaults and frauds. Les Jurisdictions d'Instruction consisted of five 
courts which, for the most part, quickly and summarily examined cases 
involving more serious crimes and political offences before they were 
referred to Courts-Martial; one body also dealt with police court cases. 
The principal difficulty at that time lay in identification of suspects 
(due, as mentioned, to the fact that most records had been lost or 
destroyed).
In this regard, the British Chiefs of Staff approved Mountbatten’s 
instructions to Gracey in Indochina and Christison in the Netherlands 
East Indies. These instructions were, essentially, that the local 
French courts should try cases in FIC, the Dutch were to set up military
* See note
courts until the civil courts could be reestablished, and British 
officers should not sit on these courts.
What part, if any, the Viet Minh played in manipulating French 
passions during this period of heightened tension in South Vietnam 
must remain a matter of speculation. In late November there was a 
violent reaction by the French civilian community to the murder and 
mutilation of two French children. The demand for reprisals, of 
which little had been heard for some time, now arose again. Stories 
of outrageous French behavior were supplied by Vietnamese propagandists 
to left wing foreign correspondents, who, to the mounting anger of 
French officials in Indochina, seized on them eagerly and despatched 
them to the world press.
The British reported an increase in the number of Frenchmen 
who wanted to emigrate to Australia. As Meiklereid had found in Dakar, 
"good” Frenchmen seemed unwilling to go out to the colonies, and the
shortage of qualified civil servants seemed likely to continue. The
local French community did little to overcome the difficult situation:
"The commercial community is apathetic.
Most of them expect things to return
to normal by some heaven-sent process
without doing a hand’s turn to bring it 
about. I fear that the general impression 
among the British when they leave is not
likely to be complimentary to the French."^3
On 23 November the first steps were taken to relieve the British 
of their commitments in Vietnam. Gracey issued orders dealing with 
the relief of his forces in Cholon by the French. The 9/12 Frontier 
Force Regiment were to be relieved of their commitments in Cholon by 
French troops, at which time* the battalion was to be detached from 
80 Brigade's operational control and come directly under Division 
command. All Japanese guards in Cholon and Saigon were to be relieved
on the day before 9/12 FFR handed over to the French. One 9/12 FFR
company was to relieve "C" Company, 1/1 GR (which had remained in 
Saigon to mount guard over the Control Commission when the rest of the 
1st Gurkhas went up to Thu Dau Mot). The 9/12 FFR was to move to Cap 
St. Jacques in order to prepare to receive the bulk of the surrendered 
Japanese personnel. The 9/12th advance party was scheduled to arrive at 
Cap St. Jacques on the 27th, followed by the remainder of the battalion 
(less one company) on the day after. Just north of Saigon, 9/1^
Punjab handed over all responsibility for the difficult Gia Dinh area 
to the French 9th DIC.
* 25 November 1945.
The French takeover had an ominous beginning, as their assumption 
of control was marked by an explosion and fire in their Cholon 
barracks. It seemed as if everyone in the French Army smoked cigarettes, 
and it appears that a match or lighted cigarette end accidentally fell 
into some petrol, which set off some nearby ammunition and added to 
the pyrotechnics of the evening, during all of which the Viet Minh 
started two other fires. To add to French problems, the news from 
Laos reflected the difficulty faced by the still weak French in vital 
areas there. Two captured French soldiers were beheaded by the ViSt 
Minh in Vientiane, and their severed heads were publicly exhibited.
The French were expecting a difficult time in the Nha Trang area, 
and radio and propaganda from Hue broadcast encouragement to Viet Minh 
forces opposing the French in that sector.* The French were now 
carrying out reconnaissance patrols of entrenched Viet Minh positions 
just half a mile west of Nha Trang. The Hue broadcasts continually 
spoke of "trainloads of reinforcements" arriving to help the local 
Viet Minh. To facilitate Franco-Japanese cooperation in the coming 
battles to eliminate the Viet Minh around Nha Trang, Lieutenant
* t
Colonel Gopsill of 3/1 Gurkha Rifles (fresh from the Long Kien operations)
was flown in by the RAF to act sis the liaison between the French and
Japsmese. Gopsill stayed there for about six weeks, and was in the
44-
thick of the fighting in the Nha Trang area.
There was, of course, another side to the Anglo-French pacification 
operations, and this was the vital intelligence-gathering function 
performed by a number of agencies which were, for the most part, little 
known. Their war diaries are either not available or do not adequately 
record their operations. Many small, specialized sections were cloaked 
under inocuous titles or buried within more mundsme organisations such 
sis Supply Offices, and so forth. These covert operations came to 
light on rstre occasions, such as the assassination of an agent or 
soldier performing those unique duties. A measure of the effectiveness 
of these small, special units may be gathered by the following excerpt 
from the "20th Division's History":
* Incredibly, the bad feeling between SEAC and China theatre continued 
after the war, and from Kandy Browning was obliged to ask Carton de 
Wiart, in Chungking, to protest to Wedemeyer about the stream of 
anti-British propaganda emanating from Hanoi Radio, propaganda which 
included charges that the RAF was making use of explosive toys and 
pencils.
"During the latter part of November, there 
was little change in the situation in the 
SAIGON/CHOLON area. Both in 80 Bde and 
32 Bde areas security checks were carried 
out on a very thorough basis. This entailed 
segregation of large areas and checking
the identities of 400 to 300 people a day.
High praise is due to the Field Security
personnel who operated in some of the very 
worst areas of SAIGON/CHOLON —  the price 
placed on their heads by the VIET MINH 
being a testimony to their efficiency." 45
Indeed, on 20 November, at 1430 hours, two Viet Minh assassins*
murdered Sergeant I.J.Watt of the Field Security Section. A former 
civil policeman, Sergeant Watt was killed in Cholon by grenades and 
automatic fire. He was declared Killed In Action, and the area on 
Rue de Caymai was immediately swept by the Kumaon Regiment; eight 
suspects were arrested near the house which Watt had been searching.
Viet Minh terrorism continued without respite. The 4/2 GR
Commander escaped injury when a grenade was thrown at him, and two
A. V
grenades were thrown at the Civil Purchaser's escort in the Bien Hoa
market place —  two 14/13 FFR soldiers and perhaps thirty civilians
(five of whom later died) were wounded, and fourteen suspects were
/
immediately seized. In Ben Cat, in the north, the Japanese halted a 
Viet Minh staff car during the course of a sweep and captured a woman 
in the uniform of a Viet Minh captain* Thirty Viet Minh attacked a
t  4
9/14 Punjab post on a bridge at night, but were driven back, and 3/8 
GR found seven more vehicle traps in their area. Having lost heavily 
in strong assaults on Allied troops, the Viet Minh had switched to 
small unit tactics and simple terrorism in the form of grenade throwing 
and sniping by individuals.
Rodham's brigade appeared to have heeded his exhortations to 
"get a move on", and despite the Viet Minh guerilla war the 14/13 FFR 
disarmed five Japanese units* totalling 1380 men, on the 23rd. This 
was, at least, a significant start to the disarmament of the Japanese 
forces, and on the following day Rodham issued "100 Ind Inf Bde Jap 
Surrender Instruction No.8, Collection of Money and Valuables From Japs." 
The problems generated by Japanese manipulation of currency in Indochina 
will be more fully discussed later, but Rodham's strictures on this 
subject deserve attention at this time.
* No.4. Field Hospital, Sea Transport Corps, No.7 Railway Regiment, 
Southern Army Communications Survey Detachment, and part of Head­
quarters Southern Array.
Even now, when the Financial Adviser to the Control Commission 
had not yet fully come to grips with the problem, there was growing 
unease over the extent of Japanese tampering with the local economy. 
Rodham stated that ’’There is evidence that the JAPANESE have secreted 
vast sums of French Indo-China currency in cash. The amount may be 
in the region of 800,000,000 piasters.” He went on to say that if 
indeed the Japanese had such sums under their control they would quite 
likely seek to undermine the currencies of nearby British territories 
and build up commercial undertakings "under bogus names." It must be 
made economically impossible for Japan ever again to become a military 
power, and by stripping the Japanese of their cash the Division would 
be doing its part in this worthwhile enterprise. Terauchi had been 
notified in writing about this policy, and after the Japanese had been 
"depiastered" they were to be handed back 2,000,000 piasters for 
subsistence.
Rodham had about 80 Japanese units with 35,000 troops to disarm 
and depiaster in his Inner and Outer Zones. As he recognized, "The 
amount of work to be got through in this connection is colossal...."
The Control Commission's Financial Adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Sweeny,
, n \ - *
was to be m  Bien Hoa on 26 November to lecture the 100 Brigade 
personnel directly involved in the operation. Available officers were 
drafted in for this purpose from the infantry battalions, Sappers and 
Miners Companies and Field Ambulance Units, and officers were directed 
to start looking for educated VCOs, NCOs and soldiers to help in the 
task. Rodham appreciated the extra burden this important detail 
imposed on his soldiers as he wrote, "I well know that units have NO 
clerical staff available to assist as they are already fully occupied 
with disarmament statistics, [antiQ record [insl of collection of stores 
of every description from many Jap dumps." They were also fully 
occupied with the guerilla war.
Gracey hoped to have completed the disarmament of all the
Japanese by the end of November, with the exception of outlying
garrisons and troops in transit. Under the circumstances, it was an
ambitious goal, but at the time all his commanders were exercised with
this problem, and he hoped that the disarmed Japanese could be moved
to Cap St. Jacques concentration areas beginning in early December.
To this end, 32 Brigade now disarmed five more Japanese units* totalling
* 5th Air Division units in Tan Sdn Nhtft, Go Vap, Lai Thieu and Phu Tho, 
and a smaller number of the *fth Infantry Regiment.
over 1000 troops.
On 25 November, a day on which Numata was personally reprimanded 
by Gracey for- disobeying curfew orders, the French invalidated all 
500 piaster notes as legal tender. This caused an uproar throughout
Vietnam as not only the hoarders (mainly Chinese) were affected, but
hn
thousands of British troops were now "out of pocket" as well.
The notes had actually been declared invalid on the 18th, with
an announcement that they must be paid in by the 25th. Of the grand
total of 500 piaster notes, those issued prior to 9 March 19^ -5 (the
date of the Japanese coup) would have yCP/o of their value credited to
blocked accounts. The really bad news was that all 500 piaster notes
issued after 9 March were declared invalid. This was done to deflate
the economy and counter the effects of Japanese action in issuing
about 9^0,000,000 piasters in notes between 9 March and 23 September
19^ 5? the grand total of 500 piaster notes issued before March had been
if8no more than 300,000,000 piasters. This move reduced note issue 
by a third, and rendered valueless a large proportion of notes held 
by the Japanese and, presumably, the Viet Minh.
The British Army's Financial Adviser to the Control Commission 
discovered extensive Japanese financial manipulations, showing that 
the Japanese had drawn 615,000,000 piasters in excess of normal 
commitments in 19^ 5, of which 369,000,000 were drawn during the two 
weeks immediately preceding the Japanese surrender. Most of this 
appeared to have gone to support subversive activities, and considerable 
pressure was now being placed on the Japanese to trace these funds.*
To look ahead for a moment, of 63,^02,275 piasters in cash actually 
recovered from the Japanese forces, a third of it (22,391,000) was in 
500 piaster notes. The full extent of Japanese currency manipulation 
is revealed by the fact that, between early 19^3 and 9 March 19^ 5, 
the Bank of Indochina (on Japanese instructions) printed 1,200,000,000 
piasters. More will be said of this later.
However, as the overall operation to disarm, depiaster and 
concentrate the Japanese slowly gathered momentum, British troops still 
were obliged to react to Viet Minh attempts to conduct a lower level of 
warfare based on terror and guerilla tactics. Typical of this was the 
incident on the 25th in which two 3/1 Gurkhas went to investigate a noise
* This suggests that Sainteny was correct when he asserted that the 
Japanese meant to leave behind a "time bomb" in Indochina.
in the northern tip of Khanh Hoi. They were attacked in.what appeared 
to be an ambush, but one Gurkha escaped. The other was less fortunate., 
and two Gurkha sections were immediately "scrambled" to seach for him, 
but they came under heavy fire from Viet Minh soldiers lying in wait 
and were unable to continue the search. The Gurkha was found the 
next day —  he had been clubbed to death. Two Viet Minh bodies were 
also found, casualties of the firefight with the search party. A 
little later in the day a b/Z Gurkha was caught in heavy growth near 
his platoon position north of Go Vap and killed. A k/Z GH search party 
came across his killers as they were burying his body, and one Viet 
Minh soldier was wounded and captured when the Gurkhas opened fire. 
Within the next five days, C and B Companies, 3/8 GR, reported a 
man "missing, believed killed" from each company.
Although four Gurkhas had lately been surprised and assassinated 
by Viet Minh "snatch squads", the Viet Minh themselves suffered fourteen 
more killed and five captured when Yamagichi Butai swept through a 
village near Ben Cat. These Japanese frontline infantry units, as 
opposed to the support troops, were giving a good account of themselves 
right up to the moment when they had to disarm. It was a unique 
situation in the history of warfare.
/I
Japanese reports indicated that 700 well armed Viet Minh troops,
supported by 3000 coolies, were constructing positions at Dran, along
the Dalat-Phanrang road/rail line. These were said to be elaborate
positions consisting of caves, trenches and wire, with which the French
would eventually have to deal. The French were beginning to meet this
sort of stiffer resistance in the outlying areas, and a French convoy
was ambushed near Tay Ninh —  two jeeps were lost, two men were killed
and four wounded, including a Lieutenant Colonel. Another French
patrol of the 71st Engineers was ambushed near Benluc, a few miles
southwest of Saigon, and one more Frenchman was killed and three
wounded. Although the French had swept the Cantho area earlier, Viet
Minh activity was now on the increase there. The French attack on the
strong Viet Minh positions west of Nha Trang was held in abeyance
pending the arrival of reinforcements, and more of these arrived in
Saigon on the 23th as the 1st Battalion, 27th Colonial Infantry
^9Regiment and additional elements of the 9th DIC disembarked.
These French reinforcements presented a ticklish problem for
General Auchinleck,* who was understandably acutely aware of Indian'
sensitivities in this matter. After prolonged discussion the Viceroy
of India had now agreed that ships carrying French forces for Indochina
(and flying British and American flags) could use the harbour at
50
Cochin under the following conditions. No more than two or three
ships could be in the harbour at any time, and they were not to spend
more than two or three days in Cochin. No French troops were to be
allowed to land and, as far as possible, all evidence of the presence
of French troops was to be concealed. No reference to French troops
on board was to be made in orders or telegrams unless these messages
were classified "Top Secret". The French were to be informed that if
news of the presence of French troops in an Indian port leaked out, and
the threatened labour strikes materialized, the harbour would be closed
to French ships in the future. Such was the delicacy of this matter,
and it may have affected the rate of French trooping to Indochina.
Negotiations between the British and Chinese on the exchange of
missions in Indochina had now been successfully concluded, (perhaps
due in part to the north's desperate need for southern rice), and
Gracey had decided on the composition of the liaison team he was about
to send to Hanoi. The officer selected by Gracey to represent him at
Lu Han's headquarters was Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Trevor-Wilson, an
SIS officer who in London had shared an office with Kim Philby. Trevor-
Wilson, an officer uniquely suited for this delicate task, was to
lead a mission of four men**to Hanoi on the 25th. He was advised by
Gracey that his tasks were "solely military and in no way concerned
with politics or economics except in the rare cases in which they
51definitely affect your military tasks." However, as Donnison has 
pointed out in referring to commanders in Gracey's position, Trevor- 
Wilson found it impossible to remain uninvolved as he soon was sucked 
into the whirlwind being formed in Hanoi.
In the south, although the emphasis was-on Japanese disarmament, 
the fading of November saw Gracey's battalions busy coping with the 
Viet Minh. On the 27th a 9/1^ Punjab patrol in 32 Brigade's area was
* Commander in Chief, India.
** A Major (GSO II), Warrant Officer and a Sergeant (Wireless Telegraphists), 
and sin Orderly.
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fired on, and m  the ensuing battle five Viet Minh were killed and
// /
four captured, with no Punjabi losses* In the Ben Gat area Yamagichi
Butai met stiffer resistance and ran into three ambushes; three
Japanese were wounded and one Viet Minh killed,
A unique situation developed down in Cap St. Jacques when the
9/12 FFP advance party arrived and immediately held a meeting with
the local Viet Minh chief, G.Wong. The British were willing to leave
the Viet Minh alone provided the latter did not interfere with the
main task of concentrating the Japanese in the area. But unfortunately
all the good will in the world could not get around the main sticking
point, and that was the problem of the returning French. Wrote the
Viet Minh leader for "The Annamite Government of Gap1' to the "English
Allies at Cap":^ ■
Sirs,
As a result of our interview this morning 
the Annamite Government of GAP accept your 
request in so far as it concerns the Electric 
works, Water works, and the normal functioning 
of the market, under the following conditions:
1• The control and supervision of these 
works is the concern of the Annamite 
Government. No stranger may enter 
these works without our permission.
2. The Allies must be responsible for all 
violation of the rights of the Annamite 
people by the French.
3. The Allies must assure us on the following 
two points:
(a) The non-presence of French in the 
territory of the town of CAP.
(b) Ban the French from touching our 
public buildings.
' If ever incidents occur as a result of the 
infringement of these conditions, the Allies 
must be responsible.
We await your written acceptance before starting 
the works.
Finally, we maintain good friendship towards the 
Allies, and we are ready to help them in the 
disarmament of the Japanese.
The Consul of the Annamite Government of CAP.
[signed] G. V/ONG
DANG CHEF
But even as this letter was being delivered in the south the 
Viet Minh struck again in the north, where a Force 136 officer (probably
a Frenchman) was assassinated by a Viet Minh squad. He had been in an
Arab house in the village of Btfu Long, about two miles northwest of 
Bien Hoa, when the Viet Minh burst in, killing him and wounding the two 
Arabs present —  another victim of that subterranean, secret war of 
agents. Just a day earlier another Force 136 officer, a Frenchman, had 
been wounded in Bien Hoa.
The k/Z Gurkhas in particular had been taking a toll of Viet Minh 
in their area (Saigon’s northern suburbs), and on the 27th they again 
clashed with the Viet Minh when a V 2  mobile column was ambushed. The
A
Viet Minh, who appeared to be notably active in this area, lost ten killed 
in the exchange of fire; the k/Z Gurkhas emerged unscathed and went on 
to link up with the 1st Gurkhas in Thu Dau Mot. A 9/1^+ Punjab patrol 
was fired on in the same area where a day earlier they had killed five 
Vi&t Minh. The Punjabis burnt down a few of the nearby houses and 
four rifles were captured, including two which were fished out of the 
paddy field where they were thrown on the approach of the patrol.
f v
Three Japanese were now captured by the Vi&t Minh in the Ap Bung Cau
area north of Thu Dau Mot, and another was taken by Viet Minh squads 
v
near Binh Thanh. The 100 Brigade situation report commented that these 
kidnappings were becoming more prevalent as greater numbers of Japanese 
were being disarmed. While the ^f/10 Gurkhas disarmed 920 more Japanese
3 j.
in Thu -Due, a H-/10 mortar section dropped in two rounds near a pagoda
(a known Viet Minh meeting place) and broke up a gathering of Viet
Minh who were uttering "wild cries" and beating drums.
A knife attack on some officers at the RAF Mess at Tan Sdn Nhut —
apparently made by a single assailant —  triggered a sweep by a flight
of RAF Regiment troops from 2967 Squadron. One hundred males in the
local area were rounded up and herded to a crossroads near the Mess.
There, in an unusual scene, Wing Commander Allen addressed them,
through an interpreter, by the lights of drawn up jeeps. The 1307
Wing historian recorded that "It had a profound effect upon them, and
they all filed past the Wing Commander when he permitted them to leave,
making the usual obeisances. A strange sight indeed at 2330 hours, but
these are strange conditions obtaining here and call for action which
53is not always according to the book."
But although the Viet Minh appeared to be well organized in 
propagating a steady level of violence, and in the south had a free 
hand outside the British key areas, Allied emphasis was on the formal 
Japanese surrender ceremonies and disarmament as November drew to a
close. Mountbatten’s intended visit on 30 November to Saigon, 
where he was to receive Terauchi's personal surrender, sharpened 
this emphasis as Gracey!s staff made preparations for the big event.
There were now few big targets for Gracey*s battalions to hit —  
fewer large groups for columns such as Gateforce to meet and destroy. 
But the level of violence, though locally lethal, was generally 
tolerable. The once-paralysing Viet Minh blockade of Saigon had been 
broken and life was slowly getting back to normal. The French were 
taking greater responsibility for affairs in South Vietnam, and the 
Gurkhas, Punjabis and Dogras were speculating on their next postings. 
On the 28th a large part of 32 Brigade’s sector, north of Saigon, was 
handed over to the French as the 14th Army Commander, General Sir 
Miles Dempsey, landed at Tan Sdn Nhu*t on the eve of Mountbatten's 
arrival. The end of the beginning of the modern Vietnam wars was in 
sight.
Footnotes: Chapter XIV
1 GB, PRO, WO 172/7135, War Diary 100 Indian Infantry Brigade,
Operation Instruction 56, 1 November 1945.
2 Gracey Papers, 1/1 GR Newsletter, n.d.
3 Lieutenant Colonel R.W.Clark, letter to author, 1977*
4 Ibid.
5 GB, PRO, WO 172/7793, War Diary 4/10 Gurkha Rifles, 2 November 1945*
6 GB, PRO, Wo 172/7353, War Diary 16 Light Cavalry, 5 November 1945-
7 GB, PRO, WO 172/7135, War Diary 100 Indian Infantry Brigade, "Jap
Surrender Instr No.1", 3 November 1945-
8 GB,PR0, W0203/5024, Gracey to Department of Public Relations, India,
4 November 1945.
9 Gracey Papers, Letter from Gracey to Slim, 5 November 1945*
This tailpiece may have reflected a meeting between Brigadier
Woodford, Commanding 32 Brigade, and the senior Japanese officer 
in his area. The Japanese had requested the meeting shortly 
after a sizable number of French troops had arrived in Saigon.
When he entered Woodford’s office the Japanese officer said 
that he was speaking for all Japanese when he asked that they
be excluded from having to operate with the French. In 
Japanese eyes, the French were a defeated nation and the Japanese 
did not wish to be humiliated by having to work with or for them. 
Woodford clearly recalled the phrase used by the Japanese commander 
when referring to the French: "We do not like their schemeless plans."
In other words, the French were not decisive and often changed their 
plans. [Brigadier E.C.J.Woodford, personal interview, 23 September 1973-3
'JVC.
10 Lieutenant Colonel Clark, Letter, 1977*
11 Gracey Papers, "20th Division’s History", n.p.,n.d.
12 Rodham's directives were as follows:
Searching must be done politely and cheerfully 
and the people themselves will NOT be searched.
All civilian vehicles will be searched whether 
they are flying a CHINESE flag or NOT. In 
many cases Tongas, Bullock Carts etc. will only 
be carrying passengers and all that will be 
necessary is to stop them, have a glance inside, 
or perhaps make the passengers get out for a 
moment or so that one can see that they are 
not sitting on anything.
All vehicles must be searched but we must do 
it in such a manner that we will NOT antagonise 
friendliness.
The institution of these CHECK POSTS is at first 
annoying for the population. It has been found, 
however, from other anti-terrorist campaigns that 
provided such searches are politely carried out, 
in the long run, they help a great deal in 
restoring public confidence.
Even if we do NOT succeed in finding many arms, 
these CHECK POSTS will impress on the population 
that we really do intend to catch offenders. This 
will give those who are inclined to be friendly 
confidence that we really mean to enforce law and 
order.
(GB,PR0,W0 172/7135, 100 Ind Inf Bde Op Instr No.5, 5 November 1945*3
13 Gracey Papers, "20th Indian Division's History".
14 Some civilians may well havef become casualties in this operation, 
for the entire village of B&n Cat, numbering about 800, began 
evacuating the village to the north bank of the river on the 
approach of the Gurkhas. Casualties were "unknown" when eight 
of the boats were sunk. From the 100 Brigade situation reports 
the Gurkhas, sniped at all the way, pushed the snipers back
into B&n Cat, and it seems likely that the Viet Minh either ordered 
or persuaded the population to desert the village.
|GB, PRO, WO 172/7135, I 1222, 7 November 1945^
15 GB, PRO, WO 172/7135i War Diary 100 Indian Infantry Brigade,
7 November 1945*
16 GB, PRO, WO 172/7008, War Diary 20 Indian Division, "INTSUM No.50",
7 November 1945*
17 Gracey Papers, 7 November 1945*
18 A 3/1 Gurkha officer interviewed by the author stated that while 
he was on a mission to Mytho local French agents had passed him 
information of clandestine midnight flights in and out of the 
Mytho-Ccinthc? area by US C-47 aircraft. These aircraft were said 
to be ferrying arms in and out of the area, between Cochinchina 
and Tonkin, and the OSS was suspected of directing the operations.
19 For example, "Op Directive No.2", signed by Gracey, directed 
Major M.Sadiq Khan, 9/A  Punjab, to act as Liaison Officer to 
Lieutenant Colonel Massu for Operation "Stica", the drive to 
Tay Ninh. He was to pass French orders to the Japanese, who 
would not deal directly with the French. Of the operation 
itself, the ^/^k Punjab historian wrote:
As French columns go it was apparently a 
success but the method of conducting the 
operation was somewhat novel to our way of 
thinking. Apparently the column moved at 
a uniform speed of some V? m.p.h. and if any 
casualties occurred a detachment of French 
nurses were left behind without protection, 
to look after them and catch up as best 
they could. Luckily they all did catch up 
but, knowing the Annamite, it makes one 
shudder to think of it.
20 The Summary of Instructions stated that 20 Division was to 
relieve the Australian forces in the South West Pacific Arfea, 
the first brigade group going out to British Borneo in mid- 
December. Division Headquarters and the second brigade group 
were destined for Dutch Borneo and the Celebes in mid-January, 
and the third brigade group was to go to Ambon and Dutch
New Guinea as soon as the French were able to complete the 
relief of Gracey's forces. Actually, the last brigade,
100 Brigade, returned to India.
(Gracey Papers, Appendix "A", ALFFTC No. 3362/G, 9 November 19^5«]
21 Gracey Papers, Leclerc letter to Gracey, 12 November 19^5.
22 GB, PRO, FO 371A6309, F 10117, 10 November 19^5-
23 GB, PRO, WO 203/2019i "Turnover of Command in FTC and NEI",
9 November 19^5*
2*4- GB, PRO, WO 172/7826, War Diary, 1st Battalion, Kuraaon Regiment,
11 November 19^5*
25 GB, PRO, WO 172/7008, War Diary 20 Indian Division.
26 GB, PRO, WO 203/502^, Gracey to Mountbatten, 13 November 19^5*
27 GB, PRO, WO 172/7135, War Diary 100 Indian Infantry Brigade, 
Appendix A to "100 Ind Inf Bde Jap Surrender Instruction No.8",
2^ f November 19 +^5. Gracey letter dated 17 November 19^5«
28 GB, PRO, WO 172/7008, War Diary 20 Indian Division, No. 3365/GS,
17 November 19^ +5*
29 GB, PRO, WO 203/^9^1, Mountbatten to Browning, 17"November 19^ 5*
30 GB, PRO, WO 172/M+31, Minutes of Meeting, 19 November 19^ +5*
31 GB, PRO, WO 172/7135i War Diary 100 Indian Infantry Brigade,
19 November 19^5*
32 Gracey Papers, 3/1 Gurkha Rifles Newsletter.
33 Lieutenant Colonel E.Gopsill, personal interview, 12 December 1977.
34 Ibid.
(^Gracey Papers, 9/A  Punjab Newsletter^ 
58^ -
35 Gracey Papers, "20th Indian Division's History", p.1*f.
36 Lieutenant Colonel Gopsill, interview, 12 December 1977-
37 Gracey Papers, 3/1 GR Newsletter.
38 Ibid.
39 GB, PRO, 172/7008, War Diary 20 Indian Division, Minutes of 
20 November Conference, 21 November 19^5*
kQ Ibid., INTSUM No.65, 22 November 19^5- 
GB, PRO, 10 371/53957.
b2 GB, PRO, FQ 371/^6310, Meiklereid to Foreign Office, 26 October 19^5*
43 GB, PRO, FQ 371/55957i SITREP, Meiklereid to Dening, 30 November 19^5*
While Anglo-French relations were generally good, there
were occasions when good will was strained. The primary 
foci of British complaints were the apparent lack of fire 
discipline of the French troops and the French attitude 
towards,‘and treatment of, the Vietnamese. British/Indian 
troops and buildings came under French fire on a number of 
occasions, often for no readily discernible reason. Typical 
of this was the incident of 19 November when the 63rd Indian 
Infantry Workshop Headquarters received a number of machine 
gun bursts from the newly-arrived French in Cholon. Dozens 
of rounds just missed the barracks as a French armored car 
travelled the street firing on both sides. The IEME 
commander happened to be inspecting the 63rd at the time 
and himself came close to being shot by the French barrage. 
Understandably incensed, he filed a complaint against the 
French. [But while he was unhappy with French indiscipline, 
he ordered his four Indian Field Company Commanders to 
tighten up discipline in their own units].
At least one Gurkha, and possibly more, was shot dead 
by the French, and a sentry at the 2/8 Punjab mess narrowly 
missed being shot when the French fired on him with machine 
guns at 0300 on 26 November. He had replied to the French 
patrol's challenge with "Friend Anglais!", at which time 
the French opened-fire. It happened that these French 
soldiers had only arrived in Indochina on the previous evening 
and had been told to fire on anyone not replying to them in 
French. Fortunately, the sentry's companion recognized the 
patrol as French and managed to restrain his colleague from 
returning fire with his own light machine gun, thereby 
possibly saving needless Allied casualties.
A 20 Division Intelligence Summary- listed complaints from 
80 Brigade about the police. While acknowledging the French 
problems, the report stated:
On frequent occasions they have failed 
entirely to fulfil commitments, the 
most glaring example being a case where 
the French Police undertook on four 
successive days to relieve a British 
guard and on each day failed to turn up.
[GB, PRO, WO 172/7128, 20 Division Intelligence Summary, Appendix E, 
22 November 19^5*]
The same summary also had this to say:
The IORs have begun to distrust both 
the French troops and civil authorities.
The shoddy turnout of French troops, their 
bad discipline and their habit of lounging 
about on street corners have caused the 
average sepoy to feel contempt for them.
The French police too have not impressed 
the IORs as a result of their indiscriminate 
shooting at night at mere shadows, bad 
behavior while cooperating with units on 
raids on suspect areas, and ruthless and 
brutal treatment on occasions of civilians 
detained for interrogation.
The engineers also had their problems. On 19 November, major 
repairs on the power house boilers were necessary, including 
rebricking the furnaces. The U22nd Indian Field Company reported 
that "Cooperation from the French [was] most disheartening.11 
When sapper engineers were withdrawn from the pumphouse on the 
21st, the French sent no replacements, despite repeated requests 
to do so.
Nor were the leaders spared. On 29 October Gracey, who had already 
criticised C&iile and Rivier, had harsh words for two other 
officials. Cedile's deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Anthonioz, was 
described as "small minded, lacking in imagination and pigheaded", 
and Colonel Martin (head of the French mission to the Control 
Commission), came under Gracey*s withering pen. Martin, wrote 
Gracey, "does little but waste the time of our overworked staff 
with minor details and cannot even speak English." However, 
Leclerc's Chief of Staff, Repiton-Preneuf, was complimented 
by Gracey.
Gopsill returned to Saigon in time to rejoin his unit as it 
embarked for Macassar in late January. Years later, a group 
of South Vietnamese Army officers toured Britain. Their itinerary 
included the School of Infantry at Warminster, where Gopsill 
was an Instructor. One of the Vietnamese officers approached 
Gopsill and asked if he had ever been in Nha Trang in late 19U£* 
When Gopsill replied that he had, the officer said, "I commanded 
the Viet Minh force opposing you. It was our aim to kill the 
big British major."
Gracey Papers, "20th Indian Division's History."
GB, PRO, WO 172/713E>» War Diary 100 Brigade, 2k November 19U5*
Not everyone suffered from the impending recall of the 500 
piaster notes. A British officer's commandeered car suffered 
a flat tire during this period, and since there was no key to 
the trunk (boot), the lock was shot off. The lid flew up, 
revealing an amazing sight. The officer —  who, because of 
this incident, requested anonymity when interviewed by the author - 
found the trunk stuffed with boxes of what appeared to be 
"monopoly mony", but which were, in fact, 500 piaster notes.
He and the officers with him decided to remain silent about their 
discovery. They tried an experiment with the freshly-printed 
notes, which were determined to have belonged to a Viet Minh 
paymaster (who himself had stolen them or had received them
from the Japanese). They took a single note and bought 
a bottle of whisky —  when they received change, with no 
questions asked, they decided that the notes were genuine.
At about this time news was received of the plan to 
recall the $00 piaster notes. The entire battalion was 
immediately formed up on the following morning, and in 
keeping with their long-standing policy of dividing spoils, 
the money —  which equalled the staggering sum of £27,000 
sterling, was divided among the men and a portion put into 
the battalion fund. The men had one day in which to spend 
all they could. Through some deft manipulation a large 
portion of the money stayed in the unit fund, and until its 
disbandment there were no more mess bills for members, and 
the troops always had the best of recreational equipment, 
sporting gear, etc.
The Division Finance Officer, who had his suspicions, visited 
the unit and asked about the money —  there would be no 
questions asked if the money was turned in. That story has 
remained relatively unknown for all these years, and there are 
a few more like this yet to be told.
GB, PRO, F0 371/53957, F1058, 30 November 1945*
Substantial French forces were en route to Saigon at this time. 
Thousands of troops were aboard ships flying the U.S., British 
and French flags. As of 29 November the Orontes (British) and 
Pasteur (French) were already in Saigon. The Stanford. Kings-point. 
Winchester. Pachang. Taos. Lake Charles (all U.S.) and Bridan 
(British, flag, French crew) had just passed Singapore. The 
Georgetown and Amherst (U.S.) were out of radio contact but had 
passed Colombo. The Boissevain and Johande Witt (Dutch) were to 
sail from Marseilles on 29 November and 4 December respectively.
The Felix Roussel (French), Monarch of Bermuda. Cameronia.
Arundel Castle (British) had been cancelled. Trooping for the 
remainder of 9 DIC had not been fully confirmed as yet.
GB, PRO, WO 172/1793, War Diary Headquarters SEAC, Rear 
SACSEA to SACSEA (MOKAN 1234), 26 November 1945*
Papers of Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Trevor-Wilson, 24 November 1945- 
Trevor-Wilson's orders were as follows:
ASSIGNMENT.
You are Senior Military Representative of a Military 
Mission whose tasks are outlined below and which tasks are 
solely military and in no way concerned with politics or 
economics except in the rare cases in which they.definitely 
effect your military tasks.
CHARTER.
Your duties as leader of the Military Mission at HANOI are 
as follows:-
(a) You will act as my Military Representative with 
your H.Q. at HANOI, and as such you will present
to Commanding General LUHAN all problems which have 
arisen or which may arise in order that you may 
reach the most expeditious settlement.
(b) You will confer with the Chinese authorities on the 
exact demarkation of the 16th parallel, with a view 
to the solution of such occupational problems as 
have arisen or may arise in territory on either side 
of it.
(c) You will ensure that early information is exchanged 
between General LUHAN and myself on the subject of 
the premeditated arrival in either area of Missions, 
representatives etc; this will also include the 
flight across the 16° parallel of such aircraft as 
may be necessary for one purpose or another, where 
such aircraft intend to land within French Indo China.
(d) You will ensure that no inconvenience or inefficiency 
is caused by the unheralded arrival of official or 
semi-official representatives in either HANOI or SAIGON.
(e) You will ensure the easy exchange of information between 
my H.Q. and that of General LUHAN on all problems of 
mutual interest and importance.
(f) You will transmit to the correct authorities in HANOI 
such information as I may desire;
(g) You will endeavour to ensure the expeditious turn 
round of such ships as may be sailed from SAIGON to 
ports in northern F.I.C. with a view to an exchange 
of coal for rice. You will keep me informed of any 
delays or difficulties which may occur and you will 
take such immediate steps as may be necessary to make 
adequate preparations for the proper safeguarding of 
such commodities, either arriving from SAIGON or due 
for shipment to SAIGON.
(h) You will examine the possibility of accrediting British 
and other War Correspondents to the Chinese at HANOI.
COMMUNICATION.
You will communicate reports on your task as they are necessary 
by wireless using such means as you have in your possession and 
by the despatch of Mail Bags, informing me by W/T. of their E.T.A.
It will be essential for you to return to SAIGON on or about the 
10th December, 1945, in order to make a full report.
D.D. Gracey,
Major General,
Commander,
H.Q. SACSEA Commission No.1,
Saigon.
24th November. 1945.
In addition, Trevor-Wilson was assigned ten covert tasks:
TO: Lt.Colonel A.G. TREVOR-WILSON 
Major E. Esiing.
You are in possession of your Charter signed by General 
GRACEY, in addition to your Charter you have a list of items 
which are of obvious interest to General GRACEY, but some of 
which cannot appear in an official Charter; apart from those 
of which you are well aware and which are contained in your 
list, the following summarizes those points which are of 
particular interest to General GRACEY and which do not appear 
in the official Charter:-
1. Release of British aircraft held at TODRANE.
2. Extent of disarmament of Japanese forces carried 
out by Chinese.
3. Extent of move northward of Chinese forces out of F.I.C.
U* Work done by Chinese forces towards documentation 
and collection of evidence of War Criminals, with 
special reference to those War Criminals likely to be 
indited by the British Empire.
5. Future programme and policy for Chinese forces in 
northern F.I.C., with especial stress laid on their 
plans for hand over to the French Authorities.
6. Number of French Officers under arrest in Annamite 
gaols.
7. The strength of Annamite forces and all details.
8. Indian Independence Movement Organization and extent 
of its membership or that of kindred societies.
9. Evidence of Japanese’ "stay behind" movement.
10. Broadcasts by Hanoi Radio.
DIMSEY
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff,
GB, PRO, WO 172/1793» War Diary Headquarters SEAC, 27 November 19U5* 
GB, PRO, Air 29/1118, 1307 Wing War Diary, November 19U5-
CHAPTER XV
DRAWDOWN
The camaraderie which exists between 
Officers of the Indian Army and their 
Gurkha and Indian soldiers must be 
explained to them. Our men, of whatever 
colour, are our friends and not considered 
1 black* men. They expect and deserve to 
be treated in every way as first class 
soldiers, and their treatment should be, 
and is, exactly the same as that of white 
troops.
There is no more fruitful source of friction 
between Indian Army Officers and their men 
on the one side, and French troops on the 
other, than when our Indian and Gurkha 
troops are regarded and treated as 1black* 
by French officers and men. I mention 
this point particularly as cases have 
occurred in which it is obvious that our 
Indian Army traditions have not been 
understood.
General Gracey to General Leclerc 
Saigon, 12 December 19U5*
As November drew to a close a 3/1 Gurkha writer summed it
up fairly well: "... November closed fairly quietly after a similar 
beginning, but a stormy middle period." The arrival of the French 
in British key areas was viewed with mixed feelings. Wrote a 9/^b 
Punjab:
"Our area in GIADINH, except for our own 
barracks, has now been taken over by the 
9th French Div. There is a word for 
discipline in the French Dictionary but 
apparently it is obsolete; however their 
senior officers are charming and affable 
and say that we are 'Tres Sympathetique'.
We have made some good friends among them 
but do wish that they would stop calling 
all Indian Troops *Les GOORKHAS *; we have 
explained- that *Les POONJABS' are the 
ones that really count and hope to educate 
them in time." 2
The Punjab historian went on to echo the universal British/ Indian 
complaint of the fresh French troops:
"Since their arrival in GIADINH our nights, 
previously quiet and peaceful, have 
resounded to the noise of musketry on 
all sides. We started off 'standing to* 
and thinking that the whole Annamite army 
was attacking us but now realise that it 
is merely 'Trigger happiness* on the part 
of our Allies; the French maxim seems to 
be 'when in doubt discharge your weapon 
as rapidly as possible and in any directioni *
Luckily they usually shoot, into the air and 
anyhow we have a wall round us. 'Vive la 
France1 or at least those who survive the 
nightly fusillades from their comrades." 3
The apparently complete lack of French fire discipline culminated 
in a 3/1 GR sentry being shot dead on the docks, and the 3/1 platoon 
which went to retrieve his body was also fired on.* The 3/1 Gurkha 
base area again came under fire on the following day, despite the 
intervention of the commander of D Company, 3/1 GR, who had asked the 
French to stop it.^
These unfortunate incidents occurred not infrequently. One Gurkha 
officer interviewed in 1977 stated that a French officer refused to 
acknowledge the challenge by one of his Gurkha sentries; the Gurkha 
shot the Frenchman dead, and his body was immediately buried. No 
report was ever filed of this incident.
Gracey now had a direct link to Hanoi, as Trevor-Wilson had 
announced on 28 November that the Saigon-Hanoi communications link 
was open. On the same day, at 1700 hours, the main body of 9 FFR had 
arrived at Cap St. Jacques by river and found the town almost 
deserted and most of the nicer bungalows looted. The Japanese helped 
the battalion to unload and move into their new home (the Grand Hotel)
on the sea front. The Mayor's house became the officers' mess.
> >
In Thu Due, i+/lO GR now began their "Japanese Financial Disarmament" 
and four Gurkha officers collected over 8£ million piasters and gold 
bullion worth about two million pounds sterling,^ plus a "considerable 
quantity" of opium which was also handed in by the Japanese. On the 
following day they collected about three million piasters in addition 
to jewelry, watchesi cameras, and so on. The magnitude of this vitally 
important "depiastering" operation may be appreciated when it is 
realized that these enormous amounts of money, gold and opium were 
collected by a single battalion in two days. Furthermore, thousands 
of Japanese troops outside the British key areas had to travel to the 
key areas to be disarmed and to turn over their valuables. There was 
just no way to check on the amount of arms, ammunition and money which 
were quite probably turned over to the Viet Minh as these Japanese 
units made their way to the British area around Saigon.
The 11+th Army Commander, Lieutenant General Dempsey, arrived in
t
Saigon a day before Mountbatten, reaching Tan Sdh Nhut on 28 November, 
and was greeted at the airport by Gracey and Leclerc. He chaired a 
meeting at 20 Division Headquarters and did his best to answer the 
unanswerable concerning the future of the division and of the role, 
if any, of British officers in the Indian Army sifter independence.
Even as Dempsey was talking the Gurkhas were out hunting for 
Viet Minh. The 1+/2 Gurkhas plus 16 Cavalry were in two columns, working 
two main roads between Tan Son Nhut and Thu Dau Mot. Approaching the 
Saigon River near Thu Dau Mot they surprised -a Viet Minh ambush party 
digging up the road at an elbow bend about three miles south of the 
town. The Viet Minh fled on seeing the Gurkhas, and the two columns 
met and swept the area. The Viet Minh were again encountered near 
the river, and ten were killed; the rest threw their weapons into the 
river and tried to escape to the north bank, only to find the 1/1 
Gurkhas waiting for them there. Several more Viet Minh were killed by 
the 1/1 Gurkhas, and k/2 GR then returned to base without incident.
No British/Indian casualties were incurred during the operations.
On 29 November the Supremo himself arrived in Saigon. He had 
earlier visited Tavoy, on the Tennasserim coast,, and at 1630 landed 
at Tan Sdn Nhu*fc. In their discussions Gracey stated that Terauchi * s 
health was deteriorating rapidly and there was some doubt as to whether 
the Japanese Field Marshal "could stand the strain of a move to 
Singapore."^ Mountbatten agreed that Terauchi should at least remain 
the titular head of Japanese forces to keep unbroken the chain of 
command from the Emperor on down. Terauchi was to remain in Saigon 
until Gracey departed, at which time the decision would be made as to 
whether he would be moved to Singapore, stay in Saigon or be returned 
to Japan. Mountbatten reiterated that he was aware that "Terauchi 
was a major war criminal., but that in his present state of health he 
doubted that he would ever be brought to trial, and that he would 
inform the Chiefs of Staff accordingly".
Although extra security precautions had kept the nearby 80 
Brigade area quiet, trouble continued in the outlying areas. In 32 
Brigade*s area two Japanese were wounded when a convoy of three supply 
trucks was ambushed about seven miles northwest of Tan Sdh Nhut; two 
more Japanese were wounded near Thu Dau Mot, and in the I'^ ytho area 
the French killed 22 Viet Minh, captured 16 and destroyed an arms and 
grenade factory.
At last, on 30 November, the moment came for Mountbatten to 
receive the personal surrender of his Japanese counterpart. The scene 
was the rear of Gracey*s residence, where a red carpet was laid at the 
foot of the stairs leading down from the palace. Representatives from 
the various Indian, Gurkha and British units were represented and lined 
up on the stairs, forming a cordon through which Mountbatten was to descend. 
Waiting in the courtyard, off the carpet, were the old Field Marshal and 
his aide, who was holding the box containing the two swords. After a 
suitable delay Mountbatten, in white, descended the stairs and faced 
Terauchi; the time was 1000. The Supreme Allied Commander then stated:
"I am now going to accept the swords of Field- 
Marshal Count Terauchi as a symbol of the 
final act of surrender of the Supreme 
Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces 
of the Southern Regions to me as Supreme 7
Allied Commander of the South East Asia Command."
Terauchi then saluted and handed over the box. It was all over 
in a few minutes; for some reason Dempsey did not stay for the ceremony, 
as he departed Saigon at 0900. According to Gracey*s papers, two
British Army doctors also attended the ceremony —  they stood by with 
a syringe of morphine at the ready:
"For a long time F M  Terauchi had been 
due to surrender his sword to the 
Supremo but this had been postponed on 
account of the former*s ill health.
Before the Supremo*s visit to FIC in 
Nov we were asked to examine Terauchi 
to see if he was fit to attend a ceremony.
A medical board of Col Jackson, Lt Col 
Passmore, and Major Miller, examined 
him at HQ Jap Southern Army. They found 
him hemi-plegic, and suffering from 
marked arteriosclerosis with cerebral 
degeneration. They advised that Terauchi 
should not be put to the strain of a 
public ceremony but could participate 
in a small private one —  and this took 
place with Major Brook and Major Miller 
standing by with a syringe of morphia 
just in case...." 8
By 1030 Mountbatten was holding a meeting at Gracey*s residence 
attended by the two senior French officials, B*Argenlieu and Leclerc 
(plus their Chiefs of Staff), Gracey, Kimmins, Hirst, Scott-Bell 
(Royal Navy), Micklereid, Clarac (D*Argenlieu's Political Adviser) and 
J.Rayner (Psychological Warfare).
Coming straight to the point, Mountbatten said that it looked as 
if the first brigade of 20 Division would leave at the end of December, 
followed a month later by General Gracey, Division Headquarters and 
the second brigade. He then asked the French if these proposals were 
acceptable, to which Leclerc replied that the departure of the first 
brigade posed no problem, but the movement of Gracey and the second 
brigade "should not be fixed firmly, as it depended on the arrival of 
the 9th D.I.C."
Although Gracey and Leclerc had enormous respect for each other,
Gracey now interjected to state that in his opinion the second brigade
could depart as planned, as it was not necessary to await the arrival
9
of 9 DIC's equipment. D ’Argenlieu then said that "General Leclerc 
had only meant that he must have sufficient equipment to ensure that 
he would be able to employ the division as such."
Mountbatten suggested that Gracey and Leclerc could settle the 
matter in the light of events at the time, and if a serious holdup 
of 9 DICfs equipment occurred the question might have to be reconsidered. 
However, the driving factors in this case were the intricate interlocking 
theatre movements, one piece being the departure of the second brigade
and their subsequent relief of the Australians in the Celebes.
Mountbatten said that the third brigade would also probably be used 
to relieve Australians, and that any undue delays would have to be 
negotiated with the Prime Minister of Australia. Could General Leclerc 
give any indication as to when the third brigade [100 Brigade] could be 
withdrawn?
Leclerc replied "that he could not possibly take the responsibility 
for guarding all the disarmed Japanese in French Indo-China until all 
the French forces which he was expecting had arrived from Europe."
This, however, depended mainly on the shipment of equipment from 
Britain. However, it appeared that the third brigade could depart when 
3 DIC had received its equipment. Leclerc added that he had received 
a telegram from the French military attache in London saying that the 
British had accepted responsibility for moving the French brigade 
from Madagascar.
Mountbatten "said that when in Delhi the Viceroy had informed 
him that Indian agitators were making much capital out of the employment 
of Indian troops in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies."
The minutes of the meeting went on to record:
"In these circumstances he [Mountbatten] ■ 
regretted that at the request of the 
Government of India the original intention 
to place British/Indian troops under French 
command after the departure of General 
Gracey, could not now be carried out. He 
regretted this decision, but the matter 
was out of his hands."
It is doubtful if all this handwashing was really necessary for 
a*straightforward soldier like Leclerc, but after Mountbatten made 
his regrets both D*Argenlieu and Leclerc assured him that they understood.
Mountbatten then returned to this theme of avoiding potentially 
unfavourable publicity. He told the French that he would have no 
objection to Leclerc immediately taking over direct command of French 
forces, acting under D ,Argenlieu instead of Gracey, Mountbatten said 
that Government approval would have to be sought for this, and "he did 
not wish to press it, but he put it forward from a desire to help the 
French as much as possible." It would also "ease the political criticisms 
being levelled in India and other parts of the world."
The French again said that they understood, but Leclerc, in 
saying that he appreciated the offer, thought that "certain difficulties"
might make it impossible to separate the commands at this time. In 
his opinion the proper time for that was the departure of General 
Gracey and the arrival of the remainder of 9 DIG.
After again turning down D'Argenlieuts request to transfer the 
disputed Cambodian area from General Evans in Bangkok to Gracey,
Mountbatten turned to the subject of aircraft for the French. Leclerc 
had asked for a squadron of Spitfires, and Mountbatten wondered whether 
the French would accept Japanese fighters pending consideration of the 
request. Leclerc replied that he did not want to address the proposal 
unless there was no hope of obtaining the Spitfires.
Mountbatten again indicated his aversion to adverse criticism, 
explaining that "as an Allied Commander he had to follow the general 
principle of the United Nations in regard to the use of Force against 
native populations." The Allied forces under Gracey had to conform to 
these principles and he "did not want to lay down definite guidelines 
which would restrict the French, unduly." He left it to Gracey and 
Leclerc to sort out the separation of British and French commands in 
Vietnam. D fArgenlieu agreed.
Mountbatten had to tread lightly over this issue, for the next 
item of discussion concerned the export of food from Cochinchina.
Mountbatten needed the rice surpluses from Indochina to alleviate the 
serious food shortages throughout the rest of his command. D*Argenlieu 
replied that his own situation was not too good either, but he would 
do what he could to help "if his situation improved."
Saigon Radio was discussed next, and the British proposed that 
the French should take it over Immediately, subject to certain reservations. 
D*Argenlieu raised the question of SACSEA directives after Gracey*s 
departure, for he felt that "one of the principal points of sovereignty 
was control of the radio...." Mountbatten again replied that these 
directives "were not entirely his own product, but that they were based 
on directives received from the Foreign Office in London, and that he 
understood that they were issued under the auspices of the United Nations." 
The Supreme Allied Command had now twice invoked the United Nations in 
giving the impression that he was so far down the chain of command as to 
be virtually powerless in this matter, at which point D ’Argenlieu quietly 
asked if it might be confirmed that these directives were indeed issued 
under the authority of the United Nations; Mountbatten replied that he
would have to check on this. D'Argenlieu then asked if Mountbatten 
had listened to Hanoi Radio, and suggested that the Chinese "might 
also be reminded of their obligations to the United Nations". But 
Mountbatten had been attempting for some time to get the Americans 
to intervene with the Chinese to control the vituperative and 
inflammatory Communist propaganda emanating from Hanoi, but without 
success.
Mountbatten emplaned for Singapore on the following day.
Terauchi, whose request to say a few words during his surrender ceremony 
had been curtly denied, was waiting at the airfield to speak to 
Mountbatten. The Supreme Allied Commander had granted Terauchi’s 
request to deliver a note, provided it was brief (less than 1-J- minutes).
The old Field Marshal, now a pathetic figure despite his status
as a major war criminal, expressed his "heartfelt gratitude and deep
emotion" at the consideration shown to him by Mountbatten during the
surrender ceremony the previous day. On behalf of the officers and
men of the Southern Army he thanked the Allied Commander for granting
a special holiday on the occasion of the Meiji Festival on 3 November,
and assured Mountbatten that Southern Army "will continue faithfully to
carry out their duties in connection with the surrender." Terauchi
said that he looked forward "with pleasure" at receiving Mountbatten' s
personal guidance, and concluded by saying ". . may I congratulate
Your Excellency on your notable victory and express to you my warm
10
appreciation for your having granted me a personal interview."
Mountbatten responded by saying that General Gracey had reported
that Terauchi was carrying out his orders, and added, "I may say
privately, and this will interest the Field Marshal, that I am sending
11
one of the swords to the King." Terauchi again burst into tears 
during this meeting, and he remains an enigma, for an RAF witness 
wrote that the Field Marshal and his senior officers appeared to be in 
good spirits on Mountbatten*s departure.*
Mountbatten, on his departure from Saigon, noted in his diary 
that Leclerc had declared, "Your General Gracey has saved French Indo 
China.’" The Supreme Allied Commander also wrote that Gracey was
* When on his arrival in Singapore in March, 19U&, Terauchi asked for 
a meeting with SACSEA, Mountbatten said that "he did not feel much 
disposed to meet Field Marshal Terauchi again after the lachrymose 
efforts which had followed his last meeting."
"doing a first-class job", a significant reversal of opinion as he had 
been on the point of dismissing Gracey just a few weeks earlier (before 
the Chiefs of Staff had overruled his wish to restrict Gracey to the 
immediate vicinity of Saigon).
Even as Mountbatten was leaving Saigon, 1^/13 FFR was in action
ft ^
against the Viet Minh in the Bien Hoa area. A mobile column went in 
pursuit of Viet Minh reported to be about three miles southeast of 
Bien Hoa; another platoon travelled by river to land downstream in 
support of the mobile column. As the river-borne platoon made the turn 
south on the loop of the river it came under heavy fire from Viet Minh 
on the bank. There were no 1 V ^ 3  FFR casualties, but five Viet Minh 
were killed.
A few days later Mountbatten was joined in Singapore by the two 
senior Allied officers in Vietnam, as Generals Gracey and Leclerc 
arrived to attend the Supreme Allied Commander's 3 ° ° ^  Meeting, which 
was held in Government House on 6 December at 1730 hours. This was 
an occasion of unusual importance because the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, was present.* What 
his thoughts were at this time tempt speculation, for he had already 
received Major General Hyman*s letter informing him about the dissatisfaction 
with Mountbatten * s leadership shared by a number of the most senior 
officers, and there is little doubt he had already discussed this matter 
with some of them.** Also present were Browning, Park (RAF), Dempsey 
(who was succeeding Slim as ALFSEA Commander in Chief), Evans (ALFSIAM), 
Dening, Meiklereid (Gracey's Political Adviser) and other key staff 
officers. After discussing the subject of disputed territory between 
Siam and Cambodia the rest of the meeting (eight items on the agenda) 
was devoted to Indochina.
The Supreme Allied Commander asked Leclerc to "give a brief 
summary of the situation as he saw it in French Indo-China". Leclerc 
began by saying that by comparison with what was happening in Java
* It was during this time that Alanbrooke assured Gracey that the
proclamation of 19/21 September, to which Mountbatten had violently 
objected, was correct in its form and timing.
** These discussions may have been influential in the decision of the 
Chiefs of Staff to disapprove Mountbatten*s strong suggestion that 
a Supreme Commander, and associated command and staff structure, be 
retained after his departure and the disbandment of SEAC. The 
services, especially the Army and Navy, strongly opposed the retention 
of a Supreme Commander.
things were not too bad in Indochina. But he stressed that the 
reason the French had achieved success so far was because they had not 
over-extended themselves —  they had done only what was possible. He 
also said that the part of Indochina under control was small when 
compared to the remainder. In order to finish the task he needed the
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3rd DIC and the Expeditionary Corps units —  especially their equipment.
In response to a question by Alanbrooke, Major General Denning, 
the PAO*, stated that eleven ships with French troops had arrived in 
Saigon or were at sea between Singapore and Saigon; two more ships 
were expected in mid-December, which should complete the buildup of 
9 DIC (less a certain number of vehicle parties). The British had 
already supplied the French with 600 vehicles in Indochina, and would 
hand over another 1300 on the departure of 20 Indian Division. Denning 
added that the first ship carrying troops of the 3rd DIC (the Arundel 
Castle) was due to sail from Marseilles on 18 December. Two other big 
liners were scheduled to sail on 3 January and one more on 10 January.
The remainder of 3 DIC’s trooping had not been fixed yet, but the four 
ships mentioned would carry between eight and nine thousand troops; the 
passage took four weeks. In response to another question by Alanbrooke, 
Denning replied that 1900 vehicles in India were earmarked for 3 DIC, 
of which I4OO were to be shipped in December.
Mountbatten then informed Leclerc of a report which had recently 
appeared in the Chicago Sun** newspaper, stating that the crews of 
eight American ships (each of which had carried 2000 French troops to 
Saigon) were "resentful of this task". These crews "had declared that 
they would have preferred to have been employed repatriating American 
troops from Europe", an unsurprising statement given the political 
preferences of their union leaders.
Leclerc made no comment on this information and, in a reply 
to Mountbatten1s question, voiced his agreement with the proposed British 
drawdown in Indochina, saying that he wished to
"emphasise most particularly the great 
need for landing craft. This arose 
because the roads in French Indo-China 
were in very bad shape, and were often 
cut by the rebels, whereas, particularly 
in the south, there were many rivers and
* Political Affairs Officer.
** A newspaper known to be strongly isolationist and, for some reason, 
virulently anti-British.
canals which could he used for troop 
movements and supplies. North of Saigon 
all the key towns were on the coast and 
could only be reached by sea. The lack 
of landing craft had caused casualties 
in previous operations; for an example 
at Nha Trang a landing on the beaches 
was not possible because there was no 
landing craft. Instead the landing had 
to take place in the harbour itself.
They had to be landed in an unarmoured 
native junk and ten men were killed or 
wounded by a light machine-gun." 13
Leclerc was then invited to send the French aircraft carrier 
B e a m  to Singapore to fetch what landing craft were available, but, 
since the B e a m  was equipped with 12-ton cranes, only the smaller 
craft could be transferred in this manner. It was also agreed that 
harbour defence motor launches would be handed over to the French, and 
Sir Keith Park added that the Air Ministry in London had authorized the 
transfer of twelve Mark VIII Spitfires to the French.
Mountbatten closed the meeting by announcing the appointment 
of Brigadier Maunsell as Head of the Inter-Service Mission which was 
to be established on Gracey*s departure and the disbandment of the 
Control Commission, and Leclerc said that "he agreed that this was 
a most suitable appointment."^
Prior to his departure for Singapore to attend this conference,
Meiklereid had submitted a political report in which he addressed the
French administrative reorganisation in Indochina. Five Commissioners
of the Republic had been appointed, to serve under the High Commissioner,
19Admiral D'Argenlieu.
Up to this moment the Port of Saigon had been efficiently managed 
by the British Military and Naval authorities, but the time had now 
come for the French to take it over. Their troops were arriving in 
increasing numbers and the tonnage of merchant shipping was expected 
to increase as normal commercial life was revived. But the French, wrote 
Meiklereid, had "so far shown little inelincation to tackle this 
responsibility —  and it is no small problem —  maintaining that they 
do not possess the necessary ways and means."
Meiklereid finally went to D*Argenlieu himself to discuss the 
matter , and as a result of this intervention a meeting was held between 
the appropriate British and French authorities. Although the French 
remained reluctant partners, it was decided that a French Liaison Officer
would Immediately be attached to the British docks operating1 staff 
and a French Port Authority would be formed.
Another pressing problem was the shortage of food in Indochina.
Since 19U3 there had been a steady decline in rice production, which 
was likely to be aggrevated when the 19U5/U6 crop was in.* The political 
situation, in Meiklereidfs view, had directly affected the situation.
The position in the north, in Tonkin, was so bad that the French had 
set aside the first 200,000 tons of the new crop for the north. There 
were only 71»000 tons in the Saigon/Cholon area, as follows s the 
Japanese military authorities held 50,000 tons (half of which was unfit 
for human consumption), and French civil authorities had 21,000 tons. 
However, the requirement for the next three months was for 81,500 tons.
Although the rubber plantations were generally intact, machinery 
was badly damaged. Planters were now beginning to return to their 
plantations, where they were reorganizing their labour forces under the 
protection of armed guards.
Meiklereid went on to discuss the tangled financial situation 
in Indochina, where on 18 November the first deflationary measure had been
introduced. [This was the announcement that all 500 piaster notes —
the highest issued —  would be cancelled, and required to be paid in 
by 25 November]. Wrote Gracey*s Political Advisers
"... the measure is aimed at persons who
have amassed large fortunes from financial
dealings with the Japanese and from black 
market activities. The measure is expected 
to reduce the note issue by one third. A 
large proportion of these notes is still in
the hands of the Japanese and a considerable
number are also held by the VIET MH3H." 16
The Chinese merchants "who are not prone to the utilisation of 
bank facilities" were hit hard. While the French were now mounting 
"a considerable press campaign" to explain the necessity of such severe 
action, they were now wondering if "they may have been a trifle hasty 
in introducing these measures which may adversely affect the political 
situation." The British Army Financial Adviser had uncovered evidence 
of "extensive Japanese financial manipulations", and there was "little 
doubt that a considerable portion of these funds**has gone to ground for 
subsequent use in subversive activities."
* The shortage was reflected in the amount of rice exported, as follows:
19U3: 922,000 tons; 19UU: 500,000 tons; 19U5(to the end of August):
61,000 tons.
** Perhaps hundreds of millions of piasters.
The level of activity in the British area in Vietnam gave no 
evidence of any decline. The nature of guerilla warfare resulted in 
the scattered British battalions fighting sharp, localised and unrelated
v * 1
actions in their respective areas. In the always troublesome Go Yap 
area, in Woodford’s 32 Brigade area, 9/1^ Punjab’s No. 3 Company twice 
came under Viet Minh fire while carrying out a sweep to the northwest. 
Twenty-five suspects were arrested, including a man identified as a 
former major in the French Army who was now Chief of Staff of the 
Annamite Southern Army. A few days later the 9/1U Pun jabs took up
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blocking positions as the French swept the area south of Go Yap; four 
Yiet Minh were killed during the operation. The Punjabis reported 
that a French truck was attacked in Go Yap, and return fire killed nine 
Viet Minh soldiers. Shortly thereafter the Japanese guard on the Go 
Yap train depot came under fire —  these last few Yiet Minh attacks had 
been carried out in daylight and were supported by light machine guns.
Two French Jeeps had been shot up near the golf course, and four 
Frenchmen were wounded and one Jeep burned. A !+/2 GR patrol reacting
to this ambush intercepted the Yiet Minh party and killed four. A
* A  f
Jat patrol searching a village four miles north of Tan Sdn Nhiit discovered
the body of a Frenchman in a Vietnamese house, and six suspects were
arrested.
a \ */
Four more Viet Minh were killed in Go Yap when two platoons 
of 9/1U Punjab were subjected to grenade and small arms fire. The 
Punjabis engaged the Yiet Minh with 2 inch mortars, and when the 
Viet Minh retreated they were met by the French, who killed four. Other 
Vi£t Minh were killed by ones and twos in a number of isolated incidents 
throughout the area.
In a small but significant incident a Vietnamese woman passing 
32 Brigade Headquarters had her shopping basket searched by a 2/8 
Punjab sentry. Ten hand grenades were found in her basket, and she
A
stated that the Yiet Minh were paying anyone the sum of twenty piasters
per grenade smuggled through Allied lines, and five hundred piasters
■ 17
was the payment for throwing a grenade at Allied troops. At these 
prices a number of civilians were undoubtedly killed in the act of 
hurling grenades at Gracey's forces. The Field Security Section in 
Gia Binh later informed 32 Brigade that the arrested woman had given 
the security forces information on where she had received her grenades, 
and a 9/1U Punjab platoon arrested two suspects in a house in Gia Binh.
On 9 December Brigadier Woodford held a conference at 32
Brigade Headquarters to discuss the brigade’s last major operation
e 1in Vietnam: the assault on Han Phu island. Attending were the 
commanders of 9/14 Punjab, 4/2 GR, and representatives from the Royal 
Navy and 114 Field Regiment (Royal Artillery). According to the 
”20th Division’s History”, Han Phu had developed into a major base
for Viet Minh guerillas driven out from the Saigon area. The objective
•?
of the operation was to clear Han Phu, and the detailed plans were 
worked out at this time.* Even as the conferees were working out the 
details the Royal Artillery reported that they had destroyed by artillery
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fire a number of junks in the Han Phu area northeast of Go Vap.
.The plan was published on the following day. The operation was 
32 Brigade’s biggest undertaking since October, when it spearheaded
'V. ^
the expanding British role with the investment of Go Vap and Gia Dinh, 
Briefly, the plan called for 4/2 Gurkha Rifles to assault and sweep 
Hail Phu, while 9/14 Punjab was to take up blocking positions to cover 
possible Viet Minh escape routes, to include the shooting of Viet 
Minh retreating across the river. The 9/14 Punjabs were also to be 
prepared to cross the river in rubber boats or ’’country craft” if called 
on by the 4/2 Gurkhas.
The Royal Navy was tasked to provide five craft in which to transport
* ?
the Gurkha battalion to Han Phu; the departure point and time was to be 
the RN barracks in Saigon, at 0630 hours. One of the boats was designated 
a casualty evacuation craft, and each boat was to be armed with four 
Bren guns and eight soldiers from 9/14 Punjab. One battery of artillery 
from 114 Field Regiment was to support the operation from their gun 
emplacement area on the golf course hear Tail Son Nhut. The area to be
t
bracketed was about one kilometer due north of Ben Cat and between two
and three kilometers northeast of Go Vap, in the pocket formed by the
/ ?
bifurcation of the river. The Han Phu area encompassed about one square
W  /
kilometer. The French post on the bridge east of Ben Cat was responsible 
for protecting the 99 Field Ambulance detachment and the naval craft 
while at anchor.
* The assault was scheduled for 12/13 December, and amended to 
15/16 December.
Unfortunately, the Viet Minh scored first, for on the eve of 
the operation three 9/14 Punjab soldiers were killed, and one wounded,f
by Viet Minh snipers in Go Vap as the Punjab company was moving into
/
position to support the Han Phu assault.
On 15 December the 4/2 Gurkhas embarked as briefed, at the
Royal Navy area in Saigon, and at O83O the 4/2 GR mission commander
radioed that his landing had been unopposed. Brigadier Woodford
observed the landing from the opposite bank of the river, and it
appeared that the Viet Minh had not expected a waterborne approach.
The Gurkhas turned south, and a few minutes later the company on the
right flank came upon a force of fifty Viet Minh, who were immediately
*
dispersed. By this time 9/14 Punjab was in place, providing stops 
at likely exit points.
As a 4/2 GR writer described it:
"The siae of our force was limited to 
two Rifle Coys and Tac HQ, by the extent 
of our other commitments. This force 
embarked in 5 landing craft at the Docks 
before dawn, then as dawn was breaking we
moved up the river and landed without
opposition (but in great danger from our 
own guns) on the northeast comer of the 
peninsula [the area between the Cho and 
Saigon Rivers]; we then spread out 
Westwards and turned SOUTH in the hopes 
of driving the rebels into the arms of 
9/14 Punjab who were lining the SOUTH and 
WEST banks of the river CHO. Actually 
most of the rebels had already cleared 
out, apparently in much hurry, but we 
estimated that there were about 100 left 
to oppose us and for an hour B Coy mostly, 
had quite a little battle losing one man 
killed and 4 wounded in the process and 
killing about 30 of the rebels before 
the rest slid off into the jungle and were 
never seen again. During the course of the 
drive a vast amount of booty was collected 
and destroyed, the rebel HQ was found and 
gutted and over 400 assorted able bodied 
males were rounded up and sent to the 
Surete in SAIGON. On the evening of the 
15 Dec we harboured the night on the S.E. 
comer of the Island and the following 
morning following a bombardment by our 
guns one coy of 9/14 Punjab crossed on to 
the peninsula and assisted us in finishing 
off a thorough house search of the area.
Finally about 1300 hrs we called it a day 
[and] reembarked on our landing craft and 
returned the way we had come." 18
The 32 Brigade War Diary listed the results of U/2 GR's 
efforts as 6f noon on the 16th: 32 Yiet Minh killed,* bS9 captured, 
and equipment collected included three medium machine guns, rifles, 
pistols, radio transmitters, generator, telephone exchange, and 
more. The 9/U Punjab view of the Han Phu operation was as follows:
"This party was a complete success from 
all our points of view. Firstly, the 
area was cleaned up and secondly the 
unpleasant task of wading through the 
paddy was done by i+/2nd GR...."
On the return, U/2 GR engaged in a potentially disastrous 
three way firefight with the Yiet Minh and the French. A French 
armoured column of the 2nd Armoured Division, returning from the north,
was fired on by Yiet Minh troops at a bridge near Hanh Thong Tay,
/
about three miles straight north of Tin Soil Nhut. The French troops, 
unaware that British troops were in the area, mistook the returning 
Gurkhas for Viet Minh and opened up on them. A confused battle 
followed in which the Gurkhas fired on the Yiet Minh, who were shooting 
at the French while the French shot up the Gurkhas. One French soldier 
was killed and three Gurkhas slightly wounded in the face by flying 
brick splinters.
But even as 32 Brigade battalions were operating in the Han Phu 
area, ALFFIC Operation Instruction No. 9** was published. These 
orders addressed the relief of 32 Brigade by the French. On 18 and 19 
December this brigade was to become the first British brigade to 
relinquish responsibility in Vietnam. Upon relief the 32 Brigade 
units were to be concentrated as follows: 9/1U Punjab in Gia Dinh,
U/2 GR at a main road junction about a mile north of Tan Son Nhut and 
northwest of Go Yap, 3/8 GR about three quarters of a mile north of 
Tan Son Nhut, and 2/8 Punjab's B Company at Tain S8n Nhut. Rodham's 
100 Brigade remained in place, the Royal Artillery was to be responsible 
for the area due north of Cholon and west of Saigon (which included 
the artillery barracks and the race course), and Taunton's 80 Brigade 
held the area from Tan Sdn Nha (about three kilometers'southwest of
v / /'
Tan Sdn Nhiit) to the eastern tip of Khanh Hoi island. This area 
included most of Cholon and was bordered in the north by the main road 
which became known as Le Vdh Duyet. The French assumed complete 
responsibility for Saigon.
* These were bodies recovered; others probably remained undiscovered 
in the jungly swamps.
** Dated December 19U5*
The French took over Go Yap from 9/11+ Punjab on the 18th, 
according to plan; or, as a 9/1U Punjab writer put it, "... on 
[the] 18th the French took over complete control, or as near control 
as they could get." On the following day 4/2 GR and 3/8 GR were 
relieved by French troops, and on the 20th the last of the Japanese 
Go Yap garrison —  42 men —  surrendered to 9/14 Punjab. Woodford's
bat tali oris were now in their final concentration areas and on the same
day 32 Brigade was declared non-operational to permit all units to 
prepare for their impending move to British North Borneo.^
With 32 Brigade preparing for their departure and 80 Brigade 
fairly quiet, 100 Brigade was bearing the brunt of the Yiet Minh 
guerilla activity. The "20th Division's History" stated:
"During December there was no improvement 
in the situation in 100 Brigade area. The 
Japanese, who had been responsible for law 
and order over a large part of the area were 
being rapidly disarmed and this encouraged 
YIETMINH elements driven from their haunts
in other.areas to seek refuge here. Incidents
ranging from the throwing of grenades at 
passing vehicles to organised attacks on our 
own and Japanese posts and picquets were a 
daily occurence and our troops had their 
hands full in maintaining law and order in 
the vicinity of their garrisons and keeping 
the roads clear for convoys. At this time 
the YIETMINH were concentrating on a policy 
of the destruction of rubber dumps, public 
buildings and other French property. The 
few armed Japanese that remained provided 
guards for these dumps and installations and 
there were many small battles fought between 
them and YIETMINH incendiarists." 20
The fighting between the Japanese and the Yiet Minh had indeed
increased in intensity. In mid-December the Japanese summarily
executed two Yiet Minh captured while attempting to poison the Japanese
*  , /
unit at a crossroads about eight miles northwest of Tan Son Nhiit.
Seven more Japanese were poisoned in Tan Ba, about three miles west 
northwest of Bi&n Hoa; all recovered, but two "went mad". * In other 
instances of Japanese-Viet Minh clashes, a routine Japanese patrol 
came upon a Viest Minh party a few miles northwest of Thu D&u Mot, and
* These were but two of many documented attempts by the Yi&t Minh 
to poison Japanese food or drink. However, British Intelligence 
suspected that in a few cases the Japanese used this as an excuse 
to "lose" their weapons to the Yiet Minh.
in the ensuing1 fight two Viet Minh were killed; another patrol south 
of Saigon killed three Viet Minh and captured seven. A delayed report 
from Loc Ninh stated that the Japanese outpost at Dak Kia had been 
attacked by a strong Viet Minh force. After a one hour battle the 
Viet Minh retreated, leaving behind ten killed —  many more were 
believed to have been wounded. Japanese casualties were one dead and
/ f
four wounded, and a Japanese sentry on a supply dump in Ben Cat was 
killed by a sniper. A later report on the Dak Kia battle revised the 
known Viet Minh death toll to fourteen, although the local inhabitants 
stated that thirty Viet Minh died of wounds; some of the dead Vi3t 
Minh were said to have been Tonkinese. This attack had been made by 
regular uniformed Vi«|t Minh troops.
In Lai Thi£u the Viet Minh attempted to b u m  a bridge by rushing 
the Japanese guards; driving a truck, they burst through the sentries 
and set fire to the truck on the bridge, after which the Viet Minh 
team escaped by jumping into the river while the guards were busily 
extinguishing the blaze. In an unrelated incident, ten Japanese,
\
including a captain, were killed and thirty-two injured in Bien Hoa 
when a barracks housing 177 Japanese en route to Cap St. Jacques 
collapsed.
There was trouble every day in Go Vap, where the Viet Minh were 
making things difficult for the French. Two Japanese soldiers were 
killed there on the 13th as the French and Japanese were continually 
engaged by guerillas. Another Japanese was killed when one of their 
convoys was attacked in 1/1 GR's area.
In 80 Brigade*s area another interpreter was kidnapped by a 
Viet Minh squad. The interpreter, Dost Mahommed, was reported by the 
1st Kumaons as having been captured while buying food in a village 
located on the north bank where the Saigon River forms a loop —  
opposite the eastern tip of Khanh H$i island. Three suspects were 
caught in a raid by 1 Kumaon, and the trio confessed that Dost Mahommed 
was dead. On the following day the Kumaons laid an ambush near the 
spot where Dost Mahommed had been captured, and two more suspects were 
captured and handed over to the French police. These Viet Minh prisoners 
reported that the interpreter had killed four of his abductors and 
wounded another with his revolver and a grenade before he died from 
bullet wounds.
In the south, where 9/12 FFR was coexisting with the Viet Minh, 
two armed Viet Minh were arrested inside the 9/l2th battalion area 
and sent under escort to Saigon for interrogation by the Field Security 
Section, at which time the local Viet Minh were "warned not to make 
trouble in CAP ST JACQUES." ^  On the following day the local Viet Minh 
Chief met the battalion commander and apologised for the incident, 
and arrangements were made with the VitH Minh to permit the battalion 
Medical Officer to give medical aid to the local inhabitants twice a 
week (Mondays and Saturdays). The Japanese in Cap St. Jacques were 
ordered to guard the water points, and the Vietnamese were requested 
to repair the water works and restore electricity. The Viet Minh replied 
that they were willing to cooperate with the British so long as no 
French returned to the area.
A meeting was held on 6 December between the 9/12 FFR Adjutant, 
representatives of the Japanese Army and local Vietnamese (presumably 
the Viet Minh, who controlled the area) to decide on a suitable 
concentration area for Japanese troops (60,000 of whom were expected 
in Cap St. Jacques by mid-January). On the following day the 9/12 FFR 
officers again met Viet Minh officials to discuss the evacuation of 
certain areas on the arrival of the Japanese Army units. Because the 
British and Viet Minh were conferring regularly here there was little 
combat activity, and the 9/l2th was reverting to peacetime training —  
something that most of the other battalions were not able to do. The 
battalion conducted demonstrations of street fighting, but on the 1l*th 
a British gunner from 231 Battery, 111+ Field Regiment, was killed and 
another wounded by Viet Minh as the battery was en route to Baria.
While the Royal Artillery gunners were attempting to repair the bridge 
they were attacked with rifles and light machine guns, and a 11+/13 *'FR 
mobile column rushed down from Bien Hoa and with artillery support 
dispersed the Viet Minh from their ambush positions.
Most of the fighting, however, was occurring in Rodham's 100
Brigade zones. The greater number of such incidents indicated that the
Viet Minh were increasing the level of their activity, and this was
confirmed in Rodham's Operation Instruction No. 60,* which began by
stating that "Hostile activity on the 'All Red Route* is on the 
22increase". But Rodham himself maintained the offensive and kept
* Dated 8 December 19U5*
the Viet Minh off balance by his adroit use of the relatively few
r
troops at his disposal, given the area of his responsibility. As 
he wrote, "The problem to be considered by Comds* is how best to dispose 
the comparatively few troops, in relation to the length of the road 
to be protected, they have available." Most ambushes occurred on 
non-convoy days.
Rodham further stipulated that "Particular parts of the road 
require of course particular treatment." He instituted roving mobile 
patrols which dismounted at random to search likely trouble spots 
and ambush sites, and he was careful enough to insist that they be 
strong enough so as not to be ambushed themselves and require relief.
They were to search, for likely grenade ambush sites and "Small Arms 
fire" sites up to two hundred yards from the road. As the roadside 
scorched earth policy developed the emphasis was to swing from the 
"Grenade Thrower Ambush" to the "Small Arms Fire Ambush".
Rodham specifically drew the attention of his commanders to 
previous experience: "The old North West Frontier rule fof never 
doing the same thing twice the same way* applies equally to these 
mobile piquets and will bewilder the enemy." After suggesting courses 
of action regarding protection of convoys, Rodham wrote:
"I realise that Bn Comds will NOT have 
sufficient troops on convoy days for any 
other ops or officers available for 
depiastring parades etc. but this must 
be accepted. It will also be the devil 
of a sweat for officers and men but it is 
worth it. Unless we start now taking 
strenuous action like this I am convinced 
that there will be a danger of the convoy 
being badly shot up and the troops suffering 
unnecessary casualties.
Even if it turns out that we have over­
insured no harm will have been done." 23
Rodham's stringent precautions were paying dividends, for an 
intercepted Viet Minh message to their headquarters stated that "the 
clearance of hedges and undergrowth from the road to a' depth of 2$ 
meters on either side was making their guerilla warfare most difficult 
and that they were considering moving off further Westwards." Rodham 
was now using every available Japanese on these road-clearing operations, 
and authorized the issue of "extra cutting implements" to the Japanese 
for this.
* Commanders.
Rodham's strict insistence on clearing undergrowth on either 
side of widely-travelled routes undoubtedly saved some Gurkha lives 
when a U/10 GR company en route from Thu Bui to Bien Hoa was ambushed 
halfway through their journey. At 0730 on the 3nd the company was 
attacked and the Gurkhas immediately dismounted to engage the enemy, 
whose strength was estimated at fifty armed with rifles and two light 
machine guns. Although the ambush achieved surprise, and one Gurkha 
was wounded by fire, all the Viet Minh grenades fell short due to the 
distance [I+O yards] between their scrub cover and their targets on 
the road. The Viet Minh fled on the approach of the Gurkhas, and a 
Japanese search party later found three dead Viet Minh at the site.
But the ViSt Minh were not without their successes. In Thu Dau 
Mot a column of 1/1 Gurkhas and Jat machine gunners departed for Tan 
Thanh, about four miles to the east northeast. They were to inspect a 
Japanese hospital there and to collect medical supplies. The mobile 
column had barely cleared the outskirts of Thu D&u Mot when it was 
ambushed by the Viqt Minh. This attack occurred just ninety minutes 
after the 1+/10 company (mentioned above) was ambushed. Two Jat 
soldiers were immediately killed by grenades and machine gun fire.
One of the most successful Viet Minh operations occurred four 
days later when a British/Indian column of 36 vehicles was ambushed. 
This column was transporting printing press machinery from Ben Cat to 
Thu DsLu Mot. The Allied force was not weak, being composed of 1/1 
Gurkhas with a mortar section and a Jat medium machine section. The 
column was attacked by a Viet Minh force armed with light machine guns, 
rifles and grenades, and in a skillfully executed ambush the Gurkhas 
and Jats suffered thirteen casualties. Two Gurkhas soldiers were 
killed and one Gurkha officer and four soldiers wounded, while the 
Jats lost one soldier killed, one VCO and three soldiers wounded; 
in addition, a transport driver was killed. Viet Minh casualties, if 
any, were not known. The column finally proceeded as two 1U/13 FFR 
companies raced over from Bien Hoa and swept the area.
Brigadier Rodham now laid down further guidelines concerning 
the Japanese, and advised his commanders not to discuss these plans
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with the Japanese "in case false hopes are raised". The British 
were hoping to have their first commitment (Navy and 2nd Division 
troops) ready by December for shipment to Japan. Rodham told
Gracey that over 9000 Japanese troops could start the inarch to 
Cap St. Jacques at 1+8 hours notice —  after they had been relieved 
of their money. The Japanese headquarters staff were ordered to 
work out the details, and most of the Japanese would pass through
A v
Bien Hoa en route to the final concentration area at Cap St. Jacques.
Rodham also decided that his troops should become more visible 
in order to encourage a return to normality among the local Vietnamese. 
Wrote Rodham:
"100 Ind Inf Bde and att[ached] tps will 
est[abli'sh] permanent posts throughout 
the present INNER ZONE with a view to 
restoring confidence amongst peaceful 
ANNAMITES and thereby assist restoration 
of law and order and the disarmament and 
evaluation] of the JAPANESE forces." 25
The Inner Zone remained divided into the three sub area of 
Thu Biic (14/10 GR), Bi£n Hoa (11*/13 PER) and Thu Dau Mot (1/1 GR). Since 
the decision had been made in November to make Cap St. Jacques the
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final Japanese concentration area instead of the Thu Bdc - Bien Hoa - 
Thu Dau Mot triangle, Rodham's Inner Zone became a holding pool through 
which the Japanese would pass en route to Cap St. Jacques after having 
been disarmed and depiastered by Rodham's forces. Two Dogra companies 
with their mortar sections came under U/10 GR command on the 27th in 
order to more fully implement this policy. The main tasks of the Sub 
Area Commanders remained the- "Maint[enance] of law and order, the 
extermination of all hostile elements and arrest of all custodians of 
arms" and the protection of a variety of vital points. The new policy 
was described in "20th Indian Division's History":
"Up to this time 100 Brigade had maintained 
their garrisons in the three main towns —
1/1 GR in THU DAU MOT, II4/I3 PER in BIEN HOA 
and Brigade HQ and 2+/10 GR in THU DUC and 
used the Japanese for guards and picquets 
outside these towns. In an attempt to 
restore confidence amongst the more peaceful 
elements of the population it was decided to 
establish small garrisons of Indian troops . 
in a few important villages and points in the 
area. For this purpose two companies of the 
1+/17 D0GRAS were placed under command of 100 
Brigade —  80 Brigade's commitments in SAIGON/
CHOLON having been considerably reduced by the 
handover to the French. The occupation of the 
selected places was carried out on 27 December 
against NO opposition although the VIETMINH 
were not slow to react to our occupation of
areas in which they had previously had 
comparative freedom of movement. Our newly 
established posts and garrisons were 
subjected to the now familiar sniping and 
grenade attacks —  the 1/1 GR coy at BUNG 
(6 kms SE of THU M U  MOT) and the h / V  Dogra 
coy at LAITHIEU (8 kms NW of THU DUC) 
coming in for most of the attention. On the 
3 and k Jan 1/1 GR from THU DAU MOT swept 
the area around BUNG and the town itself 
but the flooded country side and numerous 
demolitions hampered progress and our tps
were unable to close with the parties of
YIET MXNH guerillas who offered occasional 
opposition." 26
Further examples of such "occasional opposition" included the 
Yiet Minh ambush of a convoy of three vehicles in the southern outskirts 
of Thu Dau Mot. A Gurkha rifleman was killed in the ambush, and the 
ensuing sweep by 1/1 GR brought in 29 suspects. A Japanese detachment
moving by the Saigon river from Thu Dau Mot to Phu Thuah, to the
northwest, was also ambushed by Yiet Minh lying in wait along the river 
banks. A sharp, twenty minute firefight began, and when the action was 
over ten Vi%t Minh and one Japanese soldier had been killed; one
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Japanese was wounded and four were missing. Near Bien Hoa a mobile 
column was ambushed en route to Yinh Cud, and another Indian soldier 
was killed; however, six Viet Minh in trenches were captured. In 
Cambodia, five Japanese deserters were killed at Prek Kak, probably by 
the French, and in the Saigon area, the 9/1U Punjabs reported that a
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member of the "VIET MINH Secret Service" had been arrested in Go Vap 
and turned over to the Field Security Section.
The small Field Security Section staff was reduced when an FSS 
sergeant attached to 100 Brigade Headquarters was severely wounded in 
Thu Stic; he and his French interpreter had left the British lines 
without an escort. This was contrary to standing orders, but was a 
fact of life in the nether world of covert operations, and he was shot 
and his interpreter kidnapped and believed murdered. Two sections of the 
U/10 GR defence platoon were sent out to search for the interpreter 
(and the British truck which was also captured). The Gurkhas were fired 
on almost immediately and remained in a running fight for one or two miles.
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They reported that the Yiet Minh "Fire also included heavier stuff than 
S/A [small arms] either 2" Mortar or Grenade Discharger". One Gurkha 
was wounded and three Viet Minh were killed. That night a U/10 Gurkha 
was wounded outside the perimeter, and on the following day the Gurkhas
searched the half-dozen areas from which they had been fired on,
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including a Pottery (about three miles south of Thu Ihic). They 
burnt thirteen houses to clear the road to fifteen yards on either 
side, and on approaching the Pottery were informed by a local that a 
Viet Minh meeting was in progress inside. The building was immediately 
attacked, but the Viet Minh had fled, leaving behind documents which 
were handed in to Brigade Headquarters. The Gurkhas then burnt down 
the Pottery.
The Gurkhas retraced their steps on the following day and came 
upon a small village about two miles south of Thu Bub. After completing 
their search of the village they had moved no more than fifty yards 
down the track before they were fired on from the village. The Gurkhas 
returned and burned five empty huts, but they continued to be fired on 
by snipers in the surrounding area. Before withdrawing the Gurkhas 
captured three home made guns, smooth bore launchers with which the 
Viet Minh had fired on them from a distance of twenty yards.
In the Bien Hoa Inner Zone, two companies of 1 i+/l3 sweeping
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the area north of Tan Phong village (about two miles north of Bien Hoa) 
engaged fifteen encamped Viet Minh, killing four; two Viet Minh were 
wounded and captured. Eleven suspects were arrested during the ensuing 
sweep, and the jungle camp was burnt after some arms and ammunition 
were recovered. One Indian soldier was later wounded by sniper fire, 
and one of the captured Viet Minh stated that their main body had left
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the Tan Phong camp in the morning for Tan Tich, a few miles to the north.
But although the Viet Minh guerilla activity showed no signs 
of abating, Gracey*s forces were suffering attrition from the effects of 
the war*s end. A representative comment was made by a Punjab
writer:
"We are still suffering acutely from a 
shortage of men. Although we have lost 
all our SIKHS no JATS have yet arrived 
to replace them. The same applies- to the 
DOGRA Coy now that the AHIRS and GTJJARS 
have gone. Men who went off on 28 days 
leave in JUKE have not yet returned. As 
a result we are working on three weak 
Coys., A and B being combined as one... 
we hope that it will not be long now 
before the Jat Coy is a full strength 
going concern... Repat[riation] is 
beginning to hit us....1127
Against this background of sustained violence and constant 
contacts with Viet Minh guerillas, Gracey wrote a letter to Leclerc, 
a letter which inferred a barely controlled exasperation with French 
demands on the overstretched British resources, their apparent lack 
of appreciation of the current situation, and above all their attitude 
toward non-whites in 20 Division* Gracey began by referring to his 
recent conversation with Leclerc and wrote, "I think it would be of 
great value to publish the following figures to all French units."
Gracey then proceeded to list the numbers and types of vehicles
already turned over to the French, and the amount of vehicle maintenance
he was providing-to French forces. Furthermore, "French troops should
know what it entails in the way of transport to concentrate the
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Japanese in the CAP ST JACQUES area." The numbers of Japanese
involved were as follows: 6000 from Saigon-Cholon, 26,000 from Thu
Dau Mot-Bien Hoa, 11,000 from Phnom Penh and 7000 from outlying districts 
such as Lqc Ninh, Budop, Tay Ninh, Nha Trang, etc. Also, more than 
7000 tons of stores and 7000 sick would have to be transported by road 
and river.
Despite their genuine mutual respect for each other, Gracey*s 
letter was sharp and to the point:
"They should also be told of the tremendous
task it has been to concentrate all the
Japanese dumps and depots into safe places 
from the hundreds of small depots into which 
the Japanese had, before the surrender, 
dispersed them in accordance with their 
scheme of defence, and to avoid undue damage 
from air raids which were, becoming increasingly 
heavy towards the end of the war. This 
has already involved moving some twenty 
thousand tons of petrol, raw materials, 
equipment, stores and rations by road and 
river, a considerable quantity of which has 
gone to the French forces.
They should learn of the road and bridge 
repairs, and the railway repairs being 
carried out by British and' Japanese 
engineers, all requiring transport, and all 
greatly assisting the free movement of French 
forces.
It might be of value for them to realize 
that, had not the Japanese in most cases 
carried out my orders faithfully, there 
would have been a disaster of the first 
magnitude in Southern French Indo China 
with a massacre of thousands of French 
people, and the destruction of a vast amount 
of French property.
They should know I think, that I, and you, 
depend on the Japanese maintaining their 
discipline in order to ensure that they continue 
to carry out their orders faithfully, and that 
anything done to undermine their discipline 
will, in fact, react against your plans for 
the resettlement of French Indo China.
They should be told of the British efforts 
to hasten your equipment and to provide 
everything possible to assist the French e.g. 
most of our vehicles are being left behind 
when we gb; aircraft have been transferred; 
landing craft, medical supplies, rations, 
canteen stores etc are being provided."
Having placed the situation in perspective for the newly- 
arrived French forces, Gracey saved his sharpest point for last:
"The camaraderie which exists between Officers 
of the Indian Army and their Gurkha and Indian 
soldiers must be explained to them. Our men, 
of whatever colour, are our friends and not 
considered "black" men. They expect and deserve 
to he treated in every way as first class
soldiers, and their treatment should be, and is,
exactly the same as that of white troops.
There is no more fruitful source of friction 
between Indian Army Officers and their men on 
the one side, and French troops on the other, 
than when our Indian and Gurkha troops are 
regarded and treated as "black" by French officers 
and men. I mention this point particularly as 
cases have occurred in which it is obvious that 
our Indian Army - traditions have not been 
understood."
Gracey said that, on his part, he had "fully explained to all 
my Officers and men the magnitude of the task you have before you, and 
the steps you are taking to get your young soldiers into trim for 
their formidable task." He concluded by congratulating Leclerc on
the "remarkable improvement shown in the last week."
Although the Army remained continually -engaged against the Viet 
Minh guerillas, the RAF had not as yet been employed in a combat role. 
After weeks of flying tactical reconnaissance sorties, punctuated by
an occasional leaflet drop, the Spitfire pilots were eager to become
involved in attacking the Viet Minh forces; however, constraints on 
their use made this almost impossible. But at last, on 11 December, 
came the day for which the pilots of 273 Squadron had been waiting —  
the chance to expend ordnance on the enemy. In this the single instance 
of offensive use of Spitfires in Indochina, the log of 273 Squadron 
reads as follows:
11 Dec/0720-09^0/ At last the great day has 
arrived and permission has been 
given to strafe the Annamites and 
give close support to French troops 
who are threatened by 1000 Annamites 
in area MZ8086 northeast of BAH ME 
THUOT. The lucky pilots on this strike 
were S/Ld.W.J.Hibbert, F/Lt. D.Colebrook 
and F/Lt. S. Shi Sho. Conditions were 
not ideal as 10/10 cloud at 1*00 feet 
was encountered over the target area 
but this did not stop warning leaflets 
being dropped and straffing runs being 
carried out on these positions. Ho 
movement was seen, but strikes were 
seen on buildings at 818870, and one 
building was left burning at the road 
junction 795855* and one armoured car 
was seen amongst the buildings there.
The French forces reported guns at 
position 810863; no guns were seen, 
but the area was thoroughly straffed.
All the pilots were overjoyed when 
these three aircraft returned, and all 
hope we will get more work of this 
nature in the near future. * 29
This was the single action of the lone Spitfire squadron in 
Indochina, and in this, their only attack, no bombs were dropped and 
no Vietnamese were even seen. Warning leaflets were dropped and most 
of the strafing was directed at empty ground as map coordinates only 
were attacked,**and no free armed reconnaissance was conducted. 
Furthermore, the whole squadron was disbanded and the pilots left 
Indochina soon after.
On 13 December Gracey reported to SACSEA the series of events 
leading up to his approval of the use of the Spitfires. On the 7th 
Colonel Rivier had reported that 200 or 300 well-armed Viet Minh were 
strongly dug in at crossroads of the Pleiku and Hinh Hoa roads. The 
Japanese guard at the nearby airfield was forced to withdraw towards 
Ban Me Thuot as the Viet Minh were expecting the arrival of 1000
* This entry is reproduced in its entirety because of the false picture 
painted of the use of the RAF in Indochina, typical 'of which is Ellen 
Hammer's statement, "In London, British liberals recoiled from reports 
of Royal Air Force attacks on Vietnamese in support of French troops." 
[Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p.119 .]
M  As a Spitfire had limited endurance at the best of times, and because 
Ban Me Thuot is in the highlands some distance north of Saigon, and 
since the atrocious weather probably made it difficult to find the 
target, the Spitfires would have had just a few minutes over the target 
area. This, then, was the grand sum of "Royal Air Force attacks on 
Vietnamese".
Tonkinese reinforcements from Ninh Hoa. A number of incidents 
indicated an attack was imminent. The Vi§t Minh reinforcements 
arrived on the 8th, and proceeded to occupy the northern part of 
the airfield. The French detachment now lost seven killed and 
seventeen wounded (20% of their total strength). On the following 
day Colonel Rivier urgently requested reinforcements. On the 10th 
the Viet Minh began their attacks at 0£30, using mortars. Rivier 
had been unable to give information about Viet Minh positions as the 
guerillas were very mobile and controlled the outskirts of Ban Me Thuot. 
The small French detachment was reduced to a fight for survival, and 
the French Command lacked any means of reinforcing them (none of their 
four Catalinas was in flying condition). At this point Gracey was 
approached, and he agreed to permit a patrol of three Spitfires to 
intervene if the situation at Ban M§ Thuot became critical.
The Viet Minh attacked unceasingly on the 10th, and on the 11th 
they increased the pressure and the French position became precarious.
The Spitfires were then sent in and made three passes over the target 
area, responding to signal panels laid out by the French. The Viet Minh 
attacks ceased as soon as the Spitfires began their strafing runs.
The Commander of RAF Station Saigon also submitted a report to 
Air Commodore Cheshire at Commission Headquarters. He reported that 
the patrol had been ordered to drop warning leaflets, attack three 
specific target areas and avoid attacking "large Annamite concentrations. 
The patrol saw the French, but no one else, and French troops placed 
their signal panels on a football pitch north of the town. These 
signals agreed with the briefed targets and strafing passes were made 
on two road junctions and a "gun area" (but no guns were seen). The 
"French then began to put out ground signals which were not on the list 
handed to the RAF. No action was taken by a/c."* That the Spitfires 
were able to do what they did remains something of a miracle given 
the weather conditions (10/10 cover at i|00 feet in a mountainous terrain)
Headquarters ALFSEA now approved Gracey's proposal to hand over 
to the French the complete equipment of one troop of HI4. Field Regiment, 
Royal Artillery. As the day of his departure drew closer, Gracey wrote 
to ALFSEA about the future of his division, a unique formation which, 
as Brigadier Woodford wrote, was perhaps one of a kind in that it was 
born, lived, and eventually died under but one commander. Gracey knew 
that his division, like proud battleships no longer needed, would
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eventually be broken up; it was his wish only that it not be split 
up and fade away by pieces —  it should remain a complete division 
until it disbanded. Wrote Gracey:
"I am most anxious to ensure that when 
32 and 80 Brigade Groups have reached 
BORNEO and MAKASSAR, 20 Indian Division 
should not cease to exist as such. In 
order to carry this out I most strongly 
recommend that the interior economy, 
disciplinary matters, general administration 
and training of these two Brigades be 
carried out under my orders, and that 32 
Brigade Group in BORNEO should be put 
tinder my operational command as well, after 
my arrival in MALAYA; 80 Brigade Group 
merely being under operational command of 
AFNEI. If some such arrangement is not 
made I am very much afraid that the 
magnificent esprit de corps of the 
Division will be seriously impaired.
It is the wish of all Officers and Other 
Ranks in the formation to keep the Division 
as such until it is finally disbanded. 31
Major General Fyman, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, 
ALFSEA, replied to Gracey on the 2i+th:
1. The Commander-in-Chief is also most 
anxious that the identity of 20 Indian Division 
should not be lost when it leaves French Indo 
China for redeployment. He realises the 
difficulties resultant upon wide dispersion 
and the different nature of the tasks of each 
brigade.
2. To ensure continuation of the present 
magnificent esprit de corps of 20 Ind Div 
the Commander-in-Chief has ruled that all 
brigades of the division after redeployment 
will still remain under the command of Major 
General D.D. GRACEY, CB, MC, for all purposes 
except that:-
(a) 80 Bde Gp on arrival at MAKASSAR 
will be under command of -15 Corps 
for operations and maintenance
(b) 32 Bde Gp on arrival in BORNEO 
will be under the direct command 
of HQ ALFSEA for operations and 
maintenance.
3. After Main HQ 20 Ind Div have arrived 
in MALAYA the Commander-in-Chief intends 
discussing the future command of 32 Bde Gp 
with Major General GRACEY.*
* As it turned out, Gracey's wishes were not fulfilled for a number 
of reasons. The division headquarters did not go to Malaya, but 
returned directly to India, and the primitive state of communications, 
added to the distances involved, would have made contact with his 
scattered brigade groups very difficult at best.
The political situation as of 15 December was described by 
Meiklereid in his report to Dening. After referring to Mountbatten1s 
recent visit to Saigon, and the meeting in Singapore with Alanbrooke 
(attended by Gracey and Leclerc), he touched on the problems being 
created by the "very arrogant" behaviour and indiscipline of the newly- 
arrived French troops, who were being increasingly criticized by the 
press for the manner in which they had conducted their clearing 
operations. Leclerc was taking all possible steps to improve the 
situation and had instituted weekly press meetings to explain the 
military operations to Allied press correspondents.
Friction existed between the new French arrivals and the colonial 
French population, and the Vietnamese in Saigon had adopted a policy of 
noneooperation with the administration. The news of the impending 
departure of British troops was being received "in some quarters with 
considerable perturbation, as it is felt that with the French troops 
disseminated throughout the territory the danger of acts of violence 
on the part of the Annamites is likely to increase." Older residents 
were pessimistic and desired to "cut their losses and get out", but 
strict censorship had been imposed to keep news of this sort from 
reaching France, where recruiting for the Administrative Service and 
commercial interests would be adversely affected.
In Meiklereid1s opinion the paddy situation was not as bad as 
had been anticipated, and the Viet Minh had actually been advancing 
cash* for the gathering of the crop in certain areas. They had taken 
over the mills in Sqc Trang and Canthc? and, contrary to good Marxist 
doctrine, were making a profit from the sale of their goods. In Laos, 
the situation was "still confused", and Prince Souphanouvong (the 
"Red Prince") had gone to Hanoi.
After describing the.difficulties faced by the French due to 
the Chinese in Tonkin, Meiklereid wrote:
"The French have obviously had to give in 
all along the line, having only gained 
from the Chinese the implied right of 
legislating in that territory, though 
apparently still subject to the agreement 
of the Chinese. On the other hand I am 
reliably informed that the FRANCO/CHINESE 
negotiations in CHUNGKING regarding the 
eventual withdrawal of Chinese troops from 
Northern INDO-CHINA are progressing
* As a result of the massive monetary assistance afforded by the 
Japanese, there was no lack of cash in Viet Minh coffers.
favourably. The French have now realised 
that the "pacification" of Southern INDO­
CHINA is going to take longer than was first 
anticipated, and they are not likely to be able 
to tackle the even more serious problem of 
Northern INDO-CHINA for some time to come.
In view of the large French community and 
French interests in the territory, whose 
safety is solely dependent on Chinese 
maintenance of law and order, they will 
continue to have to rely on Chinese troops 
until they are able to take over themselves." 32
On the 28th a more comprehensive report from the astute 
Lieutenant Colonel Trevor-Wilson, Gracey's representative in Hanoi, 
was received at Commission Headquarters in Saigon. His assessment 
of the political situation is of more than passing interest as he 
was quite likely the' only disinterested observer in Hanoi. After 
describing the differences between the Viet Minh and the elements 
comprising the B6hg Minh Hoi, Trevor-Wilson wrote:•J
"The actual VIET MINH Government is greatly 
criticised both in the native press and 
by means of street demonstrations and 
distribution of pamphlets. Since the VIET 
MINH took over power in August, 19U5* i«e. 
four months ago, there has been ample 
proof of its inability to administer the 
country. The administration was completely 
disorganized by the sudden removal of the 
Mandarin system, the Mandarins having been 
replaced by improvised committees. The 
public treasury has been completely emptied 
as a result of demagogic measures such as 
the cancellation of direct taxation. No 
remedy has been found to off set the great 
floods of 19U5 as a result of which large 
parts of TONKIN are still under water; 
nothing has been done to keep the dykes 
in repair. Railways, roads and bridges 
are in a very bad state. Coal mines produce 
very small output. No measures have been 
taken to prevent outbreaks of cholera and 
above all to remedy the almost certain 
famine conditions which will ravage the 
country within a few months. Government 
has been carried on by terrorist tactics, 
e.g. arbitrary arrest, suppression of 
free press, etc.
Five Government ministers are communists, 
two of them extremist... " 33
Although a military team of seven Russians (headed by a full 
colonel) was due in Hanoi in the near future, Trevor-Wilson wrote
that ’“There is no evidence, however, that the Viet Minh is in contact 
with Moscow. '* Trevor-Wilson thought that a shift of power to the 
■Dong Minh Hoi was possible "In view of the fact that the Viet Minh 
Government is so much discredited in the eyes of the mass of the 
native population..." —  however, "It is possible that the two sides 
will form a coalition before the withdrawal of the Chinese Forces."
In the south, the guerilla war continued. A bloody clash 
occurred on the 30th when at 0600 a Viet Minh force attacked a tire
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factory at Binh Phifdc, about two kilometers east of Han Phu island.
The dozen Japanese guards repulsed the Viet Minh, who lost fifteen 
or sixteen killed; the Japanese suffered three wounded. A French patrol 
was ambushed in Ben Cat, north of Thu Dau Mot, and the French casualties 
were three killed and five wounded; another Frenchman was killed in
Gia Binh as fifty suspects were detained in the course of mopping up
operations.
But as December came to a close and Christmas drew near, 32 
Brigade prepared to depart. During this time the L/2 Gurkhas threW 
a party. As Lieutenant Colonel Kitson, Commander of I4./2 GR, earlier*
had written of their successful cocktail party and dance, it was
"marred only by the fact that a couple of Frenchmen were murdered almost 
within sight of our house only an hour before the party started and 
some of us had to go and clear up the mess."^
32 Brigade now made its last march in Saigon. As a 9/^h Punjab 
writer reported:
"On 22nd Dec *1$ a farewell parade for 
32 Bde was held in the BOULEVARD NORODOM
in SAIGON at the special request of the
French. A composite Bn.[Battalion] formed
of one Coy from each Bn. in the Bde and a
Bn. of French Troops took part, supported
by a sqn of the 16th Cav and some Stuart
tanks of the [French] R.I.C.M., reputedly 
the crack Regt of the French Colonial Army.
The parade was Commanded by Brig. WOODFORD 
of 32 Bde while the Bn was Commanded by 
Lt. Col. Hobbs. A Platoon each of JATS,
PMs and PATHANS made up the 9/^h Coy which 
was Commanded by Major Harwood Barnes.
The parade was a great success and after 
an inspection by General Le CLERC and 
Brig. RODHAM of 100 Bde, who was Commanding 
20 Div in the absence on leave of Gen GRACEY, 
we marched past. The pipe band of I4/17 
Dogras played for us and the British force
inarched past led by our old and valued 
friends 92 Fd.Coy REIE. This was followed 
by a march past of the French with their 
own band playing. On the whole a fitting 
finish to a happy sojourn in FIC. We have 
left many friends there and sadly also we
leave five graves in GIADINH, of men 
killed in action, two others missing from 
operations we have not recovered but local 
information leaves us in little doubt that 
they were murdered and thrown into the river. "35
Although the 9/lUth writer was unhappy that the Christmas season
"was rather spoiled by our move to SARAWAK", they did host a cocktail
party on Christmas morning;
"it was attended, by all the VCOs with Gen.
VALLUY the Commander of 9©me DIC and some 
of his staff as our guests of honour. General 
VALLUY had been a good friend of the Bn. and 
showed his appreciation by presenting Col.
HOBBS with the badgeof the 9®m© DIC, a charming 
gesture as it was his own personal badge which 
he unpinned from his shirt. He was presented 
to all the VCOs and through an interpreter told 
them of his appreciation of their work and 
cooperation. The rest of the day was mainly 
spent in packing and in farewells of varying 
tenderness by officers to their friends."
On Christmas day the 3/8 Gurkha Rifles embarked on the 
MV Highland Brigade, which set sail for Labuan on the following day.
The British withdrawal from Vietnam had begun. At Cap St. Jacques 
several 9/12 Frontier Force Regiment officers and VCOs took to the 
water in landing craft to wave goodbye to their friends in 32 Brigade 
as the Highland Brigade sailed slowly past them on the Saigon River 
and out to sea. These two battalions, who had gone through so much 
together, would not meet again due to the breakup of 20 Indian Division 
they ended up being on opposing sides as 9/12 FFR went to Pakistan 
(as yet not in existence) and 8th GR to India.
These few days over Christmas were relatively quiet ones, even 
in Rodham’s area. The L/10 Gurkhas escaped injury when a convoy was
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attacked in a unique fashion two miles north of Thu -But: —  an 81 mm 
mortar bomb, which had been suspended by wires in the foliage above 
the road, was dropped on the last truck of a convoy, but it did not 
explode.
As the 100 Brigade War Diary described it:
"21; Dec Annamite forces demonstrated m o d e m  
air sp [support] to ground tps (19U5)* 81mm 
Jap Morftar] bomb suspended by stout string
over bough of tree. Seasoned bomb aimer 
squatted [at] base of projector. Bomb 
hurtled down to own tps convoy but failed 
to explode. One dejected Annamite captured.
Own tps amused.
On the 26th, as the Highland Brigade slipped her moorings in 
Saigon, h/cL Gurkha Rifles and associated detachments embarked on the 
SS Aronda. As they were boarding Brigadier Woodford and some of his 
headquarters staff departed Saigon for Labuan on the destroyer HMS Nith.
On the following day, as the Aronda left Saigon for Jessolton, 9/1^
Punjab embarked on the Lake Charles Victory. Theirs was not a luxury 
cruise:
"On the 28th* we reluctantly said goodbye 
to our comfortable quarters at GIADINH 
and set out for the docks. Adm Coy went 
with the baggage and the rest of the Bn. 
marched, with the Dhol and Surnai playing 
nobly, through the streets of SAIGON and 
aboard the S.S.LAKE CHARLES VICTORY. Our 
first and we hope our last experience of 
an American Victory ship. Luckily we were 
not crowded on board but even then it was 
most uncomfortable. No portholes at all 
in any of the troop decks or cabins, very 
little deck space and of what little there 
was none was covered which was Ca] 
considerable disadvantage as it rained 
continuously."
To add to their problems the sea was rough and most of those 
on board, including the American contract crew, were seasick. Finally, 
halfway through the voyage the ship's company heard by radio that their 
contract had expired on 1 January, and "The result was that they lost 
what little interest they had had in the proceedings and our disembarkation 
was a difficult affair." Even some of their baggage was looted by the 
crew.
So an entire brigade was now gone. There are two postscripts 
to their departure. Brigadier Woodford later wrote of his brigade's 
work in Vietnam:
"In hindsight, I would rate the intelligence . 
we received before embarkation at Rangoon 
as scanty. We knew that our mission was to 
receive the surrender of the Jap forces in 
French Indo-China, consisting of about 77,000 
men and including the H.Q. of Field Marshal 
Terauchi. As you know, 80 Bde had flown in 
ahead of the rest of the Div. and we heard 
from them a certain amount of scattered 
shooting had been going on before we dis­
embarked. It was not until my Bde H.Q. was 
established ashore that it was clear that we 
had more to handle than casual banditry.
* A minor discrepancy, as the 32 Brigade War Diary has them boarding on 
the 27th. The 9/1^ War Diary agrees with this Newsletter.
First impressions on reaching Saigon were 
mixed. Of course the change from living 
constantly in the open was welcome and the 
amenities of a city were appreciated. When 
it came to the fighting, we found that less 
fierce but more frustrating than the war 
proper. The hit and run tactics of the Viet 
Minh never gave us a definite objective and 
seemed to involve more sweat for less result.
I doubt if anyone fully appreciated the 
potential seriousness of the problems likely 
to develop in the country. At that time 
the power and determination of the Communists 
was not so evident as it later became and 
after being under Japanese occupation for so 
long, a bit of disorder was not surprising.
The only French troops I met were those of 
the 9th Colonial Infantry Division. We got 
on quite well with them, but were not 
impressed with their discipline and behavior.
They were inclined to help themselves to the 
market produce brought into the city via the 
check points on the roads and they seemed to 
treat the local people with less consideration 
than we had insisted on. I never saw them in 
action...
When we had settled in and were chasing the 
VM, I had three battalions of Japanese 
infantry fighting under my command against 
the VM. They did their stuff very well and 
kept up their morale and discipline to a 
remarkable degree." 36
A b/2 GR writer added:
"We had been in French Indo China for just 
under 3 months; as an experience it was
interesting but it was a poor type of war
since throughout it was so difficult to 
understand why we were there. That they 
remained unquestionably and intensely 
keen and loyal throughout this difficult 
period is fitting tribute to their 
incredibly high morale, to the stock 
from which they are sprung and to the 
'esprit de corps' of the 2nd Gurkhas." 37
As occupation troops they had been much the same as any others.
There had been romances between them and the local women, commanders 
had worried over the venereal disease rate, black marketeering had been
inevitable and there was some financial manipulation on a personal scale.
All these things would later affect the American troops in Vietnam, but 
Gracey's soldiers had eschewed the use of drugs, which were then as readily 
available as they would be a generation later.
b2*f
With 32 Brigade en route to Borneo and 80 Brigade gradually 
disengaging in Cholon, 100 Brigade was left to deal with the complex 
problems of maintaining internal security, neutralizing the Vi£t Minh, 
disarming, depiastering and concentrating the Japanese and sorting out 
the numerous and varied Japanese supply dumps throughout their area.
On the 26th there had been an as yet unexplained air attack by the French
/v ^  /V
on the railway station and sidings at Bien Hoa* Although the Viet Minh 
largely controlled the railways and had used them to transport a  sizeable 
number of Tonkinese troops to Cochinchina, the station and rolling stock 
in Bien Hoa were in Allied hands.
Five valuable engines were destroyed by the attack, and some 
rolling stock and the barracks of the Japanese guards were damaged.
The Spitfires making the raid had just been handed over to the French, 
and French and RAF roundels and fin flashes were very similar. The
Japanese reported the attack, and as the 14/13 FFR War Diary reported,
38
"Incident unexplained." December did not end quietly. Four French
scout cars were ambushed while en route to Lai Thieu. Return fire 
killed thirteen Viet Minh and several houses in the immediate area were 
burned. A 4/10 GR patrol "bumped" a Viet Minh force of unknown strength 
just southwest of Thu 'Buc. One Gurkha and eight Viet Minh were killed.*
The patrol, two sections of 4/10 Gurkhas searching for snipers who had 
fired on the radio station, met "considerable resistance", and one 
Gurkha was wounded when shot by a pistol at a range of six feet.**
As mentioned earlier, the 1/1 GR company at Bung came under 
continuous attack by the Viet Minh. The company reported that "90% 
of rebels in the area are TONKINESE, who by force of arms have instituted 
a reign of terror."
A 3/1 GR writer pretty well summed up the situation in the Saigon
area:
"Throughout the month the FRENCH kept taking 
over more and more commitments and we had 
one or two incidents. Looting in the area 
of the Docks continued to be defeated by 
most excellent marksmanship and a display 
of a corpse or two on the scene of the 
crimes. Flag marches and night patrols 
continued regularly and enabled us to 
enjoy a very pleasant Christmas on the 
nearest lines to 'Peace Time’ for many 
years. 1945 ended with little more 
incident —  the FRENCH troops ’shooting 
in’ the NEW YEAR magnificently." 39
But while the Saigon area was quieting down as the new year approached,
there was little relaxing in 100 Brigade's Inner Zone.
* *
100 Brigade report.
** 4/10 GR report. The Gurkha apparently later died of wounds(100 Brigade Repor
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CHAPTER XVI 
ClTOYEN D'HONNEUR
However distasteful it may be to 
you, you should stress, if asked 
by the Press, that this is a mark 
of personal esteem for you on 
giving up your association with 
the French and should not be con­
strued as a national gesture.
Dempsey to Gracey 
January, 19^6.
On New Year's Eve Rodham issued M0p Instr No.63", which closed
the year on a sombre note. In it he directed his battalions to mount
a series of preemptive strikes against the Viet Minh since "Information
from very many different sources indicates that the rebels are planning .
some sort of co-ordinated offensive to take place between now and
10 JAN '46. The VIET MINH leader is reported to have said that this
will be 'the last grand offensive before the British leave'." Rodham's
instructions continued:
"The sudden increase in rebel activity in the 
last three days, during which period there 
have been 12 incidents in this Bde's area 
alone, certainly does indicate that there is 
some foundation for these reports.
In this connection it is interesting to note 
that the VIET MINH bands in this area are 
now reported to have been placed under the 
control of one man.
From reports received by Div HQ and also by 
this HQ the four main rebel concentration 
areas are:
(a) Between THU DAU MOT and BEN CAT 0999-
(b) WEST and SOUTH WEST of BUNG 207*t.
(c) In the BEN GO area 4067*
(d) NORTH EAST of BIEN HOA." 1
One squadron of armoured cars was to be placed under command of
100 Brigade from 1 to 5 January; as Rodham wrote, "The first essential
is to strike at the rebel concentration areas and discourage them before 
they start."
The 1/1 Gurkhas were ordered to "destroy all hostiles in the BUNG 
area on 2 JAN." Supporting the Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Clark, 
were armoured cars, a section of artillery, medium machine guns and 
mortars. The Commander of 14/13 FFR was ordered to destory all hostiles
,■ ^  i
in the Ben Gd area in operations set for 4 January; Ben Go was on the
A. #
river, five or six miles south of Bien Hoa. One company from 4/10
a ^GR would travel to Bien Hoa and cover for 14/13 FFR while they swept
Ben GcJ. The exact location of the third Viet Minh concentration north- 
* /<• *'Ss‘
east of Bien Hoa had not been pinpointed, and should the fighting patrols
^ a/ ^
fail to make contact with the Viet Minh in Ben Go they were told to be
prepared to switch their operations to the northeast of Bien Hoa,
provided firm intelligence of that area ivas received. Regarding the
. / /
fourth area, around Ben Cat, the French were planning an operation to 
clear out the Viet Minh up there.
Rodham emphasized that "The above operations deal with specific 
enemy concentrations only." Commanders were told to strike as hard 
as they could during the next ten days at any reported enemy concentration 
within reach, as Rodham's information indicated that the locals were 
wearying of military operations and the Viet Minh were becoming dis­
couraged; "If we can give him* one or two good knocks now we will have 
every chance of discouraging him from worrying us in the future." 
Commanders were advised to regard "all locals anywhere near where a 
shot has been fired as enemies", for "The difficulty is to catch him, 
as immediately he has had his shot or thrown his grenade he pretends 
to be friendly." Commanders were also encouraged to bring in suspects 
from troublesome areas, for "Locals do NOT like a trip to the Surete 
in SAIGON and this will encourage them in future to give us information 
before the enemy start any of their nonsense, for fear of being made 
to take another trip to the Surete." In view of the increased Viet 
Minh activity, company and postcommanders in outlying areas "must 
have NO compunction in clearing an adequate field of fire round their 
posts. Obstacles, wire, poonjis etc. must be placed far enough out 
to prevent the enemy getting within grenade throwing range."
With the increasingly rapid drawdown of Japanese fighting units 
the number of incidents increased to close to an intolerable level as 
the Viet Minh quickly moved to fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of 
Japanese forces. In the last three days of 19*^ 5 the French had killed 
93 Viet Minh and captured 32 for the cost of one Frenchman wounded.2
In accordance with Rodham's directives to maintain the offensive, 
a 1/1 Gurkha patrol, escorted by two scout cars, brought in the New 
Year by reconnoitering a bridge about four miles southwest of Thu Dau Mot. 
As they approached the bridge they came under machine gun fire from 
a strong bunker position south of the bridge and received sniping from 
both flanks. The Gurkhas returned fire, but a road block prevented 
the scout cars from advancing. The patrol then returned to base, 
during which trip they had two grenades thrown at them. A mortar 
concentration was subsequently laid on the bunker area, with unknown 
results. At Bung, just a kilometer due east of the same bridge, a 
1/1 GR company was heavily grenaded and fired on for an hour, and a 
Japanese post about two miles northwest of Thu Dau Mot was attacked 
unsuccessfully. At the same time, eleven houses on the wharf in
Thu Dau Mot were set alight by Viet Minh incendiarists —  most of the 
houses were Chinese-owned,
On the following day the '1/1 Gurkhas, with armoured cars and 
Jat machine gunners, returned to the bridge west of Bung. The bridge 
was repaired while the armoured cars waited, and in the meanwhile one 
Gurkha company proceeded about two miles further south, to a road 
junction; another platoon, with Jats, went to another crossroads nearby, 
where all were grenaded heavily —  two Gurkhas were wounded and one
Viet Minh killed. To the south, Rodham's own escort, travelling with
? ;the ration convoy, was ambushed and shot up between Thu Diic and 
Lai Thi&u; the Gurkhas returned fire with light machine guns and mortars 
but as soon as they dismounted the Viet Minh melted away into the jungle 
Throughout the night the 1/1 Gurkhas received heavy sniping and 
replied with harassing fire; dead Viet Minh were later found where the 
Gurkhas had laid their return fire. Near Bung, a Japanese patrol rhn 
into a Viet Minh party and a sixty minute firefight followed, during 
which one Japanese NCO and five Viet Minh were killed.
At this time a remarkably successful patrol was undertaken by 
a small party of ten 14/13 FFR soldiers led by Havildar Bagh Bahar.
The patrol, called "Sherforce", had been attached to a strong fighting
A s
column which on New Year's Day had left the main base at Bien Hoa to
a/
sweep Vinh Ciiu. Sherforce slipped away as the main column departed
> /s ^Vinh Cuu for the return to Bien Hoa. The Havildar's orders were to
observe Viet Minh activity in the Ben Go area (about seven or eight
miles southeast of Bien Hoa); they were to return early on the 3rd.
The eleven men, entirely on their own in Viet Minh territory,
moved through very thick jungle and undergrowth, skirting road blocks
and trenches discovered on the back trails and roads. They came upon
twenty Viet Minh accompanied by two Japanese in uniform, all armed
with rifles or submachine guns. Continuing south they laid in wait
on a road and ambushed and captured one man. .The patrol then split
into two groups. Five hours later one group returned to the starting
point, having moved about from midnight to 0500 in the morning. They
reported "constant movement on the roads of armed bands often including
3
women and much noise in the houses." The other small force reported 
much the same thing —  the roads at night swarming with armed bands 
and a great deal of activity in houses and, in this case, a Cao Dai 
temple•
On one occasion barking dogs nearby gave them away, but the 
patrol avoided villages and came to a bridge over which was passing 
a Viet Minh patrol. The Viet Minh were joined by another party, 
at which time Havildar Bagh Bahar's squad moved on, crossing a 
nullah - this was now at the northern loop of the Song Cai, just 
east of Bien Hoa. At this point they heard a group approaching from 
the west, and took up ambush positions. The party approached to 
within five yards of the Havildar*s squad when they realized that they 
were being observed, at which time they shouted "Japanii" The patrol 
were not taken in and opened fire, killing at least fifteen Viet Minh —  
this included their prisoner who tried to escape in the confusion.
The rest of the Viet Minh force, including some women, ran to a nearby
village, from which they fired a few shots, and the 1 ij./13th patrol went
on to Bikn Hoa, reporting to the Battalion at 0715*
This well-executed patrol revealed the extent to which the Viet 
Minh owned the countryside at night —  armed bands literally everywhere 
and roaming at will. But during Sherforce*s final night out in the 
bush the parent battalion, the 1U/13 FFR, had come under heavy attack 
by a strong Viet Minh force of at least battalion size. The first 
assault had hit the northeast sector of the Bien Hoa perimeter, which 
was held by D Company under Major T.B. Hunter, MC, plus Jat machine 
guns. The attack was opened by a heavy machine gun firing explosive 
bullets, and this was the signal for simultaneous assaults on C
Company, 11+/13 -^‘h, under Major J.L. Stewart (on the river bridges) and
a post under Jemedar Karim Dad of D Company (across the river and west 
of the bridge). The main attack was on the Battalion's perimeter, 
where the Viet Minh had infiltrated forward by crawling along the 
ground using all available cover and aided by heavy supporting fire.
The attack was finally beaten off by concentrated machine gun fire, 
assisted by heavy mortar concentrations on the Viet Minh rear. The 
two other attacks, on C Company and Post RP3,'were also beaten off, 
as were two attacks on Japanese positions at the jail and railway 
station. It was four hours before the Viet Minh withdrew —  and 
an hour later Havildar Bagh Bahar's squad entered the lines.
Although the Viet Minh were unsuccessful in breaking through 
the lU/l3th perimeter they had displayed sound planning in mounting 
five simultaneous attacks in the area. At 061*5 1U/*13 FFR patrols
swept the area around their perimeter and found nineteen bodies 
of Viet Minh soldiers —  mainly Tonkinese, and including one women —  
though it is highly probable that the total number of killed was 
greater. Also recovered were a number of rifles, grenades, bayonets,
Bren magazines and nine Japanese helmets. At 1045 Brigadier Hirst, 
acting Division Commander, drove up and congratulated the 14/13th 
Commander on his battalion's performance during the night. Known 
Viet Minh killed (during the big attack and by the Havildar*s ambush) 
on this morning came to 34» but the figure was subsequently found to
be much higher —  it turned out that the 1 JL*/13th and the Jats had
almost annihilated the Viet Minh attackers. On 5 January the Japanese
,v V.
captured a Tonkinese in the act of throwing a grenade at the Bien Hoa 
"lunatic asylum". He revealed that he had been a member of the force 
of 700 (including 183 Tonkinese) who had assaulted the Bien Hoa perimeter
on the 3^d. Of this force, no less than 80 had been killed and 200
wounded. Their severe losses were due to the fact that only ten percent 
of the attackers possessed firearms. Although supported by four 
machine guns and two mortars, most of' the attackers were armed with 
knives and swords — - good planning, but bad judgement! The real 
killing was done when the Viet Minh were caught in a crossfire by 
the Jat machine guns. There were no 14/13 FKR or Jat casualties.
The 100 Brigade "Sitrep to 0900 hrs 6 Jan" reported that 14/13 
PPR officers considered the figure of 80 Viet Minh killed to be 
"substantially correct". Two remaining hours of darkness had permitted 
the Viet Minh to remove all but 34 bodies. The 100 Brigade report 
stated that "the attack recklessly carried out came straight in on 
the cross fire of two Sec[tion]s MMGs* and the whole area was spattered 
with blood." A remnant of this force had been ambushed by Havildar
Bagh Bahar's patrol and fifteen more were killed. Whatever the
/\
military wisdom of the operation the courage of the Viet Minh soldiers 
was beyond question.
The next few days saw 14/13 -kPH actively sweeping their area
A
following the disastrous Viet Minh attack of the 3 d^, the bloodiest 
day yet for the Viqt Minh.
The minutes of an interservice meeting held on 3 January provide 
an indication of the enormous amounts of ordnance stocked in Cochinchina; 
820 tons of ammunition were loaded on a Japanese craft awaiting disposal
* Medium Machine Guns.
at sea, and 3000 more tons of general ammunition were awaiting disposal 
in Saigon. A great deal of ordnance had been handed over to the French 
for custody. Fhu Tho airfield contained nearly three hundred huge 
2000 kilogram bombs whose size made removal extremely difficult, so 
it was decided to render them harmless and leave them in place.- The 
RAF reported the presence of a number of dumps in the Phnom Penh area, 
including 600 tons of bombs and ammunition in the city itself; there 
was no available shipping to move this ordnance, which was being guarded 
by the French. The Royal Navy wanted to dump much of it "in the 
PHNOM PENH backwaters", which were "not used for navigation, are muddy 
and reasonably deep." They thought that it would be "almost impossible" 
to salvage any heavy ammunition so disposed. Curiously, French ships 
had refused to accept for disposal any of the 3°0 tons of ammunition 
in Saigon. At all times "The possibility of improper disposal must 
be considered."
The medical representative at the meeting reported that opium 
was still being received, although most of the medical stores were 
now concentrated in Saigon.
It is highly probable that the Allies recovered but a portion of 
the huge arsenal of arms, ammunition, bombs, grenades, and other 
ordnance stockpiled by the Japanese in Indochina.*
At this time Colonel de Guillebon (Chief of Staff French Forces 
in the Far East) wrote to Brigadier Hirst. The letter followed a 
discussion held earlier that afternoon between de Guillebon, Brigadier 
Taunton (Commander of 80 Brigade) and Lieutenant Colonel Ritchie 
(Chief of Staff, 20 Indian Division). After the meeting, and a subsequent 
discussion with General Vallery, de Guillebon wrote that
"...I beg to inform you that we agree to the
withdrawal of 80 Brigade on or about 15th January
1946.
I take this opportunity to inform you that, in 
view of operations towards the North and East 
and in connection with the installation of the 
Madagascar Brigade, General LECLERC has made
* There was no way of adequately accounting for Japanese equipment, as 
shown by a report dated 16 December 1945* For example, in one report
the Japanese claimed to have turned in 27,177 rifles. 1134 machine guns,
276,000 grenades, 610 wireless sets and 60,535*000 rounds of small 
arms ammunition. The British reported receiving 3707 rifles, 148 
machine guns, 65,000 grenades, 14 wireless sets and 7»046,000 rounds 
of ammunition.
plans, which he will forward to General 
GRACEY, for the taking over of part or the
whole of 100th Brigade area by the French.
The departure of 80 Brigade should not 
interfere with General LECLERC* a plans." 1;
Brigadier Taunton * s 80 Brigade units were given definite news 
of their standdown when 20 Division Headquarters published “Suggested 
Programme of Relief of 80 Bde Gds"*. The brigade was to be relieved 
of all commitments by 2/8 Punjab, 9 Jat and the French at 1600 hours 
on 11 January. Thus the Kumaons, 23 Mountain Regiment, 3/1 GR and
the Dogras were to be relieved of their various guard commitments
on vital points such as the Central Jail, Yokahama Specie Bank,
Japanese Transmitter, Fhu Tho airfield, artesian wells, power house, 
Gracey*s residence and more (including a most important key point —  
the brewery, which the French would take over).
An advance warning order alerted 80 Brigade to be prepared to 
embark on 15 January, so the two Dogra companies helping Rodham*s 
100 Brigade were ordered to return to Saigon (from Lai Thieu) on the 
12th. The French were specifically asked to take over four areas:
Khanh Hoi (presently held by a battalion —  3/1 GR)» "the important 
Cholon power house, a smaller power house in Cholon (just' south of 
the race course), and the brewery, all guarded by 70 men each. Nine 
other areas would be taken over by the Jats and 2/8 Punjab.
Things appeared to be going well enough for the French to talk 
about the relief of 100 Brigade. In a letter to General Gracey, written 
for General Leclerc by Major F.A.Weil, Liaison Officer, the French 
announced that they should have one mechanized cavalry squadron each 
in Bien Hoa and Thu Dau Mot by 15 January, which would permit a 
"progessive evacuation" of those places by 100 Brigade units.^ By the
20th they hoped to have been able to relieve 100 Brigade everywhere
? t
except in Thu Bufc itself. Gracey penned a short statement to the letter 
which called for the relief of the Japanese battalions in Xuan Loc and 
Ben Cat before 100 Brigade could draw down.
Rodham's methods were now bearing fruit, for when J4/10 GR swept
V  •) 0 I
Binh Phu, west of Thu Du’c, some locals pointed out the houses of 
pro-Viet Minh inhabitants. The houses were "suitably dealt with" by
A
the Gurkhas, and two Viet Minh flags and a number of documents were 
captured. In Kh^inh Hoi, the 3/1 Gurkhas engaged four boats carrying 
a party of Vietnamese attempting to land on the eastern tip of the 
island at night. One boat escaped, but the remaining three were captured 
and their twelve occupants killed in the water.
* Guards.
Early in January it was announced that Mountbatten had been 
promoted from Captain to Rear Admiral; he was now a substantive flag 
officer, not just acting as one. When the distinguished actor John 
Gielgud* brought "Hamlet" to the British troops in Saigon he insisted 
on using the same costumes as in the London production. He also 
performed in Noel Coward*s "Blithe Spirit", and referred to his 
"audience", rather than the "troops", which is one reason why he 
is held in such high esteem.
The War Office was doing its utmost to speed up the movement 
of the 3**d BIC to Vietnam. Between the end of December and mid-January 
there were five ships** available for French trooping, each capable 
of carrying from 3000 to 3500 soldiers. Nevertheless, even when their 
trooping runs to Saigon had been completed there would still be 8667 
French soldiers left in France, and it was hoped to move them in February. 
The departure of 100 Brigade to some extent depended on the arrival 
of the 3^d Division.
Gracey was now requested to issue the following statement 
simultaneously with a similar one by Admiral L'Argenlieu:
"As a result of a joint plan agreed between 
the High Commissioner for France for Indo­
china, and the Supreme Allied Commander 
South East Asia, the French authority will 
henceforth assume the task of maintaining 
law and order in Southern French Indo China 
except for certain defined zones in which 
Japanese armed forces will be interned 
pending their repatriation. The British and 
Indian troops in Southern French Indo China 
have begun to withdraw from the country.
For the present, however, it is necessary 
for some to remain in the zones of Japanese 
concentration to guard the disarmed Japanese."***
One third of Gracey*s division left the parent body on
I4. January when a terse message from ALFSEA to ALFFIC announced that
at noon of the 5th, 32 Indian Infantry Brigade "ceases to be under
command 20 IND DIV and comes under command HQ ALFSEA for all purposes."
* Later Sir John Gielgud.
** Cameronia, Andes, Pasteur, Monarch of Bermuda,, Nea. Hellas.
*** See Mountbatten*s Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff for the relevant information, pronouncements, etc., on 
this period.
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The command of British North Borneo simultaneously passed from the
3rd Australian Division to Woodford and 32 Brigade.
In Vietnam, the tempo of French military activity quickened
perceptibly. They killed fifty Viet Minh in operations just two
kilometers north of Thu Dau Mot; Colonel Massu*s column was slicing
through the area southeast of Saigon, and 31 more Viet Minh were killed
around Ban Me Thuot, Heavy engagements occurred in several other places,
notably in Tay Ninh, Can The# and Mytho.
In the Travinh area of the delta the French had the unusual
experience of being petitioned by one group of rebels for protection
against another group of rebels. Officers on the warship Gazelle
were asked to help" 3000 Vietnamese being attacked by the Viet Minh.
Ironically, the boat carrying the petitioners was flying a Viet Minh
-1
flag. This was probably a Hoa Hao group seeking assistance against 
Viet Minh attacks.
The French lost no time in integrating their new air support 
capability into their repacification operations. Rodham's 100 Brigade 
"Operation Instruction No 65" reported scheduled French Spitfire ground 
attack sorties as early as 7 January 19^6.* This particular order 
dealt with comprehensive French operations throughout the Inner Zone, 
with French Spitfires tasked to bomb and strafe a number of areas 
including An Hoa and up to the west bank of the Saigon River, and the
hook of land formed by the Saigon River around An Loc Dong (one
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kilometer north of Han Phu and about four kilometers north of Go Vap).**
Rodham's forces were to act as stops, but they were covering a
large area —  a line running from.south of Lai Thieu to a bridge, just
west of Thu Dau Mot. French columns and naval craft were driving in to this
area, including Lieutenant Colonel Sizaire's force coming down Route
Colonial© 13 from Ben Cat towards Thu Dau M6vt. The Japanese were not
given advance warning of the operations.
A French intelligence report, rated C3,-was now handed to Gracey;
s
it stated that force of 1000 Tonkinese had crossed the Sdng Nai River 
c ^ ^
in the Tan Tich area northeast of Bien Hoa en route to Phan Thiet (a
known Viet Minh concentration area). A dawn French sweep through the
<2 f
western outskirts of Thu Dub resulted in two ViSt Minh killed and 25 
suspects detained. The French, apparently acting on solid intelligence,
* The French had four Spitfires in Nha Trang by *+• January.
** The RAF had practically ceased all tactical operations by now, and 
even the daily Spitfire tactical reconnaissance sorties had been 
discontinued on 8 January 19^6.
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had picked up two known Viet Minh agents, the Viet Minh secretary for 
Thu <Bufc, two members of the force which had attacked Bien Hoa on 3 
January and a man who was known to have murdered several Frenchmen
a  *7
prior to the Viet Minh "uprising".
In French operations northwest of Thu Dau Mot, covering the 6 to 8 
January period, three French columns had converged on Thanh Phu. They 
accounted for 150 Viet Minh killed and kO captured. A French detachment 
of the 2nd RACM was ambushed south of Saigon and lost seven killed and 
five wounded. In the past week the Viet Minh had suffered serious 
losses, and the outlook for them in the Inner Zone was grim as the 
French were rapidly gaining strength and becoming more familiar with 
the new type of warfare in Indochina. As a 20th Indian Division historian 
wrote:
"The situation in French Indo China was at 
this time changing rapidly. The greater 
part of the two French divisions had 
arrived in the country and their mobile 
columns were fanning out from SAIGON in 
all directions occupying all the main 
towns and clearing up the areas in between.
VIETMINH influence and power in SOUTH FIC 
was on the wane and many of their leaders 
and followers had wearied of the struggle 
and surrendered to the French. The die 
hard elements were attempting to make 
their way to the EAST Coast of ANNAM where 
large coneentrations of VIETMINH still 
existed and which was completely under 
their control —  except for the area around 
the part of NHA TRANG where a French force 
had gone ashore in mid November and with 
the assistance of the Japanese garrison 
were holding a 'bridgehead* surrounded by 
a large concentration of VIETMINH forces.
In SOUTH COCHINCHINA the French were 
moving steadily SOUTHWARDS occupying one 
town after another. The road from SAIGON 
to PHNOM PENH had been cleared. The town 
of BAN ME THUOT 160 miles NE of SAIGON in 
the heart of the interior had been 'occupied 
and the DARLAC Plateau on which it stood 
cleared of VIETMINH. With the exception 
of the EAST Coast the disintegration of 
the VIETMINH armed forces in SOUTH FIC 
was now complete. The remnants of these 
forces joined together and formed guerilla 
bands in many parts of the country and 
their presence was likely an ever present 
threat to law and order." 8
In British operations, a I4/10 Gurkha patrol flushed and killed
a Viet Minh ahout two kilometers south of Lai Thieu; near his Body *
was a "briefcase containing Yiet Minh news Bulletins and four maps 
showing British and Viet Minh positions. The Gurkha company then 
swept the area hack to their own lines and east of the Lai Thieu road, 
turning north to Lai Thieu. Half a kilometer south of Lai ThiSu they 
"bumped" a large Yiet Minh party in bunkers. A fight ensued in which 
six Viet Minh were killed and one Gurkha wounded by a pistol shot. A
variety of bayonets, knives, three pistols, 200 rounds of ammunition, 
shotgun shells, tools for making grenades, and some grenades (which 
"appeared to be in a very dangerous condition") were found; the grenades 
were destroyed on' the spot. At the same time, two grenades were 
thrown at a I4/IO Gurkha FW escort moving through the Lai Thi&u bazaar.
Two more Yiet Minh were killed, and with these sweeps on the 10 
January the ii/lOth Gurkhas brought in 127 prisoners and suspects.
The Vi&t Minh still remained active around Bien Hoa, despite 
the costly defeats they had recently suffered in the area, and "jitter 
parties" continued to probe the 1U/13 PFR lines, firing submachine 
guns, rifles and throwing grenades as they did so. In the north,
1/1 GE joined the French in a big sweep on the 10th. The 1/1 Gurkhas, 
supported by armoured cars, acted as stops for these operations south 
and southwest of Thu BsLu Mot. The French were in the west and patrolled 
the Saigon River, 1+/10 GR was in the east flank and 1/1 GR in the middle. 
It was a relatively quiet day for the Gurkhas, although heavy firing 
emanated from the French area.
On 8 January Gracey wrote to Leclerc about the relief of 100 
Brigade. Gracey said that he was in "entire agreement" with Leclerc's 
"proposals to relieve troops of 100 Brigade in the BIEN HOA - THU BAH 
MOT area progressively during this month and thus to enable me to 
withdraw some of that Bde to the SAIGON CHOLON area." But, wrote 
Gracey:
"I would however remind you that there 
are still two Japanese armed units acting 
operationally under the orders of 100 Bde:
(a) The ’SATO BUTAI* of 500 men at 
XUAN LOC
(b) The ’YAMAGISHI BUTAI’ of 500 men 
at BEN CAT
and I consider that the early relief of 
these is a matter of first priority, so 
that they can be concentrated, disarmed 
and sent to CAP ST. JACQUES.
Although they have carried out their tasks 
satisfactorily up to date I think it would 
be unwise to rely on their operational 
efficiency for too long in the future, now 
that practically all the other Japanese 
units have been disarmed." 9
Gracey then suggested that "the first troops which you may have 
available should be used for the relief of these Japanese, and that 
after that has been completed the relief of 100 Bde (except THU DUC) 
should continue." It was acknowledged that this proposal may delay 
the relief of 100 Brigade for a short time past 20 January.
Gracey also brought up the problem of the relief of Japanese
guards on vital points. Over 100 VPs of all kinds were (as of 8
January) still being guarded by 3221+ Japanese soldiers, of whom 21+90
were armed.* Gracey wanted to keep the Japanese guards on his Lines
of Communication, for "The rebels are always attempting to destroy
bridges on this road and guards on these VPs are essential until my1
10
troops are withdrawn." He drew Leclerc's attention to the fact that 
a number of pro-French Vietnamese and priests who were now under the 
protection of Yamagishi and Sato Butais would have to be withdrawn 
to safety if the Japanese units there were not replaced by French 
troops. Furthermore, the guards on the scattered rubber dumps would 
be "very isolated" when the main Japanese force withdrew, and even 
with a fairly strong guard force "it is not possible to prevent the 
odd hostile crawling in by night and setting fire to outlying 
Warehouses."
A. ^
In Bien Hoa, the Japanese units were evidently less than 
enthusiastic about their role as Anglo-French allies, and Colonel 
Miyake, the Japanese commander, was called in to talk to the 1l+/l3th 
Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gates. The reason for this discussion 
was Gates' dissatisfaction with the state of discipline of Miyake's 
soldiers. A recent inspection of Japanese posts on the important 
All Red Route, by Major Wenham and a Japanese Liaison Officer, 
revealed "discipline slack and men untidy". Some posts were deserted, 
and the commanders of others were absent. Local purchase orders were 
being disobeyed, and post garrisons were sharing houses with Vietnamese, 
"a procedure to which the Comd. strongly objected."
* Japanese guard commitments were as follows: troops on main
Japanese dumps and equipment, $16 on civil installations, 5U9 on 
Lines of Communication, 1257 area guards (including Ben Cat and 
Xuan Loc), and $62 for use by the British.
Gates had cause for further complaint regarding "co-operation 
of Japanese forces with the Annamites." Sato Butai, in Xuan Loc, 
had captured four important Viet Minh prisoners. However:
"No report was given until an explanation 
was asked for by the Comd himself. By 
this time the prisoners had been released 
and a doubtful story was forwarded from 
Sato Butai that they had escaped." 11
Miyake was then ordered to go out and inspect Japanese posts 
on the All Red Route and to censure Major Sato. But Gates was not 
yet finished. In the big night attack on 3 January, during which the 
Japanese on Bien Hoa railway station were attacked, two of the Japanese 
light machine guns had broken down:
"Colonel Miyake, was informed that these 
guns should HOT break down. In addition 
the Japanese garrison at the station only 
fired when they thought they were being 
attacked."
Gates told Miyake that poor Japanese units would be the last 
to be sent home to Japan. The French had also complained of bridges 
being cut near Japanese posts, and General Gracey was to be informed 
that Colonel Miyake was not cooperating fully and the discipline of 
the Japanese Army in this area was poor. In order to strengthen
Miyake's authority the British now handed his sword back to him.
At this time Gracey received a message from Dempsey, who said 
that he had just seen Gracey1s recent signal to 3?yman, which inferred
a slowing down in the British withdrawal from Vietnam. Dempsey wrote
that
"On the departure of MAUI HQ 20 DIV, 80
INF BDE and DIV TPS this month I am most
anxious that only the following BRITISH 
TPS should remain in FIC. HQ BRITISH
TPS in FIC consisting of REAR 20 DIV
with CRA* in COMD. The MISSION 
SUB AREA. 100 HID INF BDE. Your Signals 
[to] PYMAN lead me to suppose that- you 
are behind schedule in concentrating 
JAPANESE. I know of NO other reason 
which would make you wish to retain 
additional battalions. Please signal 
me urgently on this matter treating 
the reduction as planned of our tps 
in FIC as of utmost importance." 12
Gracey replied immediately, suggesting that Dempsey's staff had. 
not adequately done their homework and that his plans were following 
exactly the programme ALFSEA had agreed to during the earlier conference 
in Saigon. Gracey asked Dempsey to send a senior staff officer to 
Saigon as soon as possible in order to "explain and smooth out all
* Brigadier Hirst, Commanding Royal Artillery and acting Commander,
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misunderstandings." *' Since Mountbatten wanted to return to Saigon,
Gracey suggested that the visit could fit in with the departure of 
Gracey1s Headquarters.
Messages such as this one by Dempsey appeared to intimate 
that Gracey was deliberately seeking to prolong his extremely complex 
and thankless duties in Vietnam, duties which were unpalatable and 
unrewarding as his troops —  for political reasons —  were not yet 
permitted to receive the decorations which the French wanted to 
bestow on them. Wrote Gracey:
"Delay in decision re award to my officers 
and men of French decorations producing 
feeling of slight resentment at our apparent 
apathy in reaching decision —  fully 
realize difficulties but naturally 
D'ARGENLIEU and LECLERC wish to present 
some such decorations personally prior 
to departure [of] 20 Div. "
He also expressed his disappointment at the decision to send 
Headquarters 20 Division and division troops to Malaya:
"Splitting of div to this extent gives 
rise to rumours of dissolution [of]
20 Div. I wish at once to lay such 
unsettling stories —  your policy for 
future employment 20 Div with my task 
in MALAYA [with] possibility of taking 
over comd again of 32 and 80 Bdes and 
future task of 100 Bde would enable me 
to quieten fears which I hope are quite 
unfounded."
It was ironic that Dempsey's staff had prepared his prodding 
note to Gracey at literally the very moment when a sizable part of 
Gracey*s force was leaving Saigon, for on 10 January the 1114th Field 
Regiment, Royal Artillery [the only British troops in Vietnam excepting 
the RAF and RE —  the rest were Indian] departed for Malaya. The 
H ^ t h  personnel sailed on the Esuerance Bav. followed by the unit 
transport in an LST. They were followed to Malaya just two days 
later by the 16th Light Cavalry (minus C Squadron) and their armoured 
cars. So, except for 23 Mountain Regiment, Gracey n o w -had no heavy 
firepower left to him, and the loss of 16 Cavalry meant that Rodham 
was now effectively stripped of his ability to mount fast preemptive 
mobile sweeps through suspected Viet Minh areas. On the 11th, Taunton's 
advance party from 80 Brigade flew to Makassar as 80 Brigade itself 
was relieved of all commitments by the French and stood down. Responsibility
for the shrinking British sector in the Saigon area itself was 
assumed by Brigadier Hendriks and 555 Sub Area, with forces composed 
of 2/8 Punjab and MG Jat (less one company).
A week later Gracey received a response to his query about 
decorations for his soldiers; the philosophy was contained in a 
note from SACSEA to Browning. Mountbatten was against an Anglo- 
French parade at which French medals were to be given to the British. 
This "may well give the Hearst press* and the many pro-Annamite and 
pro-Indonesian journalists the chance to say that the French were 
publicly rewarding British soldiers for having put them back into 
FIC by force." It was hard to see how the handing out of a few 
medals to brave private soldiers, which could have been done quietly, 
would alter world opinion, while senior officers like Mountbatten 
himself were regularly accepting foreign decorations.
On 11 January, the 20 Division Chief of Staff received a letter 
from Major Weil, French Liaison Officer, concerning the impending 
relief of British/Indian forces. On behalf of Leclerc, Weil wrote:
"We have made arrangements for THUDAUMOT and 
BIEN HOA to be relieved on 20th January 19U&.
If possible we intend to relieve XUAN LOC 
at about the same time. We may not have 
enough troops at our disposal for XUAN LOC 
before the 23rd.
As regards BEN CAT we agree to the withdrawal 
of the Japanese as from the 20th January." 1U
Gracey accepted the premise that the French would not be able
to relieve all Japanese troops prior to the departure of 100 Brigade,
but he was standing firm on his insistence that the two remaining
active Japanese infantry battalions (Sato and Yamagishi Butais) be
15relieved concurrently with the standing down of 100 Brigade.
Since it appeared that 20 Division would be going to Malaya, 
Gracey wrote to Malaya Command requesting details of the division's 
future tasks and its proposed location. Malaya Command replied that 
20 Division would be lodged in 2nd Division's area, with Gracey's
* Mountbatten*s criticism of the American press was well founded.
The Chicago Tribune had, for example, called British retaliatory 
action against an Indonesian village, whose inhabitants had cruelly 
murdered British/Indian soldiers in a plane which had crash-landed, 
as "another Lidice". American soldiers would later suffer similar 
treatment from their own press reporting the Vietnam War.
Headquarters at Kluang and three "battalions dispersed in the area.
His tasking would he to control and move Japanese from Johore State
to the Riouw Archipelago, and local operational duties as decided
by 2nd Division. It was impossible to be more specific as the final
16
order of battle of 20 Division to Malaya had not yet been decided.
Gracey now informed Dempsey of the proposed French relief of 
100 Brigade. The French planned to relieve 1/1 GR and 11+/13 F^R 
(in Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa respectively) by 20 January, with the 
possibility of this schedule being slightly delayed. After these 
two battalions had been relieved ("and NOT before") he could release 
two battalions of Division troops namely the Reconnaissance Battalion 
(2/8 Punjab) and the Machine Gun Battalion (MG Jat), by 25 January.^ 
After that British troops in Indochina would be located as follows: 
one battalion at Thu Bute (1+/10 GR), which would continue to supervise 
the movement of Japanese from the outer areas to Cap St. Jacques —  
Rodham*s 100 Brigade Headquarters, one infantry battalion (k/10 GR), 
one squadron of 16 Cavalry, plus a Field Company and Field Ambulance 
unit were then to move down to Saigon. Rodham* s task would be to 
command British troops in Indochina for a short time, until the Inter- 
Service Mission took over.. In Saigon itself, 2/8 Punjab was charged 
with guarding the Mission and Jail. Local administration in Saigon 
was to be provided by 555 Sub Area, and one battalion (9/12 FFR) 
was in Cap St. Jacques. Brigadier Hirst was to depart with Main 
Headquarters 20 Indian Division at a time to be decided by Dempsey, 
but not earlier than 25 January.
The future of 20 Division was still uncertain, although there
were only two weeks left before Gracey was.to leave Saigon, and a
little over three weeks before 20 Division Headquarters was due to
depart. On the 12th Dempsey wrote to Gracey about "the future of
your Division". Said Dempsey:
"My object is to concentrate 20 Div in Malaya 
with yourself in command. It will then no 
doubt return to India like the other divisions.
In the meantime 100 Inf Bde will have to remain 
in FIC until the situation permits it being 
brought to Malaya. 32 Inf Bde is temporarily 
in Borneo and you will take it under command 
directly your headquarters are set up in 
Malaya. 80 Inf Bde will have to visit 
Makassar for a period which cannot yet be
determined and whilst it is there it will
operate directly under 15 Corps. I still 
cannot say for certain that it will be 
unnecessary for you to take a small headquarters 
to Makassar but I sincerely hope that you will 
NOT have to go." 18
‘The relief of 100 Brigade (less k/10 GR) was to coincide with a
French sweep from Thu d £u  Mot to Thu B u t  The sweep was scheduled
for 20 and 21 January, and on the 21st the 1/1 Gurkhas were to leave
Thu Dau Mot for Saigon. An Anglo-French conference of 12 January
worked out this plan, which also called for Yamagishi Butai to be 
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withdrawn from Ben Cat on 17 January, followed by all Japanese troops 
outside the British Sector moving to Thu -Bu’c on the 22nd. On 23 
January it would be the turn of 11+/13 FFR, together with all posts on 
the Thu Bub - Bi&n Hoa Line of Communication, to be drawn into Saigon, 
followed on the 26th by the relief of Sato Butai in Xuitn L&c. Hewsg
of the relief of the Japanese battalions was to be kept from them
until the last moment.
These were fairly extensive sweeping operations which were being
planned by the French, and which included 100 Brigade participation.
All participating French units were to come under the command of
General Valluy of 9 DIC. These substantial French units included
Valluy's own 9th Division, a light commando, a Marine battalion,
a company of the river flotilla, two battalions of the warships Tourville
and Savorgnan de Brazza, one or two destroyers, one light cruiser,
and assorted other barges and craft. Rodham's brigade was to operate
primarily along the river and lay down barrages to keep the Viet Minh
from falling back on Thu Bub.
As far as the British in Vietnam were concerned, the situation
was fluid at best. Plans were changing rapidly and the future of
20 Indian Division was uncertain. On the 13th, as the 20 Division
Order of Battle for Malaya was published, Rodham issued "Operation Instr
No. 66"; under the first subheading ("Change in Policy") Rodham wrote
that "The move of British Tps ex [from] F.I.C. has been speeded up,"
19and "This entails a redistribution of 20 Div Tps in F.I.C." ^ Further­
more, "The majority if not all of the Jap guards on rubber dumps, 
installations, VPs, bridges etc. in THU DAU MOT and BIEN HOA Sub-Areas
are being abandoned and NOT taken over by the French."but Japanese
? (
guards in the new Thu Dub Sub-Area were to remain for the present.
Rodham described the overall relief plan in an Operational Order 
to his units; in his Order he announced that the relief of 100 Brigade 
would be carried out in two phases. Phase I was the relief of Thu 
Dau Mot sub area" in conjunction with a combined BRITISH/FRENCH sweep 
through the whole of 100 Bde area between the SAIGON R and the DONG NAI R 
Phase II was the relief of the Bien Hoa sub area and the move of
Brigade Headquarters to Saigon.
Rodham received his own formal orders from Gracey in "ALEFIC
Operation Instruction No. 11". Rodham was informed that the relief
of his brigade (less h/10 GR) by the French should be completed by
23 January, and "On the move of HQ 20 Ind Div to MALAYA you will
20
assume command of all British troops remaining in FIC." However, 
he would remain directly under command of 20 Division and his 
designation as Commander, 100 Brigade, was to remain. It was now 
close enough to the event to tell Rodham that "At a date to be 
notified the operational control of French troops in FIC will pass 
to the French Government. HQ ALFFIC will close same time." The 
Commander of 555 Sub Area (responsible for administration in Saigon) 
was to come under Rodham. The 1/1 Gurkhas were to be replaced in 
100 Brigade by 9/12 FFR. Rodham's two tasks were as follows:
(a) You will ensure the internal security of 
the British Sectors of SAIGON and TED DUC 
and the area of CAP ST. JACQUES-BARIA.
(b) You will control the disarmament and
concentration at CAP ST. JACQUES, of
the Japanese Forces in FIC, SOUTH of 
Latitude 16 degrees NORTH.
ALFFIC Operation Instruction No.11 was superceded three days
later by Operation Instruction No.12, which gave the exact date on
which command of French forces was to pass to the French; this was to
be 28 January, the date of Gracey's departure from Vietnam. There
were to be three phases for the withdrawal of 20 Division.**
Brigadier J.A.E.Hirst was now to command all British troops in
.Vietnam from Gracey's departure until 7 February, at which time command
would pass to Brigadier M.S.K. Maunsell, who would be directly under
ALFSEA. Maunsell was to have under him a force which was not quite
equivalent to a brigade in strength.***
* Dated 1L|. January 1955-
** PHASE I PHASE II - PHASE III
to be completed approx. to be completed approx to be completed appro'.*
28 Jan. 6 Feb. - 10 Feb.
Main Hq 20 Indian Division HQ 100 Ind Inf Bde Rear Hq 20 Ind.Div.
1/1 GR 11i/13 FFR Hq 555 Sub Area
Proportion Division troops Proportion Div. and MG Jat
non-div troops 5/10 GR
Proportion Div.and 
non-div. troops. ^
*** 2/8 Punjab, 9/12 FFR, plus medical and dental units, engineers,
War Crimes investigators, Docks Operating Companies, Provost, Paymaster,
Canteen, Welfare and Graves Registration Units.
So determined were the British to disengage that it was announced 
that all Japanese guards were to be withdrawn by 23 January "whether 
or NOT the FRENCH take over the gds". 22
The French were heavily involved everywhere. In mid-January
twenty Viet Minh were killed in Gia Binh, which until recently had been* *
secured by 9/1U Punjab.
The extent of the Viet Minh hold on the countryside was noted in
a U/10 GR report which stated that in a number of villages only children
and old men and women could be found. Cecil Gracey had arrived in
Saigon for a short visit prior to her husband’s departure, and on the
/ 9 f
1^th, a U/10 company escorted General and Mrs. Gracey to Thu Dilc, where
the Battalion gave a concert at 2100 hours. The Graceys remained
overnight in Thu Due and returned to Saigon the following day.
With 1/1 GR and 1U/13 PPR due to be relived soon and pulled back
into Saigon, Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Mullaby (Commanding the k/10
Gurkhas) was issued 100 Brigade Operation Instruction 68 on the 19th;
in this Order was a map trace outlying his new, smaller area which
was to be called "Thu Due British Sector", as opposed to "Sub-Area" —
this name change was made to avoid confusion with the French areas,
and in any case the 1/1 GR and II4./13 FFR sub areas were being abolished.
Mullaby’s new area of responsibility was centered at a spot roughly
between Lai Thi^u and ThS. Dub, and had the Saigon River as the western
p
boundary; the road to Bien Hoa, running about two miles east of Thu
l 0 ) /V
■Dub to a crossroads about midway between Thu DUc and Bien Hoa on Route
Colonials 1, was the eastern boundary. From the crossroads (the
northeast point) the Sector curved gradually southwest, passing just
/ ? / 
east and south of Lai Thi6u to the river. The Thu Dub British Sector
was the one area which was to retain Japanese guards when the Japanese
were being withdrawn and disarmed everywhere else* However, Japanese
Navy personnel in the Sector were under the French. In this Order
Rodham announced that Sato Butai would be going from Xuan Loc directly
? (
to Cap St. Jacques, bypassing Thu Dufc British Sector. ‘The French,
as they passed through Xuan L$c, were to hand Sato a written order from
Brigadier Rodham to this effect. As planned earlier, Yamagishi Butai
>) /
was to come through the Thu Dub British Sector for disarming, then
rroceed to Saigon to raise the Japanese 2nd Division labour pool to
? /
6000. General Manaki was to remain in Thu -Dub for the time being.
The time was approaching when 80 Brigade would leave Vietnam. 
As a U/17 Dogra* writer described it:
"It was originally intended to fly out 
an advance party of officers, while the 
C.O. was to go out, stay a couple of days 
in MAKASSAR and come back to answer 
questions about the places. Various 
factors, the chief one being the non­
arrival of the DAKOTA, altered this and 
the advance party finally flew off on 
the 11th Jan with Major Colquhoun, who 
had been unearthed from PHNOM PENH, in 
charge and with Major Weber as the Bn 
representative. The Bn was complete 
again in the Annamite Barracks, long 
since renamed Dogra Lines, having by 
then handed over our SAIGON commitments.
On the 1lith 80 Bde ceremonially handed 
over to the French. The ceremonial 
consisted of a combined British and French 
parade, the whole under command of Brigadier 
Taunton, while the C.O., with Captain Evans 
as Adjutant commanded the British Battalion 
of six companies, one each from each of the 
Battalions, the others being the Fd Coy, 
the defence coy .from the 2/8 Punjab, and 
the M.G. Coy of the Jats. The parade
itself was a simple one, being a general
salute to Generals Gracey and Leclerc, an 
inspection and a march past, our pipes and 
drums playing the General Salute and for 
80 Bde’s march past." 23
The first of the two RAF tactical squadrons left Vietnam at
about this time, as the first two Mosquitos were flown from Saigon to
Bangkok on the 12th. A large proportion of 68I4 Squadron’s supplies
were flown out by the "Gremlin Task Force" (of which more will be said),
and the main party of the squadron left Tan Seta Nhut for Bangkok by
road convoy on the 20th:
"It was not known what difficulties would 
be encountered on the road as no convoy 
had come through to SAIGON for a long 
time, but despite bad roads, e^en worse 
bridges end second rate vehicles and the 
risk of attack by rebel Annamites, the 
convoy was a great success and made the
journey of over 600 miles in 7 days." 2 k
* In an appendix to the Dogra Newsletter, the Dogras listed the tally 
in their "Vermin Book", as follows: killed —  5° 3 Japanese, 1 INA,
5U Annamites; Captured —  8 Japanese, 95 INA, 105 Annamites. Dogra 
losses were 27 killed and 65 wounded. These figures included the 
Burma campaigns. No Vie't Minh had been killed in the last eight weeks.
In the Saigon/Cholon area itself the British zone shrank to
an area encompassing the Colonial Artillery barracks and the race 
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course, so that there were now three main British areas of 
responsibility in Vietnam : Thu Bub British Sector, the Saigon/Cholon 
area and Cap St. Jacques.
Major Weil replied to Lieutenant Colonel Ritchie, 20 Division 
Chief of Staff, concerning the relief of the Japanese. The French, 
in their reply of 19 January, appeared to be sensitive to British 
prodding. On behalf of Leclerc, Weil wrote:
"It is not possible to reply in a precise 
manner to the questions asked by the British 
Command relative to Japanese Guard Stations, 
which will be removed or not in actual fact 
by the French Troops.
This problem can only be dealt with after 
reconnaissance of the place, and above all, 
after mopping up of this region.
We are proposing, therefore, to wait until 
the 25th January, to decide with precision, 
after obtaining the advice of Colonel Gilles,* 
who is directing the mopping up operation 
and commanding the Section, the stations 
of which we shall assume charge, and those 
for which we shall request the provisional 
maintenance of a Japanese guard.
However, [the guards on a number of named 
depots] can be immediately transferred to 
Cap St Jacques, as has already been 
proposed by Brigadier Rodham. The depots 
are destined to supply the Concentration 
Camps —  their guard does therefore not 
concern us,** and we can only see advantages 
in their rapid evacuation to LE CAP." 26
A report by Meiklereid described how a number of French soldiers 
were complaining that they had been brought to Indochina under false 
pretenses. They claimed that they had been told that their purpose 
was to fight the Japanese, but instead they found themselves fighting 
Annamite maquis. Althoxigh a better class of French soldier was now 
arriving, indiscipline was still evident and the crime'rate had soared 
to the point where the courts were swamped.
Gracey wrote to Dempsey about the final departure plans. He 
mentioned that Leclerc had been given a promise that the last British 
brigade would leave Vietnam only on the arrival of the whole French
* Gilles, who had one eye, was a remarkable paratroop officer who was 
in the thick of the Indochina fighting from start to finish. Promoted 
to Brigadier General later, he commanded the initial airborne assault 
on Bien Bien Phu in 1953*
** A handwritten note was added by a British staff officer who implied 
that since the French would soon be responsible for feeding the 
Japanese they might reconsider the question of guarding these stocks.
Expeditionary Force. Gracey said that in view of this "he [Leclerc]
will stick his toes in probably. I think X can come to a compromise
with him whereby I leave approximately two battalions and some
service troops here to carry out the spirit if not the letter of the 
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agreement." Dempsey agreed that the promise should be kept and 
backed Gracey’s plan, to which Leclerc did agree.
By the end of January nearly 5^>000 Japanese had been disarmed 
and concentrated. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a 
reply to Tom Driberg, stated that British casualties from the breach 
of truce in mid-October to 13 January amounted to i+0 killed, 110 wounded 
and 5 missing. Annamite casualties came to 2756, of whom 1565 had been 
killed by French forces; 61+1 had been killed by the British and 550- 
by the Japanese.
Brigadier Taunton, Commanding 80 Brigade, left Saigon by air on
the 18th; he flew to Singapore to confer with the Commander of the
7th Australian Division (whom he was relieving) and went on to rejoin
his Headquarters in Makassar. A day later a firm date was given for
o /
the pullback of 100 Brigade from Thu Dub to Saigon —  this was to 
occur on 22 January, the date on which the main body of 80 Brigade 
was due to sail for Makassar. Rodham's Headquarters was to take over 
the offices vacated by 80 Brigade.
The now-famous Dogra pipes and drums played before the citizens 
of Saigon for the last time on the 21st, as the Battalion marched from 
the Annamite Barracks to the docks. Also boarding the Orduna were 
80 Brigade Headquarters, 6oU Field Security and the brigade’s supporting 
units (welfare, medical, dental, engineer units, etc.). On the 22nd 
the Orduna, bound for Makassar via Singapore, sailed slowly and 
majestically down the Saigon River —  until it got about ten miles 
downriver from Saigon, when the ship got stuck on a mudbank. On the 
following morning, the Orduna was piped off the mudbank by the Dogra 
band, and passing Cap St. Jacques a party of S/"\2 FFR came alongside 
in a French LCI to wave farewell to the Brigade.
Lieutenant Colonel Clark had brought his l/l Gurkhas into Saigon 
on the 21st, having’ conducted a number of sweeping operations on the 
way down from Thu Dau. Mot through Thu Dub. There was not much to say 
about these operations except that there were no battle casualties, 
little contact and only a few suspects arrested; the only injured 
were from B and C companies who had two or three men slightly hurt
by a "panic stricken water buffalo." The 1/1 Gurkhas marched into 
the Annamite Barracks as U/1? Dogra marched out.
Gracey, a man who did not lack a sense of direction, now wrote
to Dempsey, saying that the 20 Division Engineers were "dithering
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over [the] handover of stores [the the French]." This dithering 
was due to "lack of direction from ALFSEA", so Gracey had told his 
engineers to go ahead and hand them over immediately [Gracey himself 
was due to leave Saigon in five days]. At the same time he informed 
ALFSEA of the proposed order of battle of British forces remaining 
under Maunsell. On the 21+th, the following day, ALFSEA issued orders 
for the departure of 20 Divisions Main Headquarters, which was to leave 
on the Sefton no later than 28 January. Even at this late date there 
was no firm destination given for 20 Division, but it was now believed 
to be India.
Amazingly, the Japanese were still inflicting casualties on the 
Viet Minh, for on the 19th a patrol from Thu. Bdc had surprised a Viet 
Minh party attempting to block the Thu Dub- Bien Hoa road. The V.ie’t 
Minh were dispersed and suffered at least one killed. By the 22nd, 
the eve of the departure of 11+/13 FFB from Bien Hoa, there was still 
no word of the impending arrival of the French. As the 1U/13 War 
Diary noted, there was "considerable apprehension amongst the French 
Administrative officers owing to the non arrival of relieving French 
troops." On the 23rd, as scheduled, the lb/13 FFR departed Bien Hoa 
for Saigon.
Three days prior to Gracey*s departure from Vietnam he was 
informed by Mountbatten that the British Chiefs of Staff had now 
decided that the French could assume the task of guarding Japanese 
surrendered personnel in the southern half of Indochina. There was 
thus no official reason for any British troops to remain in Vietnam. 
Gracey was told to press the French to take over this responsibility 
as soon as possible and no later than the end "of February. The 
Japanese were then to receive their orders directly from the French, 
Wrote Mountbatten:
"My only remaining direct responsibility 
regarding the surrendered Japanese in 
French Indo-China will then be:-
(a) The provision of such additional 
maintenance requirements as the 
French may initially be unable to 
provide.
(b) The provision, of shipping for the
repatriation of the Japanese to JAPAN.11 29
But the shipping available to SACSEA was "limited", and "on my
representation the British Chiefs of Staff are taking up the question
of the provision of additional shipping with General MAC ARTHUR."
Gracey was pressing Leclerc to take over more responsibility,
but on some points the French stood firm. Leclerc would not agree
to the withdrawal of key British/Indian transportation units or the
docks operating troops until his own such specialists arrived —
these units were needed for the efficient unloading of 3 DIC, which
was vital to Leclerc's plans.
As the British role was reduced, and the Viet Minh now appeared
to leave the British alone, the fighting between the Viet Minh and
*
French was getting worse and casualties were heavy. The French were 
informed that at noon on 30 January all Japanese guards outside the 
British sector were to be withdrawn. On the 26th Gracey's Headquarters 
published the final plan for the withdrawal of 20 Division. Headquarters 
ALFFIC and main Headquarters 20 Indian Division were to close at 0001 
hours on 28 January, at which time command of all British troops in 
French Indochina passed to Rear Headquarters 20 Division. Rear 
Headquarters was scheduled to close at 0001 on 7 February, at which 
time command of British forces passed to Brigadier Maunsell and the 
Inter-Service Mission.
11A draft of Mountbatten's four page directive to Maunsell
was sent to London on 28 January. Maunsell's two infantry battalions
were not to be used for fighting except under two circumstances: against
mutinous Japanese or if British lives were in danger. Since the
equipage of the French 3 ^  DIC was a British responsibility, Maunsell
was directed to report twice monthly on the progress of equipage.
The "SACSEA Inter-Service Mission" was to be officially formed on
28 January, the date of Gracey*s departure from Saigon.
Gracey*s force was reduced some more when on the 26th pert of
i/1 GR* embarked on the 5e^ton. Dempsey had recently denied Gracey*s
request to fly straight home to India from Saigon, saying that there
were reasons "which make it desirable that you come to Singapore on
28 Jan as originally planned. You will stay a night or two here then
22
go direct from Singapore to India."
* The 1/1 Gurkhas and 3/1 Gurkhas had killed 162 and 82 Viet Minh
respectively, against five 1/1 GR and eight 3/1 GR killed or missing. 
[E.V.R. Bellers, The First King George V's Own Gurkha Rifles (The 
Malun Regiment), V.2, 1920-1?U7].
On the 28th, the day of his departure, Gracey issued his final 
report titled "Notes on Overall Situation in F.I.C.". He stated that 
D'Argenlieu would command all French forces from 28 January, the 
three services being commanded by Leclerc (Army), Auboyneau (Navy) 
and Andrea [sic] (Air Force). Except for "odd bands of desperate 
characters" there was no organized resistance left in the south and 
southwest of Saigon. Japanese armed detachments remained in -Dalat 
(three battalions) and Nha Trang (one and a half battalions) to safeguard 
the French, and these would soon be relieved by the French, so that 
except for a few rifles for local protection all Japanese forces in 
southern Indochina would have then been disarmed. Although there 
were now three concentration areas for the Japanese,* all should be 
concentrated in Cap St. Jacques by late February.
Most important, to Gracey, was the fact that it was now "Apparent 
that French policy is now being more clearly linked with French military 
action. General tendency to show by practical measures that policy 
will be sincerely carried out." This was helped by " (a) Disgust of 
majority [of] local Annamites of VIET-MINH army brutality and terrorism,
(b) Better discipline of troops and (c) Better tactics used by French 
troops and (d) Steady establishment of French Administration and 
police."
Under "How We Can Assist French" Gracey wrote, "Start, even 
a trickle, repatriation of Japanese." The propaganda and psychological 
warfare aspects should be emphasized, and "Brutalities committed by 
VIET-MINH forces against their own people should be mentioned whenever 
they occur." These measures"will greatly assist S.E.A.C. in my opinion, 
as the easier we make the French task in Northern F.I.C., the quicker 
will we be able to leave the French entirely to it."
Gracey reported that the Japanese were "dreading" being taken over
by the French; they expected the French to treat them very harshly and
withhold their rations. Gracey had reassured the Japanese on these
points. He closed his report by saying that he expected little or
no trouble, but thought that Leclerc would put off as long as possible
32the assumption of control of the Japanese.
Before he left Saigon, Gracey was accorded a, singular honour 
by the French. In a ceremony in the C.ity Hall he was presented a 
scroll and made a Citoyen D'Honneur of Saigon —  the equivalent to 
being given the freedom of the city. This was the first time in the
* Japanese Navy in Thu Dau Mot, Japanese working parties and technicians 
in Saigon, everyone else at Cap St. Jacques.
eighty or so years since the municipal government of Saigon had been 
formed that any man had been so honoured.
In a response to Gracey1s inquiry, Mountbatten (reflecting 
the Foreign Office view) said that he had no objection to Gracey 
receiving the title "Citoyen D'Honneur" from the people of Saigon, 
but for obvious political reasons his directive must not be prejudiced 
in any way. In a message to Gracey, Browning wrote that "However 
distasteful it may be to you, you should stress, if asked by the Press, 
that this is a mark of personal esteem for you on giving up your 
association with the French and should not be construed as a national
• j l
gesture. "^
Meiklereid, who held Gracey in high regard, had returned from 
Singapore on the 27th and impressed upon the French that it was necessary 
"for political reasons" to confine the ceremony to a personal tribute 
to General Gracey —  nothing must transpire which "might in any way 
embarrass the General on the eve of his departure from Indo-China."
The French agreed, and the Prefet's speech had to be rewritten at the 
last minute. Meiklereid spoke of the "great success achieved by 
General Gracey in carrying out the mission with which he was entrusted. 
Meiklereid told the Foreign Office that the French population "consider 
that they owe their personal safety to him [Gracey] and his troops."*
Large crowds greeted Gracey, who was popular and highly regarded
by everyone except politically-motivated historians, as he entered 
the City Hall accompanied by Mrs. Gracey. He was greeted by Jean C^dile 
and the Mayor, who spoke:
"No-one will ever forget the feeling of 
exuberance which greeted the arrival of 
the first Dakotas bringing the advance 
elements of the Allied Commission. This 
arrival brought to the citizens of Saigon 
the end of a nightmare that had lasted 
for four years, the liberation of their 
city within a few months of their Mother
Country, and the renewal of relations of
the world of free men, amongst whom 
those of Free England are the most dear 
to the hearts of Frenchmen...."
Gracey replied in French and, characteristically, accepted the 
honour on behalf of the British, Indian and Gurkha troops he had the 
honour to command in French Indochina. He concluded by saying that 
"I am pleased to take the opportunity of this occasion to thank all
* However, the Socialists in power in London refused to authorize
decorations for Gracey1s troops, who were killed and wounded during 
an unpopular mission on which the Labour Government had sent them —  
they had not been in Indochina by choice.
those who helped the British, Indian, and Allied POWs both before and
after the unconditional surrender of the Japanese. Never shall we forget
what you did for them, especially those of you who at the risk of your
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own lives gave shelter to our escaped comrades in danger."^ Not long 
after, Numata conveyed Terauchi's appreciation of the "fair and 
courteous manner" in which Gracey had conducted affairs in Indochina.
Douglas Gracey was the dominant figure of this episode —  this 
whole story revolves around him, and when he left, to shouts of "Vive 
Gracey", the British involvement in Vietnam, for all practical purposes, 
came to an end.
Main Headquarters, 20 Indian Division, left Vietnam for India 
on the Sefton on 28 January.* Hirst, with Rear Headquarters, now 
commanded British troops in Vietnam.
As Gracey left, Rodham asked Hirst a number of questions concerning 
the relief of 100 Brigade by the French. Yamagishi and Sato Butais 
were still armed and in place, and a number of Japanese were still 
guarding vital points in Rodham's area. He particularly wanted 
confirmation that U/10 GR in Thu Dub would be relieved by the French 
on % February. Hirst passed these questions on to the French, who 
replied that they wished to keep the Japanese guards for the time being — 
to early February, at least.
On the following day, in Singapore, Gracey attended Mountbatten1 s 
311th Meeting, during which Indochina was the topic of discussion. 
Mountbatten "expressed his very high appreciation of the way in which 
Major General Gracey had carried out a very difficult task as Head of 
the Control Commission in French Indochina. He wished to add his 
tribute to the gratitude which had.already been expressed by Admiral ■ 
d'Argenlieu and Lieutenant General Le Clerc." The Chiefs of Staff had 
agreed to SACSEA's proposal that French Indochina south of the 16th 
parallel should be withdrawn from SEAC on Gracey's departure (with the 
temporary exclusion 01 the Cap St. Jacques area).
Mountbatten thought that the US Chiefs of Staff would raise 
objections to his relinquishing command in Indochina to’ the French.
Since at least six weeks had e1apsod since Mountbatten had made these 
suggestions, it was possible that the US Chiefs did indeed object. Mr. 
Brain thought that "the only explanation which occurred to him was that
* Also departing on the 28th were J>/'\ Gurkha Rifles and the 1st
Battalion (Russell's) Kumaon Regiment (formerly 1/19 Hyderabads) — * 
these 80 Brigade battalions marched on foot from Khanh Hoi and Cholon, 
respectively, to embark on the Dutch ship Tegelberg for Makassar, 
where Brigadier Taunton became Force Commander, Outer Islands.
the Americans did not wish to associate themselves with the idea of 
handing over the Annamites to the control of the French."
The British presence in Vietnam was still needed, apart from 
anything else, for the administration of the French Colonial 
Infantry Division. As the French had not officially made known 
their views on the necessity for the Inter-Service Mission, Mountbatten 
set forth his own ideas. He would not accept the idea of the British 
quietly folding their tents and slipping away from Saigon now that 
the area was secure. He directed Maunsell to tell the French, as 
tactfully as possible, that if they dismissed the Mission the Supreme 
Allied Commander would withdraw their vital logistics support. 
Furthermore, as the British had "cleared F.I.C. for them by force of 
arms... our Mission was not to be a 'hole and comer' affair or 'here 
on sufference' *'.
It was generally accepted that Anglo-French relations were at 
their best at this point, and would probably not be as good again. 
Although the French were anxious to reassert themselves as completely 
as possible they were having difficulties in recruiting and keeping 
Vietnamese labour. They could not have kept vital installations like 
the docks and the power plant operating without British help, and were 
in the uncomfortable position of wanting the British to leave but not 
being able to afford to see them go.
On the last day in January what little role the RAF had left 
in Vietnam ended with the disbandment of 273 Squadron (Spitfire). As 
early as 7 December they had been sharing their ground support equipment, 
generators, etc., with the French, whose own Spitfires had begun to 
arrive from France in mid-December. The French were now masters of 
their own destiny, at least in southern Indochina.
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CHAPTER XVII 
THE END OF THE BEGINNING
Bn marched, from the lines to the 
naval jetty [— ] drums and sumais 
were played. Men shouted their 
religious cries. Japs lined them­
selves up on the road and bowed to 
the inarching column.
9/12 FFR War Diary 
30 March 191*6.
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With General Gracey gone, command of British troops in Vietnam
had passed to Brigadier Hirst. The British wanted to send "Check
Recce Parties" to Indochina to survey installations and gather
intelligence, but Leclerc had asked SACSEA to hold up the movement
of these reconnaissance parties until approval had been received
from Paris. Browning asked Maunsell to get Leclercgs approval for
their arrival with the stipulation that they would be confined to the
British perimeter until approval was received from Paris —  to delay
them would mean the loss of valuable shipping space. Had it been
a week earlier there would have been no reason to ask the French —
the Check Recce Parties would have gone in anyway, but the French
were now in command again.
On 2 February a schedule was published which outlined the program
of relief of British and Japanese Army troops by French and Japanese
Naval units.* For the British, the main points were the relief on
5 February of 2+/10 GR (Thu Buc), one company 2/8 Punjab (Tan Son Nhiit)
and one company MG Jat (Phu Tho Petrol Depot) —  these units were to be
relieved by the French Army, but all this depended on the arrival of
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French troops on the Cameronia. which was due in on the l+th. Japanese 
troops on the Phu Tho Petrol Depot were to remain in place.
As for the rest of the Japanese Army, all detachments on guard
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duties in the Thu Dau Mot - Bien Hoa - Thu -Buc area were to bet
withdrawn by noon on U February for movement to Cap St. Jacques, where 
they were to be disarmed on the £th. These Army units were to be 
replaced by Japanese Naval units under French Army command which 
would receive their arms from the Army units they replaced. Of the 
two Japanese infantry battalions, Yamagishi Butai (down to company
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strength in Ben Cat) was to be relieved by the Japanese Navy on the 7th, 
while the stronger Sato Butai would remain in Xuah Loc until the 15th.
Both Japanese battalions were to make their own way to Cap St,Jacques 
for disarming and depiastering by 9/12 FFR (which had technically 
replaced the departed 1/1 GR as the Division Reconnaissance Battalion).
All Japanese in Cambodia were now ordered to proceed to Cap St.Jacques 
immediately.
The situation at Cap St.Jacques was curious in that this was the 
one place where the British and Viet Minh were still getting along 
fairly well. Regular meetings were held between 9/12 FFR and the local
* The last of 16 Cavalry —  C Squadron —  departed Saigon on 2 February 19M>*j
Viet Minh leaders, and in a response to the latter the British had
arranged to transport more salt to the area* However, as the 9/12th
historian wrote, ".. * a growing complication was the arrival of the
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French to take over more and more area under their control."
Mountbatten returned to Saigon a few days after Graceyfs 
departure. On 2 February he held a meeting at Tan Son Nhu!t, which 
was attended by Maunsell, Meiklereid and four other officers. Maunsell 
reported that the local situation reflected a change of policy coming 
from Paris. The French attitude was "now that GRACEY is gone, let
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us make it F.I.C. and not Anglo-F.I.e." Mountbatten "said that his 
fear had always been that there would be incidents for which he would 
have been blamed*"
Maunsell drew Mountbatten*s attention to the Press, which was 
eagerly looking for French atrocities against the Vietnamese. He 
thought that the sooner the British got out, the better.
To SACSEA*s query, Maunsell reported that the "French advance 
by road was moving very quickly to the 16th parallel, which would be 
reached in two or three months, but he felt that an overall clearance 
of F.I.C. would take up to three years." Again in reply to Mountbatten, 
Maunsell stated that French troops could not get to Hanoi before 1 March. 
As for Terauchi, Maunsell thought that the old Field Marshal*s attitude 
was, "They think I am an old man who is finished, but I will show them 
that I can move [to Singapore ]." The French wanted to take over 
responsibility for the Japanese on 20 or 25 February, "which will make 
the retention of all British forces, apart from the Mission, unnecessary."
Mountbatten asked if the French still wanted the Mission, to which 
Maunsell replied that "they had not shown their hands yet on this, but 
that it would be necessary for the administration of the French 3rd 
Division." It was at this point that the Supreme Commander stated 
that the Mission would not be a "*hole and comer' affair". Maunsell 
then said that there had been "a tremendous send-off for Major General 
Gracey", and added that "General Gracey had even been complimented by 
the Annamites [Viet Minh]."
A number of miscellaneous points were covered, including the 
trial landing of a Dakota at Siem Piep so that the SACSEA could visit 
Angkor. It was laid down that "our general policy should be that the 
French were running the place, but that it was being fed through the 
shipping resources of South East Asia." ^
For the Mission, there were only small arms left in Vietnam 
on the 5th, since the last British guns had gone when the 23rd Mountain 
Regiment (Indian Artillery) sailed on the Dunera for Singapore. They 
were to have moved to Makassar, but there was no room for them there. 
Not long after, the Dunera passed the Cameronia. inbound with more 
French reinforcements —  their arrival meant that the third and last 
British brigade could depart. The Cameronia docked in Saigon on the 
6th, with 3391 French troops on board, and two days later Rodham's 
hard-working 100 Brigade Headquarters embarked.* Their last week had 
been taken up with handing over paperwork to Maunsell rs Mission. On 
the following day Rear Headquarters 20 Indian Division and Headquarters
100 Brigade sailed for India and disbandment, but not oblivion —  for
they had left as a legacy a foundation of security on which the French 
must now build.
At the moment the Cameronia was leaving Saigon, the RAF Ensign
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was being lowered at Tan Son Nhu?t, where at 1000 hours, to "God Save
the King", the flag was lowered —  followed immediately by the
"Marseillaise" and the raising of the Tricoleur.
The final entry in the log of RAF Station Saigon records the 
end of an episode and the beginning of another:
"And so passed control of Tan Son Nhut
airfield from the RAF to the FAF after
five months of occupation. These have
been months of changing fortunes. We
have had many administrative worries but 
it has been a happy Station. On the 6th 
of September 19U5» we took over the air­
field from the Japs; on 9th February we 
handed it over to the French and on 15th 
February the Air Headquarters disbanded.
We have seen many changes since the 
September days. At first the only aircraft 
on the strips were Japanese and these were 
used by us for all sorts of jobs. But 
in these five months, we have seen Saigon 
develop into an important air terminal 
used by the RAF, TJSAAF, FAF and RAAF; 
we have seen the coining and going of 
681; Mosquito Squadron and 273 Spitfire 
Squadron.
And in these early days, the nights 
were filled with the sounds of firing 
and many were the times we 'stood by*.
* In January 6292 British/Indian troops left Vietnam, followed by 
5638 in February. The rear party of 1/1 GR also embarked on the 
Cameronia. Mountbatten * s original plan had been to put 100 Brigade 
under French command, but had changed his mind on the strenuous 
objections of General Auchinleck and the Viceroy of India. 5
Now, though each night still brings 
its crops of shootings, peace reigns 
—  more or less.
In this, our last month in Saigon, 
the Airfield looks pleasant and clean.
Gone are the large expanses of water, 
the muddy side tracks. Circumferenced 
by noble trees, this busy field presents 
a most attractive appearance both from 
the air and from the ground.
In the shuttered houses of Saigon 
town French families are saying 
farewell to our men and in the canteen 
at nights the last sing-songs reverberate 
through the thatched roofs. And so 
another chapter in the annals of the 
Royal Air Force is closed....11 6
This was a touching last entry in the log, written by an officer 
who was evidently proud of the part played by his unit in the overall 
operation —  and well he might have been, for the efficient operation 
of Tan Son Nhut during the weeks that Saigon was under a state of 
seige by the Viet Minh kept the city alive and in touch with the world. 
The airlift and the river-borne food convoys from Cambodia had 
prevented the city from collapsing during the weeks of hard fighting 
in late 19U5 »
In February the Foreign Office received a report on Japanese 
financial manipulations in Indochina —  the Japanese had done the same 
throughout their areas of occupation. The report was compiled by 
Lieutenant Colonel Sweeny, Gracey*s Financial Adviser on the Control 
Commission. It was an arduous and seemingly impossible task, but 
Sweeny did a tremendous job of investigative work in clarifying the 
extent of Japanese financial manipulations. The Foreign Office commented 
that "Lt.Col. Sweeny appears to have done an admirable piece of detective 
work" in fitting the story together despite lost or falsified records 
and uncooperative witnesses.
In his summation Meiklereid told the Foreign Office that a 
"considerable sum, estimated at 200 million piasters in south F.I.C, and
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75 million piasters in North F.I.C. has gone to ground." The Japanese 
"Economic Co-Operation Association" had met regularly in the former 
British Consular Residence in Saigon, and in fact had been sitting when 
the building was bombed in February 19U5 —  the members had been killed.
Regarding south Indochina, two of a list of thirteen areas of 
expenditure were "likely to prove dangerous" —  these concerned items 5
(work on fortifications and supplies) and 13 (normal maintenance).
Some firms had been passing "large sums" on to third parties before 
closing up business following the Japanese defeat. Up to 200,000,000 
piasters had "gone to ground" under items 5 and 13 alone:
"The money in the whole of FIC that may be 
available for undesirable use should not 
exceed 275*000,000 piasters... It seems 
likely that a large number of the 500 
piaster notes declared illegal recently 
have found their way from South FIC to 
Hanoi and may strengthen the forces 
opposing French reoccupation of North 
FIC." 8
Sweeny traced Japanese expenditures in Indochina from 191+1 to 
19l+£*. The revised figures for the rise in fiduciary issue in French 
Indochina were as follows. In August, 1939» notes in issue totalled 
186,206,000 piasters. In November, 191+1, after the Japanese entry 
to Indochina, notes in issue amounted to 338, 865,000 piasters. On 
9 March 191+5, "the day of the Japanese coup, the total jumped to 
1, 51+8,287,000, and by 31 August 191+5, when printing stopped, it had 
soared to an astronomical 2,31+9»51+3»000. It was thought that the 
French in Hanoi had smashed the plates of the printing presses on 
the date of the Japanese surrender. General Numata claimed that the 
greatly increased expenses during 191+5 were due to the decision to turn 
Indochina into a strongly fortified zone and the supply base for 
Southeast Asia in a fight to the last. During the last three quarters 
prior to the surrender the Japanese had withdrawn nearly a billion 
piasters, 256,11*7,000 on the 1l+th of August, a large sum of which had 
gone to Hanoi.
What the Japanese failed to tell Sweeny was that on 23 August 
191+5 they had advanced six months of pay to all ranks, amounting to 
some 16,000,000 piasters, yet on 17 November Terauchi had requested 
the release of 1+1,000,000 piasters to cover the pay of his troops 
from 15 October to 31 December 191+5* As Sweeny mentioned, "The sum 
would have covered fourteen months pay and they had already been paid 
up to February 11+, 191+6.1" Among other things, the six months advance 
caused a steep rise in black market prices during September.
It was towards the end of November before the British were in 
a position to get a grip on Japanese assets, which after impoundment
* 191+1: 57,210,188 piasters; 191+2: 85,607,019? 191+3: 119,227,320; 
19W*! 359.836,910! 19+5s 935,667,000.
at that time came to just 58,930,573 piasters. As the Control Commission 
tightened their hold on Japanese accounts, Japanese expenditure dropped.
In September these had totalled 17,000,000, in October 15,000,000, and 
in November 13,000,000. The British had full control by December, at 
which time Japanese expenditures plummeted to 1+,500,000 piasters; it 
was forecast to be 3,500,000 in January and 3,00,000 per month thereafter. 
Japanese firms in Indochina represented the following industries: 
construction materials, textiles, timber, metals, chemicals, transportation, 
buying agents, shipping, rice, steel, oil, food, ships chandlers, canned 
and dried food stuffs, ironwork, refrigeration and cold storage, buyers 
of hides and meats, wood shipbuilding, gunny sacks, and more. Over 
100,000,000 piasters had been paid to these firms after the Japanese 
Headquarters knew that Tokyo was asking for peace terms. Nearly all 
of this had passed to third parties and disappeared.
There is more to Sweeny's report, but it seems clear that Ho Chi Minh 
and the Viet Minh may not have established the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam as destitutes, despite their failure to seize the Bank of 
Indochina in Hanoi. As well as these not insignificant sums of money 
they inherited a large quantity of Japanese arms and ordnance so that 
there can be little doubt that they were left in a moderately sound 
position by the Japanese —  certainly they were more fortunate than 
most revolutionaries.
In Cochinchina, French marines came to Cap St. Jacques on the 10th, 
and presumably British - Viet Minh conferences ceased at this time. The 
Japanese High Command enforced a standard of discipline among their 
troops to the end. Senior Japanese officers constantly visited their 
forces, both in the concentration areas and in the field where they 
were still armed.* On 28 January, the date of Gracey*s departure from 
Vietnam, Numata had a talk with Dempsey in Singapore. At this time 
Numata was on an inspection trip throughout the vast area of Japanese 
Southern Army when Dempsey asked him to be completely frank in 
describing Field Marshal Terauchi's condition and whether Terauchi 
was really in charge or commanded in name only. Numata said that 
Terauchi now spent most of his time convalescing near the sea at 
Cap St. Jacques, and while his health had not improved, at least it 
was not deteriorating. He suggested making General Itagaki the Deputy
* Some British troops grumbled that Japanese senior officers still 
possessed staff cars.
Supreme Commander under Terauchi, and, despite misgivings over 
Itagaki's militaristic past this was done. Numata said that Itagaki's 
appointment to that position would be in accordance with the 
Demobilization Ministry (formerly the War Ministry) in Tokyo. On 
Itagaki* s elevation, Numata (whose specific statements were "off 
the record" and not included in the SEAC report) thought that Terauchi*s 
Headquarters could be moved to Singapore. Numata further said that 
it was Terauchi*s wish to remain in the theatre of war in which he had
fought, and not return to Japan too soon.
On the 15th it was Air Commodore Cheshire's turn to hand over,
as RAF Headquarters, French Indochina, was disbanded —  for the RAF,
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only No. 2 Staging Post remained actively employed at Tan Son Nhut.
With the British presence reduced to just two battalions,* Leclerc
was beginning to show signs that he was feeling the increased pressure
which had now descended on his shoulders (as illustrated in a report 
from Meiklereid to the Foreign Office, in which he described Leclerc*s 
reaction to an article by a minor political newspaper).
A new weekly periodical, Justice, was the organ of the "Section 
Socialiste" of Saigon. It was normally little-circulated, except 
among Party members, but on 12 February its front-page leader was 
titled "Pacification". This was a "violent criticism" of the French 
Army, which was called too brutal, indisciplined, and so on. The 
article at first caused little comment, as the paper's background was 
well known, but much to everyone's surprise Leclerc chose to respond 
to it. On the 11+th, Leclerc spoke to a large crowd outside the High 
Commissioner's palace (he was acting High Commissioner in D'Argenlieu's 
absence). He said that the reason for his address was attacks by the 
local press on his troops and the Army were not going to let their 
flag be besmirched without replying. He went on to summarize French 
successes despite difficulties with the rebels and that type of war.
Meiklereid thought it worthy of note that Leclerc*s delivery —  
normally clear and precise, as Leclerc was an excellent extemporaneous 
speaker —  was now halting, and he constantly referred to a sheaf of 
notes in his hand. A French businessman later said that the audience 
were embarrassed by the address.
* The 9"th Jats and I+/10 Gurkhas had sailed for India on 12 February 
aboard the Orduna. the Jats to Bombay, then Bareilly for disbandment 
1+/10 GR to Internal Security duties in a turbulent India until its 
disbandment in early •
The United States, which had sided with the Communists in their
bid for power in Vietnam, now expressed concern that the colonial 
powers —  treated as political pariahs by the Americans —  were not 
comfortable in their role as scapegoat. The British Cabinet had had 
enough, and refused to consider an American request that Indochina 
remain in South East Asia Command:
"We are unable to agree to the American 
argument for the continued inclusion 
of FRENCH INDO-CHINA in the SEAC Theatre.
Arrangements made under Terminal were based 
on operational requirements for the 
prosecution of the war against JAPAN. It 
has always been our intention that the 
FRENCH and DUTCH should resume full 
responsibility for their own territories 
as soon as they are in a position to do so.
Resumption of control by these powers 
cannot await repatriation of all Japanese 
which may take some 3 years to complete.
We consider that the arrangements proposed 
[earlier] would not entail renegotiation 
of general order No. 1. It would only be 
necessary for the FRENCH formally to 
recognize S.C.A.P.'s authority as laid 
down in his directive and for appropriate 
instructions to be issued by S.C.A.P. to 
the Japanese. The position of the French 
would then be analogous to that of the 
Australians, who although, not named in 
S.C.A.P.'s directive, exercise direct 
responsibility for the Japanese within 
their own area of command.
We appreciate, however, that it is unlikely 
that we shall get the Americans to agree 
to our point of view now and as an interim 
measure we would agree to an arrangement 
whereby Admiral MOUNTBATTEN hands over to 
the French full responsibility for Southern 
FRENCH INDO-CHINA, but continues as S.C.A.P.*s 
agent for the limited purpose of co-ordinating 
policy in respect of the disarmament and 
evacuation of the Japanese from Southern 
FRENCH INDO-CHINA. 'This arrangement would 
avoid the necessity of LE CLERC dealing 
direct with S.C.A.P." 10
Mountbatten affirmed that at midnight I+/5 March a public 
announcement was to be made to the effect that French Indochina would 
pass completely to French control, except for SACSEA's "continued 
responsibility as SCAP's representative for matters directly concerned
with the repatriation of the Japanese."
The Japanese were concentrated in four general areas in the
Cap St* Jacques/Baria area, and 9 FFR divided their area of responsibility
into five sectors: Baria North, Xa Bang, Baria East, Long Hai and Cap
St. Jacques; Companies were to ’’organise at least two patrols a week”
in every sector except Cap St. Jacques, which would be patrolled locally
under Battalion arrangements. In other words, the Japanese were left
pretty much to themselves and their own officers. In a 9 FFR Operational
Instruction dated 2 March 19^6, these patrols were assigned twelve
tasks, from checking on Japanese reports to ’’where timbers and local
11material are being collected.” —  there was now no mention anywhere 
of fighting the Viet Minh, clearing out hostiles, conducting sweeps, 
etc., except for a single sentence which said, ’’Under NO circumstances 
will armed action be taken against local inhabitants except when 
defensively necessary for your own security.” Since the British and 
Viet Minh had been conferring at Cap St. Jacques, and as it appeared 
that there was nothing to be gained from fighting, the two sides left 
each other alone here. In the same vein, the Commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel M. Hayaud ("Gunga”) Din,* wrote: ”Do NOT render direct or 
indirect assistance to the French Forces unless ordered by me.” Under 
these orders, one company at a time rotated through Baria, spending a 
week there before being relieved by another company.
Brigadier Maunsell wrote to Lieutenant General Browning from 
Saigon, in which he reported that the French (D'Argenlieu and Leclerc) 
were in complete agreement with the proposed handover of responsibility 
and the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously at SEAC 
Headquarters and Saigon:
"As from midnight V 5  Mar. and in accordance 
with the agreement arrived at with the Allied 
Powers INDO CHINA South of 16 parallel will 
cease to form part of SOUTH EAST ASIA 
Command . From that date control of that 
part of INDO CHINA will be exercised solely 
by the FRENCH. However the SUPREME ALLIED 
COMMANDER SOUTH EAST ASIA will continue to 
act as the representative of the SUPREME 
COMMANDER and the Allied Powers in the 
Pacific in the limited role of co-ordinator 
of the policy of disarmament and repatriation 
of all Japanese as far as Southern INDO CHINA 
is concerned.” 12
* Later Major General Din, Pakistani Army. Here at this time, also, was 
Major Manekshaw, destined to become India's only Field Marshal.
The French assumed responsibility for Japanese administration 
on 15 March 19^6:
"The handover has proceeded smoothly, and 
British Staff Officers are continuing work 
with French, by their request, for a further 
two weeks, but only in an advisory capacity.
The French have assumed this responsibility 
without apparently realising all the 
repurcussions that are likely to arise. No 
difficulty is, however, visualised in 
straightening these out with the French as 
these occur. The administrative handover 
has been without prejudice to finance, the 
responsibility for which the French will 
not accept without directions from their 
Government in Paris. This matter can only 
be resolved by negotiation between London 
and Paris."
Leclerc travelled to Haiphong to facilitate the entry of French 
forces to Tonkin. He returned to Saigon on 25 March and saw Maunsell 
the following day. Although Lu Han had been heavily bribed by the 
French (he had already been heavily bribed by Ho Chi Minh), the local 
Chinese commander in Haiphong had apparently felt slighted, with 
results that are now history and are well recorded elsewhere. But 
events in Tonkin are briefly touched on only in regard to the involvement 
of two British officers, Lieutenant Colonel Trevor-Wilson in Hanoi 
and Commander Simpson-Jones in Haiphong (who, unknown to Gracey or, 
apparently, SEAC) had been sent to Haiphong by the British Pacific 
Fleet Headquarters.
Maunsell’s message to SACSEA said:
"He [Leclerq] thanked me for Brit Military 
Mission in HANOI and said ’cannot tell 
you what comradeship of TREVOR WILSON 
and SIMPSON JONES* meant to me nor can 
I imagine how we could have obtained 
FRANCO Chinese agreement without them.’
Behaviour of Americans in HANOI HAIPHONG 
was apparently so pro-Chinese if not 
definitely anti-French that LECLERC has 
taken some, though not yet defined, action 
here. This has produced considerable 
consternation with SAIGON American reps.
From LECLERC staff and HANOI paper it 
appears that arrival TREVOR WILSON and 
SIMPSON JONES at official saluting base 
at HANOI was greeted with ’spontaneous 
and prolonged cheers from crowd.' " 13
* It was said that Simpson-Jones went out in a small boat and almost
alone stopped the French-Chinese battle in Haiphong ^Trevor-Wilson Papers}
The Americans were received in complete silence. Both Trevor- 
Wilson and Simpson-Jones have never received due recognition for 
their absolutely vital intervention during delicate negotiations
a
involving the Viet Minh, Chinese and French. As neutrals they were 
trusted by all sides and acted as arbitrators and confidants in a
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number of ways. Both men held regular meetings with Ho Chi Minh,
more than once a week, and got to know Ho as well as anyone could.
Apart from their official duties they did a great deal of humanitarian 
work, and in noticeable contrast to the dozens of American officers in 
Hanoi, were responsible for providing relief (and in some cases release) 
for Frenchmen imprisoned by the Viet Minh. Trevor-Wilson wrote,"The 
extent of villainy of the Vietnamese police and army authorities was 
incredible. I was taken to see at the French police headquarters a
number of French men and women who had been murdered in a vicious way.
Many other people were chained together and marched off..."
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Of particular interest was Ho Chi Minh's assistance to Trevor- 
Wilson in the arrest of the Indian nationalist and Chandra Bose's 
deputy, Major General A.C. Chatterjee. As Trevor-Wilson later wrote:
"Another job I had to do, all alone, was to 
try to capture the members of the Provisional 
Government of INDIA who were in residence in 
HANOI. They were awaiting a plane to take them 
to MANCHURIA or RUSSIA. The Foreign Minister,
Major-General A.C. CHATTERJEE, had taken over 
the command of the provisional government of 
INDIA at a time when the original commander,
CHANDRA BOSE, was killed in an aircraft 
accident...
In view of the fact that HO CHI MINH appeared 
to be friendly towards me, I decided to consult 
him first. I told him that I had received a 
message from INDIA (which was of course wrong) 
saying that the Indian Government would 
welcome the return of these people who would 
do better in India than in HANOI.
HO CHI MINH told me that he would place a 
cordon of his policemen around the 123 Rue 
Laloe if I went there. He gave me a whistle 
to blow if I had any disturbance, and then 
his policemen would come to my aid. In the 
airfield I had a Dakota with several Royal 
Air Force men aboard. I went to 123 Rue 
Laloe unarmed, as HO CHI MINH had said, 
and asked to meet CHATTERJEE. He later 
appeared in full uniform, with a revolver at 
his waist... somehow or other I managed to 
make him happy." 14-
Trevor-Wilson persuaded Chatterjee and his staff to spend the 
night at the British Mission, and on the following day they all left 
for Saigon and Singapore.
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Trevor-Wilson went on to France with Ho Chi Minh, and returned
to Hanoi as Consul, where he stayed until declared persona non grata
by General de Lattre de Tassigny in 1952.
On 18 March there was a parade in Saigon "marking the termination
15of the stay of Major British Forces in F.I.C." This was also the
date that Gracey nominated Mr. Meiklereid for the 19^ -6 Birthday Honours
List. Mountbatten did not want to forward Meiklereid1s name, because
of his short period of service, but Gracey intervened strongly and the
nomination for the CMG was approved: "His tactful determination to steer
the political ship out of what promised to be very troubled waters has
succeeded beyond all expectations in seeing it safely in harbour."
Terauchi had since been moved to Singapore, having sailed on the
13th on the Kashima Maru —  two days before the French assumed responsibility
for the Japanese. He took with him a staff of A-3> six tons of baggage
and equipment and one car —  he had asked to take along gold bullion,
and it is not clear how or why he still possessed wealth of this kind.
As to Terauchifs future, Dempsey agreed with Mountbatten that the
Japanese Field Marshal should be spared the rigors of a War Crimes trial.
Sir Keith Park disagreed, and said that Terauchi should be tried, "especially
in connection with his responsibility for the deaths which had occurred
among those prisoners who had been forced to work on the Bangkok to
17Moulmem railway, unless he was actually certified insane." Mountbatten,
at his 297th Meeting, thought that the real culprit was Tojo, and Terauchi
was only an intermediary; Tojo, said the SAC, had ordered it built at
sill costs. In the event, Terauchi was not tried.
In mid-March, in Hanoi, the new Consul* (soon to be elevated to
Consul-General) opened the U.S. Consulate, and
"expressed himself very dissatisfied with the 
results so far attained by the U.S. Mission 
and expects to have them replaced shortly 
by Military, Naval and Air Advisors attached 
to his staff. He fully realises the un­
favorable comparison made by the French 
between the Americans and ourselves, and is 
obviously going to do his utmost to improve 
the situation; this probably will take the 
shape of purchasing facilities with U.S. 
and Concentrated American propaganda." 18
* Mr. Read, who went up from Saigon.
In fact, he was appalled at the political damage wreaked by 
the OSS, not to mention their callous inhumanity to the French POWs, 
and had them unceremoniously removed with the utmost speed. Whether 
the OSS were really as ignorant of the political realities in Indochina 
and as gullible as their actions would suggest, or whether their 
conduct was dictated by their ideological sympathy with the Viet Minh 
and its Marxist leadership, remains an open question.
Mountbatten returned to Saigon in mid-March for a conference with 
D'Argenlieu and Maunsell, at which time the SAC asked the High Commissioner 
for an explanation of the difference between "Viet Minh" and "Viet Nam".
The French reported that there was still trouble in the South, and that
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Ho Chi Minh himself had ealier said he found it necessary to promote Qly
resistance in the South in order to provide him with political leverage.
It was now time for the last two British battalions to leave Vietnam, 
their responsibilities having been assumed by the French. For 2/8 
Punjab, there had been a break in their routine when on the 11th an 
entire platoon in seventeen vehicles had to make the long journey to 
Siem Reap, Cambodia, in order to provide Mountbatten a suitable reception 
for his visit to Angkor Wat.* At 1030 on 29 March, 2/8 Punjab, less 
B Company (which remained to guard the Inter-Service Mission), embarked 
on the Islami and sailed slowly down the Saigon River for Cap St. Jacques.
At the Cape, 9/12 FFR had been reduced to a heavy schedule of 
cinemas, shooting competitions, football and swimming to keep busy —  a 
favorite pastime was putting to sea in Japanese trawlers to watch 
their charges fish. When the time came for 9 FFR to leave, the Japanese 
staged a farewell drama for the Battalion —  it•was well received. There 
can scarcely have been a more bizarre relationship between victor and 
vanquished:
"As the concentration of surrendered 
Japanese troops increased, the men of 
the Battalion had naturally to come 
into closer contact with their late 
enemies, and had an opportunity to 
observe them closely. It is recorded 
that their discipline was first class, 
and they co-operated and carried out 
orders 100 per cent. Never was there 
cause for complaint, and the men grew 
to respect them and showed a tendency 
to fraternize." 20
* In addition to the considerable cost of moving an infantry platoon 
to Cambodia and back, a vehicle broke down en route and had to be 
abandoned.
When the Islami, with 2/8 Punjab aboard, moored at Cap St.Jacques
and it was time for the 9/12 Frontier Force Regiment to go, a large
number of Japanese senior officers and men lined the Battalion's route
of march from their barracks to the jetty. The 9th formed up and
marched smartly to the docks, "From lines to the Naval jetty drums
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and surnais were played. Men shouted their religious cries." Another
writer said of that moment, "... it was a curious, if not pathetic, scene
to find the very men who had fought against us so bitterly, now so
22manifestly sorry to bid the Battalion farewell." In a poignant and
starkly memorable scene the Japanese along the route bowed to the
Battalion as the last British troops marched away from Vietnam.
Maunsell came aboard to wish the battalions goodbye, and at 1215
on the 30th the Islami slipped her moorings and sailed for India.
The British had been responsible for the maintenance of the French
and Japanese Surrendered Personnel (JSP) up to 31 March 19^6. From
1 April onwards the French took over these obligations, and on 3 April
the Combined Chiefs of Staff informed Mountbatten that he could handover
his responsibilities for the Japanese to the French. The French accepted
this duty with the proviso that the Japanese were gone before their
eight or nine month stockpile of supplies (sold to the French by the
23
British) was exhausted.
On 8 April there was a terrific explosion in Saigon when the 
main French ammunition dump blew up. The ceilings in Maunsell's office 
(two kilometers away) collapsed, and Saigon Radio, located nearby, was 
blown off the air. The explosion was caused by a careless French soldier 
who overturned his speeding truck in the depot, which embraced the area 
of the Botanical Gardens. The depot area was 500 yards by 350 yards, 
and contained a mixture of French, Japanese and British ammunition, and 
the total of 6000 tons called for a storage area of two square miles.
The explosion destroyed virtually all French Army records, so that the 
screenings for war criminals, personnel files', records, dossiers, 
histories, etc. were lost.*
Mountbatten wrote to the Cabinet on May, informing the 
Government that as a result of discussions between the Mission in Saigon 
and the French, the latter had agreed to accept complete responsibility 
for all matters affecting Japanese disarmament and repatriation as of 
midnight, 13/1^ May 19^6. When this information was passed to the U.S.,
* Destroyed also were the personal records and papers of Pierre Messmer, 
recently returned from Viet Minh captivity in Tonkin.
the American Chiefs of Staff wanted to know what time zone this 
referred to; they were told "GMT" —  Greenwich Mean Time, the standard 
time used for military operations the world over.
At 0001 on 14 May, SACMISFIC (the Inter-Service Mission) was 
disbanded; by 15 May all but 920 Japanese (retained by the French) 
had been repatriated. A reduced ALFSEA Liaison Detachment* replaced 
the SACMISFIC, and Maunsell left Saigon to become Commandant of the 
Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. The last company of British troops,
B Company of 2/8 Punjab, left Vietnam on the following day. The 
Liaison Detachment personnel eventually became the military attaches, 
and they met regularly with the Consul, Mr. Meiklereid. The RAF 
Staging Post, with a strength of 330, remained at Tan Scfti Nhift, which 
had become a major stopover point.
From Hanoi, Simpson-Jones told Meiklereid that during his frequent 
and lengthy visits with Ho Chi Minh —  he met Ho at least three times 
a week, for never less than one and a half hours per visit —  Ho had
expressed the fear that the French would pull back into Cochinchina '
2^f V
and cut Tonkin adrift. Meiklereid also informed Ho orally that the
British Prime Minister had received Ho's telegram, but it could not be
acknowledged because of the status of the Viet Nam Republic, which was
as yet undefined.
On 10 June 19^6 occurred the last British casualties of the First 
Vietnam War, when a "Check Recce Party" was involved in the ambush of 
a small French convoy of three vehicles near Baria. The British (a
A
group of ten in one truck) were actually travelling in the opposite 
direction, and, by the most unfortunate of coincidences, happened to 
pass by the French convoy during the first seconds of the ambush, and 
they were caught in it. The British party returned fire until their 
ammunition was exhausted, at which time the ambushers moved in for the 
kill. Six of the British were killed, including four Army, one RAF 
and one civilian interpreter —  but miraculously, four survived, though 
badly wounded.’ One man was missing, and the attackers were thought to 
have been Japanese rather than Viet Minh.
By July 19^6 Saigon was still not quiet and the French were
continuing their mopping up operations. At Meiklereid's 8th Staff Meeting
with the British service representatives it was noted that there were
still about 200 Japanese with the Viet Minh, and on 13 July a force of
150 Viet Minh, accompanied by 20 Japanese, had attacked and derailed the
* 7 Officers and 20 men, plus 3 Naval Officers to supervise refuelling
and revictualling of transient shipping.
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train from Saigon to L&c Ninh. A strong French escort drove off
*
the attackers, however. At Meiklereid1s 2^ f July meeting it was reported
that the Japanese Naval Headquarters had finally been wound up, and
the Japanese Naval personnel had returned to Japan on the vessel Choran
Maru. Of the Japanese only war criminals and witnesses remained,
together with a few officers detained by the French. On 28 August it
was announced that thirty-five Japanese war criminals were being returned
25
from Singapore to Indochina to stand trial for the Langsdn massacre.
The RAF in Saigon had now moved in to the Gia Long School from 
their quarters near Tan Sdn Nhdt, because of the unrest out there. The 
discipline of the French armed forces remained poor, and many Foreign 
Legionnaires (mostly German) were calling on the British Consulate 
seeking to enlist in the British armed forces.
On 11 September 19^6* —  exactly one year after the advance 
elements of 20 Indian Division had entered a tense and fightened Saigon -■ 
Meiklereid held his weekly staff meeting with the British military 
representatives. The most senior officer was a Lieutenant Colonel 
(the Press Officer, who was about to be demobilized) —  the remainder 
comprised an Army Major, a Naval Lieutenant Commander and an RAF Flight 
Lieutenant.
Footnotes: Chapter XVII
1 Gracey Papers, Rear Hq 20 Ind Div, No. 3370/GS, 2 February 19^6.
2 W.E.H. Condon, The History of the Frontier Force Regiment (Aldershot:
Gale and Polden, 1962), p.512.
3 GB, PRO, WO 203/5026, Minutes of Meeting at Saigon Airfield,
2 February 19^6.
4 The French Order of Battle as of March 19^6 was as follows:
ARMY: TOTAL 68,688, including 2^50 enrolled partisans.
—  9 DIC 
3 DIC
1 Bde 2 DB
1 BEO (Madagascar)
Corps Tps, including 1 BD4E0 (Bde Leger'Maritime Extreme Orient
2 armed regts.
NAVY (INDOCHINA).
3 Destroyers (Somali, Senegalese, Algerian)
3 Sloops (Annamite, Gazelle, Chevrevil)
2 Tankers (Horn, Var)
Misc: 8 LCL(L), 2 LST, 6 MFV, k BYM.
* On the 11th it was announced that six Vietnamese were found guilty of 
the Cite Heyraud massacres of the previous year, and executed.
«( (
FAR EAST AND PACIFIC NAVAL FORCE,
5 Cruisers (Emile Bertain, Tourville, Suffren, Duquesue Gloire) j
2 Flotilla Ldrs (Triomphant, Fantasque) i
1 Acft carrier (Bearn) j
1 Sloop (Savorguan de Brazza) j
3 Storeships (Quercy, Barfleur, Cap des Palmas) t
AIR FORCE: TOTAL 1300 Men.
—  339th FTR WING
2 Spitfire Sqdns
2 Transport Sqdns (.1 C-A*7» 1 JIJ-32)
Misc units.
[GB, PRO, FO 371/53961, SEACOS 662, 17 March 19^6].
5 GB, PRO, WO 172/1793? KQ SEAC War Diary, 26 November - 6 December 19^5-
6 GB, PRO, Air 28/679? Log of RAF Station Saigon.
7 GB, PRO, FO 371/53959? 19 January 19^6; also FO 371/53^59.
8 Louis Allen expressed reservations about Meiklereid*s assertion
that the Japanese passed on large sums of money to the Viet Minh, 
but wrote:
I agree there's more to be known about Japanese 
funding of Vietnamese organisations, and I 
sometimes suspect I may have let the evidence 
slip through ray fingers in 19^6. In March of 
that year, when a number of civilian firms, 
including Mitsui, were shipping back their 
documents along with the repatriated soldiers, 
we established a rule that boxes and trunks 
should be presented for vetting unsealed and 
unlocked. One consignment contained a vast 
number of legal deeds of all sorts, and was 
in fact locked. My first instinct was to 
insist they opened the whole damn lot, but 
they produced a duplicated list of contents 
which they guaranteed, and some of the 
guarantors were people 1 1d known and been 
helped by before. On the other hand, I was 
no financial or legal expert, and couldn't 
be responsible for letting through documentation 
of this kind alone, so I submitted the list 
to the Finance Officer - I ' m  not sure of his 
exact rank or title - with the British Mission, 
and asked him if there were any papers in it 
which ought to be held or scrutinised* I 
suspect he was in the same quandry as myself, 
and wrote a self-guarding note, saying as far
as he could judge there was nothing in the list !
which need be retained. So all the papers
were shipped back without scrutiny. I don't
think it matters a great deal, but it's just
possible they might have contained accounts
of dealings with VN organisations; on the
other hand, it isn't very likely, since they
must have known they'd have been vulnerable to
a request for opening.
Louis Allen also kindly translated for the author a relevent 
portion of the Japanese official history (produced by the Self 
Defense Force):
Extract from Japanese official history of the war, fourth volume 
of Burma campaign, Shittan; Mei-go Sakusen ('Sittang, and the coup 
de force in Indo-China''), Asagumo Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1970.
MONEY
p.683. Restraints on inflation
It was. not only the three countries (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) 
which were poor, but the Japanese Army also. In Indochina 
military scrip was not used, and expenses incurred in army 
supply were agreed with the French Indochina authorities on 
an annual basis, and piastres were loaned by the FIC 
authorities. So it was natural that the volume was not 
great. When the Southern Area Army came to Saigon, there 
was no appropriation for buying of supplies for it, or 
provision of war materials. At that time, the Banque 
d'Indochine, the source of supply), was under Army control.
However, Lt.-Gen. Tsuchihashi, the Army C-in-C, avoided 
as much as possible the release of currency, to prevent 
inflation. So no great inflation occurred. However, 
around July (19^5)? 300-piastre notes were issued, and 
used for military expenditure. These military notes did 
not command much confidence, and became ineffective after 
the end of the war.
(Source: Postwar recollections of Tsuchihashi, and of Colonel 
Ogata, 0C 38 Army Paymaster Department).
ARMS.
p75H3 also refers to the period at the beginning of August 
when ammunition, bayonets, pistols and 10,000 rifles taken 
from the (French) army of Indochina were collected and sent 
off to Hue for use by the new Vietnamese government, but on 
the way fell into the hands of the Viet Minh (Source is 
Tsuchihashi, and reference is also made to Ellen Hammer, 
who in fact states the Japanese handed over arms to the 
Viet Minh). The arms and ammo were not greater than 
this in quantity, because Southern Area Army had earlier 
ordered that all weapons &c taken from the French should 
be sent off to the Burma front.
VIET MINH APPROACHES.
p.68H. This page details approaches made to Viet Minh
by the Japanese Army,* after the failure, in June 19^5,
of the punitive expedition in the North carried out by 
21 Division. The proposed intermediaries were the Kam Sai,
Ke Toai, and the nuiyor of Hanoi, Chan Ban Lai, who drew 
up a number of propositions describing what the Japanese 
wanted their relations with the Viet Minh to be, and 
asking Ho Chi Minh to send a representative for 
discussions. The end of the war intervened, so nothing 
seems to have come of this notion.
.e. Tsuchihashi (whose diary in Allen's view, is "one of the prime
historical sources for the period" —  letter to author, 1 August 1977)-
Allen also provided an excerpt from the account of a Japanese 
journalist, who was in Saigon in 19^/^+5:
His name’s Wada, and he was a Mainmichi Shimbun political 
correspondent, finally interned and shipped home in April 
19^-6. In one of his chapters he says something of direct 
relevance to your theme, namely that he was once asked by 
a FrenchHeutenant-colonel to report weekly to an agent 
on anything that might be interesting from the intelligence 
point of view. He names the agent, a French captain 
George Wagner, whom he met every Wednesday at the back 
door of the Cathedral. On one occasion Wagner let fly 
a storm of violent anti-British abuse, which Wada noted 
with some relish and retails in full, saying it was 
representative of the general coldness towards the British 
felt by the French in Saigon. I don't believe this was 
entirely true at all, though I quite accept they would 
use Japanese they believed to be friendly. Many of us 
were on quite cordial personal terras with the- French, 
and there was some mutual entertainment at most levels, 
civil as well as military.
Of his own unit's role, Allen wrote:
My unit was "attached" to Maunsell's Control Commission, for 
the purpose of screening the Japanese. We were members of 
CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre) and 
SEATIC (South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre) 
Mobile Section, consisting of members of all services, and 
after the war we were chiefly concerned with checking up on 
Japanese intelligence activities and documenting war-time 
history. On a much smaller scale (and with, needless to say, 
nothing like the resouces in men or equipment) we corresponded 
to ATIS. One unit with which we'd been connected in Burma,
55 Division, was by this time in Cambodia, and its senior 
staff officer, Lt.Col. Saito (I think I mentioned him) was 
involved with tracing Japanese deserters and wooing them 
back. He was one of the last Japanese to leave Saigon, 
but we were also in constant touch with some civilians...
When I returned to Saigon later in 19^6, after the Mission 
had withdrawn, and there were only a few officers left, 
everything was on a much reduced scale, and we shared a house 
in the Rue Legrand de la Liraye, if I remember its spelling, 
near the Gia Long School. Screening usually consisted in 
scrutinising nominal rolls and ticking names off against 
laden Japanese climbing into rusty litt'le ships. But it 
also involved the pathetic process of screening Formosans 
and Koreans, the former in particular a hapless lot caught 
up in something they were hardly concerned in, and having 
their lives uprooted for nothing. On the intelligence side, 
there were of course other chores, but somehow they lacked 
the excitement of similar exercises carried out in war-time. 
Having been a student of French, it was of course intriguing 
for me to see French overseas life at close quarters and it 
provided me with my first great disillusionment. I'd
expected them all, naively, to spout like Pascal 
or Racine, and to be intellectually,or somehow 
fascinatingly, motivated. Whereas there was 
little to choose between them and the colonial 
British overseas, both armoured against difference.
Of the local population, we knew next to nothing;
I'm still staggered at the vast ignorance we 
showed - partly, no doubt, because we were so 
exclusively occupied with the Japanese that 
there was little incentive'or time to get to grips 
with what was happening politically in Saigon - 
all I remember is that we never referred to 
VietNam, it was always 'the Annamites', though we 
did know the Viet Minh and laid every exploding 
grenade or Boooomp in the Night to their door.
Even so, Saigon was a real oasis for most of us.
Air Commodore Cheshire later provided a fascinating account 
of his employment of the Japanese Air Force —  the "Gremlin 
Task Force" earlier referred to in the log of 68*f Squadron. 
Wrote Cheshire at the start:
"When Air Command Headquarters at Kandy 
detailed me for this appointment they 
were extremely vague about the duties 
and responsibilities involved, and 
this lack of positive instructions was 
further emphasised when the Staff 
invited me to write my own directive...
The RAF in FIC were also in difficulties 
but, unlike the Army, they were short 
not of men but of fuel. The squadrons 
had, in reserve, only one hour's fuel 
or, in other words, they could complete 
only one sortie each. Here again the 
Japanese were in a position to provide 
very useful help. Most of their aircraft 
had been grounded since the surrender, 
but many were still serviceable and could 
be flown. Backing these aircraft was 
a useful reserve of fuel which, for 
technical reasons, could not be used in 
our own aircraft. After some discussion 
the decision was taken to make limited 
use of the Japanese Air Force. The 
limitation was imposed for political 
reasons, based on the curious idea that 
bullets fired from aircraft were politically 
more reprehensible than bullets, equally 
lethal, fired from the ground." *
* by the Japanese Army.
The Japanese Commander seemed pleased at being assigned an 
operational role, which was confined to "transport and unarmed 
reconnaissance duties only." Continued Cheshire:■
"The Japanese aircraft suitable for the 
tasks allotted to them ranged from a
' creditable Jap copy of a Dakota to a 
small passenger carrier capable of 
lifting four or five- passengers. Some 
bomber types were also available, useless 
for passenger work but valuable for 
lifting cargo."
The daily procedure called for the Japanese Commander to notify 
Cheshire's staff daily of the number of aircraft available, at which 
time the tasking was done. Cheshire installed a Squadron Leader and 
interpreter in a hut alongside the Japanese Commander, and this 
arrangement worked very well, "confirming previous experience that 
simple organisations are also frequently the best... Experience in 
operations showed that once their aircraft were offered a task, there 
were few technical failures." The next step was to call this force 
something besides the Japanese Air Force:
"The next stage in the creation of this 
special force was to obliterate Japanese 
markings on the aircraft and replace them 
with R.A.F. roundels. Finally I decided 
to give this force a special designation, 
to distinguish them from the R.A.F. and 
the French Air Force, both of which were 
also operating in the area. Inspired by 
the U.S. example set in the Pacific, I 
selected the term TASK FORCE with the 
prefix GREMLIN because of its popularity 
in the R.A.F. at the time. Thus the 
Gremlin Task Force, or G.T.F., was born."
The Gremlin Task Force undertook a variety of assignments, 
and their major role in moving 68*f Squadron to Bangkok was their 
last big operation:
"In the short period of their existence 
they had successfully completed over
2,000 sorties. By the standard of later 
massive operations, such as the Berlin 
airlift, this was small beer, but it 
had usefully filled an unavoidable gap 
in our logistic operation, and did so 
at little cost to the British Treasury.
The RAF administrative tail supporting 
this effort consisted of two officers 
only; certainly one of the least costly 
air operations undertaken since 1939*••
652
The Second World War and the troubled 
era that followed gave birth to many 
so called •sideshows1, the GTF was 
one of them and although not as un­
usual as some, I believe its existence 
and achievements to be worth recording.”
These Japanese aircraft had proved extremely useful to 
both British and French Array Commanders, for much of their 
pre-operations reconnaissance was done in GTF aircraft.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter G. Cheshire, Letter to author, 16 November
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23 Towards the end of March, M.E. Dening, in his capacity as Chief
Political Adviser to SACSEA, submitted a final report to Mr. Bevin, 
the Foreign Minister. With the recent appointment of Lord Killearn 
as a special commissioner in South East Asia, Dening*s functions as 
political adviser to Mountbatten had come to an end when on 15 March 
the office of Chief Political Adviser to SACSEA was abolished. In 
his letter to Bevin, Dening commented:
The report is, I fear, rather long in 
these days when there is too much to 
be read. But a great deal has happened 
in the period. While the war continued 
political events were subsidiary to the 
main conduct of the battle. When the 
war ended it was the political situation 
which influenced military events...
In the summary of my previous report I 
concluded with the words: 'But the 
conclusion of hostilities will give 
rise to a host of intricate problems.1 
That has proved to be true.11
Some of the more germane portions of the report follow:
... As the year wore on, the campaign in South-East Asia 
became more and more a purely British-Indian affair. Towards 
the end of 19^4- ‘the decision had been made by the Sino-
American command in China to withdraw two Chinese divisions
from Burma to avert the possibility of an apparently imminent 
collapse. This was followed early in 19U5 By a decision to
transfer the remainder of the Chinese forces from Burma, and
later the whole of the United States air forces operating with 
the South-East Asia Command. The sole American brigade which 
had operated in S.E.A.C. in conjunction with the Chinese forces 
in Northern Burma was also transferred to China.
American strategy, in so far as the Asiatic mainland was concerned, 
was, in fact, concentrating upon China to the exclusion of 
South-East Asia, whereas the strategy of S.E.A.C. was directed 
towards opening the Malacca Straits and gaining access to the 
South China Sea. In so far as the diversion of Sino-American 
forces to China created gaps in the S.E.A.C. order of battle, 
the operations of the latter were hampered. The subsequent 
decision to provide a British Commonwealth force to take part 
in the main American assault on Japan would have placed further 
restrictions upon the S.E.A.C. effort.
Militarily there can be no doubt that the Pacific strategy as 
a means of bringing the war with Japan to an early end was sound. 
Whether the China strategy, which was also an American concept, 
was equally sound is more doubtful. Historians may well argue 
that a combined, instead of a divided, effort might have led to 
an earlier opening of the Malacca Straits and thus greatly 
have facilitated redeployment at the close of the European war, 
whereas it was very doubtful whether the state of China would 
have admitted of any effective campaign through Chinese territory.
These military considerations are mentioned because they were 
not without their political cause and effect. The United States 
had come to regard the Japanese war as something peculiarly their 
own, just as they came to regard China as their particular prot£g£. 
Though commanders might or might not see eye to eye with their 
British counterparts (and on the mainland, on the whole, they did 
not), it is doubtful whether, in American eyes, there was any 
fundamental conception of a joint Anglo-American effort in the 
war against Japan, whatever might be declaimed from public 
platforms. In part there was resentment at the alleged unwilling­
ness of Britain to do her share. But far more there was the 
feeling that this was an all-American show in which American 
arms both could and would demonstrate both their superiority 
and their authority over all others.
In this American conception of the Far Eastern war, which was 
little realised in Europe, S.E.A.C. was always a poor relation.
It was the unnecessary front, and as such could always be 
deprived of resources or have them withheld. The slow progress 
of its operations, which was due in part to the withholding of 
resources, and, in part, to American insistence on securing the 
air route through North Burma to China, was always regarded as 
a legitimate target for criticism.
In spite therefore of the fact that S.E.A.C. was an integrated 
Anglo-American command, and in spite of the cordial relations 
between the integrated staffs, it cannot be said on balance that 
the campaign in South-East Asia resulted in a better understanding 
between Great Britain and America. Nor was the existence of the 
American "India-Burma Theatre” within the command conducive 
to good understanding. On the contrary, though through no fault 
of ours, S.E.A.C. was a constant potential source of friction.
At the root of the matter lay the fact that America always 
suspected British Ear Eastern policy, and that, in her new-found 
strength, she was satisfied that her own policy was not only 
the right one, but also the more disinterested. Whether it was 
so right or so disinterested remains to be seen.
However that may be, the end of the war with Japan found the 
British forces of S.E.A.C. and the Sino-American forces of China 
apart from one another and faced with entirely different sets 
of problems.
From those problems which now confront S.E.A.C., America, has 
remained aloof. At the same time she has maintained through 
O.S.S. (now transformed into S.S.U.) detachments in various 
places, posts of observation which not improbably combine the 
task of economic penetration, while in Siam she has a strong 
foothold, including an air staging post, which is no doubt 
intended to be the forerunner of a commercial air line. For 
the rest, she retains and exercises the right to continue to 
suspect us and to criticise us. Individual relations, however, 
remain cordial.
Before proceeding to review the problems of South-East Asia 
by countries in their intricate detail, it is well to consider 
the position of S.E.A.C. when hostilities ceased. The end of 
the war with Japan found the Command militarily readier than 
any other to take immediate action. But General MacArthur, 
who had to take the initial occupation of Japan with comparatively 
slender forces, and who had by then been appointed Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, was anxious lest any incidents 
in outlying areas might render his task more difficult. He 
therefore forbade any reoccupation until he had taken the 
formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, an event which did not 
take place until the 2nd September, 1945* A delay was therefore 
imposed upon S.E.A.C., which had important consequences, 
particularly in Indonesia.
On the very day that Japan agreed to unconditional surrender, 
namely, on the 15th August, 1945* Admiral Mountbatten became 
the unwilling inheritor of a large portion of the former South- 
West Pacific Command, including Java - unwilling because he was
given no additional resources to meet his largely 
increased commitment. Indo-China as far as the 16°N 
parallel was also placed finally in his Command.
He had thus an area of 1,£00,000 square miles, with a 
population of 128 million to deal with, in addition to some
750,000 Japanese. As for the forces under his command, the 
additional formations and shipping from Europe which he had 
been led to expect were no longer forthcoming now that the 
war was at the end, while there was a steady depletion of 
the ranks of trained and experienced officers and men by the 
inexorable demands of release and repatriation.
It is important to remember these military facts, because they 
were largely responsible for the situation which subsequently 
arose and which has given rise to widespread misunderstanding 
as well as to widespread criticism. Admiral Mountbatten was 
not, in fact, given the tools to finish the job. It is not 
suggested that there were not good reasons for this. But the 
results were inescapable.
One of the liveliest targets for criticism has been the continual 
employment, months after the Japanese surrender, of Japanese 
troops for the purpose of maintaining law and order. There could 
hardly be anything more repugnant to the world at large or to the 
populations which, after years of Japanese occupation, are still 
compelled to obey Japanese orders (even though they be delivered 
in a somewhat different voice).
But there was never any likelihood that the forces available to 
the Supreme Allied Commander could stretch to every hole and 
c o m e r  of the vast area allotted to him. Except in Siam, there 
was no Government exercising administration, while the organised 
police forces which existed in South East Asia before the war 
had disintegrated under Japanese rule. The best that could 
be hoped for was that stable administrations could be set up 
at an early date in the areas to be occupied, and that the 
Japanese could thereafter immediately be disarmed and concentrated 
for ultimate repatriation. In the event, things turned out 
quite differently.
It was not only the absence of police forces which enlarged the 
task of the South-East Asia Command. Throughout the area there 
were already large quantities of arms in the hands of unauthorised 
persons. In addition, vast ammunition dumps and stores of arms 
and military equipment had to be guarded until they could be 
disposed of. There was thus plenty of material to put in the hands 
of an enormous population which, in the years of Japanese occupation, 
proved in the event to have suffered a serious decline in public 
morals.
The causes of this decline are not far to seek. Prior to 1941 
the peoples of South-East Asia had lived in conditions of security 
and comparative plenty. Whatever the critics of colonial 
government may be pleased to say today, it is a fact that in 
South-East Asia the age between the wars was one of security, of 
comparative stability and of gradual development.
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With little or no warning to the average person, his world 
was rudely shattered and his erstwhile governors and protectors 
ignominiously dispersed. All that he had looked up to had 
vanished without any immediate prospect of return, and in its 
place he was confronted with the harsh and inconsiderate rule 
of the Japanese, who, while they did nothing to improve the 
lot of the population, were indefatigable in their efforts 
to humiliate the white man and to prove that not only was his 
rule at an end, but that his return was something to fight 
against. These efforts were by no means entirely successful, 
but to a varying degree they left behind an unwelcome legacy 
which added to the already heavy burden of the S.E.A.C.
While the Japanese did their utmost to destroy what had been, 
they put nothing in its place and there grew up amongst native 
populations a spirit of resistance which manifested itself in 
covert attempts to evade.Japanese regulations and to outwit 
them in devious ways. This spirit indeed formed the kernel 
of the resistance movements which were encouraged by our clandestine 
organisations, and which, in Burma and Malaya, rendered active 
assistance to the Allied cause.
But by its very nature this spirit of resistance encouraged a 
law breaking as opposed to a law-abiding temperament, and what 
was b o m  of duress has to some extent become a habit difficult 
to eradicate with the disappearance of that duress. In particular 
this applies to the youth of the areas concerned, and even in 
Malaya, which compares very favourably with any other part of 
South-East Asia in its progress towards rehabilitation, juvenile 
delinquency is at a premium. Youth was neglected during the 
occupation except where it was deliberately cultivated to evil 
ends by the Japanese, as in the case of Java. There will be no 
complete cure until youth has found, or been given, a new 
orientation.
The tasks allotted to S.E.A.C. were to disarm and concentrate 
the Japanese forces and to succour Allied prisoners of war and 
internees. Together with these tasks there was the somewhat 
ill-defined responsibility for maintaining law and order, which, 
however, with the strictly limited forces available, could for 
practical purposes not extend beyond the areas of actual physical 
occupation. The preceding paragraphs have shown to what extent 
the vast quantities of arms and ammunition, the generally 
prevailing atmosphere of unrest and lawlessness and the absence 
of organised police forces added to the difficulties of the tasks 
which were set to the Command. These difficulties were general 
and not entirely unforeseen. The difficulties likely to be 
encountered in Indo-China were also not unforeseen. But it was 
the situation in Java, which was only included in the Command 
on the day of Japan's collapse, which upset all previous calculations.
It was the necessity to divert much larger forces to Java to cope 
with a politico-military situation which had not been foreseen 
which delayed the concentration and disarmament of the Japanese 
and made it obligatory, in the absence of any stable administration, 
to continue to employ them on guard duties and even on occasion 
to use them in a defensive operational role.
The conditions described in the preceding paragraphs were 
general to the situation as a whole. From the date of the 
Japanese surrender it was the political situation in the 
various areas which influenced the military situation and to 
a much greater extent the situation in non-British than in 
British territories...
There is no doubt that anti-French feeling in Siam is strong, 
and when the ex-Regent (now described as the Senior Statesman), 
who was educated in France, said that he loved France but hated 
the French in Indo-China, he was probably speaking for most 
educated Siamese. The fact of the matter is that the French 
of Indo-China, as they were before the war, earned the liking 
and respect of none and they have on occasion been described 
as the scum of France...
French Indo-China.
The relationship of Indo-China to the South-East Asia Command 
was unsatisfactory from the very outset. Early in 1942 Mr. Winston 
Churchill and the late President Roosevelt agreed to place both 
Siam and Indo-China in the Chinese theatre under Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek. That was when the recovery of these territories 
appeared remote, and it was presumably felt that something must be 
done to enhance the generalissimo's prestige at a time when 
neither Great Britain nor the United States could furnish him 
with any material assistance in his struggle against Japan.
Such was the position when at the first Quebec Conference in the 
summer of 1943 it was decided to create the South-East Asia 
Command. Siam was placed in this command, but, after second 
thoughts, Indo-China was not, and the subject was left for 
discussion between Admiral Mountbatten and the generalissimo, 
the United States being represented by General Brehon Somervell.
When the three met in Chungking in October 1943» the generalissimo 
did not take kindly to the suggestion that either Siam or Indo- 
China should pass out of his command. Eventually a gentlemen's 
agreement was put forward whereby the forces of both commands 
would be free to operate in these territories, the boundaries 
to be subsequently determined by agreement. Both sides were 
also to be free to undertake clandestine operations in Siam 
and Indo-China.
This agreement was put forward at the Cairo Conference in November 
1943» But it was not taken, and in the event it was never ratified, 
though in the absence of any substitute- it was held by Admiral 
Mountbatten to be in force, while the generalissimo never 
specifically repudiated it.
This state of affairs was unsatisfactory and led to constant 
misunderstandings between the two commands. It was no doubt 
with the intent of solving the problem that the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff at Potsdam in 1945 resorted to the judgement of Solomon 
and decided to cut French Indo-China into two by the 16°N. parallel, 
and to allot the southern part to S.E.A.C. and the northern to the 
China Command. Unfortunately, the legitimate parent was not in 
this case consulted, so that dismemberment took place with results, 
which, if not fatal, were at any rate singularly unhappy, and which 
may lead to starvation amongst many thousands of people in the north.
The late President Roosevelt had on more than one 
occasion let it be known that in his view Indo-China 
should not be returned to the French. This opinion 
undoubtedly influenced the attitude of the United States 
Chiefs of Staff and of American officers in the Far East.
It created not only difficulties with the Americans in an 
integrated command, but also with the French.
In October 1944 the French attached a military mission under 
Lieutenant General Blaizot to Headquarters, S.A.C.S.E.A. But 
early in 1945 there were still difficulties about the despatch 
of the 5th Regiment of Colonial Infantry, which the French 
intended to use in a clandestine role in Indo-China.
After the death of President Roosevelt the American attitude 
changed and it was agreed that French forces should be despatched 
to S.E.A.C. for employment in Indo-China. The French, on their 
part, replaced General Blaizot by General Leclerc, who was destined 
to be the military commander-in-chief in French Indo-China, and 
appointed Admiral d'Argenlieu as High Commissioner-designate.
The personality of these two men has undoubtedly assisted the 
return of the French to Indo-China.
When Japan collapsed there were not sufficient French forces 
in the Far East to assume responsibility in Southern Indo-China.
The Supreme Commander's first task there was to secure control of 
the Japanese Headquarters for the Southern Regions. This was 
accomplished by flying in to Saigon via Bangkok a brigade of 
the 20th Indian Division and the establishment of a control 
commission under Major-General Gracey, who was also the commander 
of the division and of the Allied forces.
In March 1945» the Japanese, who had become suspicious of French 
intentions, seized control of the Government of French Indo-China, 
under Admiral Decoux, which they had hitherto tolerated. There 
was some sporadic fighting by resistance elements which eventually 
escaped into Chinese territory. Thereafter the subjugation and 
humiliation of the French in Indo-China was complete. By their 
subservience to the Japanese they had earned the contempt both 
of the latter and the native population, and when the Allies 
reached Saigon French prestige had sunk so low as to be non-existent.
It is desirable at this stage to review briefly the political 
situation as it discovered itself upon our arrival in Saigon,
The Japanese coup of March 1945 had rendered it more difficult 
to gain intelligence about Indo-China and though the existence 
of anti-French movements was not unknown, the situation was at 
first confused until a clearer picture could be obtained by 
observers on the spot.
A nationalist movement existed in Indo-China as long ago as 1911, 
but it was not until 1930*31 that serious disturbances occurred. 
These were rigorously suppressed by the French, as were further 
disturbances in 1940* Tk© Ammanite United Independence party 
(the Vietminh) thereupon went underground.
During the Japanese occupation, while the Laotians and Cambodians 
continued on the whole to support the French against the Siamese 
and the Annamitee, in Annam, Tongking and Cochin China the 
nationalist groups centred round the Vietminh were strongly 
encouraged by the Japanese. In March 1945 the Japanese proclaimed 
the complete independence of Cambodia, Luang Frabang, and Annam.
In May, Tonking was incorporated with Annam, and, in August,
Cochin China was incorporated, the name Vietnam being reintroduced.
At first an empire, it subsequently proclaimed itself a republic.
France on her part had, in March 1945, proclaimed her intention 
to grant autonomy to French Indo-China within the French Empire.
With the connivance no doubt of the Japanese, the Vietminh were 
loud in their determination to resist the return of the French.
In fact, the situation was not dissimilar to that which was 
subsequently discovered, in Java, with the important differences 
that the Annamites had not been nearly as well trained and 
organised as their counterparts in Java, nor were they as well 
armed.
It was never the intention of the Allied Command to do more than 
to establish a bridgehead at Saigon through which French troops 
would eventually pass to the reoccupation of the country. The 
difference as compared with the Netherlands Indies was that 
whereas the French had battle-trained divisions which they could 
employ as soon as the ships could bring them, the Dutch had no 
trained formations at all.
It was inevitable that the Vietminh should accuse the British of 
supporting the French against them, and the Sino-American command 
north of the 16°N. parallel was either unable or unwilling to stem 
the torrent of abuse against Britain and France which poured from 
the Hanoi radio. The chorus was naturally taken up all over the 
world wherever it gives pleasure to criticise Great Britain.
But, in fact, the British forces went to Saigon to accomplish 
their main tasks of disarming and concentrating the Japanese and of 
rescuing prisoners of war and internees and having accomplished 
this task they have come away again, with the exception of a small 
force guarding the Japanese, which will gradually be withdrawn.
The rest has been done by the French. On the night of the 23rd 
September, they staged a coup and recovered from the Annamites 
government buildings and police stations in Saigon. Some fighting 
ensued, in which, from time to time, British forces were inevitably 
involved. But gradually the area of control was extended and 
order restored. In the meanwhile the French had .held early 
conversations with the Annamites and they had continued a policy 
of negotiation while imposing order by force where necessary.
By the end of January it was possible for General Gracey to relinquish 
command at Saigon and for the greater portion of the 20th Indian 
Division to be withdrawn. On the lybh March, 1946, S.E.A.C. 
relinquished control over southern Indo-China, though Admiral 
Mountbatten continues to act as the agent for General MacArthur, 
as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in the disposal 
of Japanese surrendered personnel. A small British military mission 
remains at Saigon.
The troubles of the French are not over, but they do not fall 
to be dealt with in this report. In October 1945 Mr. E.V.
Meiklereid proceeded to Saigon as Political Adviser to General 
Gracey, and on the 18th February he assumed his functions as 
His Majesty's Consul-General at Saigon. He has reported in detail 
the events which have taken place since his arrival in Saigon.
Looking back, it is possible to say that Great Britain has 
liquidated her military commitment in Indo-China with less 
difficulty than might have been anticipated. It is to be 
doubted whether our operations will have caused any permanent 
anti-British feeling amongst the native population as a whole, 
and the vituperation has died down. When one considers how 
traditionally easy it is for British and French temperaments 
to clash, it is very satisfactory that we should be leaving 
Indo-China on good terms with the French civil and military 
authorities and great credit is reflected upon all concerned.
The future of - Indo-China now rests with the French, and it 
remains to be seen how they will discharge their undertakings...
... Mention should be made of the conduct of our forces, both 
British and Indian, who, though the war was over, continued to 
operate in circumstances of great difficulty and often of great 
personal danger, not only without complaint, but with the same 
devotion to duty which they had displayed while the war was still 
in progress.
Economic Factors.
The sudden end of the war with Japan brought S.E.A.C. face to 
face with economic conditions which, though they were not entirely 
unforeseen, yet demanded measures which the command was not equipped 
to undertake. Whereas in Europe elaborate planning had preceded 
the collapse of Germany, in the case of Japan planning was, almost 
up to the moment when the last shot was fired, based on the premise 
that the war would end in November 1946. The results of this
unpreparedness, for which S.E.A.C. was in no way responsible,
were unhappy. In the circumstances it is surprising that things
have gone as well as they have.
The conduct of the war in South-East Asia had demanded the setting 
up of civil affairs organisations and of planning against the day 
of reoccupation. But while hostilities were in progress reoccupation 
envisaged no more, at any rate in the initial stages, than the 
prevention of disease and unrest amongst the population, and 
rehabilitation and reconstruction only to the degree that they 
facilitated the conduct of military operations. With the end of 
the war, however, rehabilitation and reconstruction are no longer 
of secondary, but of primary importance, and special machinery 
is required to bring conditions back to normal with as little 
delay as possible.
In the case of S.E.A.C. the sudden end of the war meant that there 
were only the war staffs to deal with the host of economic problems 
which were to descend upon them. Not only were the military staffs 
not reinforced, they became more and more depleted as time went 
on with the demands of retrenchment and demobilisation. The
civil requirements of tens of millions of civil population 
had to be screened by the Principal Administrative Officer's 
staff. The military administrations, known somewhat misleadingly 
as civil affairs, which had always been starved of man-power, 
were called upon to perform superhuman feats, while the Economic 
Intelligence Section of the Directorate of Intelligence, originally 
created for a totally different purpose, was saddled in the early 
stages with the task of collecting the data without which future 
requirements could not be estimated. Great credit reflects on 
those who, with little or no warning, readilymdertook new and in 
many cases unaccustomed labours.
But with the best will in the world the military command, with 
its operational commitments and the responsibility for the welfare 
of large military forces, could do no more than devote part-time 
attention to what is unquestionably a whole-time job. The lesson 
to be learned from this is that it is as necessary to plan for 
the end of the war as it is for the beginning and for the conduct 
of it. Once again S.E.A.C. had not been given the tools.
The main economic problems confronting the command did not differ 
from those prevailing in other war-stricken areas. They were, 
and still are, shortage of food, of transportation and of 
inducement goods. In addition, Burma has been shattered by war;
Siam is in the throes of a fearful inflation, while the political 
situation in Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies has prevented 
the movement of goods and the restoration of economic life, 
though in the latter area certain islands (such as Celebes) have 
made greater progress than others. Only in Malaya has there been 
steady progress towards recovery, though much remains to be done.
Rice being the staple diet of South-East Asia, the shortage of 
it is likely to have most serious consequences. Burma, the largest 
surplus producer of all, has been able to furnish a negligible 
quantity. In Siam, where there is known to be a considerable 
surplus, the political situation, inflation and general inefficiency 
have together conspired to prevent more than a trickle from 
flowing to deficit areas. In Indo-China, the arbitrary division 
of the country for military purposes, and the general unrest make 
it inpossible to estimate at present whether any surplus will 
be available for export. Java, which was at one time self- 
supporting, has now become a deficiency area. The prospect is not 
an encouraging one*
Two immediate problems present themselves. The first is to extract 
and distribute available stocks. The second is to ensure maximum 
planting in the coming season. It is in connexion with this 
second problem that we come up against the question of inducement 
goods. The result of the introduction of Japanese currency and 
the debasement of existing currencies by the Japanese has been to 
destory the faith of the peasant in money. That faith can only 
be restored if he is able to buy for the money which he receives 
in payment for his products the goods which he requires. Until 
he can do this he is unconvinced of the value of paper and will 
tend to grow only for his own requirements. The need, therefore, 
to provide goods, and in particular textiles, which will induce the 
farmer to grow a maximum crop, is an urgent one.
As was to be expected, the end of the war found South-East Asia 
in financial chaos. In Burma and Malaya it was found possible 
to ban Japanese currency with the entry of our troops. This 
somewhat drastic step cannot have failed to cause some temporary 
hardship, but it was effective. It has, however, had a curious 
after-effect in contributing to the lack of faith in paper money 
which still prevails amongst the ignorant, who reason that if 
one currency can become valueless overnight, what is to prevent 
the same thing happening to any other paper currency.
In Siam the note issue is eight times that of pre-war days, and 
Herculean steps will have to be taken to provide a remedy. Whether 
the Siamese are capable of Herculean steps remains to be seen.
In Indo-China the French maintained the value of the piastre.
But in view of the division of the country it is likely to be 
some time before the financial picture becomes clear.
In the Netherlands Indies the Butch successfully introduced a 
new N.E.I. guilder issue in many of the outer islands. But in 
Java and Sumatra the Indonesians murdered anyone found in 
possession of Dutch notes, and as our position was for many 
months so insecure even in the areas nominally under control, 
the Japanese guilder continued to circulate, without any foreign 
exchange value at all. Only in March 1946 was it found possible 
to introduce the N.E.I. guilder within a limited area, while 
the Japanese guilder was given a temporary exchange value of 
3 Dutch cents until it could be withdrawn. It is as yet too 
early to estimate the effect of this measure. The exchange rate 
of 2s.7-Jd. to the new N.E.I. guilder is considered by a British 
financial expert to be too high, since that in Holland is understood 
to be only 1s.10jd.
The Japanese.
Even to those who knew the Japanese before (if anyone knows a 
Japanese), it could only be a matter of conjecture in August 1945 
how they would behave in defeat, since they had never been 
defeated before in living memory. It was, therefore, with mingled 
sentiments of curiosity, suspicion and doubt that a party set out 
with Admiral Mountbatten' s Chief of Staff in August to meet 
Field-Marshal Count Terauchi's Chief of Staff, who had been 
summoned to Rangoon to discuss the implementation of the surrender 
terms.
In the event the Japanese were correct,-if ill at ease. Though as 
an act of courtesy they were allowed to retain their swords (since 
the formal surrender was not to take place until the 12th September 
in Singapore), for which they rendered formal thanks, their escorts 
and their close surveillance can have left them in no doubt of their 
defeat.
From the outset - though on our part suspicion naturally died 
slowly - it became evident that the Japanese, having been ordered 
by their Emperor to surrender, intended to obey that order to 
the letter. Indeed, except for isolated instances and more 
particularly in Java, the Japanese have carried out their obligations.
From the first they pleaded that they should carry out the 
surrender voluntarily themselves. That is to say, having received 
the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, the Japanese High 
Command would then convey these orders to subordinate commands 
and accept responsibility for their execution. They also asked 
that all orders given by the Allies should be in the name of the 
Supreme Allied Commander. Both these requests were granted, and 
in practice, with only few exceptions, the procedure has worked 
very well.
It has already been explained in this report why it was necessary 
to continue to use armed Japanese for defensive and guard purposes 
in certain areas. At times they became involved in hostilities and 
on occasion displayed as much gallantry and devotion to duty at 
the behest of the British as they had in the days of their own 
arrogant domination.
Elsewhere the Japanese were employed as labour, and here, too, 
they performed the tasks assigned to them without question and with 
an efficiency which often compared favourably with the performance 
of local native labour.
The effect of all this has been vaguely disturbing. The Japanese 
have, inihct, been carrying out their "defeat drill" with the same 
discipline and determination which characterised their aggression.
It is a mistake to assume that the spirit which animates them is 
not the same. But their general behaviour has been such as to 
give rise to a sneaking sense of almost admiration amongst the 
citizen-soldiers of a nation which notoriously cannot hate for long.
Fraternisation with Japanese is fortunately not in question, for the 
customs and habits of our two nations are so different as to render 
anything of the sort distasteful. But the orderly behaviour of the 
Japanese in the midst of disorder; their efficiency, which is without 
doubt incomparably greater than that of most of the indigenous 
inhabitants of this part of the world, and their ready acquiescence 
are liable to give rise, even if only sub-consciously, to the 
thought that "they are not so bad after all."
Nor would they be, if they were animated by a different spirit.
But there is no convincing evidence that the Japanese in South-East 
Asia are changed in spirit. At any rate at first they did not even 
admit defeat. The vast majority of them had not been in Japan for 
a long time and had not witnessed its destruction. Their view 
was that they were undefeated, and that they were merely obeying 
the orders of their Snperor, who, in order to avoid further bloodshed 
in the world, had told them to lay down their arms.
Today most Japanese in this area are probably conscious of their 
defeat and to this the efforts of our former political warfare 
organisation have without doubt largely contributed. But what 
next? It is not difficult to change the words which issue from 
the lips of a Japanese - one could occasionally accomplish that 
even in the bad old days - but it is quite' a different thing to 
change his way of thought. And it is far from being an advantage 
to have him under one's control far from his own country, since 
it is only in Japan that his regeneration can take place - if at all. 
However excellent our propagandists, they are too few in number even 
to begin to know what three-quarters of a million Japanese scattered
over a wide area are thinking.
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The Japanese in South-East Asia have, in the main, not 
been defeated in battle (except those who were in Burma). They 
may be convinced of their defeat, but they may equally well be 
determined to do it again when opportunity offers. Segregation 
in remote areas will do nothing to convince them to the contrary. 
They will be outcasts in an alien land with much time for thought, 
which may well breed a spirit of revenge.
There is another danger and that is that present discipline may 
break down. This may, in non-British territories, lead to 
reprisals, or it may, particularly in the case of Siam, lead to 
a restoration of Japanese confidence as a result of their ability 
to defy authority.
Everything, therefore, points the same way, namely, that the 
Japanese should be repatriated to Japan as soon as possible. But 
S.E.A.C. has not the resources and the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers has so far not proved helpful. At the present rate, 
repatriation will take several years, with consequences which can 
only be bad. The problem is an extremly serious one, which must 
be tackled resolutely - and soon.
[GB, PRO, TO 371/53995 (F.5093)].
21* GB, PRO, TO 371/53961* [F 9106].
25 Numbers of Japanese in Indochina as of:
1k August 19k5
[SOUTH] 71,000 military
$,000 civilian
1k August 19k6.
k00 military 
50 civilian 
+ 500 deserters
[NORTH] 50,000 military 15,000 military
2,000 civilian 250 civilian
[F0 371/53965; Meiklereid*s Meeting Notes, k September 19k6].
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CHAPTER XVIII
EPILOGUE
Considerable, if less well-defined, administrative 
and political responsibilities were also assumed by 
the British military authorities in the foreign 
territories of Indo-China and Indonesia...
Admittedly no formal British Military Administrations 
were proclaimed in these countries, but within 
certain limited areas administrations came into 
existence of a clearly military character since 
they were set up by the local military commanders 
and remained responsible to the latter in 
administrative, and, even more markedly, in political 
matters. And these commanders were British. And 
again, although the staffs charged with general 
administration were not in the main British, yet it 
was British military technicians who were largely 
responsible for the revival of essential public 
services. Furthermore, outside these limited areas 
of active administration, the vacuum left by the 
absence of any effective government tended always 
to suck the British military commanders into 
situations in which they found themselves driven 
to accept varying degrees of political or adminis­
trative responsibility...
But throughout the first months after landing of 
British forces the question was always present 
whether, and if so to what extent, the British 
commanders should assume political or-administrative 
responsibilities outside these limited areas. Some 
description must be attempted of the sharp and 
distressing dilemma facing these commanders and 
of the manner in which it was met. 1
F.S.V. Donnison.
In the vast, complex and bloody story of post-war Indochina,
Gracey's relatively small band operated in a restricted area of Vietnam 
for a brief period of time. Yet their presence was of profound 
importance with far-reaching consequences out of all proportion to their 
numbers and length of stay. Central to this history was the character 
of Douglas Gracey, a misunderstood and unjustly maligned officer who 
has fallen victim to the spate of ideologically motivated historians 
spawned in the postwar era. These academic Pied Pipers have led a 
curious assortment of followers —  journalists, politicians, "instant 
historians", and the rest —  to mimic their criticisms of Gracey.
Scaroely any of the authors in question had either met Gracey or spoken 
to any of his principal subordinates and, because the main body of 
official records did not become available to historians until very 
recently, the writing about this period tended to be a "fashionable" 
reflection of the prevailing ideology of certain factions in the 
academic community,’ based upon personal political prejudice and guesswork.
Gracey's accomplishments are rendered even more impressive when 
viewed against the background of conflicting pressures under which he
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was operating. Squeezed on the one hand by the French and Viet Minh, 
with all that implied, and on the other by an ambitious and politically 
sensitive Supreme Commander, a Socialist home government and the 
Viceroy and Commander in Chief, India, he performed his mission in an 
area where tension ran high with a small force amidst a numerically 
superior and undefeated Japanese Army. An officer with anything less 
than Gracey's professional competence, common sense and force of 
character might not have proved equal to the task. When he left Vietnam 
he had accomplished all he had been asked to do and had earned the 
respect of the French, the Japanese and, as is attested to in official 
sources, the Vietnamese.
Germane to this history are passages from F.S.V. Donnison's 
official history, British Military Administration in the Far East, 
19^5-19^-6. Donnison explained the differences he^ween .the Dutch and 
French approaches to their respective returns to Indonesia and Indochina.
French sensitivities appeared to have played a major part in 
the decision to send a small British force to Indochina:
"There was a different approach in French Indo- 
China. Before any planning for overt operations 
began, and before the French had been able to
turn their attention from Europe to the Par 
East for the purpose of any detailed planning, 
it became clear that the re-occupation would 
take place as the result of the surrender of 
the Japanese and not as the result of military 
operations* The French, for their part, were 
dedicated to the task of re-building their 
lost prestige as a great power. Consequently, 
while the Dutch planners for Indonesia accepted 
dependence upon SEAC for the re-establishment 
of their administration, French plans, drawn 
up at a much later stage, were far more concerned 
to avoid the disadvantages that must ensue if 
their administration appeared to have been re­
established, not by themselves, but by foreign 
forces. Accordingly the agreement between 
Admiral Mountbatten and the French provided 
that the forces of South-East Asia Command 
would enter the country only to enforce 
surrender of the Japanese forces and to liberate 
Allied prisoners of war and internees. No 
responsibility was placed upon them to maintain 
order*or to re-establish French administration.
No notice or proclamation was to be issued by 
the Allied Commander. The law to be administered, 
and the manner of its promulgation, were matters 
for the French, not for the occupying forces of 
South-East Asia Command. In all cases the 
Allied (but in fact British) Force Commander was 
to be required to aonduct his dealings with the 
civilian population through the agency of the 
French Administration. It may be noted in passing 
that the inevitable paramountcy of military 
interests and the inability of the French 
Administration to function without the support 
of British troops ultimately drove the Force 
Commander in French Indo-China to issue a 
proclamation on 19th September 19^ +5» announcing 
his intention to ensure the maintenance of order 
in that part of Indo-China which fell within his 
command. But he did not proclaim any law that 
would be enforced.11 2
Donnison's description of the postwar atmosphere in Asia, marked
by the various nationalist explosions, provides an excellent background
for an appreciation of the milieu into which Gracey was "pitchforked"
(to use General Kimmins’s apt expression):
"In those dependent territories of south-east Asia 
where nationalism was a force to be reckoned with 
before the second world war, the attention of the 
casual observer was apt to be monopolised by the 
clamour of the small groups of extremists
* Throughout French Indochina.
dedicated to the attainment of national 
independence immediately and by the use of force 
if necessary. It was consequently easy to assume 
an absence of nationalist feeling in the people 
at large. But there was in most of the countries 
concerned an underlying and widespread preference 
for self-government, even if this was to be bad 
government, springing from a natural pride 
strongly reinforced by the political teachings 
of the West. This preference mostly found no 
expression and seldom led to action. There 
were many reasons for this. There was fear of 
the power that the European wielded. There was 
respect for his scientific knowledge and practical 
ability. There was, here and there, a true 
feeling for European culture and political ideals. 
There was genuine friendship for individual 
Europeans. Many Asians had begun to acquire a 
vested interest in the undoubted material 
benefits that European rule had brought - 
greater security for all, a higher standard of 
living and culture for some. At the same time 
there was a scarcity of leaders of the necessary 
stature among the extremists, for the ablest men 
were likely to find a career within the existing 
framework. Again, before the war there had 
been no obvious occasion for the detonation of 
revolution. Above all, perhaps, there was the mere 
habit of being governed, which ensured that most 
people accepted the existing administration without 
much more than a grumble, and preferred to approach 
independence by decently-spaced stages. It was 
only the few who broke through these restraints; 
and this not always because they were more 
courageous, or more patriotic, but often because 
they had less to lose by destroying the existing 
social order and plunging the country into chaos 
and violence. They were often, and were often 
felt by their own compatriots to be, irresponsible, 
and were accordingly, in a sense, unrepresentative 
of their people. In a wider sense, however, most 
of the latter were at heart in sympathy with the 
ultimate objects of the extremists and could 
not but be stirred by the thought of their 
personal bravery, however much they might disapprove 
of their methods.
Much of this inertia was broken down by the war. 
Respect for the foreign rulers, fear of their 
power, ebbed away as the Europeans were defeated 
and fled before the Asian conquerors, or were 
imprisoned and humiliated by them - though 
personal friendships often survived. Vested 
interests disappeared as the old society crumbled 
away. The habit of generations was rudely broken.
The absence of Europeans opened to larger 
numbers than before the experience of employ­
ment in administrative work and thus, rightly 
or wrongly, dispelled diffidence in their own 
ability to do the work of Europeans. And chaos 
both threw up the leaders, giving the tough and 
ruthless their opening, and brought the 
opportunity to break with the past.
Nationalism, thus released from its inhibitions, 
was deliberately encouraged by the Japanese, at 
first with the aim of enlisting its support in 
the crusade against the white man, later, as the 
possibility of defeat forced itself upon them, 
in order to leave a legacy of trouble to the 
forces of re-occupation. In particular, youth 
movements were formed, sometimes armed, and 
trained to violence against Europeans and 
Americans. In quite a different, unintentional 
way the Japanese did almost as much to stimulate 
nationalism by their arrogance and brutality. 
These roused hatred against themselves as 
foreigners and so strengthened feeling against 
other foreigners also.
But it was not only the Japanese who encouraged 
nationalism for their own ends. There were few 
countries in south-east Asia where Communists 
did not seek to work their way into power under 
cover of such movements. And there were few 
countries in which the British and their Allies 
did not also seek to raise the forces of 
nationalism against the Japanese. Local under­
ground movements were befriended, training was 
given in sabotage and guerilla warfare, arms 
and money were supplied. In fact all parties, 
friend and foe alike, were vigorously engaged 
in whipping up nationalist enthusiasm.
It was hardly a matter for' surprise, therefore, 
that when the Allies re-entered Burma, Indonesia, 
and Indo-China, they found a nationalism that was 
a very different force from that which they had 
known before the war. Nearly all the inhibitions 
which had kept it in check had been dispelled so 
that the movement had gained in strength and 
confidence. Every\^here nationalist armies had 
been raised, whether to eject the Japanese or. to 
resist the return of the Europeans, or both.
These armies, by western standards, were ill- 
equipped, .ill-trained, ill-organized, and not 
very large. Yet they had their own limited, but 
not ineffective techniques; and their members had 
fought, and some had died, for the independence 
of their people; there could be no greater 
stimulant to nationalism. And everywhere its 
leaders called for 'freedom', a slogan that 
few dared resist - neither the indigenous
moderates, shamed or terrorised into support 
by their fiery compatriots, nor most of the 
returning European powers, bound by their own 
professions in the Atlantic Charter, conscious 
also of world opinion, and influenced by the 
steady growth of a social conscience in the 
west which had coloured the whole trend of 
their colonial policies. There was no doubt 
of the new strength of the nationalist movements.
It is more difficult t'o answer fairly the question 
whether the movements were in fact representative 
of the majority of the people or not...
The British Government's ultimate policy had 
been repeatedly asserted both in and out of 
Parliament. In regard to India, the Acts of 
1919 and 1935 made substantial transfers of 
power. In 19*K) the British Government had 
accepted the principle that Indians should 
themselves frame a new constitution for a fully 
autonomous India. In regard to Burma it had 
been stated in Parliament on 22nd April 19^3 
that the aim of the British Government was 
to assist Burma to attain complete self- 
government within the British Commonwealth as 
soon as circumstances permitted.
The Dutch, in December 19^2, looked forward to
1 a commonwealth in which the Netherlands,
Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate, 
with complete self-reliance and freedom of 
conduct for each part regarding its internal 
affairs....
The French, in March 19^51 declared their 
intention to create a French Union that should 
include an Indo-Chinese Federation and said 
'Indo-China will enjoy, within this Union, its 
own freedom.' The inhabitants of the Federation
1 without discrimination of race, religion,
or origin and with equality of merit..... will 
have access to all Federal posts and employment 
in Indo-China and in the Union.'
The vaguely liberal tone of these pronouncements 
was given further expression in the Atlantic 
Charter of 19^2 to which the colonial powers ■ 
concerned had signified their adherence. The
second clause of this charter read'  they
[the United States and the United Kingdom] 
desire to see no territorial changes that do 
not accord with the freely expressed wishes 
of the peoples concerned.' The third clause
read *.... they respect the right of all 
peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live; and they wish 
to see sovereign rights and self-government 
restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of them.r The Charter of the 
United Nations included the following aims: 
f.... to re-affirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small;
... to ensure... that armed forces shall not 
be used, save in the common interest 1
Against the background of these professions 
there could be little doubt what attitude 
would be taken by world opinion towards any 
attempt to re-establish colonial rule against 
opposition. And, whether this opinion was 
right or wrong, superficial or well-informed, 
it could not easily be disregarded. Britain 
could afford, even less than most, to disregard 
and so to stultify the organization for mutual 
security that she was helping to build and 
upon which she must expect increasingly to 
depend for protection against major aggression'.'3
Addressing specifically the problems faced by officers like 
Gracey, Donnison went straight to the heart of the matter:
"Considerable, if less well-defined, administrative and 
political responsibilities were also assumed by the 
British military authorities in the foreign 
territories of Indo-China and Indonesia, and this 
narrative would be incomplete without some account 
of these. Admittedly no formal British Military 
Administrations were proclaimed in these countries, 
but within certain limited areas administrations 
came into existence of a clearly military 
character since they were set up by the local 
military commanders and remained responsible to 
the latter in administrative, and, even more 
markedly, in political matters. And these commanders 
were British. And again, although the staffs 
charged with general administration were not in 
the main British, yet it was British military 
technicians who were largely responsible for the 
revival of essential public services. Furthermore, 
outside these limited areas of active administration, 
the vacuum left by the absence of any effective 
government tended always to suck the British 
military commanders into situations in which they 
found themselves driven to accept varying degrees 
of political or administrative responsibility.
A full political history of these times and of 
the complex and delicate problems arising would 
fall beyond the scope of this book. But through­
out the first months after landing of British
forces the question was always present whether, 
and if so to what extent, the British commanders 
should assume political or administrative 
responsibilities outside these limited areas.
Some description must be attempted of the sharp 
and distressing dilemma facing these commanders 
and of the manner in which it was met. This 
dilemma, was mainly the result of three 
conflicting considerations. On the one hand 
were the obligations of friendship felt by 
the British towards their Dutch and French 
allies. On the other was loyalty to the liberal 
policies focused in the Atlantic Charter. Thirdly, 
the balancing of these first two considerations 
had to be undertaken in full knowledge of the 
restrictions imposed upon the British commanders 
by the fact that virtually all the troops under 
their command were borne on Indian, not British, 
establishments...." h
Donnison further discusses the use of Japanese troops, another 
point on which Gracey has been frequently criticised:
"Nor was it certain whether the Japanese forces 
in this area would obey the Imperial order to 
surrender. Most of them were undefeated and 
some had threatened to continue fighting. To 
minimise the possibility of resistance it was 
ordered that no Japanese-held territory 
should be occupied until the general surrender 
had been formally made to General MacArthur 
in Tokyo Bay. And after this it became of the 
first importance to establish control of the 
main Japanese headquarters in Saigon. Only 
after this had been done, and the new base at 
Singapore had been established, could general 
re-occupation be undertaken. Weeks must 
clearly elapse before British troops could be 
landed in Indonesia.
The increase in the Supreme Allied Commander's 
responsibilities was far greater than the mere 
increase in the area of his command. Nowhere 
throughout the new area was there any govern­
ment functioning at the time of the surrender...
Admiral Mountbatten had no option in the 
circumstances but to place upon the Japanese 
Supreme Commander and his forces the 
responsibility for maintaining order until 
the Allied forces could arrive to relieve them." 5
Dennis Duncanson further described the situation in south 
Indochina:
"The principal elements in the situation were 
that the French authorities in Indochina had 
thrown in their lot in 19U0 with Vichy, so 
that, although metropolitan France was one 
of the Allies, French officials in Saigon 
were, as a group, technically traitors and 
liable to be treated as enemies; that, on 
March 9> 19bSt the Japanese had interned 
the whole French administrative cadre and 
members of the military garrison; that the 
Japanese had nevertheless not formally 
proclaimed a military occupation - they were 
with local French consent given under duress, 
not by request - or set up any military 
administration in place of the deposed French 
administration, except in areas where they 
had some definite military interest; that the 
Japanese had recognized the Emperor Bao Dai 
as henceforward being independent of French 
protection in Annam and Tonkin and, a few 
days before the ceasefire, as sovereign in 
the French colony of Cochinchina as well - 
although such unilateral acts by an occupying 
power would have no validity in international 
law and the Emperor lacked the administrative 
machinery through which actually to govern; that 
the Indochina Communist Party, in the guise of 
the Viet Minh, had taken advantage of - and 
in many places deliberately aggravated - the 
administrative vacuum and the breakdown of 
the retail trade in food in order to establish 
their own cadres, at gunpoint, in strategic 
positions in Tonkin and northern Annam; that 
various sectarian and bandit groups had done 
the same in the countryside of Cochinchina; 
that the Emperor was in process of abdicating 
in Hu£ under Communist pressure from Hanoi 
(August 29)i clearing the way for the 
declaration of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam by the Viet Minh (September 2, the 
day of the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay); 
and that Viet Minh agents in Saigon had set 
up a Committee for the South, which was 
inviting other groups, by persuasion or 
coercion, to join it, in order to procure a 
popular mandate for accession of Cochinchina 
to the new republic in Hanoi. It was extremely 
difficult to know who was who. In any case, 
the elements in the situation summarized here 
were at best sketchily known outside the 
country, where military and political decisions 
had to be made by the victorious powers, 
uncertain what precedents in international law 
they should act on, if indeed the circumstances 
were not altogether novel...
The compromise reached by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff at Potsdam ratified at last the two 
de facto spheres of operations by fixing a 
formal boundary between them at the 16th 
parallel; the southern half of Vietnam thus 
fell to British occupation because South-east 
Asia Command was a British command, not 
because of any implication of British political 
rights in Indochina. Indeed, it was no function 
of a wartime military conference, such as that 
at Potsdam, to commit the participants or 
anybody else to permanent disposal of the 
territories being fought over, or to transfer 
of sovereignties and so on; such matters must 
fall for decision after the heat, the pressures 
and the tension have passed and when all the 
relevant information is to hand, in the eventual 
peace treaties. The task in hand at Potsdam 
was to make arrangements, largely of a 
humanitarian kind, for safeguarding Allied 
prisoners of war, for the physical removal of 
Japanese forces, for the welfare of civilian 
populations, and for the care and maintenance 
of public installations and institutions.
The contrary view, that conquest bestowed 
absolute rights of decision on the conqueror - 
implicit in current strictures on General Gracey - 
is supposed by writers on international law to 
have gone out with the eighteenth century." 6
Duncanson went on to make a telling point in the central issue 
of the controversy over General Gracey:
"By agreement between the British Government 
and the Government of General de Gaulle, 
which all the Allies recognized as sovereign 
in Indochina, the duties of the Control 
Commission were (a) to enforce surrender 
and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces 
throughout South-east Asia Command [sic], 
and (b) to liberate Allied prisoners of war 
and internees in Indochina. It is this 
instruction which may, in part, have given 
rise to misunderstanding that General Gracey* s 
subsequent actions went beyond his mandate; 
in reality, he had other tasks as well, arising 
from his command of Allied Land Forces. These 
were "to secure the key area of Saigon, to 
maintain order, and to liberate Allied territory 
as far as his resources permitted." The 
word "liberate" was no doubt vague, but the 
one among these tasks which gave rise to 
controversy was the maintenance of public 
order. Yet a little reflection will show that 
it could not well have been omitted from the 
list. Not only would it then have been 
impossible to discharge the other tasks, 
but General Gracey was in fact, even though 
there had been no fighting, an occupying 
military power and liable to perform the duties
falling to an occupying power under the 
laws and usages of war on land. The Hague 
Regulations were explicit, placingthis 
duty before all others:
'The authority of the power of the State 
having passed de facto into the hands of 
the occupant, the latter shall do all in 
his power to restore, and ensure, as far 
as possible, public order and safety, 
respecting at the same time, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country.'
Even if a British Commander of an occupying 
force were not given explicit instructions 
on this point - and General Gracey was - 
he would still be bound by the British 
Manual of Military Law, which reproduces 
the Hague Regulation word for word and 
so makes its observance by British forces 
mandatory.
However, when General Gracey*s men began 
to arrive at Saigon, from September 13 
onwards, they did not come as a military 
administration. An occupying power is not 
obliged to discharge the duty of keeping 
order by setting up his own administration, 
and on this occasion the expectation was 
that the existing French administration, 
released from Japanese captivity, would 
take over, subject to such purge or other 
adjustment as the Government of General 
de Gaulle might see fit to make; the 
tasks falling to the British would then be 
limited in practice to the Control Commission 
aspect. This was the subject of the Anglo- 
French agreement already referred to, and 
a French Commissioner entrusted with 
supervision, a M. C^dile, had been para­
chuted into Cochinchina three weeks earlier 
(apparently without Admiral Mountbatten1 s 
c o n s e n t a l t h o u g h  he had met with foreseeable 
difficulty in obtaining Japanese recognition 
in advance of the arrival of the Control 
Commission. Except perhaps for this 
literally precipitate arrival of the French .
Commissioner, which had no affect on the
Actually, Mountbatten probably did know of C&Lile's jump into 
Cochinchina, for C&lile's inspection tour of British Military 
Administration in Burma had been instantly cut short by Japan's 
sudden surrender, and he was taken to Jessore where arrangements 
were made by RAF Special Duty and Force 136 personnel to drop him 
into Indochina. Also, Mountbatten stated that he had parachuted 
Pierre Messmer into Tonkin [Letter, Lord Mountbatten*s Private 
Secretary to author, 1977* and interview with Pierre Messmer, 1977]» 
so that the SAC was no doubt cognizant of C&lile's actions as well.
course of events, the arrangements described 
were in full accord with the principles of 
international law and custom, and General Gracey 
was adopting a very correct attitude when he 
told M. Hertrich at Rangoon on the eve of the 
latter*s departure for Saigon that it was up 
to France to re-establish an administration 
there - "La question du gouvemement de 
1 *Indochine est exclusivement franqaise." It 
was not up to General Gracey - or Admiral 
Mountbatten or the Potsdam Conference - to 
prejudge the future political settlement of 
Indochina - only to ensure public order 
temporarily against the consequences of 
the war, until the surrendering enemy forces 
were out of the way and the power recognized 
by the Allies as sovereign, namely France, 
was in a position to resume its administrative 
responsibilities.
In the event, the situation in Saigon and the 
"key area", stretching roughly twenty-five 
miles round the capital, was nnich more chaotic 
than had been envisaged, thanks in part but not 
solely to the activities of the Viet Minh. The 
British - that is to say, Indian - forces of 
General Gracey came in contingents, starting on 
September 13* and at first their small number 
put even their own defence in jeopardy, not to 
speak of wider responsibilities. Although 
"many Annamites [i.e. Vietnamese] wished to 
co-operate with the French and British in 
restoring order and viewed with disgust the 
brutal methods adopted by the Viet Minh extremists" 
General Gracey, as Commander Allied Land Forces, 
could do little more than call on the Japanese 
commander (Field Marshal Terauchi) to restore 
order; the latter was under an obligation so to 
do until relieved by the occupying force, and his 
reluctance to carry it out before being explicitly 
ordered to had not been correct. Restoring order, 
moreover, was far more complicated than mere 
protection of public buildings, all of which had 
been seized by the Viet Minh: it meant restoring 
the electricity supply and other public services, 
whose workers were being intimidated into 
abandoning their posts, as well as the flow of 
food from the countryside, where peasants were 
being intimidated into staying away from the 
market. Saigon was threatened with famine and 
disease as a consequence of the rioting, looting, 
murder and arson. After a week of frustrated 
efforts to calm the situation through appeals to 
Mr. Thach and Mr. Bach but with the active help 
only of the Japanese, General Gracey decided 
on September 21 to assert his authority as 
Commander of all armed and police forces in
southern Indochina by means of a proclamation; 
the proclamation at the same time threatened 
summary execution for looters, saboteurs and 
other wrongdoers who prevented "the transition 
from war to peace conditions peaceably and with 
minimum dislocation to public and utility 
services, legitimate business and trade, and 
with the least interference with the normal 
peaceful activities and vocations of the 
people." Now, it had not been intended that 
he should assume any responsibility for law 
and order outside the "key areas" - that is to 
say, the areas where there were either Japanese 
troops to round up and disarm or Allied prisoners 
to release and evacuate. Admiral Mountbatten, 
more distant from the trouble spot but constantly 
concerned about the effect of press reports, 
especially in India, that Indian troops were 
being employed, not to protect civilians from 
the misdeeds of criminals, but to repress a 
declaration of independence by another Asian 
people - a line which Viet Minh broadcasts very 
naturally adopted - took fright, not at the 
assumption of responsibility for keeping order 
in Saigon, but at its extension to the whole of 
the area designated at Potsdam for occupation 
by his Command. He referred to the Chiefs of 
Staff in London the question whether the 
proclamation, by extending jurisdiction in this 
way, amounted to an excess of duty on the part 
of General Gracey; the Chiefs of Staff judged 
that, in the circumstances, it did not, and 
General Gracey was later commended for his 
forthright action. Undoubtedly the proclamation 
could have been criticized on points of form, 
whose deficiencies were probably due to lack of 
models and of professional drafting staff.* But 
luckily the form of the proclamations was not 
destined to be put to the test. There was not 
much improvement in the situation, however, largely 
because it was harder for the Viet Minh leaders 
to stop the disturbances than it had been to 
encourage them before: to extend the metaphor of 
Kahin and Lewis, their "nascent" administration 
had been conceived but had not actually been 
brought forth yet. The General consequently 
ordered French Commissioner C^dile, with a small 
number of released French troops armed for the 
occasion, to evict the Viet Minh leaders on 
September 23 from the Government buildings they 
had occupied - an action that even Admiral 
Mountbatten referred to later, with clear dis­
approval, as a coup d'etat. If anything, there 
was further deterioration in the situation, from
This is correct [Interview with Brigadier Maunsell, 20 April 1977].
reprisals both by the indignant Viet Minh 
and by the French, who, now that some of them 
had arms in their hands, began to pay off the 
scores indiscriminately. General Gracey 
promptly took back the French arms and, while 
still employing Marshal Terauchi's forces on 
guard duties, finally persuaded Commissioner 
Cedile, after the latter had been flown to 
SEAC Headquarters for a pep talk from Admiral 
Mountbatten, to negotiate a ceasefire with the 
Viet Minh (October 2)• Several hundred Europeans 
had by now been massacred, but, again, Hertrich 
commends the General for his patience: "il veut 
aller jusqu'au bout dans la voie des negociations."
No summary executions under General Gracey's 
proclamation were ever carried out, nor did he 
in practice exercise any jurisdiction outside 
the vicinity of Saigon." 7
Louis Allen, with unique access to Japanese sources, wrote 
following:
"... the really crucial year in French Indo- 
China history is the year between the Japanese 
coup d'etat of 9th March 19^ -5, and the March 
19^0 discussions at Fontainebleau.
At the first date, the Viet Minh were merely 
a problem of chian iji ('the preservation of 
order') as far as the Japanese were concerned, 
at any rate in the south, in Cochin China.
By the latter date, the Viet Minh and Ho 
himself - by this time President - were factors 
of importance well outside the French Union, 
and the future lines development of what we 
now call Vietnam were clear enough to see." 8
Regarding the British role, as carried out by officers like 
Gracey:
" First, the role was brand-new. Until the 
day of the Japanese surrender on 1^th August 
19^ 5, South-East Asia Command boundaries, 
although they included Siam stopped' at the 
Mekong. Of the pre-war Netherlands East Indies 
only Sumatra was included. The new tasks were 
enormous. The area contained 128 million 
people included 122,700 prisoners of war and 
internees in desperate need of help of all 
kinds, also three-quarters of a million 
Japanese troops and civilians (633,000/93,000), 
and 10,000 Formosans and Koreans, to be 
disarmed, concentrated and repatriated. There 
seems to have remained some doubt in Mountbatten*s
mind whether the Japanese generals in 
South-East Asia Command would obey orders, 
but a meeting in Rangoon with Numata, Terauchi's 
Chief-of-Staff, on 27th August 19^5, convinced 
him that he could by and large rely on their 
surrender if not their goodwill*..
It may be seen that General Gracey had landed 
himself in quite a complex political situation.
His mission was to establish control over 
Terauchi and the Southern Area Army HQ, and 
ultimately to repatriate the Japanese of whom 
there were 72,000 in Southern French Indo-China 
(the second mission was christened 'Operation 
Nipoff' by a wag in Mountbatten's headquarters, 
and became known as this in official documents.)
The environment of this mission was a country in 
which the Viet Minh 'were in complete control' 
[Mountbatten, op,cit. p.287] outside key areas, 
in which the Japanese had expelled or imprisoned 
the French military presence seven months previously, 
though there were a few resistance groups still 
operating; ’ and in which the native element itself 
was nationalist but with the entirely contrasting 
options of monarchy (Bao Dai) and communism (Ho Chi 
Minh). To Gracey's North, across the parallel,
Chinese troops flooded in, looting and pillaging.
Ho Chi Minh, who had no more than 5,000 reliable 
followers at the time, had already proclaimed the 
independent Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, under 
the benignly approving gaze of the American OSS 
detachment for whose benefit independence banners 
in English were suspended across the main avenues 
of the city. Gracey's problem would have been 
diminished by a proper French military presence, 
and indeed de Gaulle had already envisaged the 
necessity of this long before..." 9
In listing the few French forces available to Gracey, Allen 
wrote:
"Now this fact clearly altered the whole feasibility 
of Gracey's carrying out his mission smoothly. It 
was all very well for Mountbatten to transmit to 
him the orders of the Combined Chie-fs of Staff to 
the effect that the responsibilities in French 
Indo-China of the Supreme Allied Command South- 
East Asia 'were strictly limited and temporary',
Gracey knew that neither the Viet Minh nor the 
Japanese had an interest in maintaining public 
order, and that French attempts to enforce it in 
the North by parachuting plenipotentiaries, to 
take control wherever possible, had met with 
resistance from Viet Minh, Chinese and the OSS.
Many members of these groups were killed or 
taken prisoner by the Vietnamese. Pierre 
Messmer, designated as Commissaire de la 
Republique for Tonkin, was taken prisoner and 
later had to escape from his captors. Only 
Jean Sainteny managed to make any kind of a 
showing and set himself up, after a flight 
from Kunming with the OSS Major Patti, in the 
Gouvernement General in Hanoi. Here Giap and 
a delegation came for talks on 27th August, but 
Devillers is convinced that the possibilities 
of good relations were at once halted by the 
Americans who promised American support to the 
Viet Minh if they resisted French demands.
Soon Sainteny and his four companions were 
isolated in the Gouvernement General under the 
eyes of Japanese sentries (Devillers, op.cit. 
p. 151 and'n.^f)...
Gracey was faced with a similar situation, 
though of course he did have force at his 
disposal; but not a great deal. There had 
been riots in Saigon on 2nd September, before 
Gracey*s troops arrived, and only the inter­
vention of released Allied POW's prevented 
this becoming a massacre of French citizens.
The Vietnam Republic was proclaimed on 17th 
September and on that day the Viet Minh 
enforced the closing of the Saigon markets 
and a boycott of all French employers.
•Sporadic fighting... and hooliganism* took
place in the town. Mountbatten comments
that this was 'mainly unpolitical' (Mountbatten,
op.cit. p.287) but that it showed no legal
writ ran, and 'that the Viet Minh party (who
claimed to be in control) were taking no
steps to see that order was maintained', (ibid.).
So Gracey cracked down hard. Four days after 
the riots, he has posted in all the various 
languages throughout Saigon and Gholon a 
proclamation that he intended to carry out 
the transition from war to peace 'with the 
minimum dislocation of public services, 
legitimate business and trade; and'with the 
least interference with the normal peaceful 
activities and vocations of the people' (ibid.),.
Gracey hesitated at first when Cedile approached 
him to apply firm measures against the Vietnamese 
according to Devillers, because he knew London 
wanted no complications... None the less, 
when the Viet Minh informed him they could not 
restrain all elements of the population, Gracey 
acted swiftly on behalf of the French...
It must not be forgotten, though, that in 
her attempt to fulfil her duty towards her 
French ally, Great Britain had to employ 
two armies raised in Asia, one impregnated 
by, and the other touched with, the fever 
of Asian nationalism. The Indian Government 
was not particularly pleased to see its forces 
used in French Indo-China and Indonesia to 
support a colonialism which it was preparing 
to throw off at home; and Japanese attempts 
to encourage Vietnamese nationalism against 
the French had been in terms of traditional 
monarchical institutions (it was Bao Dai, as 
Emperor of Annam, who had proclaimed national 
independence after 9th March 19^5) and their 
sympathy with the communists was minimal. Yet 
contact had been established with the Viet 
Minh, and at least one Japanese general had 
been won over to a policy of supporting it." 10
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in Vietnam at that 
time, the attacks levelled at General Gracey^in some of the better 
known histories of this period are seen to be personal in nature and 
to transcend the bounds of academic criticism. Some are easily 
explained, as in Isaac's case, by the US Army's Office of History 
when one of their well-known historians brushed aside Isaacs by 
saying that the latter's ideological antecedents were well known —  
and, as has been mentioned, Trotsky had recommended Isaacs.
Joseph Buttinger's own background as an Austrian Socialist is 
plainly reflected by his treatment of Gracey and he, like Leclerc 
who was cautioned by Gracey, seems to know very little about the 
Indian Army or its traditions. Buttinger thought that the Indians 
and Gurkhas were "astonishingly loyal" in the performance of their 
duties in Indochina. The following passage may help to explain 
in part what appears to be "astonishing" to civilians, writers like 
Buttinger whose military experience is anything but extensive; in the 
first place, few of those writing about this period had any great 
knowledge of the Indian Army:
"Disbandment of the ^th Battalion took place . 
at the Regimental Centre in an. impressive 
parade attended by Lieutenant-General Douglas 
Gracey, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., the inspired 
leader of the 20th Indian Division in which 
the Battalion had fought... and had made for 
itself a name worthy of the high reputation 
of the Regiment and the Gurkha Brigade.
The passing of a fighting unit is always 
a sad occasion and few remained unmoved 
as this grand Battalion marched past for 
the last time to the stirring music of 
the Regimental March* the Battalion flag 
was lowered and the Uth Battalion 10th 
Gurkha Rifles passed into history to the 
haunting strains of "Auld Lang Syne". 11
The above was written by a chronicler of the U/10 Gurkhas, 
describing the moving scene which became a familiar one as wartime 
battalions, brigades and divisions were disbanded.
Scarcely less important was the philosophy set down by a Jat
writer in the following passage:
"Eventually we were told that SAIGON in F.I.C. 
was our destination, though we were still 
uncertain how we were to get there. To the 
officers SAIGON, known only by name for the 
quality of its pre-war Radio programmes, 
conjured up pictures of a Paris of the East 
complete with the traditional gaieties and 
amenities of its original in the West, and 
the prospect was greeted with enthusiasm.
For the men SAIGON was just another place 
in the world they would be able to say 
they had visited, but to date Its very 
existence was unheard of* They displayed 
no surprise at the news, and with a polite 
"Achha bat sahib", dismissed the matter, 
and waited for the order to move. Had 
our destination been the North pole, they 
would have displayed the same fatalistic 
outlook. Not that it denoted indifference, 
far from it, for the Indian soldier loves 
seeing new places, and there was no great 
wish to return to India. So long as they 
could get back to their families once a 
year on leave, they were more than content 
to remain on service indefinitely enjoying 
plentiful rations, and increased pay, and 
accepting risks and discomfort with a 
fortitude that deserves and gets the admiration 
of the officers who lead them." 12
Although most of Gracey's critics never knew him personally,
some felt able to make personal criticisms of the General. Buttinger*
prose provides an example:
"... Gracey*s simple political convictions excluded 
the possibility that an eastern country could 
cease to be a colony ... Had the Potsdam 
conference decided that the states of Indochina 
no longer should belong to France, General Gracey
would have been as shocked as the French.
But since no such outrage had been perpetrated, 
the general regarded the right of the French 
to reoccupy Vietnam as self-evident... This 
view remained the point of departure not only 
of Gracey1 s thinking, but also of his actions, 
even after it had led him to violate his 
political instructions... The idea of trying 
to re-establish order by siding with the 
Vietnamese authorities never even entered 
Gracey*s head..." 13
But if one, like Buttinger, may imply the gift of clairvoyance, 
the strongest challenge could be made to his statement that Gracey 
"regarded the right of the French to reoccupy Vietnam as self-evident", 
and Gracey "would have been as shocked as the French" had the politicians 
at Potsdam not decided to return Indochina to France. The fact is 
that Gracey personally was little concerned with who ran Vietnam, and 
the evidence of his character and conduct makes it plain that he would 
have kept the French out had he been so ordered. In no official 
documents, the General's own papers or in interviews with his closest 
subordinates can any evidence be found that Gracey at that time was 
particularly sympathetic to the return of the French to Indochina. As 
Dennis Duncanson has mentioned, Gracey was simply reiterating his 
government' s policy when he stated that the French were responsible for 
the administration of Indochina. It is thus apparent that a great deal 
of poetic license has been used by historians and journalists in writing 
of these events.
The implication in all this is that Gracey was politically naive 
and did not think much of the Oriental's ability to manage. Yet some 
of Gracey*s own regimental commanders were Indian, and the General had 
spent years in building the Indian Army. And to say that he could not 
entertain the possibility of an eastern country ceasing to be colony 
is again not entirely correct, since Gracey knew very well that India 
itself, the "brightest jewel in the empire", was on the road to 
independence. The entire discussion of Gracey very much underestimates 
the man who rose to become Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army 
and who, with the Indian Commander, General Bucher, personally averted 
a war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 191+8 by talking their 
respective governments out of it.
Dennis Duncanson has himself discussed the fashionable criticisms 
of Gracey, recognizing that, indirectly at least, Gracey stood accused 
of contributing "to America's subsequent embarrassments and quandaries 
over Vietnam."
Wrote Duncanson [in quoting Buttinger]:
"Mr. Joseph Buttinger alleges that the General's 
efforts to restore order 'intensified the 
crisis' —  adding somewhat gratuitously, since 
it never happened:
If the British had occupied the North 
also, General Gracey might still have
interfered in the internal affairs of
Vietnam but he would have lacked the 
pretext offered him by the Vietnamese 
in Saigon for interfering on behalf 
of the French." 1U
Duncanson also addressed the writings of Professors Kahin and 
Lewis (who by now had inflated to nearly 5000 the number of 11th
RIC troops rearmed by Gracey prior to 23 September), and Theodore
Draper (who, like Hammer and nearly everyone else, apparently had 
no knowledge of Gracey's orders in writing that Gracey had been 
limited to disarming the Japanese).
Jean-Michel Hertrich, a Viet Minh sympathizer, was given by 
Gracey a seat on the first RAF aircraft to land in Saigon in late 
August, 191+5* He also reported that Gracey was initially sympathetic 
to the Viet Minh, until the outrages began and until they told Gracey 
that they could no longer control their followers. Said Duncanson:
"It appears from this evidence that, even if the 
Viet Minh spokesmen who came forward to meet 
General Gracey in Saigon (a Dr. Pham-ngoc-Thach 
and a Malt re Phan van-Bach) had not themselves 
faded swiftly into oblivion thereafter, they 
hardly had grounds for bearing the lasting 
grudge to which some American writers wish to 
attach so much historical importance. The 
impression General Gracey's remark in 1953 
seems to have meant to convey was that he had 
unequivocally declined to recognize the 
precarious authority which his virtually 
anonymous Communist contacts in Saigon were 
claiming, on the fragile evidence of messages 
being broadcast over Radio Hanoi in the name 
of the self-proclaimed Democratic Republic.
Was this stand in itself an improper one for' the 
British Commander to take? The answer must 
turn on what the status of General Gracey*s 
force in Vietnam was and whether, as a matter 
of fact, he departed from his prior directives - 
some allowance being due, of course,for the 
possibility that the directives did not entirely 
meet the "bizarre" situation he found on arrival." 15
As Duncanson so correctly pointed out, many of Graceyfs critics 
have seized on a quote by the late Bernard Fall as proof of Gracey* s 
perceived prejudice:
"As evidence of the General's supposed personal 
prejudice, some writers quote a remark he made 
in 1953 at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian 
Society, of which he was a distinguished member:
I was welcomed on arrival by the Viet 
Minh, who said "Welcome" and all that 
sort of thing. It was a very -unpleasant 
situation, and 1 promptly kicked them out.
These sentences are invariably taken, incomplete 
and out of context, not direct from this Journal 
but from the late Mr. Bernard Fall - although the 
latter was not himself critical of General Gracey.
Since it is clear from the occasion when the 
General made this remark - during the discussion 
following a talk on the military situation in 
Indochina by an American Air Force colonel - 
that it was spontaneous and unconsidered, picked 
up automatically by the stenographer and recorded 
in these pages for all time, almost certainly 
without prior reference to him, it seems only 
right to note in the Journal whatever can be 
noted in his defence; his critics, without 
exception, base their judgements - on what was 
a question of international law, not one of 
political favour - upon a very limited selection 
of the evidence available.
To begin with, there is outside evidence 
that General Gracey did not in fact treat 
the Viet Minh spokesmen in 19U5 quite so 
peremptorily as he later gave the impression 
of having done. On that afternoon in 1953i&e 
point under discussion was whether the Viet 
Minh stood for a Communist takeover of 
Indochina; the General was concerned to 
convince the audience that he, for one, had 
never been taken in by suggestions that it 
had ever stood for anything else:
'I am quite certain that Ho Chi Minh's resistance 
movement was leading up to such a result all. 
the time and that anything he did was for 
himself and his party alone and not for the good 
of French Indochina as a whole... They are 
obviously Communists." 16
These extemporaneous remarks by Gracey deserve closer scrutiny, 
in context. The hitherto little known lecture in question was delivered 
by retired US Air Force Colonel Melvin Hall, who had earned a DSO with 
the BEF in France during the First World War; the title of the lecture
was "Aspects of the Present Situation in Indo-China", and was 
delivered on 29 April 1953 at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian 
Society chaired by Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt. Hall began by saying, 
"Indochina has been described as a 'basket of crabs*. If that gives 
you some idea of what the situation .is, I can assure you that trying 
to trace out the movements and manifestations of a basketful of 
crabs is no more difficult than following events in Indo-China." 
Continued Hall:
"The Viet Minh started as a resistance movement against 
the Japanese. In 19U6, after the expulsion of the 
Japanese invaders, Ho Chi Minh signed with the 
French two separate agreements. That was at the 
time that Russia was still, in a manner of speaking, 
an ally and had not turned against the West.
Ho Chi Minh had been educated in Moscow, and as 
soon as Russian policy turned against the West 
he received certain instructions - I do not 
pretend to know precisely what those instructions 
were - and immediately began the elimination of 
all the non-extreme-Leftist groups of the Viet 
Minh, until today they march with the Communist 
world attack...." 17
As soon as Hall had concluded his talk General Gracey, now
retired from active service, rose and added the following remarks;
because of the circumstances in which he was speaking, and to avoid 
lengthy explanations about what was done and said on his arrival at 
Tan Son Nhut airport, he simply used a piece of somewhat colloquial 
verbal shorthand:
"... I was interested in what Colonel Hall said 
about Ho Chi Minh's resistance movement, because 
I am quite certain that it was leading up to 
such a result all the time and that anything he 
did was for himself and his party alone and not
for the good of French Indo-China as a whole.
I was welcomed on arrival by the Viet Minh, who 
said "Welcome" and all that sort of thing. It 
was a very unpleasant situation, and I promptly 
kicked them out. They are obviously Communists, 
and I think, as does Colonel Hall, that it is 
a very dangerous situation and that unless we 
do everything in our power with all the 
determination we possibly can, the only hope 
for the independence of Indo-China is under 
Ho Chi Minh. Otherwise I think that the French 
and the Vietnamese are at a very great 
di sadvantage." 18
Gracey added that the incompetence of the Communists was 
factor in their long struggles in Indochina:
"When I was out there two years ago there was 
one question that the Vietnamese asked me.
I think that that was the reason why the 
French asked me out there, so that I could 
give the answer. This is what they said:
"The French say that they cannot nationalize 
or give us an army under fifteen or twenty 
years - without French assistance. How is it, 
first of all, that the Pakistan army has been 
able to be reorganized in three years? And, 
secondly, how is it that the Viet Minh forces 
are able to find their officers? After all, 
they have not been going at it very much 
longer than we have." The first part was 
easy to answer. I merely pointed out that 
we had been nationalizing the Indian Army, of 
which the Pakistan army was only an offshoot, 
for thirty years. That was an easy one to 
answer, but the question of Ho Chi Minh and 
the Viet Minh officers was a very difficult 
one to answer. The only answer I could give 
to that was that if the Viet Minh had had 
decent officers, they would have had possession 
of French Indo-China long ago." 19
Duncanson is correct when he wrote:
"Many years will pass perhaps before the last 
word is said about events in Vietnam in 19i+5» 
but it seems not unreasonable to suggest, on 
the basis of the facts and the law summarized 
above, that General Gracey, while in Saigon, 
did not really depart from his instructions 
and that, far from adapting them to the 
perplexities of the actual situation with 
impatience, he exercised under wartime 
conditions a forbearance in his methods for 
preserving law and order greater than is 
often shown in many countries in peacetime.
He received the first of his knighthoods 
in recognition of his war service; this had 
been primarily in Burma, but the honour was 
sign enough that no official displeasure 
existed over his conduct in Indochina. In 
interpreting what British policy was in 
regard to independence for colonial peoples 
in the wake of the war, Miss Hammer, quoted 
at the beginning of this article, might have 
noted the prophetic words of Sir Stafford Cripps 
in the House of Commons in June IShSt
We do not want to see in Burma, or in any 
other country, the rapid seizing of power 
by any particular group of people, in order
to improvise some form of government .[quoting Donnison, p. 370].
Soon after these events, General Gracey had an 
opportunity to demonstrate in practical fashion 
his sympathy with Asian emancipations on 
Independence in 19V7 he became Chief of Staff 
to the Army of Pakistan, and Commander-in-Chief 
from the following year until his retirement in 
1951* The issue that faced him in Saigon was 
not that of colonial emancipation, but the 
ordinary decencies of life and the protection 
of individual people from terror, injury and 
robbery - a duty falling to all persons thrust 
into positions of authority but often callously 
disregarded by revolutionaries. There is surely 
nothing inconsistent between the view that France 
ought to have granted Vietnam independence 
straightaway after the war - even that the 
Indochina Communist Party was, on ideological 
grounds, the proper group to hand over to - and 
the view that the rule of law should be upheld 
impartially by occupying powers in wartime." 20
The volume of evidence now available —  official documents,
contemporary comment, interviews with the original participants, etc. — •
warrant the drawing of several conclusions about Gracey*s role in
Vietnam, conclusions which Should be stated if only to rebut the
politically biased (and often incorrect) histories written about
this period. Firstly, those writers (Hammer and Buttinger were two
such, and there were many more who were influenced by them) who
asserted that Gracey*s tasks did not include the maintenance of public
order are guilty of historical inaccuracy. Gracey's own orders as
Commander, Allied Land Forces French Indo China, are represented in
this study. That the maintenance of law and order was one of Gracey's
principal tasks was generally known except, apparently, to some of
the writers who set themselves up as historical authorities on the
period. The US Government was unquestionably aware of it for, on
2k September 19U5» a- memorandum by the Director of the.office of Far
Eastern Affairs, Mr. John Carter Vincent, records a meeting in
Washington between Sir George Sansom of the British Embassy, Mr. Vincent,
and Mr. Abbot Moffat, Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.
The following is an excerpt from that memo:
"Mr. Moffat inquired whether Sir George 
was familiar with the statement of General 
Slim, Commander of the SEAC land forces, 
that the British would be in Indochina to 
disarm the Japanese and to maintain order 
until French troops could arrive." 21
Any researcher who had taken the elementary step of enquiring 
from Maunsell or Taunton or Woodford, for example, would certainly 
have been informed about it.
A second conclusion, and one which requires particular mention, 
is the reasoning which prompted Gracey*s decision to force the French 
into assuming responsibility for civil administration on 23 September.
The current literature depicts Gracey as an officer who went to Saigon 
impatient to conduct a coup and restore political power to the French.
It is incorrect and misleading to do so, for Gracey was fully cognizant 
of his government's policy of minimal involvement while recognizing 
(with the United States) France's sole sovereignty in Indochina. Gracey 
was persuaded that the coup was necessary by the knowledge that, 
without it, complete anarchy would quickly develop in Saigon, which would 
almost certainly result in the massacre of the French population. The 
evidence which led him to this conclusion was there in the form of 
mounting personal atrocities against the French, and his Intelligence 
officers had warned him of impending disaster. This, coupled with 
what the released Allied POWs had told him of the anarchy in Saigon 
prior to his arrival, convinced Gracey that, no matter what the personal 
consequences to him, he could afford to wait no longer.* But had 
Gracey* s own division not initially been withheld from him by Mountbatten 
it is conceivable that the coup would not have taken place, for Gracey 
would have disposed enough force to guarantee the public safety in Saigon 
without resorting to French help. But as Gracey later told Mountbatten, 
he had only few companies at his disposal at that time to accomplish 
his tremendously complex tasks in an area relatively bigger and more 
important than Liverpool. Also, the Japanese (largely "on the fence" 
or sullenly hostile at the time) would not be impressed with the 
spectacle of the Allied Commander dancing to the Viet Minh tune.
On several occasions Gracey took the French to task for not 
according proper treatment and respect to the Asians, which is scarcely 
conduct to be expected from the colonialist bigot that.some historians 
describe. Luring the four and a half months he was present in Saigon, 
Gracey prevented the massacre of the French civil population, secured
the Japanese Supreme Headquarters, kept the capital city alive through
S '
a Viet Minh sei'ge, and was the instrument by which the Communist 
presence was ejected from Saigon. What happened in Vietnam was unique
* On 6 October 19^5 General Slim informed the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff that, in addition to everything else, a rising of the 
French civilian population had been a real possibility.
in that other postwar coups were of the reverse character, that
is, Communist power liquidating the existing administration. This
was the only contemporary example of the Communists suffering a
reverse, and it happened at Gracey*s hands.* The political Left and
their sympathizers have never forgiven him for this.
A further matter which needs to he clarified concerns the
figure of 2700 Viet Minh killed, cited by several histories. The
total is correct, but what all of them omit to state is that slightly
more than 600 of them were actually killed by British/Indian troops.
The remainder, more than 2000, were killed by the French and Japanese
who, outside key areas, were not under direct British supervision.
Typical of the elementary errors which abound in Hammer's history
of the period are her statements that Gracey departed from India for
Saigon —  he actually set out from Burma —  and that the OSS dropped
C^dile into Cochinchina from a US C—i+7; in fact, Force 136 and RAF
SB B-2l+s did. Again, if "liberals" in London "recoiled", it was not
over the use of the RAF, for this was minimal, comprising a single
attack, in which no personnel were hit,
Buttinger's personal prejudices emerge more clearly than Gracey*s
from his criticisms of Gracey, while virtually every historian of the
period has unquestioningly followed Isaacs in stating that Vietnamese
sentries were "shot down" and killed during the 23 September coup. Yet
it has been shown that only Frenchmen were killed during the coup —
no Vietnamese had been "shot down". And if the French overreacted by
behaving outrageously for a few hours before a furious Gracey disarmed
them, it must be borne in mind that Viet Minh jailers had replaced
Japanese guards on the French POW camps. The British did not kill
2700 Vietnamese, and Gracey did not "take it upon himself" to restore
the French to Indochina.
Another American writer, Robert Shaplen, who like Isaacs was
employed by Newsweek magazine, wrote that the Committee for the South
was "running a government", that the French spread rumours about the
Japanese arming the Viet Minh —  thus implying it had not happened —
and then went on to describe his meeting with a Viet Minh man (said
to be the eldest of twenty children) in whom "the seeds of discontent
22were probably sown" at the age of only two years.1 Shaplen also
* This may explain, in part, why DRVN and SRVN official publications 
have given such scant notice of Gracey and the British occupation 
of Saigon.
stated that Train V&n Giau "recognized the authority of the new 
Republic of Viet Nam in Hanoi", suggesting that Giau was to some 
extent independent of Hanoi. The riot of 2 September, continued 
Shaplen, may have been instigated by the Japanese employed by French 
as provocateurs [this is really the least likely explanation], and 
the Gurkhas engaged in looting, something which the Vietnamese, it 
appears, never did [in fact, the Viet Minh stripped the palace of the 
Governor of Cochinchina, and were ordered by Gracey to return the 
furniture and crockery].
Robert Denton Williams, a captain in Taunton1 s 80 Brigade, later 
asserted that Ernest Bevin started the war in Vietnam.
In authorizing publication of the story in Peace News, an antiwar 
publication of the Sixties, Williams implied that, as of September 19H5*
"In a command paper (R 2817; March 25» 195U)» 
and also in other papers before and since, the 
Central Office of Information (COl) gave it 
out that, because of "unrest and terrorism",
General Gracey had given orders to arm the 
French. Both part3 of the statement were 
wholly untrue. There was at this time no 
unrest and no terrorism, and General Gracey 
did not give the order to arm the French. The 
order came from the Foreign Office, through 
an FO official in Saigon, and it was delivered 
to the local British commander (Taunton).
As many British and Indian officers in Saigon 
understood it, a deal had been done between 
Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, and 
Massigli of France. Under this secret agree­
ment, the French were to be allowed to re­
establish themselves in Indo-China on the 
understanding that they would not attempt to 
return to Syria and the Lebanon, The 
Committee of the South, in the face of Western 
perfidy, resolved to fight; and nightly attacks 
on Saigon began." 23
The problem with this theory is that there was no Foreign Office 
presence in Saigon before 23 September 19^5* As Gracey himself wrote, 
the failure of SEAC Headquarters to provide him with a Financial Adviser 
and a functioning Civil Affairs Staff "was a boob by S.E.A.C. as was 
their failure to supply me with a high level political adviser from 
the start." Sir Norman Brain, in an interview with the author, confirmed 
that he had arrived in Saigon after the 23 September coup, and was in 
fact unable to say what his advice to Gracey would have been had he been 
there prior to 23 September.
As recently as 1971 > the view that the British were bloody
butchers who bombed and shelled the Vietnamese at every opportunity
was expressed in a sLight volume entitled The British in Vietnam. In
it, the author, George Rosie, aired his almost hysterically anti-
British sentiments. Its influence cannot have been extensive, for it
was printed in a limited edition, was filled with typographical errors
and now has gone out of print and almost out of sight. According to
Louis Allen, Rosie "suffers from the historical malady of hindsight
2k
in a very acute form." ^
Rosie gained an interview with Brigadier Maunsell by writing on
stationery bearing the letterhead of a well-known London newspaper,
and opened the conversation by saying that General Gracey had never
received the credit due him and he wished to do something about this.
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He listened to Maunsell for forty minutes, "never took a note" and 
subsequently wrote a vicious attack on Gracey and the British in Vietnam. 
The British Broadcasting Corporation, for reasons apparent only to itself, 
commissioned Rosie to write the script for a radio broadcast about the
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battle of Bien Bien Fhu. The broadcast, narrated by Rene Cutforth in 
1977 > opened with the statement that Gracey, described as "peppery" 
and "little" [he was not a "little" man but a powerful man of at least 
average height or better], singlehandedly caused the start of the
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Vietnam War —  neither Ho Chi Minh, Giap, Tran Van Giau nor other 
lifelong fanatical Marxist revolutionaries were mentioned in this regard.
However, in all of this the nature of the professional military 
officer should be taken into account when analyzing Gracey*s actions. 
Would any other general on the spot have acted differently, and would 
history have taken another course had there been another commander on 
the spot? Probably not. Gracey made tactical decisions on his own, 
but that is why he achieved high rank in wartime. Had he waited for 
guidance about every problem that came along, he probably would have 
remained a captain all his life. A more cautious commander might have 
been able to drag out the end of the beginning (the expulsion of the 
Viet Minh from Saigon) for a few more weeks, but the end would have been 
the same: the French returned to power. Allied policy was quite clear
on the matter. It should be obvious that if Gracey were indeed 
sympathetic to the Vietnamese, blocked the French and strengthened the 
Viet Minh in office, he would have been instantly recalled to Singapore 
to explain his refusal to follow orders, removed from his present and 
any future command, and replaced.
The British legacy in Vietnam was, for thirty years, the state 
of South Vietnam. The French were too weak and disorganized in the 
Far East to turn the Viet Minh out, and a large measure of the French 
troops carried East from Europe were brought Allied ships. Saigon 
was economically and politically crucial. Even if the Viet Minh had 
captured ninety percent of the south without taking Saigon they would 
still be regarded as rebels, and not as a government. Conversely, 
the occupiers of ten percent of the country which included Saigon 
would be recognized as the government. The British drove the Viet Minh 
from Saigon and left it to the French. When the French returned to 
Indochina in strength they came first to Cochin China and Saigon.
The Viet Minh were thus never able to consolidate their position in 
the south. Had the Chinese in North Vietnam done the same favors for 
the French, it is not entirely unlikely that the Viet Minh could have 
been smothered before reaching full bloom. What they may have meant to 
the subsequent histories of France, Vietnam, and the United States is 
something to think about.
Thus, the obvious question arises from the earlier French suggestion 
that SEAC be responsible for northern Indochina as well. Supposing a 
Gracey had also been sent to Hanoi, and had destroyed the government of 
H& Chi Minh —  would the Viet Minh have survived, and would that part of 
the world have thus been spared three decades of incessant warfare and 
the accompanying hundreds of thousands of deaths since 19U5?
The British legacy in Vietnam could well have been the state of 
South Vietnam, which endured for 30 years against the onslaughts of a 
communist enemy supported by the resources of the whole communist world. 
Lord Mountbatten opined, many years after he had completed his mission 
as Supreme Allied Commander, that the Vietnamese communists would never 
have been able to take over the country had his command been given 
responsibility for the north as well as the south. What he had in mind 
was a situation in which another General Gracey was sent to Hanoi where, 
like his counterpart in Saigon, he had perceived the hollowness of the 
Viet Minh claim to speak and act for the whole of the Vietnamese people 
and refused to accept its pretensions to be the effective government.
By maintaining law and order, ensuring essential supplies and services, 
and protecting the ordinary people from coercion and terror from armed 
political thugs, such a commander might have provided the period of 
respite necessary for the mass of the people to express, and maybe even 
realize, its aspirations. These were quite certainly not for a communist
state. Perhaps the opinion was fanciful. Perhaps the tiny communist 
party, with the backing of the OSS's vast material resources and no 
less vast political naivete, would have emerged the victors anyway. 
Nevertheless, some explanation must be found for the fact that Prance's 
military might was defeated by the communists in the north within a 
few years, but not in the south; for the unbroken resistance of the 
southern people over so many years; even for the continuing resistance 
to communist rule after the victory of 1975 and the readiness of so 
many Vietnamese to risk their lives in tiny craft on monsoon seas rather 
than live under this. It is possible, to put it no stronger, that the 
cause of the great differences between the behaviour of North and South 
Vietnam was the vastly different experiences of the two regions in 19i+5» 
when General Gracey assumed responsibility for the south and General 
Lu Han with his Chinese forces for the north.
The official version of events in Saigon compiled by the SEAC 
Recorder on the instructions of Mountbatten was evidently regarded 
by Gracey as little better than propaganda and he took strong exception
to it. Mention has been made of this document earlier, but it is necessary
at this juncture to list the remainder of General Gracey's corrections
to it. The matters with which these corrections are concerned will be
apparent to the reader:
"It was decided that it should be made clear
to all at once by a proclamation that the
S.A.C. was determined to ensure that law and 
order were kept in Southern P.I.C. south of 
the 16 degrees parallel, and that he, through 
his local commander, was prepared to take 
s t e m  measures with all the forces available 
to him to ensure this.
The Japanese were inclined to regard the
situation as one in which, by virtue of the
fact that they had large armed forces, they
held the whip hand. The proclamation made it
quite clear to them all, as it had .been made
clear to their senior officers in RANGOON, that
the British commander was going to stand no
nonsense from them, or anyone else, for that'matter...
Outside the British perimeter, as each detachment 
arrived, the French forces (army, navy and air), 
under General Le CLERC, acted with great speed 
and determination, in spite of their administrative 
services being lacking or ill-found.
Until French forces arrived in sufficient 
strength to move out and clear areas 
outside the perimter - this was done in the 
order, southwards, westwards, and then finally 
northwards - the Annamites picketted all the 
roads and imposed a rigorous food blockade on 
SAIGON and CHOLON. By vigorous action via 
canals and the MEKONG river into CAMBODIA and 
back, and by their own transport aircraft, the 
Japanese troops broke this blockade and brought 
in ample supplies, which were most ably distributed 
to the enormous population - French, Annamite 
and Chinese - swollen as it was by innumerable 
refugees - by a Food Control Board, organised, 
run and staffed by H.Q. 20th Division assisted 
by some French civilian officials. This Board, 
by its energy and hard work, overcame all 
difficulties, and ensured an adequate ration 
for all, special attention being paid to 
children and babies.
As regards the officers and men of 20th Indian 
Division, and the units attached to it, their 
bearing, discipline, and speed and efficiency 
in dealing with each unpleasant military 
situation as it arose were beyond praise and 
had the most remarkable quietening effect on 
the frayed nerves of the local inhabitants, 
a very restraining influence on the activities 
of the Annamite hooligans, earned the admiration 
of the Japanese forces, and had a most steadying 
influence on them.
There is absolutely no doubt that the clear-cut 
enunciation of policy which was given out to 
every man on his arrival was largely instrumental 
in keeping morale high, when facing a situation 
which might otherwise have been misconstrued.
In no instance did the troops open fire until 
they were fired upon; the strain on them can be 
imagined. In the first two months, some heavy 
fighting was essential to defend vital installations, 
to clear streets of rebels armed with mortars and 
heavy and light automatics, and to clear areas 
up tothe agreed outer perimeter line. That the 
Division lost so few during the period it was 
in F.I.C. was due to their own high qualities 
as battle-seasoned soldiers,.,
The work of the staff of the Allied Mission, 
including that of Mr. MEIKLEREID, the F.O. 
adviser, who relieved Mr. BRAIN, of the Naval 
and Air Commands and of 20th Division (A.L.F.F.I.C.) 
was equally successful.
In addition to complicated operations, the 
control of Japanese Southern Army H.Q., the 
technical inspection, collection and destruction 
of a mass of equipment and stores, the opening 
and the working of the port, the control of 
civilian ration arrangements, the control of the 
very considerable Japanese naval, military and 
air forces, the feeding and transportation 
arrangements for the French forces, the 
accommodation of troops in an area already over 
crowded, the supervision and management of a 
worn-out electric and water supply system, the 
collection and documentation of Japanese 
valuables and treasure, and a hundred and one 
other problems were tackled and carried through 
successfully with great calmness, enthusiasm and 
efficiency, and in great harmony with the French 
commanders, troops and civilians...
The majority of the Annamite population was 
horror-stricken at the turn of events, and at the 
barbaric and monstrous cruelties of the puppet 
forces. Though imbued with the thought of 
independence, without much idea as to what it 
meant, they were soon alienated from their so-called 
deliverers. As they were progressively released 
from the ruthlessly terroristic attention of the 
rebels, they resumed their work and opened their 
markets. The intelligentsia were mainly, and quite 
justifiably, concerned with removing the many 
discriminations in pay and status between them 
and the French.
As regards LAOS, and the rest of F.I.C., I am 
not in the position to give a true picture.
I doubt if anyone can, and under the circumstances, 
the less said the better. I consider it would be 
best to leave LAOS out all together - it was an 
unpleasant situation, outside the orbit of the 
forces under the S.A.C.
I have however made comments on the appropriate 
paragraphs, where there are known inaccuracies in 
them...
The French will strongly dislike the statement 
that the Chinese pursued a strict policy of non­
intervention in LAOS. This, I should say, wa,s 
quite incorrect...
I wish to draw the attention of the Recorder to 
the correct way in which the keeping of law and 
order is stressed in these paragraphs, with 
special reference to the omission of this fact 
in the story of F.I.C. Unless paragraph I2I4. is 
suitably amended it is most misleading and unfair 
to the Allied commander...
Para 120 - "remainder of 20th Division'11
Amend in accordance with the facts.
The "build-up" was as follows:-
13 - 28 September - 80 Brigade and 1/1 Gurkha Rifles flown in,
7 October - - - - 32 Brigade and 2/8 Punjab arrived by sea.
12 October - - - - 9 F.F.R. arrived by air.
13 October - - - - M.G. Jat arrived by air.
17 October - - - - 100 Brigade, less 1/1 Gurkha Rifles
arrived by sea.
Para 121.
Main H.Q. opened as H.Q. A.L.F.F.I.C, on 8th October.
This gives a most unfair picture. No one accepted 
the situation after 9th March. The [French] Army, 
except for those who escaped to form guerilla bands 
mostly in Northern F.I.C. and CHINA, were put into 
prisoner of war camps; civilians were either interned 
or put under strict and severe restrictions.
The date 17th September is very misleading. The 
Annamite government in COCHIN-CHINA took complete 
charge after the unconditional surrender in August...
Unless paragraph 121*. is amended to include A.L.F.S.E.A. *s 
task of maintaining law and order, it will be most 
misleading and will give a false picture.
To get the correct chronology, I consider the date 
of COSSEA 31k should be checked. My recollection 
is that it was not received till later; I may be wrong.
General GRACE! was fully in this picture before he 
left RANGOON and had already taken action...
In fact, this information came from the Allied 
Commander I [Gracey].
This date is most misleading. After the Japanese 
surrender on August 12th, the Annamite government 
in COCHIN-CHINA took complete charge, having 
already, under Japanese sponsorship, been 
functioning some months before. Shortly after 
the coup d*£tat in March, Annamite troops and 
police were in possession of the barracks and 
police stations, jails, etc. and were guarding 
certain key points by the middle of August...
Comments, lines 11-1k. There was never any 
question at the time of the publication of the 
proclamation, as far as 20th Division was 
concerned, that the whole of it was not to be 
sent to F.I.C.
Last sub-oara. There was never any intention 
in the mind of the Allied commander to interfere 
in the internal affairs of a foreign country.
The proclamation followed by the eviction of the 
puppet government saved a massacreI
General. In the story of the Indonesian affair, 
the Recorder has stated that strong action at 
the start would undoubtedly have saved many 
casualties later. Why not apply this to F.I.G., 
and state categorically that the strong action 
taken by the Allied commander, his staff and 
troops did that, and more.
Para. 131. lines 6 - 9 .
Unnecessary. There was never any doubt in 
General GRACE!*s mind nor in that of his 
troops that we were then in a preventative 
role. Why imply otherwise?
Para. 132.
This meeting [with the Viet Minh] had already 
been arranged before we came to SINGAPORE.
Negotiations to arrange this meeting started 
two days after the coup d f£tat, i.e. on 
September 25th." 26
In a number of places Gracey posed this question:
"Why the "I"?* Why not the Allied commander** who did it!" ^
It should be clear by now that Mountbatten * s "colossal" staff 
(in the words of the British Chiefs) was guilty at best of poor staff 
work in their recording for posterity the history of the events in 
which SEAC was involved. Gracey had no known wish to be remembered 
in history, and his objections were not to occasional errors but 
to what appeared to him to be a deliberately and grossly distorted 
record of what really had happened in his sphere of operations.
He also took full and public responsibility for what he knew would be 
controversial decisions, such as that which brought about the coup, 
but at all times he was guided by what he considered best for the 
common good, regardless of personal risk to himself. As Brigadier 
Woodford has pointed out, this characteristic had kept him as a 
Major General when it was considered that he had the capacity for 
higher rank and greater responsibilities. [Indeed, when Gracey finally 
left Mountbatten*s command he rose to four star rank].
While a senior commander in India just prior to independence,
Gracey fully supported and amplified the remarks by Lieutenant General
Sir Arthur Smith of the General Staff:
"As professional soldiers and as British 
officers who have helped, whether old or 
young, to make the Indian Army one of the
* Mount bat ten ** Gracey
best Armies in the World, we all have 
a responsibility to that Army and to 
the men in it which we must not fail to 
carry out. We all want to see the Indian 
Army remain efficient, contented and 
reliable as it is today. If this is to
be achieved, it is essential that it should
have the best officers it is possible to 
get. The quality of an Army is the quality 
of its officers.
It has been decreed, and in my opinion 
inevitably decreed, that we - the British 
officers - are to go. Before we go, it is 
our bounden duty to do all we can to ensure 
the continued well-being and efficiency of 
our men and of the Army we have loved so 
well and served so long." 28
Gracey became the first Commander in Chief of the Army of
the new nation of Pakistan —  hardly a fit post for a known colonial
bigot, since he was particularly asked for. Pakistan named her first 
military hospital after him. In 1951» just prior to his retirement, 
he received a flood of letters from his former soldiers. For example, 
Jemedar Imdad Hussain Hashmi wrote:
"You are going much against the wishes of 
thousands of soldiers whom you so dearly 
loved and patronized like your own kith 
and kin. Millions of Pakistanis, though 
not in uniform, have seen you working more 
than a Pakistani in the true patriotic 
spirit - they too are unhappy on hearing 
that you are departing very soon. And 
last but not least your humble servant,
Hashmi, is perhaps most unhappy on hearing 
this bad news. Whenever I read in the 
news paper about your "fare-well" tours 
to various Units these days, my heart 
begin to sink - I do not know why.
From the hearts of my heart I reveal this 
once again that I will miss you most. From 
the past many years I have been a source of 
trouble to you - in 19M>» just before the 
disbandment of our "Happy Family", I was 
caught up as a law breaker by writing a 
letter to Pandit Nehru and you saved me - 
then ever since the inception of Pakistan 
I came to you frequently, at one occasion 
for a Commission, at other for a house and 
for financial help. I hope most sincerely 
that you will forgive me for all that I have 
been doing in the past.
I am ashamed my financial position is still
not encouraging and I may not be able to
return the amount borrowed from you but I 
assure you, Sir, that I will certainly do so 
as and when my hands are free - no matter 
where you may be at that time.
I am not discouraged to find out that I could 
not get a Commission - perhaps I do not deserve 
one. All I wanted was to get rid of this 
clerical job - but it appears to be that it 
will continue to stick to me till I die. I 
wanted to be a soldier in real sense - to 
prove my worth in the battlefield but I feel 
I am destined to finish off in heaps of paper 
around me. I am sorry I prolonged this un­
pleasant subject which is unsuitable to the 
occasion.
My last two desires are
(a) Please allow me to serve you with a
cup of tea at my place at any 
convenient time and date
and
(b) A photograph where I may have the 
honour to stand by your side." 29
On retirement Gracey became Chairman of the Royal Hospital and 
Home for Incurables in Putney. Although on strict doctor*s orders to 
curtail his activities because of heart trouble, he always made a 
weekly visit to the Hospital, where he was immensely popular with the 
staff and the patients alike. He never publicized his own direct 
involvement in history, and members of the staff in later years were 
astonished that such a kindly gentleman had grappled with such momentous 
challenges. He died in 19^U» while on his feet at home, when his 
heart suddenly failed. After his death Pakistan commissioned the 
Gracey Memorial Pavilion at the Hospital.
In an earlier publication the author wrote the following:
"The rain clouds which had sprinkled Saigon 
were soon to burst open and unleash torrents' 
throughout all Indochina. The last Englishman 
and Indian to sail away would eventually be 
joined by a last Frenchman, a last Australian, 
a last Korean, a last Thai, a last Filipino,
New Zealander and a last American. Who would 
next be the last out of Vietnam?"
As often happens in life, the answer to this question turned out 
to be the unexpected: the last out of Vietnam were the common 
Vietnamese themselves, in numbers vastly exceeding those of their 
former colonizers and occupiers —  and they are still leaving.
In Saigon* s last years, few South Vietnamese knew of General 
Gracey and how he influenced their history. That was a pity —  both 
deserved better.
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APPENDIX A.
Franco-Japanese Protocol Concerning 
Joint Defence of Indo-China 
July 29, 19k1.
The Imperial Japanese Government and the French Government
Taking into consideration the present international situations
Recognizing that in consequence, in case the security of French Indo­
china is menaced, Japan will have reason to consider that the general 
tranquility in East Asia and her own security are in danger:
Renewing on this occasion the engagements taken, on the one hand 
by Japan to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia 
and especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the 
sovereign rights of France in all parts of the Indo-Chinese Union, and 
on the other hand by France not to conclude in respect to Indo-China 
any agreement or understanding with a third power anticipating poli­
tical, economic and military cooperation of a nature opposing Japan 
directly or indirectly:
Have concluded the following arrangements:
(1) The two governments promise to cooperate militarily for the 
joint defence of French Indo-China.
(2) The measures to be taken for the purpose of this cooperation 
shall be the object of special arrangements.
(3 ) The above arrangements shall remain effective only as long 
as the circumstances which constituted the motive for their 
adotpion exist.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their 
respective Governments, have signed this Protocol which shall be 
enforced from this day, and have affixed their seals.
Drawn up in duplicate, in the Japanese and French languages, at 
Vichy, 29 July, 19M, corresponding to the 29th day of the seventh 
month of the 16th year of Showa.
Kato Sotomatsu (seal)
F.Darlan (seal)
Signed at Vichy on July 29, 19M » the 16th year of Showa; put into 
effect on the same day of the same year; promulgated (in the August 
2nd issue of the Gazette) on August 1, 1 9 M , the 16th year of Showa.
APPENDIX B.
The President of the United States of America, authorized 
by Executive Order July 6, 19k6» has awarded the Medal of 
Freedom to
MAJOR MARCEL MINGANT, FRENCH ARMY 
for meritorious, service:
Major Mingant, French Army, performed meritorious service 
as a member of an Intelligence Net operating in the China 
Theater from January 19k2 to March 19k5* He remained loyal 
to the Allies throughout the war and helped organize and direct 
a net of agents that covered all of Northern Indo-China. His 
organization rescued several American aviators who were shot 
down behind enemy lines. Major Mingant,s extremely valuable 
assistance to the Allied cause made an important contribution 
to final victory.
[SEAL]
APPENDIX C.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES OCCUHED TO THE JAPANESE 
FORCES IN INDOCHINA (38th ARMY).
1) Following the transfer of the Japanese South Area 
Command from Saigon to Singapore in December 19k2, the 38th 
Army was formed and installed its headquarters in Saigon, for 
the defence of Indochina, according to the Japanese-French 
protocol signed in August 19k1» and was put under the command 
of the South Area Command.
The main disposition of .troops at that time was as follows:
South Indochina Area —  82nd Infantry Regiment of
the 21st Division (Saigon)
North Indochina Area —  Main forces of the 21st
Division (Hanoi)
2) Later, with the developments of general situation in 
the Southern area, the 3kth Independent Mixed Brigade (formed in 
Japan proper) was stationed in Tourane district in March 19kk» and 
in December 19kk the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade (formed by 
surplus troops in Indochina) was quartered in Saigon district, thus 
enforcing the Japanese-French defence power in Indochina, and increasing 
the total reserve troops of the South Area Command.
3) In December 20th, 19kk» the troops stationed in Indo-china 
were reformed under the 38 th Army Command, which gave to the 38th 
Army the character of an operation army.
The main disposition of troops at that time was as follows:
North Area —  Main Force of the 21st Division
Central Area —  The 3kth Brigade
South Area —  Part of the 21st Division & 
the 70th Brigade
U) In February 19k5» the navy units which were stationed in the 
operation zone of the 38th Army, were put under the command of the Army 
Command so far as ground defence was concerned. The main navy units 
thus put under the army command were, the 11th Navy Base Unit,
5) Since December 19U3 > the 38^  Army under the above-mentioned 
formation, took the responsibility for the common defence of Indochina, 
based upon the Japanese-French Protocol, though once engaged in minor 
operations in the north frontier districts.
6) Judgement of the general war situation in January 19k5*
As the U.S. Army main forces attacked Luzon in the beginning
of January, the next points of disembarkation were judged to be 
either South China (including Hainan island, and Lei-Chou peninsula), 
Central China, or Okinawa. The 38th Army prepared the necessary 
counter plans, forcasting a landing in North Indochina, in case of an 
attack to South China.
7) According to the scheme of the South Area Command aiming 
to divert the U.N. main forces1 movement from going to Japan proper, 
and to turn it southward, the 38th Army was obliged to concentrate 
its main forces in North Indo-china.
8) According to the forcast and scheme as stated above, the 
troops were concentrated as follows:
a) The 37th Division was transfered in the middle of 
February from South China (11th Army) to North Indochina.
b) The 22nd Division was transfered in the beginning of 
March from South China (23rd Army) to North Indochina frontier 
districts.
c) The 2nd Division was transfered gradually from March 
to June from Burma to Saigon District.
9) The incident of March 9th (details apart).
Troops used in March 9th incident were as follows:
North Area - 21st, 22nd, 37th Divisions 
Central Area - 3kth Brigade .
South Area - 70th Brigade & part of kth
Division (T), 1 regiment of 20th 
Division
10) Transfer of Army Headquarters to Hanoi.
The 38th Army Headquarters advanced its commanding-post 
from Saigon to Hanoi in May 19k5» to facilitate the command of troops 
concentrated in North Indochina.
11) Forcast of war situation in May 19k5»
With the landing of the U.S. Army main forces on Okinawa, 
the possibility of an attack to South China or to Indochina much 
diminished, the chief enemy of the South Area Command shifted from 
U.S. Army to the British Army, and the strategic object was judged 
to be Singapore.
12) With the above judgement, the troops stationed in Indochina 
were transfered in the following way, according to the orders of the 
South Area Command:
a) The 70th Brigade from Saigon district to the central 
Malay, in the middle of May
b) The 37th Division to Bangkok district in the middle 
of May, to be used either in Burma front or in Malayan zone
c) The 22nd Division, since the end of May, to North Eastern
Siam
13) Main operations executed by the 38th Army 
Co-operation with the China Area Command in the operations
jointing Central and South China (under seperate cover).
1U) Situation at the time of surrender
Following the rapid development of war situation in Burma, 
the South Area Command established plans to make French Indochina and 
Malay the defence centre of southern area. Accordingly the 38th Army
was planning to enforce the defence of Hanoi and Saigon districts in
the following manner, when the war ended:
a) Formation of defence units of Hanoi and Saigon
b) Strengthening of the organisation of the 3ktb Brigade
c) Strengthening of the organisation and equipment of
the 2nd Division
d) Reconstruction of the 55th Division./...
APPENDIX D.
PART III : MARCH 9TH INCIDENT
1. The movement of the main force of the Division was completed at the 
beginning of March and then Army Orders were issued to the effect that 
the Division, as the Western Defending Troops, was to defend Laos and 
Cambodia Districts south of Kemmarat in co-operation with the French 
Forces.
The outline of the disposition of our troops at the time was as 
follows:
THE DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS : PHNOM PENH.
Approximately one infantry battalion strength under the command 
of the Commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment:
Laos south of Kemmarat and Cambodia east of the River Mekong.
Approximately two squadrons and a company strength under the command 
of the Commander of the 2nd Reconnaissance Regiment.
Cambodia west of the River Mekong and north of Tomle Sap.
Approximately two company strength under the command of the 
Commander of the 2nd Battalion, the 29th Infantry Regiment.
Cambodia north of Phnom Penh and south of Tomle Sap.
Approximately one battalion strength under the command of the 
Commander of the k28th Independent Battalion.
Phnom Penh and its vicinity and Cambodia south of Phnom Penh.
2. At 2200 hours on March 9th the Order of Disarmament was issued and 
our units in each area disarmed the F.I.C. Forces and also garrisons 
(HOAN TAl) which resisted us.
The Division henceforth urged the F.I.C. Forces which fled to 
return and on the other hand made its best effort to make it fully 
understood by the general public that the Japanese Army had no other 
intention than the disarmament of the F.I.C..Forces and thus tried 
to establish law and order.
PART IV : THE DEFENCE OF SOUTHERN F.I.C.
1. At the end of April the Orders were issued by 4-he 38th Army to +he 
effect that, the Division,as the Southern Defending Troops, should defend 
Annam, Cochin-China and Cambodia south of the line which connects Kana 
with the point where the said three districts meet together.
The outline of the disposition of our forces at the time was 
as follows:
The Headquarters of the 2nd Division.
The 1st Battalion, the 29th Infantry Regiment.
The Headquarters of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment. 
The Signal Unit, the 2nd Division.
The Headquarters of the 29th Infantry Regiment.
The 3rd Battalion, the 29th Infantry Regiment.
The 2nd Battalion, the 29th Infantry Regiment.
The 2nd Reconnaissance Regiment.
The 2nd Artillery Brigade, the 2nd Field Artillery
Regiment.
The Main Body of the 2nd Engineer Regiment.
The Main Body of the 2nd Commissariat Regiment.
The Ordnance Unit, the 2nd Division.
The Sanitary Unit, the 2nd Division.
The 1st Field Hospital, the 2nd Division.
The kth Field Hospital, the 2nd Division.
The Sick Horse Depot, the 2nd Division & the Anti- 
Infectious Disease & Water Supply Unit.
SAIGON
do
do
do
BIEN HOA 
PHANTHIET 
PHNOM PENH 
KOMPONG CHAM
PUSAR UDONG 
do 
TAININH 
PHNOM PENH 
KANTHO 
KRATIE 
BIEN HOA
PUSAR UDONG
In June the Order pertaining to the reorganisation of the Division 
was issued.
With our reinforcements arriving and our strength left in Burma and 
Java returning successively in and after July, the reorganisation was 
started in accordance with the Divisional Order issued on August 5th 
and was expected to be completed at the. end of August but it was given 
up halfway because of the surrender of Japan.
(B) OUR APPRECIATION OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE ALLIED FORCES.
1. THE DEFENCE OF BASSEIN AREA:
(1) The Allied Forces will carry out landing employing the main
body near Pagoda Point on the one hand and a portion near Sandway,
Gwa, and Baumi on the other hand, while they will send down a
powerful parachutist unit in the vicinity of Bassein.
(2) Allied units of small strength will successively penetrate 
making use of the streams in the Delta Area and at the same time 
will plan to go up the Bassein River.
2. THE DEFENCE OF NAUNKAUN AND ITS VICINITY:
(1) As soon as the monsoon season is over the Allied Forces will 
advance in the vicinity of Bhamo from the direction of Myitkyina 
while a powerful paratroop will descend on the Naunkaun Plain.
(2) It will be probable that a powerful portion of the Allied 
Forces in the vicinity of Lungling will try to advance in the 
area east of Bhamo.
3- FIGHTING NEAR DUNGLING.
(1) The Allied Forces will try to advance in the direction of 
Lungling defeating our forces in Lameng in detail. They will at 
least make their best effort in securing firmly the key positions 
east of Lungling.
(2) Once our troops were forced to take the defensive structure 
the Allied will try to penetrate into the Naunkaun Plain from every 
direction.
k. THE DEFENCE OF MUSE AND ITS VICINITY:
The Allied Forces will advance in the vicinity of Nankingli, 
seize Wanching and its environs, thus threatening our right near 
flank, and at the same time send down a powerful air-borne troop 
in the Naunkaun Plain and then attack us in co-operation with the 
superior Air Force.
5. THE DEFENCE OF SOUTHERN F.I.C.:
It was our appreciation that the Allied Forces would carry out 
landing at Phanthiet and Capt.St.Jacques.
(C): THE OUTLINE OF OUR ORGANISATION.
THE DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.
Infantry Regiment (3)- Battalion (3)- Company (3)- Platoon(3);Section(k)(One
L.M.G. in each Section)
: :M.G.Company(l)-Platoon(k);Section(2) (One
M.G. in each Section)
: :Battalion Gun Platoon(1)(Two 70m.m. guns)
:Regimental Gun Company(l) Platoon(2);Section(2) (2 75m.m
Guns in each Section)
:Quick Firing Gun Company(l)-Platoon(2)- (2 37 m.m. guns
in each Platoon)
:Signal Company (1)
RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT (1) Headquarters 
Riding Company(2) Platoon(3) : Squad (k).
Quick Firing Gun Squad (1) : 
(one 37m.m. Gun).
:Armoured Car Company (2) :Platoon (2) (3 Armoured 
cars in a Platoon)•
ARTILLERY REGIMENT (1) :Headquarters
ENGINEER REGIMENT (1)
:1st Brigade : Battery(3) : Art.Section (2) : Gun
Section (2) (One 75m.m. gun in each Gun Section)
: Wagon Line.
2nd & 3rd Brigade: Equal to 1st Brigade but one 
• 10 c.m. howitzer in each Gun Section).
Headquarters
Company (3) : Platoon (k) : Squad (k)
Engineer Material Platoon (1)
COMMISSARIAT REGIMENT (1) : Headquarters
: Company (2) : Platoon (3) (Total number of
vehicles: kO)
SANITARY UNIT (1) : Headquarters
: Company (3) ' Platoon (3) : Squad (3)
Field Hospital (3):
  REMARKS .
1. The Strength of the Division: Approximately lk,000
2. The number of vehicles: Approximately kOO.
3- In place of some vehicles in the War Establishment approximately 
1,200 craft or pack horses are used.
k. The plan of our reorganisation at the beginning of August, 19k5 was 
as follows:
(a) The Infantry Regiment will be composed of three Battalions 
besides one Company under direct control. A Battalion will
be composed of four Companys besides one Battalion Gun Company.
(b) The Reconnaissance Regiment will be composed of one Riding 
Company, one Light Tank Company, One Battery, and one Infantry 
Battalion (3 companys).
(c) An Infantry Battalion under direct control of the Division will 
be organized. (This Battalion will be composed of three Companys 
Besides this, the organisation of the Battalion in the Infantry 
Regiment will apply correspondingly to this Battalion).
(d) The Artillery Regiment will be composed of four Brigades.
(e) The Commissariat Regiment will be composed of two Motor-Car 
Companys and one Draft Horse Company.
(f) The strength of the Division will be approximately 16,000.
APPENDIX E.
THE DISPOSITION OF FRENCH INDOCHINA.
1) The purposes of the disposition of French Indochina.
The attitudes of the French authorities towards the Japanese- 
French common defence of Indochina were rapidly lacking sincerity in 
accordance with the general war situation, especially with the American 
progress in the Phillipines. In spite of the repeated expostulations 
of the Japanese authorities, the French at last came to prevent the 
Japanese war preparations in Indochina in every sphere, and it became 
evident that, if the Japanese left the situation at that, they would 
find themselves in quite a difficult position, between the devil and 
the deep sea, in case of the landing of American forces. Thus the 
disposition of French Indochina was attempted to awake the sincerity 
of the French authorities and to make them contribute to the full 
extent to the Japanese war preparations.
2) The general policies of the disposition.
The Japanese Government, in order to apply to the changed 
situation, decided, at the Supreme War Guiding Conference in February 
19^5, the following policies concerning French Indochina:
Japanese authorities, taking into account the general situation, 
especially the American progress towards Indochina regions, and in 
order to accomplish the defense of Indochina, will demand that the 
Governor General of French Indochina should consent to the following 
propositions, as a concrete token of the determination to defend the 
Indochina territory against the eventual American operations towards 
it, in collaboration with the Japanese, according to the fundamental 
spirit of Japanese-French common defense of Indochina (See the appendices; 
No.1. - Protocol concerning Japanese-French Common Defense of Indochina; 
No.2. - Local Treaties based upon the Preceding).
a) As long as the present circumstances last, the French 
troops and armed police will be put under the Japanese command and will 
act solely according to its directives as for the organisation, 
disposition and movement, of the troops, arms and ammunitions, and 
materials.
b) The organisations particularly necessary for the war
conduct, such as railways, sea transportations, and communication, will
be put under the Japanese control.
c) The Governor General will immediately give instructions
to all the organisations in French Indochina to collaborate fully and 
faithfully with the Japanese upon their demands.
(The above three items were in fact presented officially in the 
demand which Ambassador MATSUMOTO made to Governer General•DECOUX on 
March 9»)
In case if the Governer General accepts fully the Japanese 
demands, the Japanese will not go beyond the reorganisation of the 
French troops and armed police. If not, the Japanese will be obliged 
to appeal to arms and resort to military control. In that case, the 
following principles will be adopted:
a) Even if the French rejects the Japanese demands, the relations 
between the two countries will not be considered as being at war.
However, Japan will not be bound by the existing treaties 
concerning French Indochina.
b) Japan will not admit the execution of functions to the Governer 
General and his leading staff of the Government, but their personal 
treatment will be as moderate as possible.
c) The lower organisations of the government will not be touched 
and will be utilized as they are.
d) The French troops and armed police will be disarmed and 
reorganized. Those who resist at the disarmament, however, will be 
treated as prisoners.
e) The French civilians and their properties will not be treated 
as of enemy nation, but will be treated as moderately as possible.
However, in case of military necessity, the Japanese may procede to the 
control of private properties and the restriction of habitation and 
movement.
3) The development of the disposition.
On March 9, 19^5, at 1900 (Japanese time), Ambassador MATSUMOTO 
visited Governer General DECOUX at his official residence in Saigon, 
according to the instructions of the metropolis. They talked about the 
general war situation, and after the various discussions, the Governer 
General admitted the possibility of American forces' landing in Indochina. 
Hence, the Ambassador requested him- in qulity of Governer General
invested with full powers to manifest his sincerity towards Japan 
in strengthening Japanese-French common defense in the present 
circumstances. He explained the above-mentioned conditions which 
the Japanese Government had instructed him to propose to the Governer 
General, and asked to give reply by 2200. He took leave after having 
warned that the Japanese army would be obliged to take necessary 
measures if the reply was not favourable.
About 2220, Captain ROBIN brought the reply of the Governer 
General to the Ambassador, which was found qualified and which the 
Japanese authorities could not help considering as rejection.
On this, the Commanding General of the 38th Army found himself 
under the necessity of taking decision to appeal to arms, according to 
the instructions which had been given him by the General Headquarters, 
and ordered all his forces immediately to disarm the French troops and 
armed police.
b) The Japanese forces succeeded in disarming the main forces 
in a few days, though they met some resistance in Hanoi, Saigon, 
Phnom-Penh and Nhatrang. However, the Japanese paid considerable 
sacrifice in disarming the French troops which resisted in the strong 
fortresses in the north frontier regions, such as Lanson, Dong Dang, 
and Moncay.
Then the Japanese army proceeded to suppress French detachments 
stationed in the remote countries and wipe out French contingents who 
had escaped into mountains, while endeavouring to reestablish the 
public order and to revive the administration. In about one month's 
time, public order was gradually reestablished, except in the remote 
corners, public feelings were reassured, and various organisations 
generally recovered their former activities.
It took a considerable time to clear the mountain range of 
Annam, Chinese frontiers, raountaineous regions of Laos of the remnants 
of French troops and it v/as May 15 that the Japanese army finished its 
armed operations.
Meanwhile, the activities of Viet-Nam Party in the Northern 
Indochina became more and more vigorous, and especially its disturbances 
of public security, aiming to dispel Japanese forces in order to 
accomplish the full independence of their people, grew rife. The 
Japanese army was compelled to continue to employ a considerable
strength in painstaking work of sweeping Viet-Minh partisans, until 
the cessation of hostilities of August 15-
c) The French troops disarmed were divided into the Frenchmen 
group and the native group; the former was concentrated and interned 
chiefly in Saigon and Hanoi, and as for the latter, a part of it was 
adopted in the Japanese army as auxiliaries, and the rest was planned 
to be reorganized into the volantaries and the national armies, but 
that plan was not achieved, though preparations were being made.
d) As armed police was indispensable for the maintenance of public 
order, the Japanese army re-armed the minimum native policemen, excluding 
French ones, and distributed them to each province. But the total 
numerical strength of them was below the half of the former one.
e) As for French civilians, the Japanese army, both on military 
necessity and for safeguard's sake, restricted their residence in Hanoi, 
Haiphong, Hue, Nhatrang, Saigon, Phnom-Penh and Dalat.
f) Governer General DECOUX and other leading figures, military 
and civil, were made to live with their families in safe places and 
the Japanese army paid special attention to their well-treatment.
g) Administration organisations were left intact, and though a
small number of Japanese officials took charge of some important positions, 
almost all officials, both French and Annamite, were permitted to remain 
at their posts. Thus the Japanese army arranged to reestablish public 
order as soon as possible, preventing social uneasiness and disorders 
and to make all Indochina cooperate with the Japanese in war preparations.
h) As a logical result of Japan's disposition of French Indochina, 
Annam and two other nations proclaimed their independence for themselves 
and were realizing their independences substantially. The Japanese army 
took the attitude not to interfere in the internal affaires and left 
them free to do what they wanted. Meanwhile the Japanese army kept 
their actions always under eye lest they should be off the rails, ridden 
by a mistaken idea of independence and race-consciousness, and always 
paid minute attention not to make them repeat the same incooperative 
attitudes as the French regime.
i) The progress of battle at the moment of the disposition of 
French Indochina is shown in the appended plan No.1.
k) The conclusion.
Japan's disposition of French Indochina was really inevitable 
step as the result of the fact that, facing eventual American invasion, 
the French authorities could not be hoped to correct their unfriendly
attitudes and to cooperate with the Japanese in rapid war preparations 
and to facilitate the operations. It was not that Japan regarded the 
French as enemies, or attempted to occupy the Indochina territory, or 
tried to set the Annamite on the French.
Moreover, the.disposition of French Indochina was based 
upon the directives of Tokyo, and was not an arbitrary decision of 
local Japanese array. All the Japanese troops, militaries, officials, 
civilians, however humble their posts might have been, always acted 
solely by orders of superior commanders, and fulfilled their 
responsibilities most faithfully according to each given duty./.
APPENDIX F,
COPY
TO: The Supreme Commander,
Japanese Expeditionary Forces, 
Southern Regions.
DETAILED ORDERS 
FOR THE EVACUATION OF CERTAIN AREAS REQUIRED IN PURSUANCE 
OF THE LOCAL AGREEMENT SIGNED AT RANGOON ON 27TH AUGUST 
19kg REGARDING PRELIMINARY ACTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY 
THE JAPANESE FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OR CONTROL OF THE 
SUPREME COMMANDER JAPANESE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SOUTHERN 
REGIONS PRIOR TO ANY FORMAL SURRENDERS THAT MAY BE MADE. ■
1. In pursuance of the Local Agreement signed at RANGOON 
on 27th August 19^5 regarding preliminary actions to be 
carried out by the Japanese Forces under the command or 
control of.the SUPREME COMMANDER, JAPANESE EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES, SOUTHERN REGIONS prior to any formal surrenders 
that may be made (hereinafter referred to as the "Local 
Agreement"), the following immediate orders are now 
issued by the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED LAND FORCES, 
SOUTH EAST ASIA in the name of the SUPREME ALLIED 
COMMANDER, SOUTH EAST ASIA.
2. These orders are issued in addition to orders set out in 
Appendices A and B to the "Local Agreement".
CLEARANCE OF AREAS
3- Certain areas, within JAPANESE occupied or controlled
territories, are required to be evacuated of all JAPANESE 
personnel, less those essential for the maintenance of 
LAW AND ORDER and of ESSENTIAL SERVICES;all areas are 
shown clearly on the attached maps, of which two copies 
are supplied for each area.
Areas to be evacuated in whole or in part are:-
MOULMEIN SINGAPORE *
PHUKET KUANTAN
PENANG KHOTA BHARU
PORT 3WETTENHAM BANGKOK
MALACCA SAIGON
k. Areas will be evacuated forthwith and personnel will then 
be concentrated outside these areas and will NOT re-enter 
them.
5. The following additional instructions apply to areas evacuated
(a) All CIVIL POLICE will remain in these areas, and 
under JAPANESE control will help to enforce Law 
and Order, the Safety of Property, and the 
Prevention of Looting.
(b) Any Allied Prisoner of War or Internee Camp, situated 
within an area to be evacuated, will remain the 
responsibility of the JAPANESE COMMANDER, who will 
ensure the Safety and Well Being of all occupants.
(c) All local Military Motor Transport will be concentrated 
within areas to be evacuated; such Transport will have 
their drivers available and their tanks filled with 
petrol and oil.
(d) Local sources of Labour will not be dispersed from
docks or airfields; the necessary information of all
sources of local supply of labour will be made available 
for the COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED FORCES immediately on 
landing.
6. The following information will immediately be required by
the COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED FORCES on landing:-
(a) The local ORDER OF BATTLE of all JAPANESE AND 
JAPANESE CONTROLLED forces, with their locations: 
marked maps of such locations.
(b) A DIRECTORY of local COMMANDERS of the rank of MAJOR 
GENERAL and above.
(c) The Details of any Lawlessness which may exist locally.
(d) The LOCATIONS of dumps of:
Arms
Ammunition 
Equipment 
Vehicles 
Warlike Stores
Supplies, both Military and Civil 
Petrol, Oil and Lubricants
(e) The LOCATIONS of:
Airfields
Aircraft and Equipment 
Radar Equipment
(f) The LOCATIONS of:
Fortifications 
Fixed Defences 
Booby Traps
Minefields and Dangerous Areas
(g) DETAILS of SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, including LOCATIONS 
of TRANSMITTERS etc., and DETAILS of CODES, CYPHERS,
RECORDS etc.
(h) DETAILS of:
Medical Equipment available
State of local health (military and civil)
The presence of infectious disease or epidemics.
(i) The NAMES of all LOCAL INTERPRETERS.
(k) Marked maps showing the state of local road and rail 
communications and locations of centres of essential 
services.
7. In addition to the information required in para 6 above, 
details of Allied Prisoners of War or Internee Camps will be 
required by the COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED FORCES; the details 
required are as already set down in Appendix UA1! to the 
Local Agreement.
8. The evacuation of the areas described in para 3 and the 
execution of the INSTRUCTIONS in this ORDER, will be put into 
effect forthwith.
PROVISION OF STAFF OFFICERS
9* HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN ARMY will supply each evacuated area 
with an accredited representative, who will ensure the smooth 
working and proper execution of these Orders and any others 
issued by the COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED FORCES. The accredited 
representative will be a Staff Officer of sufficient Seniority 
to issue to the local JAPANESE COMMANDER all necessary executive 
orders; he will be supplied with an interpreter by HEADQUARTERS, 
SOUTHERN ARMY.
10. These Staff Officers will be flown to the areas concerned at 
once and prepare the necessary detailed Information against the 
arrival of the ALLIED FORCES. The details of each flight will 
be sent by wireless to the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTH 
EAST ASIA, giving type of aircraft, markings, route, timings.
HEADQUARTERS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER SOUTH EAST ASIA CONTROL
COMMISSION TO THE JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN REGIONS: SAIGON/DALET
11. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER will send a CONTROL COMMISSION to 
HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN REGIONS at SAIGON/DALET.
12. The object of this COMMISSION will be to ensure that orders for 
surrender are smoothly carried out, and properly controlled, 
and to provide a channel for the transmission of orders.
13* HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN REGIONS will now make all arrangements 
for accommodation and the provision of guides and transport.
1^. The COMMISSION will move into SAIGON at a time to be notified 
later after the signing of the INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER in TOKYO; 
all arrangements for its reception will therefore be made 
immediately; warning of its arrival will be given later.
15- The COMISSION will travel to SAIGON by air; the aerodrome will 
therefore be made immediately ready to receive DAKOTA aircraft.
16. The composition of the COMMISSION will be as given below; 
appropriate and self-contained accommodation will be handed 
over to house and provide office accommodation for the 
COMMISSION.
THE COMMISSION
A First Party; to arrive from 2 September onwards.
Senior Officers 15
Other Officers 120
Other Hanks 250
® Second Party; to arrive later
Officers 100
Other Hanks 600
17. The transport required for the COMMISSION will be supplied by 
HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN REGIONS and will meet the aircraft of the 
COMMISSION as they arrive. The following transport will be set 
aside for use by the COMMISSIQN:-
Load Communication
Carriers Vehicles
For Party A 25 20
For Party B 50 10
TOTAL 55 30
18. On. arrival of the COMMISSION the following action will be taken:-
(a) JAPANESE personnel manning Radio Stations will be kept to 
a minimum and will be segregated.
(b) JAPANESE Communications by telephone and other means of 
communication will be limited to those essential for 
carrying out the orders of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
SOUTH EAST ASIA. All such Communications will be 
conducted in clear.
(c) All JAPANESE Cyphers and Codes will be handed over to 
the COMMISSION in arrival.
19- Any other details, including time of arrival and information other 
than that contained herein, will be sent, by wireless, to 
HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN REGIONS - SAIGON/DALET.
20. On arrival at SAIGON, details required by Appendix nAlt or “B", to 
the Local Agreement, or by these orders, will be made available 
for the GENERAL OFFICER, COMMANDING THE COMMISSION.
(3d) M.S.K. MAUNSELL, 
Brigadier, 
for Commander in Chief, 
ALLIED LAND FORCES, 
SOUTH EAST ASIA.
In the name of
The Supreme Allied Commander, 
SOUTH EAST ASIA.
C O P Y
SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
TO: Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Land Forces, 
South East Asia.
1. The Supreme Commander, Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern 
Regions, hereby acknowledges receipt of detailed orders dated 
27th August 19^5 for the evacuation of certain areas required in 
pursuance of the local agreement regarding preliminary actions to 
be carried out by the Japanese Forces under the command or 
control of the Supreme Commander, Japanese Expeditionary Forces, 
Southern Regions, prior to any formal surrender that may be made. 
He understands that he will be informed by wireless signal from 
the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia immediately the 
Instrument of General Surrender has been signed in Tokyo.
2. Immediately on receipt of this wireless signal the Supreme 
Commander, Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Regions, 
hereby undertakes immediately to send a signal by wireless to 
the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia to inform him that 
all orders and instructions contained in the detailed orders 
referred to in para 1 above have been carried out effectively and 
completely.
(Sgd)
for Supreme Commander, 
RANGOON, Japanese Expeditionary Forces,
27 August 19^ +5* Southern Regions.
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APPENDIX G.
TOP SECRET 
28 Aug 45
ALLIED LAUD FORCES SOUTH EAST ASIA OPERATIONAL 
DIRECTIVE NO 12
Operation MASTERDQM
TO:- Maj Gen D.B* GRACEY, CB,CBE,MC,
GOC, 20 INDIAN DIVISION.
COMMAND
1. You are appointed Commander Allied Land Forces for the 
occupation of French Indo China, South of Latitude 16 degrees 
NORTH.
2. You will command all French forces in your area until 
it is decided by Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces,
South East Asia that the French can set up an independent 
command.
3. Prior to your division leaving BURMA you will remain
under command of the General Officer Commanding in Chief,
Twelfth Army, who will be responsible for mounting Operation 
MASTERDOM. On arrival in French Indo China you will come 
directly under command Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, 
South East Asia.
Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Control Commission.
You are also appointed Head of the Control Commission (Army)
for French Indo China and in this capacity you will be responsible 
direct to the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia. You will 
receive his directive separately.
TASKS
5. As Allied Land Force Commander you will carry out the
following tasks
(a) Secure the SAIGON area, including Headquarters,
Japanese Southern Army.
(b) Disarm and concentrate all Japanese forces in 
accordance with the policy laid down in this 
Headquarters letters 10028/G(0)1 dated 19 and 
28 Aug 45.
(c) Maintain law and order and ensure internal 
security.
* sio.
(d) Protect, succour and subsequently evacuate Allied 
prisoners of war and civilian internees.
(e) Liberate Allied territory in so far as your 
resources permit.
You will give such directions to the French Indo China 
Government as are required to effect these tasks. In these 
matters you will consult the senior French Land Forces Commander.
CLANDESTINE FORCES
6. Control of all clandestine forces will be exercised 
by the Allied Land Force Commander. A P Division staff 
officer will be provided for this purpose.
At Appendix ,TAn is the policy you will adopt in dealing 
with clandestine forces.
CONDUCT OF OPERATION
7. There is every indication that the senior Japanese 
commanders intend to comply with the terms of surrender.
There remains, however, the possibility that dissident 
units or individuals may create incidents.
8. All troops will, therefore, be warned that this is 
not an operation of peace, that resistance may be met and 
that therefore the initial landings will be made tactically.
OUTLINE PLAN
9* The following is the broad outline plan for Operation
MASTERDQM. Timings are in relation to Z Day, being the day 
forces are landed at SINGAPORE:-
Date Formation Moving Planned air lift
available for 
army personnel
Z + 1 Fly in of the Control Commission,
escort and press to main airfield 900
at SAIGON.
Fly in one bde gp of 20 Ind Div
and part of 9th Colonial Regiment 9,840
to SAIGON.
Remaining personnel and vehicles 
of 20 Ind Div leave RANGOON by sea.
Remaining personnel and vehicles 
20 Ind Div arrive SAIGON.
The air lifts are based on the following planning figures
(i) Average overall weight of a man and his kit - 229 lbs.
(allowances for personal kit are:
Officers - 69 lbs,
BORs - 90 lbs,
IORs - 20 lbs.)
(ii) Allowance for G 1098 equipment, per man - 10 lbs.
TOTAL 299 lbs
per man.
z + 11)
z + 15)
z + 19)
r7
U + 19)
z + 24)
z + 29)
z + 94)
*
The additional air lift available from the five DAKOTA 
squadrons operating will be used for RAF administrative 
personnel, stores, food and POL.
10. A more detailed staff study of this operation is being 
prepared by Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, South 
East Asia, Joint Planning Staff, and will be forwarded to 
you later.
FORCES AVAILABLE
11. The necessary additional forces to make 20 Ind Div a 
balanced force will be provided as far as possible by , 
Twelfth Army. A detailed Order of Battle is being issued 
separately.
12. To assist you with the control and evacuation of RAPWI,
a RAPWI control staff will be attached to your headquarters.
15* Engineer Works
(a) The priority of works is shown at Appendix '’B” .
(b) Work on these tasks will be limited to that
essential to maintain the operation.
(c) CRE 20 Ind Div will be required to fulfil the
role of CRE (Works) in addition to that of
CRE, 20 Ind Div.
RAF
1*f. The RAF forces which are planned to accompany your force
will consist of two MOSQUITO squadrons.
ADMINISTRATION
15* Administrative Instructions are being issued separately.
INTERCOMMUNICATION
16. Instructions regarding the use of wireless will be issued 
to you later.
17. You will be allocated three special'wireless sets (SCR 399) 
in addition to those being provided for the Control Commission, 
to establish the following wireless links:-
SAIGON to DALET,
SAIGON to BANGKOK (RAF Set).
Z DAY
18. On present plans Z Day will be 3 Sept A-5-
ACKNOWLEDGE F.C.Scott
B.G.S 
for General, 
Commander in Chief,
ALFSEA 133 ALLIED LAND FORCES, S.E.A.
EFs7sci—  - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----
APPENDIX H.
HEADQUARTERS, S.A.C.S.E.A. 
SIGNAL FORM
HQ. FORM No.16
FROM: ALFSEA TOO 122007 Sep
TO: SAIGON CONTROL COMMISSION
INFO: SACSEA
SECRET 151^ OPS
Subject is maintenance law and order in FIC. Para five C ALFSEA 
OP Directive number twelve dated 28 Aug is being amended in view 
of a memorandum defining adm and jurisdictional questions connected 
with the presence of Allied Forces in FIC. Memorandum still in 
draft stage pending approval by War Office SACSEA and French 
Authorities. Amendment will not be issued until paper finally 
approved.
This message gives policy to be adopted by you in interim period.
Your primary task as defined by SEAC Directive to you dated 30 
Aug is by controlling HQ Japanese Southern Army to enforce the 
surrender and disarmament of all Japanese Forces. You will 
report earliest possible the areas you require to occupy to 
ensure this control and any other area necessary to ensure 
release of RAPWI. This need not necessarily include,all of 
Saigon as indicated in para Five A of ALFSEA Directive Number 
twelve. Such areas defined as key areas. In these areas you 
will exercise full authority over both military and civilian 
but working through French Civil Adm. Outside such areas Adm 
will rest solely with French authorities exercising powers of 
state of seige.
You will not have any responsibility for the maint of law and 
order outside key areas unless called upon by the French authorities.
In such event the request will be referred to HQ SACSEA before 
action taken.
DISTRIBUTION:
DSAC
COS
ACOS
DCOS
D OF I
CPA
RAPWI CC sm
TOO 122007- Sep 
TOR 1223^5 Cep
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APPENDIX I.
TOP SECRET
Q
HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME ALLIED Copy No...
COMMANDER, SOUTH EAST ASIA.
To: Major General D.D.Gracey, C.B., C.B.E., MC.
Copy for Information to:
H-Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Fleet. 
+Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces, S.E.A. 
+Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, S.E.A.
+Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, V.C., 
K.B.E., C.B.yC.M.G.,D.S.O.
COMMAND
1. You are appointed Head of HQ SACSEA Control Commission to HQ.
Japanese Southern Army at SAIGON.
ORGANIZATION
2. The following directive refers to your duties in that capacity
in which you will be responsible directly to me. Your duties as Officer
Commanding Allied Land Forces will be detailed in a further directive 
from Commander-in-Chief ALFSEA.
(a) Your Commission will be organized according to Annex 'A'.
(b) Annex 'B1 gives information on Japanese formation 
Headquarters under command of Southern Army.
(c) Annex ’C 1 is a copy of the instrument and orders 
for surr ender.
TASKS
3- You will assume control of Headquarters Japanese Southern Army
at SAIGON and supervise its fulfillment of the orders of surrender 
imposed.
You will transmit through that Headquarters such orders to 
the Japanese as you receive from me.
p. You will obtain and transmit to me information regarding
Japanese dispositions. With regard to stock of war materials and 
foodstocks within territory formerly controlled by the Japanese 
Southern Army the Japanese Plenipotentiaries at RANGOON have been 
asked to provide the information and take the appropriate action 
shown in JLPC Secretarial Memo No.59 attached as Annex 'D1. You 
v/ill obtain and transmit to me such information as is available 
and instruct the Japanese authorities to take the action indicated.
6. You will exercise such control over Japanese communications
circuits as your resources will permit.
7. You will study the problem of assistance to RAPWI and will
render such practical aid as is possible*
8. You will study and report on the state of land and water
communications and airfield facilities within FRENCH-INDO-CHINA and 
port facilities at SAIGON.
9* You will make every endeavour to open the river and sea
approaches to SAIGON at the earliest possible moment and not later 
than 1 October 19^5i making use of Japanese minesweeping, salvage 
and survey resources. You will also prepare a pilotage service for 
our use.
10. In conjunction with your functions as the Commander of the
Allied Land Forces, you will reduce the size of Headquarters Japanese 
Southern Army to the minimum necessary to enable it to perform its 
functions of control as required by you. Such high-ranking Japanese 
Officers as are not classified as War Criminals or Prisoners of War, 
and are not required by you to exercise control, should be dealt 
with in the same way as other Japanese Officers. A list of Japanese 
classified as War Criminals will be communicated to you in due course, 
as will also the policy to be followed as regards classification of 
Japanese as Prisoners of War or "surrendered enemy personnel” .
11. You will maintain liaison with the local French Government 
and keep me informed as to the general situation.
MOVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE
12. Commander-in-Chief ALFSEA will be responsible for the assembly
of your Commission, and, in conjunction with the Allied Air Commander-in- 
Chief, for the movement of your Commission by air to SAIGON.
13* Commander-in-Chief ALFSEA, in conjunction with the Allied Air
Commander-in-Chief, will be responsible for the maintenance of your 
Commission until such time as air supply can cease; thereafter 
Commander-in-Chief ALFSEA will assume this responsibility.
1^. At Annex *Ef is a summary of information supplied by Japanese
Plenipotentiaries at RANGOON.
(Sd) Louis Mountbatten,
29 August -^5* SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
+Less Annex 'C', * D* and *E*.
Annex 1 A* - Composition of HQ SACSEA Control Commission to the 
Japanese Southern Army HQ at SAIGON.
Annex *B* Japanese Chains of Command.*
Annex *C* - Draft Instruments of Local Surrender and Accompanying Orders.
Annex *D* - JLPC Secretarial Memo No.59*
Annex *E* - PA0(SEA)12300/Q1 Information obtained from Japanese 
Plenipotentiaries.
* Japanese Chains of Command, see Lord Mountbatten*s Report to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff.
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX A TO DIRECTIVE TO MAJOR-GENERAL P.P. GRACEY
COMPOSITION OF HQ.SACSEA CONTROL COMMISSION TO THE JAPANESE SOUTHERN
ARMY HQ. AT SAIGON
(Based on WE SEA/503/1A5-)
Commander (Major General) 1
Chief of Staff (Brigadier) 1
1. CONTROL TEAM
G.S.O. I. 1
G.S.O. II. 2
A.Q.M.G. ■ 1
D * A .A .G • 1
D.A.Q.M.G. 1
5.0. I.R.E. 1
A.D. Survey 1
Cdr. R.N. 2
Lieut. Cdr.R.N. 1
Foreign Office Representative 1
5.0. I Civil Affairs 1
5.0. II Civil Affairs 1
French Liaison Officers 2.
Petty Officer R.N. 1
Clerks R.A.S.C. A
» (Field Svy) R.E. 1
" R.E. 1
Draughtsman (Topog) R.E. 1
Air Section
Air Cdre R.A.F. 1
W/Cdr. (Air Staff) R.A.F. 1
W/Cdr. (Sigs) R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. (Air Staff) R.A.F. 1
Clerks (GD) R.A.F. k
For Duty at Japanese Air H.Q.
W/Cdr. R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. R.A.F. 1
Clerks (GD) R.A.F. ' 1
Two Reconnaissance Teams each:- 
(to be flown in later)
W/Cdr. R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. (Eng) R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. (Arrat) R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. (Sigs) R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. (Eqpt) R.A.F. 1
S/Ldr. (Int) R.A.F. 1
N.C.O. R.A.F. 5
Clerks (GD) R.A.F. 2
2. INTELLIGENCE TEAM
G.S.O. I
Examination Section
G.S.O. II 
G.S.O. Ill
S.O. II R.E.
Cdr.. R.N. (Int)
W/Cdr. (Int) R.A.F.
S/Ldr. (Int) R.A.F.
Clerks G.D., R.A.S.C.
Draughtsman (Topog) R.E.
Counter Intelligence Section
Majors or Captains 
Serjeants
Signals Intelligence Section
G.S.O. II
G.S.O. Ill
3. SIGNAL TEAM
W/Cdr. (Sigs) R.A.F.
Cipher Operators 
Telephone Mech.
Despatch Riders R.Sigs 
R.S.S. Team
Wireless Operator Mechs R.A.F. 
Radio Mechs RN.
Aircraft No.1
Pilots - USAAF 
Navigator USAAF 
Engineer USAAF 
Radio Operators USAAF
Aircraft No.2
Pilot R.A.F.
Navigator R.A.F.
Wireless Operator R.A.F.
Flight Engineer R.A.F.
Operators Wireless and Line R.Sigs 
Cipher Operators R.Sigs 
Signals Officer R.Sigs
*f. MEDICAL TEAM
D.A.D.M.S.
Clerks R.A.M.C.
Medical Orderlies
5- ADMINISTRATIVE
Camp Comd (Q.M.)
C .Q.M.S.
Mess Units and N.C.E.
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
6
1
2
2
1
2
1
8
1
5
8
k
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
3
k
1
1
1
2
1
1
51
760
6. ATTACHED
Two F.S. Secs 
Japanese Interpreters 
Japanese Translators
20
7
2
G.S.O. II 1
Signal Liaison Unit Officer R.A.F. 1
Signal Liaison Unit Clerk (Sjt) 1
R.C.M. Officer R.A.F. 1
E. Group Officer 1
E.I.S. Officer 1
Naval Intelligence Officers 2
Force 136 7
O.S.S. 3
I.S.L.D. k
- C.S.D.I.C.(I) 3
APPENDIX J
20 INDIAN DIVISION
OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE No.1
THE OCCUPATION OF FRENCH INDO CHINA.
POLITICAL
1. The political situation within FRENCH INDO-CHINA is still 
obscure. The latest information will however, be issued by this H Q 
from time to time as it comes in and the general situation should be 
much clearer by the time we arrive at SAIGON.
2. As far as.our information goes at present, it appears that 
there is a revolutionary-cum-nationalist movement called the 'VIET MINH', 
which is causing trouble. This party is reliably reported to be in 
possession of plenty of arms. It is Anti-French and as we are going
to INDO-CHINA to take over the country on behalf of the French, we may 
expect it to be equally Anti-British.
3* It is NOT our job to become involved in politics, in fact
we must NOT do so. Our sole job in this connection is .the maintenance
of LAW and ORDER. But in order to carry out this task it is necessary
for Comds to keep abreast of political happenings.
MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER
4. In our task of maintenance of Law and Order we must be
prepared to deal with
(a) Armed bands of revolutionaries, bandits etc.
(b) Mobs intent on rioting, looting or killing French Civil
Officials, etc.
5- Armed Bands
Those will be treated as enemies and the minimum ruthless 
force necessary, as outlined in Div Comds Conference on 25 Sep, will 
be used to suppress them.
6. Mobs and Civil Disturbance
These will be dealt with on the normal "Internal Security" 
principles. All Comds must be reminded that in dealing with hostile 
mobs, troops must NOT be used as police.
Charging a hostile crowd with pick helves or rifle butts has 
been proved to be useless. Actual physical contact with the crowd must 
be avoided.
Exactly the same principles as have always been used in peace 
for dispersing hostile crowds will be used, i.e. Draw the attention of 
the crowd to the fact that if they do not disperse, the troops will open 
fire. If it is necessary to open fire, then only the minimum force 
necessary will be used trying at first to obtain one's object by shooting 
the ringle aders.
7- Curfew
A curfew is at present in force from 2130 to 0330 hrs.
This applies equally to our own troops except those required to be 
out between those hours on duty.
PROTECTION
8. Unless the situation alters in the meantime the following
measures will be adopted on arrival in the SAIGON area.
(a) All ranks will at all times carry their personal weapons.
Bren guns need not be carried by No.1 unless they are actually
on duty. They will be armed with rifle and bayonet if 
proceeding out of their lines NOT on duty.
(b) Parties leaving unit lines or barrack areas must not be
less than three in number.
This refers equally to officers who must always be accompanied 
by their personal escort who should walk some paces in rear 
to guard against attack from behind.
(c) Units are responsible for posting adequate sentries and
guards on their areas in accordance with the situation.
Special attention must be paid to areas where officers 
live. Until we hear to the contrary we must guard against
the possible terrorist, or fanatical nationalist, endeavouring 
to assassinate officers.
RELATIONS WITH JAP FORCES
9* General Instructions have already been issued in Appendix 'B*
to 20 Ind Div 0 0 No.13» and its Annexares.
10. (a) Jap troops less guards for V Ps, hospitals, sanitary organisations 
and H Qs have already been ordered to concentrate in the 
following areas.
LAI THIEU R J 2269
BIEN HOA R J 337^
BARIA R J 7820
TAHAN R H 8824
BENCAT R J 0899
LOC NINH R D 0882
(b) They have also already been ordered' to collect in dumps all 
weapons and arms except rifles, pistols swords and bayonets 
with 23 rounds per rifle and 6 rounds per pistol.
11.Disarmament
The collection of all heavy weapons and the concentration 
of Jap troops in the above areas will probably have been completed
by the time we arrive in SAIGON.
We will, however, probably be called upon to complete their
disarmament in respect of the weapons given in para 10 (b) above.
12. Principles to be followed in carrying out this disarmament
are given in para 16 of Appendix *B* to 20 Indian Division 0.0. No.13* 
Comds must however, always have troops suitably dispersed in the 
disarmament area to guard against possible treachery and to enforce, 
if necessary, orders issued.
13* Trophies
All individuals are strictly forbidden to possess themselves 
of any Jap arms or equipment as trophies.
The Divisional Commander will, in due course, be authorizing
units to draw a proportion of Jap equipment as trophies.
14. Relieving Jap Guards
On our arrival a number of V.P*s will still be guarded by
Japs and we will have to take over their guards. There will be no
elaborate ceremonial for taking over these guards. The procedure 
will be * ^* ....
APPENDIX K,
THE GREMLIN TASK FORCE 
By
W.G. Cheshire
It is rash to embark on a new venture on a Friday the 13th 
according to many but, fortified by personal experience to the 
contrary, I take the opposite view.
V/hen, therefore, I set off on Friday, September 13th, 1945* for 
Saigon with the Allied Disarmament Mission, I looked forward to 
an interesting and.unusual experience. Unusual it proved to be 
from the outset. When Air Command Headquarters at Kandy detailed 
me for this appointment they were extremely vague about the duties 
and responsibilities involved, and this lack of positive instructions 
v/as further emphasised when the Staff invited me to write my own 
directive.
The Mission, an Inter-Service one, with United Stated and French 
observers attached, had a two-fold task. Firstly it was to be the 
link between the Allied Supreme Command (Admiral Mountbatten) of the 
South East Asia Command and the surrendered Japanese opposite number 
(Field Marshal Terauchi) based in Saigon. Secondly, the Mission was 
to supervise the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops 
stationed in the South of French Indo China (now South Vietnam and 
Cambodia).
For political reasons, which no doubt seemed good at the time, 
French Indo China had been divided into two zones for the task of 
disarming the Japanese troops in that country. We were allotted 
the area south of the 16th parallel, and the Chinese, then still 
under Chiang Kai Shek, the area north of the line. This division 
set an unfortunate precedent which has since been perpetuated in 
the intense struggle between N. and S. Vietnam.
The members of the Mission assembled in Rangoon, in the first 
instance to discuss plans and procedures we were to follow and, 
secondly, to meet the Japanese representatives headed by General 
Numata, Chief of Staff to Terauchi, to make arrangements for our 
reception in Saigon. I was curious to meet the Japanese, who by 
their lightning victories in the early days of the war, had established 
for themselves a reputation as supermen. My only, and unsought,
previous contact with them had been in Moscow in 1943 where, because 
of the Soviet Protocol Office, I found myself embarrassingly alongside 
the Japanese Ambassador’s staff at a social function.
When the tide of war eventually turned against the Japanese, they 
fought on with undiminished determination and displayed a fanatical 
opposition to personal surrender. Very few prisoners had been captured, 
and I had seen none. A face to face encounter at the conference table 
provided a surprise and a disappointment. Their officers were 
unimpressive to look at, short, stocky, dressed in ill-fitting uniforms 
and nearly all wearing spectacles. They did not conform to my idea 
of dashing soldiers who had contrived to overrun so much of Asia and 
who had, in the process, reached the frontiers of India. Their 
personal appearances notwithstanding, the Japanese proved to be 
competent negotiators, and suitable arrangements for our reception 
in Saigon were soon agreed.
The Japanese surrender had caught us by surprise, and when it 
took place the staffs at S.E.A.G. were in the throes of planning 
the recapture of Singapore (Operation Zipper), the agreed next phase 
in our war plans. The end of hostilities thus entailed much re-planning, 
but it was decided to continue with Zipper, treating it as an unopposed 
landing. Additional plans to move contingents to other areas under 
Japanese occupation, including Siam, French Indo China and the 
Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) had to be hurriedly produced. 
These necessary moves were to stretch our air transport and shipping 
resources to the utmost, with resultant delays in the build up of 
our forces to their planned numbers. As will be seen, these delays 
proved to be a source of embarrassment to us in Indo ‘China.
So much for the immediate background. The confused and delicate 
political situation then existing in F.I.C. had its origins in 1941. 
Because Vichy France was susceptible to Axis pressures the Japanese 
were able to secure an unopposed entry into French Indo China. In 
return for this accommodating attitude, the French were allowed to 
exercise local authority in F.I.C. This enforced partnership between 
Vichy and Tokyo continued, apparently undisturbed, until the end of 
1944 or early 1945? at which stage the French in F.I.C. began to 
appreciate that they had, willingly or unwillingly, backed the v/rong 
horse. Their attitude towards the Japanese then hardened, with the
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result that they found themselves unseated and replaced by Vietnamese.
At the time of their surrender the Japanese were still in overall 
control of F.I.C. and retained this control until we could take over.
A- struggle immediately broke out over local control between the 
entrenched Vietnamese and the resurgent French.
As our aircraft took off from Rangoon we speculated about the 
reaction of the Japanese forces to our arrival in Saigon, where for 
some time to come they would outnumber us by at least five to one.
It was true that General Nuraata and his staff had behaved correctly, 
and without rancour, during our preliminary discussions in Rangoon, 
but extreme Japanese aversion to surrender had been well publicised 
during the war, and it seemed at least possible that a proportion 
of the officers might demonstrate their opposition in forcible 
fashion. In the event Japanese discipline and behaviour in F.I.C. 
gave us no cause for anxiety and, as will become clear, we had cause 
to be duly grateful for this.
After an uneventful flight, with only a brief refuelling stop at 
Bangkok, we reached Saigon late in the afternoon. The town lies a 
few miles up river from the sea in rather dull countryside. It was 
attractively laid out, with broad tree-lined roads and many large 
houses in well-kept gardens. There was also something indefinably 
French about the whole place. Saigon had not been much ravaged by 
war and, compared with Rangoon, it presented a superficial air of 
prosperity.
At the airfield we were welcomed, among others, by Japanese staff 
officers ready to carry out our orders. Waiting also was an assembly 
of staff cars ordered for our use. It was of interest that not one 
of these cars was of Japanese make, all had been requisitioned in 
the early days of the occupation either locally, or from as far afield 
as Singapore. At a later date various original owners appeared at our
H.Q. to claim their cars.
The car allotted to me v/as driven by a Japanese soldier. He was 
a thrusting driver and firmly believed that his passenger's seniority 
entitled him to priority at cross-roads. This was a perilous assumption 
because there were several other Japanese drivers with similar ideas 
about the right of way and it needed many alarming near-misses to 
convince my driver that seniority, which could not be determined in 
time, conferred no precedence.
The members of the Mission were not the first Allied representatives 
to reach Saigon following the Japanese surrender, as we had been 
preceded there by RAF Transport Command crews, some Army personnel, 
and a few French representatives. Nevertheless, some people turned 
out to greet us, among them some friendly locals and a few rather 
subdued French. I was surprised to see one of the banners of welcome 
inscribed in Russian. At that stage I had scarcely heard of Ho Chi Minh, 
and certainly knew nothing of his political affiliations, but his 
influence and its orientation soon became apparent.
The Senior Officers of the Mission were housed in a splendid 
mansion, formerly the residence of the Governor of the Province of 
Cochin China. In the turmoil following the surrender this building 
had changed hands more than once and, in the process, some of its 
furniture had disappeared with the departing occupants. To make up 
for the deficiencies so created some of us had to make do with camp 
beds and their utilitarian appearance made a sharp and amusing contrast 
with the remaining interior opulence of the residence.
The building was rat infested, and these unwelcome inhabitants made 
their sorites noisily at night. When the civil war flared up in 
earnest and marauders were about, it was difficult to determine in 
the dark whether the intruders were rebels or rats.
On arrival we had been advised by a well-meaning Frenchman to 
engage a Chinese contractor to run our Mess. An applicant for the 
post turned up and was soon installed. The food he produced was 
superb and would not have been scorned by Lucullus himself. We 
congratulated ourselves on our good fortune, but disillusionment set 
in with the first week’s bill which amounted to the equivalent of Z5 
a day each. This was altogether too much; we were happy to eat in 
the style of Lucullus but were in no position to pay like Croesus.
The Chinaman was packed off and succeeded by a fellow-countryman 
whose ideas on catering standards were more "attuned to our means.
One of the irritating features of life in Saigon proved to be 
the recurrent failures of electricity supply. The municipal power 
station had received little attention in the years of the war, and 
was sadly in need of repairs. It was rumoured, perhaps unkindly, that 
the boilers were in such a dangerous state that only the Japs would 
unflinchingly stay and work in their vicinity. Certainly when the
Japanese eventually took over the power-house the supply of electricity 
became much more reliable. Supply of fuel for the power station 
provided a further problem. Coal stocks had been allowed to run down 
to nothing, the nearest source of supply was Hanoi, then in the 
uncooperative hands of the Chinese. The latter had consistently 
refused to allow any traffic between the two zones. In this instance, 
however, the authorities in our zone held a trump card. The rice 
producing areas were almost without exception on our side of the 
dividing line, and so long as all movement between the zones was 
obstructed, we would continue to accumulate a rice surplus while the 
Northern Zone would continue to starve. The force of this argument 
was apparent even to the Chinese, so with some show of reluctance 
they agreed to barter coal for rice.
Local currency, which had been indiscriminately printed and 
broadcast by the Japs, created some controversy between the French 
and ourselves. The flood of unsupported paper money circulating in 
the country was a source of embarrassment to the French, and in order 
to bolster up their tottering currency, they declared that notes of 
certain denominations were valueless with immediate effect and with 
no compensation. This sudden announcement caused us considerable 
concern because numbers of such notes were legitimately held by our 
troops who would now be out of pocket. This was a poor return for 
all the benefits the French were deriving from the presence of our 
troops. After protracted arguments the French agreed to redeem all 
cancelled notes in the personal possession of Indian and British troops. 
As could have been foreseen this concession opened the floodgates to 
anybody with friends or acquaintances among Allied forces, once more 
illustrating the difficulty of. enforcing ill-considered and hastily 
imposed currency restrictions.
All these were minor difficulties when compared with the violent 
differences developing between the French and their former colonial 
subjects. It was proving more and more difficult to prevent an 
armed conflict. Eventually the Vietnamese appreciated that the French 
would in due course assume full and unfettered control and, in 
retaliation, the former proceeded to mass armed forces on the approaches 
to Saigon.
For the reasons already explained the build-up of our forces 
had been delayed, and it was questionable whether in their present 
reduced numbers they were in a position successfully to resist the 
advancing rebels. One possible source of reinforcement existed in
F.I.C. itself. The Japanese still had a number of fully armed divisions 
awaiting repatriation. After some understandable hesitation it was 
decided to summon them to assist in the maintenance of law and order.
The situation thus became somewhat Gilbertian since we were now seeking 
armed assistance from the very forces we had planned to disarm. The 
Japanese accepted these unexpected orders without demur and were 
immediately allocated a number of defensive tasks, including the 
protection of the vital road connecting Saigon with its main airfield. 
The Japs performed'their duties with competence and, when necessary, 
fought with courage and determination. Had they been Indian or British 
troops they would, without doubt, have earned decorations.
The R.A.F. in F.I.C. were also in difficulties but, unlike the 
Army, they were short not of men but of fuel. The squadrons had, in 
reserve, only one hour's fuel or, in other words, they could complete 
only one sortie each. Here again the Japanese were in a position to 
provide very useful help. Most of their aircraft had been grounded 
since the surrender, but many were still serviceable and could be 
flown. Backing these aircraft was a useful reserve of fuel which, for 
technical reasons, could not be used in our own aircraft. After 
some discussion the decision was taken to make limited use of the 
Japanese Air Force. The limitation was imposed for political reasons, 
based on the curious idea that bullets fired from aircraft were 
politically more reprehensible than bullets, equally lethal, fired 
from the ground.
The aircraft, flown and kept serviceable by their own crews, were 
to be employed on transport and unarmed reconnaissance duties only.
The decision to use Japanese aircraft once taken, I sent for their 
Commander to tell him what I had in mind. He made no difficulties 
and seemed pleased to take on the commitment because, possibly, his 
crews had found their prolonged and enforced idleness irksome. The 
Japanese aircraft suitable for the tasks allotted to them ranged in 
types from a creditable Jap copy of a Dakota to a small passenger 
carrier capable of lifting four or five passengers. Some bomber 
types were also available, useless for passenger work but valuable 
for lifting cargo.
The procedure adopted to control the operations of the Japanese 
aircraft was straightforward. Their Commander was to notify my staff
daily of the number of his aircraft available, and we would then
allocate individual tasks to them. To facilitate the transmission 
of information and orders, I installed a Squadron Leader and an 
interpreter in a hut alongside the Japanese commander. This simple 
and very economical arrangement worked extremely well, confirming 
previous experience that simple organisations are also frequently 
the best.
We were interested to discover, among other things, that the 
Japs had eminently sensible ideas about the importance of adequate 
servicing of their aircraft. Influenced by the stories of numerous 
suicide (kamikaze)-attacks carried out by the Japanese towards the 
end of the war, I came to believe that they would fly aircraft in 
any state, provided they could get them into the air. However, it 
soon became apparent that they were grounding individual aircraft 
for much the same reasons as we would. Taking into account the long
standing shortage of spare parts, brought about by the virtual
impossibility of moving anything between Japan and the occupied 
territories, the state of serviceability achieved by them was creditable 
and bore comparison with our own results. Experience in operations 
showed that oncetheir aircraft were offered a task, there were few 
technical failures.
The next stage in the creation of this special force was to 
obliterate Japanese markings on the aircraft and replace them by 
R.A.F. roundels. Finally I decided to give this force a special 
designation, to distinguish them from the R.A.F. and the French Air 
Force, both of which were also operating in this area. Inspired by 
the U.S. example set in the Pacific, I selected the term TASK FORCE 
with the prefix GREMLIN because of its popularity in the R.A.F. at the 
time. Thus the Gremlin Task Force, or G.T.F., was born.
Mention of the United States recalls to mind the official attitude 
to the course of events in F.I.C. It v/as made clear that they did 
not approve of much that was happening v/hich, to them, smacked of 
colonialism. The U.S. observer with the Mission, a much decorated 
and very gallant Colonel, tended to keep aloof and elected to live 
in a house on the outskirts of the town, far removed from the Mission. 
When armed conflict broke out, the isolation of his house became a 
source of danger, but he stoutly maintained that his nationality
would protect him* In the event he was proved wrong as he was 
ambushed by rebels near his house, shot dead and his body spirited 
away. In spite of the most diligent search and appeals to the rebels, 
his body had not been found by the time I left Saigon some three 
months later. He was the first, and, to my knowledge, the only U.S. 
casualty in that phase of the war in what is now called Vietnam.
Once the G.T.F. was launched it quickly got into its stride 
with the main effort directed to transport operations. The R.A.F. 
Command’s own air transport resources had been stretched to the utmost, 
and the contribution made in this field by the GTF was most welcome.
They were employed principally in FIC, with occasional flights 
into neighbouring Siam, carrying passengers, food and general stores; 
in other words, the normal routine of any air transport organisation.
Apart from the routine tasks described above, the GTF were 
occasionally assigned to special duties, and some of these stand out 
in memory. The first arose soon after the GTF had been launched.
We received an appeal from the French on behalf of their compatriots, 
marooned and starving on the Chinese side of the 16th parallel. The 
Chinese, still unfriendly, had refused to help. We rapidly assembled 
a force of assorted aircraft, loaded them with rations, and with two 
RAF officers to supervise, despatched the small armada to the North.
Radio communications were poor throughout the area, and we soon lost 
touch with the aircraft on their relief mission. There was absolute 
silence for two days, then on the third a garbled message arrived 
and, after much difficulty, was decyphered to mean that, pending 
settlement in full of the refuelling bill, the Chinese had impounded 
all the aircraft. Protracted negotiations conduced with great 
difficulty via an indifferent radio, eventually secured the release 
of all but one aircraft. This one had developed a technical fault 
and had to be abandoned, the Chinese pursuing a policy of near Soviet 
pattern of non-cooperation, had refused entry to another aircraft 
flying in with the necessary spare parts.
Because of the difficulty of keeping up reliable radio communications 
it was frequently quicker to send an aircraft from Saigon to Singapore, 
a distance of some 600 miles, and return with the answer rather than 
trust the vagaries of the other. On one occasion a Brigadier on 
the staff of the Mission needed to get a message to Singapore, and 
since no RAF aircraft was available I decided to send him in a Dakota 
of the GTF. The Brigadier had an uneventful flight to Singapore, where
the approaching aircraft was assumed to be a Dakota of the RAF.
However, when the crew emerged they were recognised to be Japanese 
and narrowly escaped internment in the nearest POW camp. They were 
rescued from this fate by their passenger, who thus made sure that 
there would be an aircraft to fly him back to Saigon.
Another memorable GTF incident, this time a personal one, was 
an early trial flight in one of their aircraft. Among the various 
Japanese types we had found at Saigon was one designated Dinah, a 
high performance, long range reconnaissance aircraft of wooden 
construction, roughly corresponding to our own Mosquito. Many of 
us had been interested in its performance and I ordered one to be 
produced for inspection. A Dinah duly appeared and through an 
interpreter I told the pilot what he was to do. We did a normal 
take-off and then climbed rapidly to 20,000’ as ordered. At this 
stage the pilot started a very steep dive for the ground, a manoevre 
not in the programme and therefore unwelcome. As we hurtled downwards 
the thought flashed through my mind that I had at last met a true 
Kamikaze pilot who was about to demonstrate this peculiarly Japanese 
technique to its fatal conclusion. Various other thoughts succeeded 
one another with great speed, the predominant one being that I was 
powerless to avert the crash on which the pilot seemed to be set.
There were no controls in the rear cockpit where X was uncomfortably 
ensconced, the pilot and I had no common language, and I had no 
parachute to bale out in case of need. At this stage the pilot gradually 
levelled out, and then completed the remainder of the schedule without 
further flourishes. As soon as we landed I indignantly sought an 
explanation through the interpreter. It transpired that the. pilot, 
who was very young and proud of his aircraft, had been anxious to 
impress me with its diving prowess. In this he had succeeded admirably, 
and doing so had established his claim to the nickname Gremlin, which 
is defined in the dictionary as "a mischievous spirit".
Air operations intensified and I moved into a house near the 
airfield. This house, like the airfield itself, was in a disturbed 
area and the Japanese were told to provide a guard who were also to 
act as servants. The soldiers, as could have been expected, were 
strangers to the Western way of life nor they did understand any English. 
In spite of this double handicap they soon learnt what was expected 
of them, and astonished me daily by their photographic memories and 
uncannily quick anticipation. As sentries they were equally effective 
and no troublemaker ever made his way into the house.
While all this was going on the French Air Force were attempting 
to achieve the impossible with the few aircraft at their disposal, which 
in any event were museum pieces. To improve their operational capability 
they tried to borrow aircraft from the RAF, but for various good 
reasons none could be spared. As an alternative I offered them some 
Japanese fighters of good performance which the Japanese were not 
allowed to fly. After some hesitation the offer was accepted, but not 
very graciously. The fighters were moved to another and less congested 
airfield where French pilots could learn to fly them. They were then 
not under my direct control and so passed out of my ken, although a 
rumour did reach me that this particular experiment had not proved a 
great success.
When French reinforcements, both ground and air, began to reach
F.I.C. there followed a reduction in calls on the GTF. This was just 
as well because apart from the perennial shortage of spare parts, many 
of the aircraft were reaching the end of their useful lives. There was, 
however, one more special task for them to perform; one of the RAF 
squadrons at Saigon airfield was due to move to Bangkok, to make way 
for the incoming French squadron. There was insufficient RAF airlift 
available to transfer all the squadron ground personnel and ground 
equipment, so the GTF were called in to take part in the move of 68J4. 
Squadron.
This was, virtually, the end of the GTF. In the short period of 
their existence they had successfully completed over 2,000 sorties.
By the standard of later massive operations, such as the Berlin airlift, 
this was small beer, but it had usefully filled an unavoidable gap in 
our logistic organisation, and did so at little cost to the British 
Treasury. The RAF administrative tail supporting this effort consisted 
of two officers only; certainly one of the least costly air operations 
undertaken since 1939*
At about this time Air Command HQ appreciated that the GTF had 
been carrying non-Japanese passengers, this constituted a departure 
from regulations, and I earned a reproof for displaying too much 
initiative in not seeking proper authority. Since, however, the task 
of the GTF was completed, and what they had done could be considered 
a success, I heard no more.
My connection with the GTF ended on a note of semi-comedy. There 
was a rule in the Command that Japanese officers were to surrender 
their swords to mark their defeated status. Admiral Mountbatten himself 
received Terauchi*s sword at a special ceremony in Saigon. When the 
end of my stay in FIC was in sight, I told the Japanese airfield 
commander that I would take his sword. He replied courteously that 
this would be an honour and sought permission to make a speech during 
the ceremony. I agreed, providing the speech contained no reference 
to Bushido, the Japanese war spirit. There was a set form of ceremony 
for these occasions, and on the appointed day the Colonel appeared, more 
smartly turned out than usual and accompanied by an interpreter. As 
was the custom he saluted the Union Jack, and then embarked on his 
speech. I do not understand Japanese and paid little attention to what 
he was saying until, about halfway through, I heard him utter the words 
"Air Commodore". That alerted me because I knew the Japanese for Air 
Commodore was quite different and did not sound remotely like it. 
Concentrating my scattered thoughts, it dawned on me that the Colonel 
was speaking execrable English, extremely difficult to understand.
Through inattention I had missed most of his speech but I was given 
a written version at the end of the ceremony, so honour was satisfied.
The Second World War and the troubled era that followed gave 
birth to many so called "sideshows", the GTF was one of them and 
although not as unusual as some, I believe its existence and achievements 
to be worth recording. My sole momento of it, apart from the Colonel’s 
sword, is a small notice board displaying the RAF roundel and the words 
GREMLIN TASK FORCE. This used to hang outside the hut occupied by my 
Squadron Leader next door to the Japanese airfield commander and it 
now decorates my study wall.
When I finally took off from Saigon for Rangoon I had time to 
reflect that ray expectations of September 13th had been fully justified.
I had found the behaviour and discipline of the Jap Forces in defeat 
an interesting study as also the unrelenting struggle between France and 
certain parts of Vietnam. I had not expected to command a sizeable 
component of the Japanese Air Force on operations, nor to fly several 
of their aircraft, and most certainly not to be guarded and protected 
by the very force we had set out to disarm.'
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